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1 Introduction 
 It was in 1660s England, according to the received view, in the meetings of the 
Royal Society of London, that science acquired the form of empirical enquiry that 
we recognize as our own: an open, collaborative experimental practice, mediated 
by specially-designed instruments, supported by civil, critical discourse, stressing 
accuracy and replicability. Guided by the philosophy of Francis Bacon, by 
Protestant ideas of this-worldly benevolence, by gentlemanly codes of decorum and 
integrity and by a dominant interest in mechanics and a conviction in the mechani-
cal structure of the universe, the members of the Royal Society created a novel 
experimental practice that superseded all former modes of empirical inquiry – from 
Aristotelian observations to alchemical experimentation. 
 It is enlightening to consider that this view is imparted by both the gentlemen of 
the Royal Society, in their official self-presentations, and by much of the most 
iconoclastic historiography of our time. Lines like “Boyle’s example … was mobi-
lized to give legitimacy to the experimental philosophy,” 1 are strongly reminiscent 
of Bishop Sprat’s 1667 eulogy of the “Lord Bacon in whose Books there are every-
where scattered the best arguments for the defence of experimental philosophy; and 
the best directions, needful to promote it.” 2 One reason for the surprising agreement 
is that this picture of openness, benevolence and civility does capture some of the 
moral-epistemological mores of the empiricism of the New Science, but this very 
agreement of historians and apologists also harbors a paradox. In interpreting the 
emergence and  modi operandi of early modern empiricism through the writings of 
its public champions, we are attending to the rhetoric which supported the new 
empirical practices – practices that aspired and promised to replace rhetoric. 
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 This paradox in the way historians of science approached empiricism is com-
pounded by a similar paradox in the way it is studied by historians of philosophy. 
Here, it was a  theory that received the title ‘empiricism’ – a particular speculative 
account of the way human individuals acquire their knowledge of the surrounding 
world. It is yet more obvious in the modern interpretation of this theory, which is 
completely disinterested in empirical practices. This interpretation of empiricism 
put at its center an ahistorical, disembodied, isolated ‘mind’ – quite the opposite of 
what the savants of the New Science were experiencing or advocating. 
 Recent scholarship has done much to undo these paradoxes. We know much 
more about the array of practices of producing and marshalling experience that the 
New Science benefited from and was instrumental in developing: sophisticated 
experimentation, instrument-supported observation, astronomical navigation, sur-
veying and mapping, collection and taxonomy. We are also much more familiar 
with the cultural context in which these were developed: commerce and seafaring, 
court and city, counter-reformation and education reform. Yet we are still far from 
a comprehensive view of the arena in which practitioners of various empirical tradi-
tions were learning from and competing with those of other traditions for epistemo-
logical primacy; in which new empirical practices were being formed as reliable 
ways of creating and validating knowledge; and in which philosophical reflection 
and public argumentation sought to legitimize and institutionalize new and 
reformed empirical habits. 
 This volume is a contribution towards filling this gap. It explores one aspect 
of the development of empiricism which the traditional use of the term obscured: 
the keen interest in the body as both an  object of research and an  instrument 
of experience. 
 The need to re-embody our understanding of empiricism is enforced, to begin 
with, by empiricism’s patent indebtedness to the sciences of the body – medicine, 
physiology, natural history and chemistry. It is in those traditions that early modern 
savants could find paradigms of empirical inquiry which did not suffer from the 
low esteem accorded to artisanship. Indeed, a quick survey of the active members 
of the Royal Society reveals that many of them were physicians, and a significant 
number of those – disciples of William Harvey. Through Harvey’s tutelage, these 
physicians-virtuosi were inheritors of the empirical anatomy practices developed in 
Padua during the sixteenth century. Furthermore, the primary research interests of 
the early Royal Society were concentrated on the body, human and animal, and its 
functions – much more so than on the mechanics the Society is usually associated 
with. Similarly, the Académie des Sciences devoted a significant portion of its 
 Mémoires to questions concerning life, reproduction and monsters, consulting 
empirical botanists, apothecaries and chemists. Directly contradicting its self-
imposed mandate to investigate Nature in ‘proper’ mechanistic fashion, the 
Académie kept closer to experience than to the Cartesian standards of well-founded 
knowledge. ‘Empiricks’, throughout Europe and through the seventeenth century, 
were primary agents of ‘empiricism’. 
 As reflections on experience and the acquisition of knowledge by embodied, 
affective agents, meditations on ‘first philosophy’ and essays on ‘human understanding’ 
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are closer to treatises on the passions, hysteria, the curing of fevers or vertigo, as 
well as to tracts on the construction and use of instruments, than they are to cri-
tiques of pure reason or proofs of the external world. Empiricism meant a new 
attention to the senses and their function from a physiological, practical and epis-
temological point of view, and all those were never far apart. The bold knowledge 
claims of new techniques and technologies of observation required justification, 
which was offered by the analysis of natural and instrumental perception and the 
relation between them. These optical, physiological and practical inquiries com-
prise much of the writings of early modern thinkers who are commonly read as 
pure, contemplative ‘philosophers’. Conversely, significant reflections on the epis-
temological ramifications of these inquiries are to be found in the most ‘scientific’ 
of early modern texts. 
 The papers in this volume are divided according to three perspectives on empiri-
cism and the body. Part I comprises studies of the body as an object of inquiry. 
In these, empirical explorations of the human body are presented as exemplars and 
harbingers of early modern empirical practices. The opening paper by Harold Cook 
lays a claim for the power of ‘matters of fact’ in the advent of medical and scientific 
empiricism of the seventeenth century. This was not a change of ‘method’, he 
argues, advanced by the learned, but a takeover of the medical marketplace by 
practicing empiricks. Cynthia Klestinec looks at this change from the point of view 
of the medical student in Padua – the leading medical school at the turn of the cen-
tury. New forms of experience, she shows, required and implied new forms of 
manual skills, from dissection to preparation, which called into question old divi-
sions between public and private, learned and practical. Both the Paduan empirical 
medical tradition and the need to re-define the relations and hierarchy of the senses 
emerge in Alan Salter’s contribution. Salter reveals the experiential empiricism 
embedded in William Harvey’s work as deeply entrenched in contemporary repre-
sentations of first-person experience, notably the ‘discourse of the senses’ of 
English poetry and drama of the period. Victor Boantza looks at the seventeenth 
century Parisian chemist and academician Samuel Duclos in order to stress how 
natural history in its chemical manifestations also affects our picture of empiricism: 
it emerged less metaphysics-free than its ideologists hoped. The role of ‘chymistry’ 
at the heart of early modern thought, whether discussions of substance, body or the 
program of natural philosophy itself, is also stressed in the following contribution. 
Peter Anstey presents Locke, the penultimate empiricist philosopher, as a chymical 
physician; an active pursuer of Helmontian chimiatric medicine. 
 But the body was not just an  object of particular ‘sciences’ or ‘practices’, the 
examination of which colors our construct of ‘empiricism’ in new shades. It was 
also, as discussed in Part II, the primary  instrument of empirical knowledge. It was 
not a transparent instrument at all: both the physiological function of the senses and 
their epistemological status as means of gathering knowledge presented an ongoing 
practical and intellectual challenge, with some surprisingly conclusions. As Ofer 
Gal and Raz Chen-Morris show, the advent of Kepler’s optics and Galileo’s tele-
scope came at the expense of the trust in the human eye. The naturalization of 
vision implied the poverty of the human sense organ and the estrangement of the 
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human mind from its objects. Bacon’s experimental investigations on the appetites 
of matter, as discussed by Guido Giglioni, did not at all serve the type of empiricism 
commonly associated with his philosophy. They implied inescapable subjectivity 
and necessitated ethical and political consideration of the mechanisms mediating 
knowledge and appetite in human societies. Mediation through memory presented 
another challenge to the empiricist project, which had to be met both practically 
and intellectually. The solution could be provided by the body, as Justin Smith 
shows in his study of John Bulwer’s language of signs and gestures, but this kind 
of language, despite its apparent immediacy and universality, raised again the 
tension between nature and artifice associated with instruments of observation. 
Memory was a challenge and a locus of debate for any régime of sensation and 
self-possession, as Richard Yeo’s paper demonstrates. It demanded the arrangement 
and condensation of material that Boyle’s insistence on matter of facts could not 
allow but other advocates of Baconian natural history, like Beale and Hartlib, found 
necessary. The anxiety and wonder concerning knowledge by and of the body did 
not subside with the triumph of the New Science and its empiricism. Snait Gissis 
analyzes the interconnections between ‘sensation’, ‘subjectivity’ and biological 
science into the end of the Enlightenment with her discussion of Lamarck on senti-
ment. As her paper demonstrates, the empiricist approach to the senses continued 
to cast them as a source of unreliable, highly personal data demanding uncertain 
deciphering, rather than as neutral particulars to be accumulated inductively. 
 The embodied approach to the interpretation of empiricism does not turn 
attention away from the mind. As the contributions in Part III show, empiricist 
thought extended bodily consideration to all aspects of cognition and mental 
life. John Sutton attends precisely to embodied cognition in his discussion of 
inattention, ‘mind-wandering’ and restlessness in the medico-philosophical 
context of British Empiricism. Traditional history of philosophy but also, and even 
more emphatically its contemporary descendents, will seize on a ‘concept’ or 
‘problem’ – be it personal identity, causality or free will – and extract it from its 
embedded context. Sutton, in contrast, returns to a richer ‘local history’, a history 
of mind-wandering, medicine, and moral physiology, of habit and body and 
brain. Lisa Shapiro’s paper ventures farther into the heart of philosophical 
empiricism with a new analysis of Locke’s account of our simple ideas. Essential 
to Locke’s thought, she shows, and thus to that of sensationist thinkers such as 
Berkeley and Condillac, were his reflections on pleasure and pain, from which 
emerged an instrumental and immersed model of experience. Tobias Cheung 
extends this theme into Enlightenment psycho-physiological discourse with a 
reconstruction of Charles Bonnet’s notion of ‘embodied stimuli’ in the context of 
organic models. In Cheung’s analysis, Bonnet continues and transcends the 
work of French empiricists like Condillac by providing models of organic 
complexity which integrate physical, mental and sensory dimensions of experi-
ence. Anik Waldow challenges the primarily epistemological understanding of 
this ‘stance’ we have inherited from Kant, by pointing to the Galenic roots of 
empiricism. Empiricism, she claims, cannot be understood apart from its 
ever-present relation to skepticism. The volume concludes with Charles Wolfe’s 
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reflections on medically motivated, indeed ‘vitalistic’ bases for empiricism in the 
early modern period as an embodied yet curiously non-experimental practice. 
There are many faces to empiricism, his contribution shows, and the mechanistic, 
gentlemanly, detached version is not the most important of them. 
 Some of the papers collected in this volume were discussed in a workshop on 
Embodied Empiricism conducted in February 2009 at the University of Sydney. The 
workshop, as well as the project on Early Modern Empiricism of which it was a part, 
has been supported by Australian Research Council grant DP0772706:  The Origins 
of Scientific Experimental Practices . We would like to warmly thank Mariela 
Brozky, Antonio Clericuzio, Stephen Gaukroger, Snait Gissis, Dominic Murphy, 
Jessica Ratcliff, Justin Steinberg, Yi Zheng and especially Jennifer Tomlinson for 
their indispensable part in the success of the workshop and the collection. 
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Part I
The Body as Object

9 Abstract  For millennia, learned physicians tried to develop theoretical principles 
that would guide their therapeutic actions. The most enduring foundations were 
built on the discourse of the four elements, four qualities, four humours, six 
non-naturals, and the ways these combined to yield individual temperaments and 
constitutions. As these fundamentals came under attack in the seventeenth century, 
empiricism and medical specifics once again seemed the best method of finding 
certainty in therapy. This was no simple change in “method” proposed by the 
learned, however, since the developing medical marketplace gave empirics many 
new opportunities for promoting their views and forcing the rest to take account of 
them. Does this transition in medicine also apply to “science” more generally, giving 
prominence to those “matters of fact” that have gained our attention in recent years? 
The case is made for answering “yes.” 
 It has long been my view that the real threat to the old natural philosophy from the 
new lay not in particular concepts such as corpuscularianism or atomism, much less 
heliocentrism, nor in something contemporaries called the experimental method, 
but in new ways of actively investigating natural phenomena that arose from a 
generalized empiricism. 1 Since the late 1970s, many have argued that science is 
best interpreted as a set of activities and practices rather than concepts; 2 a number 
of studies have gone on to point to the importance of the mode of inquiry formed 
natural history and “matters of fact” rather than simple empiricism per se. 3 I would 
now go further and observe that given its close engagement with things in them-
selves, science is something distinct from philosophy, although to be sure they 
 Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory: 
Medicine and Science in the Seventeenth 
Century 
 Harold  J.  Cook 
 
1
 Cook  1986,  1987 , 1989a, 1990b; Lloyd  1979 . 
 
2
 Latour and Woolgar  1986 , first publ. 1979; Figlio  1978 ; Lloyd  1979 ; MacDonald  1981 ; Shapin 
and Schaffer  1986 . 
 
3
 Levine  1983 ; Shapiro  1983 ; Eamon  1983 ; Daston  1988 ; Dear  1990 ; Cook  1991,  1993 ; Findlen 
 1994 . 
H.J. Cook
Department of History, Brown University
C.T. Wolfe and O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied 
Empiricism in Early Modern Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25,
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
10 H.J. Cook
share some historical roots. 4 One of the most interesting historical problems, then, 
is how some kinds of knowledge about ways of interacting with the constituents of 
the world were elevated to the status of learned knowledge, when that was still so 
often associated with the discourse of universities, which had indeed grown from 
philosophy and theology. 5 For that kind of explanation, attempts to view develop-
ments from the culture of economy and society rather than philosophy, via subjects 
that required both engagement with natural beings and articulate generalizations 
about that experience, are illuminating. 6 Seen from the point of view of those 
engaged in medicine, for example, empiricism was a fundamental interactive 
means for investigating the world and, consequently, a chief cause of change during 
the so-called scientific revolution. 
 A previous generation placed medicine on the periphery of scientific knowledge, 
as a field more affected by fundamental conceptual changes than constitutive of 
them, and so more or less a subordinate part of the “experimental” sciences, which 
were in turn held to be subordinate to the “mathematical” ones. 7 A. Rupert Hall 
spoke for this generation when he noted the great power of the work of the historical 
philosopher of science, Alexandre Koyré, who searched for “the special importance 
of those currents which led to Newton, and (which continued) by ways that were 
relatively direct to Maxwell, Planck, and Einstein.” 8 Hall himself had therefore 
written that “perhaps it is not stretching imagination to see practical medicine playing 
somewhat the same rôle in the development of biology as that of technology in the 
evolution of the physical sciences.” But since “the liberty of the scientist to direct 
his theories in accordance with the scientific evidence alone” is fundamental, “the 
prime focus of attention” on “Man” that medicine brought to science in the end 
“tended to hamper [the] later development” of biology. 9 A similar line was taken by 
Charles C. Gillispie, who argued that “the sciences of life, therefore, find their place 
in the scheme of the scientific revolution. The impression is hard to avoid, however, 
that it was a subordinate place. Despite the very evident appeal of Vesalius’ sub-
ject, or perhaps because of it, his achievements were of a lower intellectual order 
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than those of Copernicus or Galileo. His were not the ideas which changed man’s 
conception of the world, or even of himself.” 10 
 Hall himself nevertheless noted that the number of physicians among the early 
members of the Royal Society was high (as did Michael Hunter shortly thereafter), 
while a pre-Koyré line of argument about the importance of medicine and chemis-
try to the development of the new science was further developed by Walter Pagel, 
Alan Debus, Owen Hannaway, Jerome J. Bylebyl, Robert G. Frank, Jr., Charles 
Webster, and many others. 11 Physicians, medical chemists, apothecaries, surgeons, 
and even empirics were not only a significant presence among groups engaged in 
the new philosophy, most were well-educated and left a good deal of documenta-
tion behind, so that those among them who opposed the new views, as well as those 
who were in favor of them, stated their reasons clearly. It is therefore possible to 
identify the issues of the day that concerned contemporaries, thus avoiding the 
dangers of anachronism. That is, seen through the eyes of medical practitioners and 
authors, it is possible to gain a view of the prospect and problems of the new 
science as a self-defined group saw them, rather than relying on views as selected 
by historians to represent the members of the “scientific” community. 
 The economic and social processes that lay behind the scientific revolution can 
be seen clearly if one examines them through the lens of the medical community. 
As is well known, until at least the first half of the seventeenth century, university-
educated physicians of necessity were learned, being grounded in philosophy, while 
most of the many other kinds of medical practitioners were not. The surgeons, 
apothecaries, chemists, and “empirics” presented a major threat to the social status, 
political influence, and economic flourishing of the physicians. 12 So, too, they 
undermined the intellectual superiority of learned physicians. The non-physicians 
often aggressively argued that they were far better and more knowing medical 
practitioners because, unlike those usually legally-superior learned men, they had 
learned by doing. In other words, what they had gathered from practical experience 
was, they claimed, a far better kind of knowledge than the wisdom inculcated in 
the physicians by long years spent in reading and debating texts. In arguing this, 
they were clearly saying that the measure of value in medical knowledge lay in 
successfully treating patients. 13 One can find this sentiment expressed in many 
sixteenth-century medical pamphlets authored by those opposed to the establish-
ment, from mountebanks and empirics like Leonard Fioravanti, to medical chymists 
like Paracelsus and his followers, to surgeons like the famous Ambroise Paré. 14 
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Even anatomical investigators like Vesalius – whose  De fabrica was, with 
Copernicus’s  De revolutionibus , long held to characterize the beginnings of the 
scientific revolution – held up experience with the material things of the world as 
the touchstone of knowledge, mocking the learning of physicians who instead 
wished to grasp the world according to doctrines found in books. 15 The medical 
businessmen called apothecaries took a similar point of view. They not only dealt 
with medicinal imports from the New World and Asia, but were among the first to 
collect exotica and naturalia in cabinets of curiosity that were open to the 
public. 16 
 By the mid-sixteenth century, the felt need of physicians to be in control of the 
details of nature that were commanded by their rivals was so powerful that the 
eminent Parisian physician, Jean Fernel, told his peers that empirical knowledge of 
this kind had to be mastered just as much as learned theory.
 The knowledge, collection, choice, culling, preservation, preparation, correction, and task 
of mixing of simples all pertain to apothecaries; yet it is especially necessary for the physi-
cian to be expert and skilled in these things. If, in fact, he wishes to maintain and safeguard 
his dignity and authority among the servants of the art, he should teach them these 
things. 17 
 In other words, by the 1570s, even defenders of the dignity of university-inculcated 
medical learning were being forced to try to take the lead in knowing the material 
details that came from experience with worldly things. 
 The reasons for the shift in value from understanding the causes of nature to 
knowing the details about its particular instances are many. I have argued elsewhere 
that one of the most important reasons for the shift in the valuing of one kind of 
knowledge to another was the so-called consumer revolution of the late middle ages 
(or “Renaissance”). Discourses about “the good” shifted to discourses about 
“goods,” and the cultivation of virtue was better displayed by a tangible apprecia-
tion for fine “art,” practical devices, and useful information than fascination with 
philosophical elaborations. 18 As if to maintain the fundamental importance of 
immaterial powers in this world of goods, the clerics fought back by claiming that 
the future of humanity depended on the right interpretation of the large implications 
that might flow from small differences in understanding texts and learned traditions. 
It created a nightmare world of hunting down witches and heretics, and terrible 
misfortunes followed when these arguments captured the political stage. Yet in 
the background, the growth of commerce continued to transform ordinary life, and 
a view of it would emerge in the later seventeenth century in the form of new 
political economies that judged government by whether it could improve the mate-
rial lives of its subjects. The Lord Chancellor of England, Sir Francis Bacon, 
became a convert to these views and an often-quoted spokesman for furthering their 
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advancement, but he was only one of most articulate members of an ill-defined and 
widespread movement. And the “movement” itself would have been impossible 
without the regular travels of large proportions of the population, learned men 
among them, which allowed interlinked discoverses to develop. 
 Of course learned physicians sometimes objected to the knowledge claims of 
their rivals just as much as their clerical brethren did. As with cases of uncertified 
preachers, it turns out that one of the chief arguments of the learned against medical 
empirics built on the difference between good and bad judgment, which in turn 
depended on a view of the proper temperament and character-formation of the 
professional, whose work was by definition that of “professing” a view, or explain-
ing the world so as to keep their listeners within its right order. The physicians 
argued that their chief task was the preservation and restoration of health rather than 
treating disease. They – like their fellow professionals in law and church – gave 
their clients good counsel, not only helping when danger was already present but, 
even better, helping their patients to avoid danger. For this, they needed to under-
stand the regular course of nature ( phusis ) and to be able to understand how the 
circumstances of the moment could be explained in terms of those regularities, so 
that their patients could remain in accord with it. Such advice was fundamental to 
both retaining and regaining health. Put another way, explaining the causes and 
consequences of nature and the individual’s part in it was not supplementary to 
what physician did, but their core business. They might also recommend proper 
therapies in cases where more drastic measures were needed to bring the patient’s 
personal constitution back into balance with his or her surroundings, but these 
means, too, had to be in accord with their understanding of the operations of nature. 
To advise in these ways they needed the discipline of learning formed in the lecture- 
and debating-chambers of the schools. 19 
 In other words, learning gave physicians not only insight into the underlying 
 logos of the world that taught the good as well as the true, but inculcated in them 
the ordered inner discipline that allowed good judgment to relate such verities to 
the individual circumstances of life. As the English physician John Cotta put it 
in 1612,
 The dignitie and worth of Physicks skill consisteth not (as is imagined commonly) in the 
excellence and preheminence of remedies, but in their wise and prudent use. It is an ancient 
saying, that wholesome medicines by the hands of the iudicious dispenser, are as Angels 
of God sent for the good of men; but in the hands of the unlearned, are messangers of death 
unto their farther evill. Good medicines are in themselves excellent instruments of health 
and life, but require a learned workman iudiciously to guide them unto their destined end. 
It is order and not confusion, that is ever safe and happie; and knowledge (which worketh 
by election, and true reason, and not rash boldnesse, which doth good by chance and uncer-
taine event) that is the light and safe guide of understanding mindes. ... If then all enter-
prises prosper by wise advice, & it is wisedom in matters of meanest moment to consult 
with a wise and iudicious friend, in cases of health and life certainly every man is not a 
sufficient counsellor. 20 
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 For men like Cotta, uneducated empirics were a danger not only because of the 
strong and dangerous remedies they might employ – which were bad enough – but 
also, even more, because they did not have the proper character formation to allow 
them to dispense good advice. Indeed, the traits by which their rivals could be 
known were not so much practical as personal: loquaciousness, braggadoccio, 
unmannerly gestures, unnecessary boldness, and so on – all the traits of the quack 
that formed generation after generation of a literature designed to give the profes-
sionals the power to police their rivals. 
 For much of the early modern period, then, the conservative wing among the 
physicians continued to argue that only a proper form of learning that was essen-
tially literate and philosophical could form a mind capable of good judgment. But 
another argument had emerged and by the later seventeenth-century had, in many 
places, come to dominate: good judgment could even better arise from the kind of 
mental discipline that demanded the acquisition and ordering of as much of the 
material detail about nature as possible. In other words, it was not the grasping of 
fundamental axioms and methods of argumentation (or the  logos as known through 
right reason) but the acquisition (and memorizing) of correct material detail – of 
exacting descriptive information – that established a disciplined inner character and 
allowed the exercise of good judgment. The active pursuit of information could 
itself lead to virtue. 
 The point was made well by the eminent London physician, Samuel Garth. 
When at the beginning of the eighteenth century he addressed his colleagues in 
honor of the famous William Harvey, and spoke about their common profession of 
“physick,” he said something quite different than his predecessors of a century 
earlier. He began not with a discussion of the causes of things but with notable 
examples of new cures physicians could perform, whether they understood the 
reasons or not. When he came to broaden his discourse to include the places where 
certainty could be had in the knowledge of nature he spoke not of fundamental 
principles and axioms or generalizable reasoning but of investigation into particu-
lars: he spoke of botany (the “shapes and tastes of an infinite number of plants”), 
mineralogy, and all other aspects of the description of nature. Physic “pursues 
nature through a thousand windings and meanders; the very Center of the Earth 
escapes it not, neither is there any thing in the Ocean hid from it.” 21 This was a 
godly art. But the seat of the godly art had become not an Olympian height but an 
Odyssean journey. The physicians of course continued to apply their knowledge to 
the preservation of health and remediation of disease (although usually by assum-
ing that people could be treated alike rather than only according to their individual 
differences as expressed by their temperaments), but physic itself came to rest on 
an active investigation of nature and nature’s secrets. 
 The new science therefore encompassed not only a complete knowledge of nature 
but the active hunt for new and deeper knowledge of it. Certainty lay in the particu-
lars rather than the generalities. Hans Sloane, later President of both the Royal 
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Society of London and the London College of Physicians, wrote in his book about 
the natural history of Jamaica that true knowledge was now based on “Observations 
of Matters of Fact,” which were “more certain than most Others, and in my slender 
Opinion, less subject to Mistakes than  Reasonings ,  Hypotheses , and  Deductions are 
…. These are things we are sure of, so far as our Senses are not fallible; and which, 
in probability, have been ever since the Creation, and will remain to the End of the 
World, in the same Condition we now find them.” 22 His contemporary, Georgio 
Baglivi, agreed entirely: certainty in the knowledge of physic remained the goal, 
“For the Art is made up of such things as are fully Survey’d, and plainly Understood, 
and of such perceptions as are not under the controul of Opinion. It gives certain 
Reasons which are plac’d in due Order, and chalks out certain Paths, to keep its Sons 
from going astray.” But it did this by paying careful attention to matters of fact. As 
long as “Observation is the Thread to which Reason must point,” all would be well. 
But “‘tis manifest, that not only the Original of Medicine, but whatever solid 
Knowledge ‘tis entituled to, is chiefly deriv’d from Experience.” 23 Or as the most 
famous medical professor of the day, Herman Boerhaave, had it, all true physical 
knowledge was built on sense experience. Physic therefore could account only for 
those things “which are purely material in the human Body, with mechanical and 
physical Experiments.” First causes “are neither possible, useful, or necessary to be 
investigated by a Physician.” Looking back to his hero Hippocrates, Boerhaave 
explained that “the Art of Physic was anciently established by a faithful Collection 
of Facts observed, whose Effects were afterwards explained, and their Causes 
assigned by the Assistance of Reason; the first carried Conviction along with it, and 
is indisputable; nothing being more certain than Demonstration from Experience, 
but the latter is more dubious and uncertain ….” 24 
 The attentive and well-informed clinician had trumped the well-read and argu-
mentative professor. Both could be good. But the sources of goodness in each arose 
from different kinds of activities and different kinds of knowledge. The new 
philosophy could also point to its relationship to the good, but it was a different sort 
of good than that held dear by its scholastic rivals, stressing the true knowledge 
based on careful use of the senses rather than what was increasingly referred to as 
“speculation.” This is one of the chief themes in the debates in the 1660s between 
Joseph Glanvill and Henry Stubbe about the newly-formed Royal Society, for 
instance, which was contemporary and intermixed with debates between the 
London College of Physicians and the Society of Apothecaries and Society of 
Chemical Physicians. Glanvill was accused by some of his clerical colleagues of 
being atheistic for favoring the new philosophy, to which he replied by writing 
a book ( Plus Ultra ) in defense of it. He argued that the Royal Society explicitly 
disavowed philosophical discussion in favor of practical knowledge of benefit to 
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mankind, among which were improvements in medicine. Indeed, chemistry and 
anatomy were some of his favorite examples for showing the usefulness of the new 
philosophy to life. For instance, Glanvill dismissed phlebotomy with contempt as 
an outmoded practice of physicians while arguing that chemical medicines, discov-
ered by the new experimenters, resulted in pure and effective drugs. He also 
claimed that anatomy was pioneered by the virtuosi and led to such matters as 
transfusions, which would also much improve the health of men. He clearly found 
medicine important only insofar as it could cure diseases, and he also clearly found 
learned physic’s abilities in that department sadly lacking. 25 
 According to Stubbe, Glanvill’s opinions were repeated by a gentleman over 
dinner, having been boiled down to something like his published opinion that
 The Modern Experimenters think, that the Philosophers of elder Times, though their wits 
were excellent, yet the way they took was not like to bring much advantage to Knowledge, 
or any of the Uses of Humane life …. And the unfruitfulness of those Methods of Science, 
which so many Centuries never brought the World so much practical, beneficial knowl-
edge, as would help towards the Cure of a Cut Finger, is a palpable Argument, That they 
were fundamental Mistakes, and that the Way was not right. 26 
 Because of the incident at the dinner table, and that “sense of Injury I supposed 
to be done to me and all other Rational Physicians, by this barbarous Opiniatour,” 
Stubbe tried to set the public straight about Glanvill’s claims, especially about the 
mistakes Glanvill made in his chapter on medicine. 27  The debates were vigorous, 
often focusing on questions about the extent to which chemical medicines had 
improved treatment, and sometimes taking up questions about whether anatomy 
was of any usefulness. But by this time (the 1670s), all the physicians agreed in 
principle that finding things out by experiments was a good thing, and that one of 
the heroes of the new and experimental philosophy was William Harvey. 28 
 Harvey indeed had discovered the circulation of the blood by masterful methods 
of investigation, bringing him to conclusions he had not intended. It is sometimes 
said that his discovery had no implications for medical practice. That may be true 
with regard to medical therapy (the hope of benefit from transfusion excepted). 29 
But the breaking apart of the distinction between venous and arterial blood under-
cut the rationale for dietetic regimen, which (as mentioned above) was so crucial to 
arguments for the necessity of advice from learned physicians for the retention and 
restoration of health. This was a revolutionary finding, simply contradicting the 
basis of Galenic physiology, and launching further investigations onto a sea of 
confusion, where the particularities of the findings in anatomy and physiology no 
longer added up to a whole. 30 It has usually puzzled historians that Harvey seems 
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both a figure of revolutionary new empirical knowledge and yet also enormous 
professional and political conservatism. 31 But he obviously had no problem in 
squaring that circle. He may even have been a crypto-Catholic, which also upsets 
the common formula for the English world in which Puritanism, or at least 
Protestantism, seems necessary to move people toward the new science. 
 Let us begin with Harvey’s religion. We have nothing explicit about his theologi-
cal opinions in his own words – which is perhaps not surprising given the deep 
controversies over such matters in his own day. But we can infer several things from 
a few bits of evidence. He was of course baptized in the established church, and had 
his early education at the King’s School in Canterbury. He was also awarded the 
Matthew Parker scholarship, a scholarship founded by the Archbishop to support a 
boy from the King’s School in the study of medicine. Perhaps it is worth remember-
ing, though, that as chief minister of Queen Elizabeth’s church, Parker was certainly 
no Puritan. Instead, he was one of the chief persons to craft the so-called Elisabethan 
compromise. The several endowments he established late in his life were meant in 
part to counter the radical Protestants. The Cambridge college in which Harvey 
resided from 1593 had something of a similarly conservative air: while of course 
within the Anglican fold, Gonville and Caius had been refounded in 1567 by the 
then-President of the London College of Physicians, John Caius, who was both a 
conservative humanist – he lectured against Vesalius – and a Catholic. 
 Catholicism brings us to the fact that Harvey travelled to Padua in 1598 (at the 
age of 20) to further his studies in medicine. Of course Padua offered a far superior 
medical education to any then available in England, but it was after all a Catholic 
place. Because of the growing threat from counter-reformation Spain, the assas-
sination of the Prince of Orange in 1582 by a Catholic, and the discovery of several 
plots on Elizabeth’s own life in the 1580s, the Parliament had passed a proclama-
tion “for the revocation of sundry of the Queen’s Majesty’s subjects remaining 
beyond the seas under colour of study,” while sermons were preached against 
“Oure Italienated Papistes.” Not until the peace treaty with Spain in 1604 did trav-
eling to Catholic lands for study bring less suspicion. 32 Harvey was not, of course, 
the only medical student to defy the law and go abroad in the 1590s: Robert Fludd 
also left for the Continent in 1598, although he returned to take his M.D. at Oxford 
in 1605. Nor need we suspect any or all of the English travelers of harboring 
Catholicism merely because they studied in Italy: the eminent London physician, 
Simeon Foxe, for instance, was the youngest son of John Fox, the Protestant mar-
tyrologist, and himself remained a conformist Puritan. 33 And of course, Venice – in 
whose territory Padua resided – was from the 1590s battling the Pope’s claim to 
supremacy, leading to a papal Interdict in 1606. But despite toying with alterna-
tives, it remained a Catholic place, and given the times, these intending physicians 
took some risk of being viewed as Catholic sympathizers upon their return to 
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England. Moreover, as Jonathan Woolfson noted about a decade ago, when Harvey 
was awarded his doctorate in philosophy and medicine in April 1602 by count 
palatine, he swore and signed the required oath to the Pope’s supremacy and all 
the articles of the council of Trent, although at his request this was left off the copy 
of the certificate with which he returned, which is now in the College’s Library. 34 
It is worth noting here, too, that Harvey’s main patron was Thomas Howard, 2nd 
Earl of Arundel, a scion of one of the greatest Catholic families of the era, 
although Arundel nominally became a Protestant after 1615. Maybe, then, a whiff 
of Rome hung about Harvey, which might even account for why Harvey was not 
appointed a royal physician-in-ordinary until December 1639, by which time the 
religious policies of Charles I and Archbishop Laud seemed to many to be bent on 
the restoration of the old religion. 
 All this is not to argue simply that Harvey was a crypto-Catholic – although that 
possibility must be entertained – but that most probably, like many other learned 
men of his day who took an interest in the study of nature, he was not committed 
to a doctrinal position so much as a broad church. He may be a bit like the great 
Flemish linguist and botanist Carolus Clusius, who fought the Inquisition but also 
hated committed Protestants. In Clusius’s case, he may even have been a member 
of the Family of Love, a secretive group that allowed its members to take whatever 
public oaths were necessary depending on circumstance – an argument for religious 
doctrine itself being something like “a thing indifferent.” 35 Both he and Harvey 
were well-trained humanist classicists who had learned how to apply the skills of 
the philologist to the investigation of nature: much reading, a powerful memory, 
attention to detail, trying things out, and a sense that active investigation alone 
could help to recover the authentic knowledge of humankind. 
 As for the last suggestion, Harvey’s association with Robert Fludd points in 
interesting directions that were often associated with this open-ended search for 
ancient wisdom. As Harvey’s best biographer, Sir Geoffrey Keynes, notes, Fludd 
was not only the first in England to support Harvey’s discovery of the circulation 
in print, but also placed the heart at the center of all animal motion, including the 
passions. The place of the heart at the center of human experience was then preoc-
cupying many literary and religious authors, and would lead, in the middle of 
the century, to Catholic worship of the Sacred Heart. Fludd was one of the first 
so-called Rosicrucians, believing that a true understanding of ancient wisdom could 
be employed to reform natural knowledge in the present. He was also a pantheistic 
materialist, and Harvey shows many of the same philosophical attributes, although 
they have usually been attributed to his sympathy for Aristotle. Another of Harvey’s 
friends was the famous materialist, Thomas Hobbes, of whom Keynes notes that his 
early treatise  De corpore shares a theory of the senses with Harvey’s notes to his 
own work  De motu locali animalium . On his deathbed, Harvey left a ring to Hobbes 
in order to be remembered by him. And finally we have the several reports that 
 
34
 Woolfson  1998 , 21–23. 
 
35
 For Clusius, see Cook  2007 ; Egmond et al.  2007 . 
19Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory
Harvey was a free-thinker who believed that suicide was a proper way out of 
personal suffering, perhaps even attempting suicide with laudanum first in 1652 
and doing it successfully after a debilitating stroke in 1657. 36 All in all, the more 
one probes, the more one can only agree with those biographers who have found 
Harvey’s personal views to be elusive. But in no sense was he publicly attracted to 
Puritanism or doctrinal Protestantism, or to the contemporaneous controversies 
about religious dogma or ceremony. 
 In the London College of Physicians – it would not call itself the “Royal” 
College of Physicians until the 1680s – Harvey joined a group of men who gener-
ally held similar views: that knowledge of nature was far more important than 
religion. The private religious views of most Fellows of the College of Physicians 
are not known. A few can be identified as strong Protestants – or “Puritans” – but 
they were more or less equalized by several others who were clearly Catholics or 
Catholic sympathizers. As is well known, the College had been founded by medical 
humanists, the most famous among them being Thomas Linacre, at a time when 
both Henry VIII and his wife, Catherine of Aragon, patronized the latest scholar-
ship. Humanism made a powerful return under the Catholic Queen Mary, at which 
time the College’s ambitions for policing the physicians of London were encour-
aged by her chief adviser, Cardinal Pole, who had been educated in part by Linacre 
himself. Under Mary, President Caius successfully waged war on empirics in 
London and even claimed supremacy over Oxford and Cambridge, getting Pole to 
support the College’s demand that medical degrees not be awarded without the 
students having followed a prescribed course of study. 37 Nor did Caius allow the 
College’s own members to publicly dissent from philologically-inspired medical 
humanism. From Mary’s reign onwards, the sense of priestly order and dignity 
embodied in the College’s own ceremonies would also carry the scent of popery to 
sensitive Protestant noses. For the first 20 years of Elizabeth’s reign, her govern-
ment had little use for a kind of semi-Catholic fraternity of learned physicians. But 
by the 1590s, as the policies of the Crown became more conservative, it once again 
supported more active policies on behalf of the College to police the medical prac-
titioners of London – support that continued under James I. 38 
 In the years before Harvey’s admission to the Fellowship, the College was espe-
cially concerned to bring the surgeons into obedience, portraying themselves as the 
defenders of learning against the advocates for empiricism. At the same quarterly 
meeting at which Harvey was elected a Fellow – 5 June 1607 – all members were 
asked to remember occasions on which one Dr. Bonham had practiced, to help with 
his prosecution. The resulting “Bonham’s case” was truly important for the legal 
precedents it created. Thomas Bonham was also a Cambridge man, about 15 years 
Harvey’s senior. He likely graduated in medicine in the middle to later 1590s, and 
certainly before he signed himself “in Medic: Doct.” at the end of a laudatory Latin 
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poem in 1602. The poem is prefaced to a treatise on the King’s evil by the surgeon 
William Clowes the elder, and as this suggests, Bonham took the side of the London 
surgeons in their disputes with the College. In early 1605, he also signed the unsuc-
cessful Parliamentary petition of the Barber-Surgeons’ Company asking for the 
right to administer internal remedies. It may not be surprising, then, that when, just 
a year after Harvey, Bonham presented himself to the College for examination, the 
Censors failed him. He underwent examination again on 14 April 1606, but his 
replies to questions this time were declared “not pertinent.” 39 
 To summarize the consequences: because Bonham practiced without their 
permission, the President and Censors sent Bonham to Newgate for contempt, to 
be held at their pleasure. Bonham’s lawyer managed to free him by entering a 
writ of habeas corpus before the court of Common Pleas, while the officers of 
the College in turn obtained the support of the royal judges, including Lord 
Chancellor Ellesmere. Subsequently, they sued Bonham for twelve months’ 
illicit practice (for a total of £60), with their case in King’s Bench pleaded for 
them by Attorney General Hobart – they won this case. Bonham in turn returned 
to the court of Common Pleas, asking for £100 damages against the College for 
trespass against his person and wrongful imprisonment, which in 1610 he also 
won, setting him free, and fining the College £40. The declaration of Chief 
Justice Edward Coke created a clear distinction between malpractice and illicit 
practice, and more importantly introduced the view that “the common law will 
controul Acts of Parliament.” He may have intended only to overturn the 
College’s royal patent, but his language allowed eighteenth-century Americans 
to interpret his words as giving the courts jurisdiction over Parliament, helping 
to create the idea of a powerful Supreme Court. Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, Sir 
Francis Bacon, and King James himself were all furious with Coke’s decision, 
and various decisions they took in effect further strengthened the College despite 
Coke’s opinion. 40 
 It is worth dwelling on Bonham’s case for a moment not to begin a rehearsal of 
all the politico-legal affairs of the College during Harvey’s time in which the physi-
cians battled for supremacy over other kinds of medical practitioners – which they 
mainly won until the outbreak of civil war in 1641 – but to indicate that Harvey 
joined a body actively involved with the highest levels of government in efforts to 
maintain and extend the powers of the medical establishment, and that these were 
bound up with a defense of a conservative version of learned medicine. He seems 
to have fully supported his institution. On 16 October 1613, for instance, Harvey 
brought a letter to the President and Fellows from Viscount Lisle, Chamberlain to 
the Queen, charging a Mr Talbot (MA) with possible bad practice on his niece the 
Countess of Rutherford, and requesting they examine him. Afterward, he served 
several times as a Censor, one of those charged with examining and disciplining 
medical practitioners. In 1630, he was instrumental in causing the officers of the 
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College to press the City of London for enforcement of the plague orders they had 
developed, and may have been a go-between with the Privy Council during this 
period, when the Crown was eager to use the College in its attempts to police the 
City. And of course he followed King Charles during the civil wars. 
 But if Harvey was no radical in religion or politics, his pursuit of the study of 
nature undoubtedly led to important results. My own view of this is, however, that 
while his discovery of the circulation of the blood was fundamental, it was not 
based on any radically new approach to either philosophy or natural investigation. 
He pursued the course of carefully accumulating observations and making trials, 
something not only common at Padua but equally in Montpellier, Leiden, and other 
centers of up-to-date medical study. His studies were similar to those of his younger 
contemporary, Sir Thomas Browne, also meant to clear away the accretions of 
speculation in favor of matters of fact, and like Browne, and even Descartes, 
Harvey placed his faith in what the senses can tell us about nature. Like Browne, 
too, Harvey seems to have collected a cabinet of naturalia. For although it was no 
doubt severely depleted by the actions of the anti-royalist mob who destroyed so 
many of his possessions and papers during the civil war, it is sometimes forgotten 
that Harvey’s great gift to the College in 1652 was meant not only to endow a 
library, but “a Repository for Simples and Rarities” – in other words a collection of 
botanical and zoological specimens. The contents of his museum deserve further 
study. As at so many places and, in another decade, at the Royal Society, the pos-
session of a cabinet of natural curiosities was considered to be very important for 
the study of nature. What some physicians such as Harvey further pursued in addi-
tion, of course, was not only the careful visual description of living and dead speci-
mens, but the active inspection by vivisection of bodily processes – which along 
with alchemy might be considered the first experimental science. The studies 
Harvey made which are written up in his work  On Generation (published in Latin 
in 1651 and English in 1653), are particularly impressive for the range of methods 
he mentions for the study of nature. Coincident with the publication of his last 
book, then, he was doing all he could to encourage his College to become the fore-
most scientific institution in England. 41 
 Harvey is therefore a personally fascinating but elusive figure. It was of course 
his discovery of the circulation of the blood that made him deservedly famous. 
Without it, historians would find his other published work, as well as his activities 
on behalf of the College of Physicians, well worth study, but would not think that 
they were particularly unusual. Nor would his reticence about religion, nor his pos-
sible connections with Catholicism and free-thinking, come as a shock. What 
seemed surprising to twentieth-century eyes is the combination of his activities: his 
conservatism coupled with innovation. But with Harvey’s example in front of us, 
perhaps it is less surprising that even some of the chemical physicians who tried to 
establish a society of chemical physicians in the mid-1660s had been royalists 
during the civil wars (while others had been Parliamentarians), and that they were 
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equally divided in religious orientation. 42 The point is that despite the strong views 
of earlier historians that “metaphysical” or ideological assumptions lay behind the 
work of people like Harvey, people with all kinds of differing fundamental philo-
sophical, religious, and political views could share an interest in empirical investi-
gations, and agree on the results. 43 
 In The Netherlands, an equally diverse group of natural investigators were 
excited about anatomy, too. One of them was a resident Catholic, René Descartes. 
It was there that Descartes wrote his most famous philosophical works, books 
deeply affected by local information and conversations: the  Discourse on Method , 
including the  Optics ,  Meteorology , and  Geometry ,  Treatise on Mechanics , 
 Meditations ,  Principles of Philosophy ,  The Passions of the Soul , and the posthu-
mous  Description of the Human Body . And it was in The Netherlands that he 
developed his strongest intellectual friendships and most powerful theological 
enemies. His environment changed him as much as he changed it. And it turned him 
toward empirical investigations of the physical world. 
 The general Dutch orientation toward investigating phenomena using physical 
methods as the foundation for natural philosophy quickly left its mark Descartes 
– as it did for fellow travelers to the north such as Gassendi and Mersenne. The 
approach of his close early friend Beeckman, for instance, had been to isolate indi-
vidual problems and then work toward their solution using the best methods avail-
able for each rather to apply a universal set of rules. 44 This hardly compared to the 
thorough system Descartes dreamed about in his youth, but it worked well. 
Descartes had seen that everything was interconnected, but he found that starting 
from first principles was a long way from solving practical problems. Daniel 
Garber has recently concluded that “it is indisputable that as his system grew, per-
haps from the first metaphysics of 1629–1630 onward, method became, first in 
practice, and then after 1637 in theory, less and less important to Descartes.” 45 Put 
another way, in The Netherlands the predominant method, if that is the right word, 
was  circumspice , “look around you.” This underpinned, for instance, the eclectic 
approach of his friend, Constantijn Huygens, secretary to the Prince of Orange and 
enthusiast for Baconianism, who had been introduced to Descartes in 1632 by 
Jacobus Golius (the Leiden professor of mathematics and of Oriental languages); 
Huygens often tried to turn Descartes’ attention to practical ends, thinking that his 
grandest philosophical projects were overly ambitious. As he absorbed more and 
more of this practical and empirical outlook, Descartes left behind the dreams of 
his youth while turning to the study of difficult questions about how things are, like 
so many of the naturalists around him. He took up something he called  expérience 
(or experiment). 
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 One of the greatest enthusiasms Descartes developed regarding  expériences 
was the exploration of the material structure of animal bodies. These were years 
of intense public interest about anatomy lessons performed at Leiden, Amsterdam, 
and Delft, with Rembrandt’s famous portrait of Dr. Tulp done in 1632. Descartes, 
too, became captivated. Almost as soon as he embarked on his new philosophical 
project, at the end of 1629, he wrote to Mersenne that he did not wish to be dis-
tracted with further philosophical inquiries, for “I want to begin to study anatomy.” 
A few months later he wrote that “I am now studying chemistry and anatomy 
simultaneously; every day I learn something that I cannot find in any book.” As he 
put it in a later summary of his projected  De mundo , he recognized that “I did not 
yet have sufficient knowledge to speak of [animal bodies] in the same manner as 
I did of the other things – that is, by demonstrating effects from causes and show-
ing from what seeds and in what manner nature must produce them.” He had come 
to see that while his first principles could be used to construct the building blocks 
of creation, when it came to animals and humankind, especially, they could only 
explain the effects discovered – one could not imagine all that existed merely by 
proposing first principles. In effect, first principles are far better at  post hoc expla-
nation than at predicting real things. One of the reasons for not publishing his early 
 De mundo , he told the world, was that “every day I am becoming more and more 
aware of the delay which my project of self-instruction is suffering because of the 
need for innumerable  expériences which I cannot possibly make without the help 
of others.” 46 
 Accordingly, the section on human physiology prepared for  De mundo and pub-
lished posthumously as  De homine , or  L’Homme (the “Treatise on Man,” also 
known as “Description of the Human Body”), instructs the reader about human 
anatomical parts: “I assume that if you do not already have sufficient first-hand 
knowledge of them, you can get a learned anatomist to show them to you – at any 
rate, those which are large enough to be seen with the naked eye.” Once he had 
mastered the technique, Descartes dissected diligently on his own from animal 
material he obtained from butchers. He could not obtain access to human body parts 
because, as he noted, “I am not a doctor by profession,” but he applied himself dili-
gently to looking into the parts of animals. 47 In notes about such dissections, which 
Leibniz later copied and which take up nearly a hundred pages in the printed edi-
tion, Descartes wrote down precise observations about a very large number of stud-
ies, often on the fetuses or new-borns of cows: he was clearly interested in the 
physiology of development, among other matters, for he was still dissecting calves 
when living in Egmond, in the late 1640s. 
 Descartes made it very clear, too, that he now considered his earlier work on the 
foundations of the method to have been undertaken to enable a practical philosophy. 
The main purpose of his work now was
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 the maintenance of health, which is undoubtedly the chief good and the foundation of all 
other goods in this life. For even the mind depends so much on the temperament and dis-
position of the bodily organs that if it is possible to find some means of making men in 
general wiser and more skilful than they have been up to now, I believe we must look for 
it in medicine …. Intending as I did to devote my life to the pursuit of such indispensable 
knowledge, I discovered a path which would, I thought, inevitably lead one to it. 48 
 To accomplish such an ambitious goal, however, he acknowledged the necessity 
of constant labor: “I also noticed, regarding  expériences , that the further we 
advance in our knowledge, the more necessary they become.” Yet “I see also that 
[such  expériences ] are of such a kind and so numerous that neither my dexterity nor 
my income (were it even a thousand times greater than it is) could suffice for all of 
them.” 49 
 By the time he came to write the sixth of his famous  Meditations , around 1640, 
he was prepared to be quite different from the Descartes of most undergraduate 
lectures. Although he never took back his earlier proofs for the mind being distinct 
from body, “I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but 
… very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body 
form a unit.” 50 He also told the reader that he was especially pleased with the proofs 
for the existence of the material world. They showed (versus Montaigne and other 
skeptics) how one could have confidence in the knowledge about the world that 
came to the mind through the senses. He therefore shifted the apparent reason for 
publishing his work: while most people interpreted it (and still do) as casting doubt 
on our knowledge of the world via the senses, so that only pure intellect and God’s 
existence can be known with full clarity, Descartes argued that he only wanted to 
show that knowledge of the latter was more certain even than knowledge of the 
world,  which should not be doubted :
 The great benefit of these arguments is not, in my view, that they prove what they establish 
– namely that there really is a world, and that human beings have bodies and so on – since 
no sane person has ever seriously doubted these things. 51 
 In other words, his goal in publishing the  Meditations was to establish the cer-
tainty of our knowledge of God and the intellect, not to sow doubts about whether 
we have bodies intertwined with mind, that we can know about the material world, 
and so on, matters that he thought were self-evident in his empirical studies. 
 Turning to the text of the crucial sixth meditation itself, we therefore find him 
emphasizing how  expériences are required to know the world, introducing argu-
ments for having confidence in most of what one knows via the body. God is not a 
deceiver, he says, and he endows us with a variety of faculties by which one can 
check and correct knowledge that comes via the senses, which “offers me a sure 
hope that I can attain the truth even in these matters.” “Indeed, there is no doubt that 
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everything that I am taught by nature contains some truth.” And what does nature 
teach us in general? “There is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly 
than that I have a body.” 52 He went on from these arguments about the body and 
sensory experience to say something even more surprising in light of his youthful 
meditations: the original source of his doubts – how could he tell if he were dream-
ing, or awake, or being deceived by a demon? – had no foundation. “I should not 
have any further fears about the falsity of what my senses tell me every day; on the 
contrary, the exaggerated doubts of the last few [meditations] should be dismissed 
as laughable. This applies especially to the principal reason for doubt, namely my 
inability to distinguish being asleep and being awake. For now I notice that there is 
a vast difference between the two ….” 53 He had achieved his ambition, to lay to rest 
the ghost of skepticism, showing not only that the clearest and most distinct ideas 
one could have were about God and the intellect, but also showing that mind was 
intermingled with body and that knowledge about the world was dependable. 
 Descartes’  Meditations was, then, arguing for our ability to know the world, and 
for the use of natural reason rather than right reason to do it, even in the mainte-
nance of health, but divided what we know about nature from the more doubtful 
subject of moral philosophy. It freed the study of nature from the vexed problems 
of contemporary religion, although it smacked of materialism. If there is any doubt 
about whether the implications of Descartes’  Meditations were of medical interest, 
it should be laid to rest by subsequent events. For following its publication in 1641, 
Descartes became involved in a grave dispute in Utrecht about where his views 
were leading, a dispute that arose first not among the philosophers but between the 
physicians and the theologians. 
 Moreover, by that time he was also deeply engrossed in analyzing the passions, 
again arriving at some striking conclusions. He treated the passions as aspects of 
body that communicate to us how we can be happy and healthful: in other words, 
he rooted them in his physiological outlook rather than in moral philosophy. He first 
took the usual line that reason needed to control them, but later declared them all 
to be good; only a few people alive could manage to regulate them, and the rest of 
us should not worry about our health or virtue if we could not, so that we should 
embrace them. 
 Descartes’ close consideration of the problematic relationship between reason 
and the passions and his changes of view were based on his physiological knowl-
edge coupled with the concerns pressed on him by the young Princess Palatine 
Elizabeth. Descartes had heard through mutual acquaintances in late 1642 that the 
young Elizabeth was reading his  Meditations , and he managed an introduction, 
which led to a life-long relationship. Elizabeth kept pressing him about his views 
and forced him to reconsider his too easy assumptions about the superiority of 
using Reason to govern one’s life. 54 Descartes listened carefully, and during the 
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course of their conversation, personal and epistolary, he came to the conclusion 
that in most cases reason could not control the passions, and even that the passions 
were all good because they taught us how to live well. Through our bodies they 
connect us to the world of change, informing us about it for the sake of our own 
well-being. 
 The last work published in his lifetime was, then,  Les Passions de l’âme . For 
Descartes, the passions mediated between body and soul, and are affected by both. 
He drew no equivalence between passion and error, as did most classical thinkers. 
Even more strikingly, in the end he declared the passions to be good. One should 
not become anxious about one’s passions, for they teach us what is necessary for 
life. Even more powerfully, all the pleasures that are common to both soul and 
body, such a love, “depend entirely on the passions.” 55 This is a large step beyond 
Aristotle’s view that in some cases some of the passions can be good; it is almost 
unthinkable for Descartes’ neostoic predecessors; and it went considerably further 
than virtually anything else said by his contemporaries toward making the passions 
into forces for good instead of irrationality and vice. It was a far different view than, 
say, that of Hobbes, who examined the passions carefully but argued for the neces-
sity of the supremacy of reason over them; I think Descartes’ view led more to the 
monist naturalism of Spinoza, Mandeville, and Hume and other members of 
the “radical” Enlightenment than to the dualism of Locke, Voltaire, and other 
moderates. 56 Many scholars are now excitedly pursuing this text and the preliminary 
correspondence as the key source for understanding the mature views of Descartes. 
It throws great doubt on the question of Descartes as an advocate for the power of 
disembodied thought. As a consequence, an empirical and passionate Descartes 
now stalks the literature. 
 One last comment about this newly passionate and experimental Descartes: while 
it is now much doubted whether Descartes ever placed much emphasis on metaphys-
ics as a method for finding truth, it is much admitted that he took a deep interest in 
medicine. Moreover, many of the first outspoken supporters of Descartes were physi-
cians, most famously Henricus Regius in Utrecht, but soon after François dela Boë 
Sylvius, Florentius Schuyl, and others in Leiden and elsewhere. Such people had 
brought into the academic world a tradition of active experiential, even experimental, 
studies with diseases, anatomy, and chemistry, among other fields: they were not only 
Cartesians, but Harveians, Helmontians, in due course Newtonians, and other intel-
lectual mixtures. Many of them considered Descartes to be on the edge of outright 
materialism, or perhaps privately so. But for physicians, what Descartes’ writings 
promised was not so much a new metaphysics – much less one that said the best theo-
ries came from deductive reasoning – but a demonstration that the physical investiga-
tion of natural bodies on which they had long been engaged was indeed the path to 
a true understanding of nature. It was also an argument for embodied empiricism, 
 
55
 Les Passions de l’Ame , in Descartes  1985 , I:403. 
 
56
 Cook  1999 , and for the “radical enlightenment,” see esp. Israel  2001 . 
27Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory
in which the passions had far more to do with how we come to know the world than 
did some sort of disembodied reason. 57 
 In conclusion, let me return to the historiographical problems that lie behind the 
claims I have made above. Medicine is not only an excellent descriptive focus for 
understanding the causes and effects of the scientific revolution; medicine and 
closely-related topics of investigative activity helped to cause the changes as well. 
But because medicine had no single conceptual revolution but countless ones, it fits 
uncomfortably among the historiographical approaches that flow from philosophi-
cal idealism, among which I include many of the cultural studies approaches of the 
very recent past. The changes indicated above do of course point to changes in 
cultural values, but they were intimately bound up with changes in both material 
culture and in bodily activities rather than “mental” events. Certainly the changes 
were not due to one or another particular party to the religious disputes of the day. 
Arguing for causal changes arising from careful attention to human entanglements 
with the material world may seem to some historians to invite the dangers of whig-
gism and positivism, since investigations into matters of fact were crucial, and a 
great deal of information that was accepted as true remains so. For almost three 
decades, questions about “credibility” have been vigorously debated among histo-
rians and philosophers of science and medicine. Credibility cannot be reduced to 
matters of trust, nor can trust be reduced to matters of social status, although of 
course trust and status must be a part of the complex answer. 58 There is nevertheless 
also the matter of “discovery” and of the coercive power of how things work, 
whether those are, in ordinary language, “facts” or “laws.” 59 Unless we historians 
and philosophers continue to address ourselves to the old question of “how did they 
find that out?” as well as “why did they think that?,” we will lose audiences who 
intuitively understand that science is not the same sort of enterprise as philosophy 
or other subjects in the humanities. I do not mean by this that we should return to 
simple-minded accounts of material progress: far from it. 60 But I do mean that we 
need to pay attention to bodily and material culture, in which the senses and pas-
sions come first and something like disinterestedness a far distant second. 
 For medicine, a fundamental problem remained. If bodily empiricism was the 
grounding for science, then who was to say whether the empiric, apothecary, or 
surgeon, or even a peasant woman from South-East Asia, was not better informed 
about the clinical facts, and therefore a better practitioner, than a well-educated 
physician? Indeed, many of the historical episodes I have worked with raise the 
point bluntly, whether it was Jacobus Bontius on Java in about 1630 writing about 
how deeply impressed he was by indigenous female practitioners, 61 or Robert Boyle 
speaking of how a knowledge of matters of fact often arose from the illiterate or even 
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the Chinese. “Where Practitioners of Physick are altogether illiterate, there often-
times Specificks may be best met with,” he wrote in  The Usefulnesse of Experimental 
Naturall Philosophy , only to have a physician of the College of Physicians who also 
wished to advance knowledge retort: “That reasoning [is] equally absurd, which 
pleads for the Empericks to be countenanced as if their experimentings might very 
much further this pretended Reformation in Physick.” 62 If the questions to which 
the public wanted answers were about how best to remedy various illnesses, then 
matters of fact might be all that counted, whereas educated people understood that 
there was much more to advising about medicine and health than that. But how to 
make the case? John Aubrey even commented that the public began to shun 
Harvey’s practice after he published on the circulation of the blood, because his 
ideas had become controversial, and by implication what they wanted was someone 
known for excellent treatment. 63 
 In other words, just as we need to be attentive to the sensory knowledge of mat-
ters of fact, and the discovery of the world through the passions, we also need to 
recognize (as no doubt we all do) that the cultivation of public opinion can indeed 
lead to quackery. The notorious example of the young Dr. Edward Hannes is there-
fore a last example. Around 1700, he came to London fresh from his studies in 
Oxford and tried unsuccessfully to get up a good practice. Finally he ordered his 
footman to stop the carriages of gentlemen in the streets “and enquire whether they 
belong’d to Dr. Hannes, as if he was called to a Patient.” After failing to find Hannes, 
the footman was to go to the well-known Garroway’s Coffee-House and “inquire 
upstairs and down.” The social elite soon came to think that a medical prodigy had 
come amongst them, and asked him to call on them as well. Doctor Hannes soon 
rose to a knighthood and the post of Principal Physician at the Royal Court. 64 
 Given the importance of human interests and passions, then, when commerce 
became the dominant mode of getting on in the world, the knowledge favored by 
the public was that pertaining to the practical business of improving their material 
condition – and this can be seen in medicine long before Bacon agreed. But then 
how to tell good from bad information, or pretenders to knowledge from the 
authentic voices? That remained the most pressing problem for medical practitio-
ners, as well as for the public. It remains a pressing question for us today. 
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 Abstract  Often flagged as an origin of empiricism, experience has a range of 
meanings in the context of early modern natural philosophy and medicine. It has 
been aligned with practical knowledge, knowledge of contingent effects, and the 
un-theorized perception of phenomena accessible to the senses. In the realm of 
anatomical inquiry, experience joined reason to constitute (according to Galen, 
Mondino, Berengario da Carpi, Niccolò Massa and many others) the approved 
anatomical method. For medical students, however, experience also meant manual 
skill and expertise ( peritia ). Students celebrated the manual expertise – the ability 
to cut open corpses and by dissecting internal and external structures, reveal them 
to the audience – of their professors and their peers. In Padua, the home of the 
famous anatomical theater of 1595, students connected these features of anatomical 
inquiry with private anatomical exercises rather than public demonstrations, espe-
cially those given by Giulio Casseri. This paper queries the private settings in which 
anatomical knowledge was produced and the roles that private anatomies played 
in recharging the meaning of experience and embodied knowledge in the fields of 
anatomy and surgery. Using the exchange between students, professors and local 
practitioners in Padua and Venice, this paper aims to reconsider the role of practical 
experience in anatomical training and its connection to learned surgeons and anato-
mists rather than the rustic ignorance of empirics or the secrets of women. 
 1  Introduction 
 In the winter months of 1578, when the weather turned cold, several professors of 
medicine at the university of Padua found themselves with an opportunity to dissect 
the bodies of two women. As they were conducting lessons in the hospital of S. 
Francesco, Albertino Bottoni (? 1596) and Marco degli Oddi (1526–1591), both 
professors of medicine, came upon two women, recently deceased, and decided to 
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open their bodies in order “to demonstrate to the listeners the affected places and 
the kindler [or cause] of the diseases [ morborum fomites ].” 1 Subsequently, they 
dissected the uterus in each cadaver. Then Emilio Campolongo (1550–1604), 
professor of theoretical medicine, joined the group and said that in the second cadaver, 
the body of a woman “consumed by senility [ marasmo ],” he would “penetrate the 
fistula,” which resided beneath her breast, cutting into it in order to show its parts 
and connections more clearly. 2 At that point, the examination was interrupted by the 
complaints of a little old woman ( querelis anicularum ), who probably feared at her 
own death, a similar treatment of exposure and delay of her burial. 3 The woman’s 
complaints were definitely heard because, the administrators threatened degli Oddi 
and Campolongo with the loss of their salaries. At the beginning of the following 
year, moreover, they reminded everyone of the statutes governing the use of bodies 
for dissection: the bodies were to be non-noble ( ignobile ) and more importantly, 
unknown ( ignoti ). They were not to come from either Padua or Venice, suggesting 
that at least one of these women was a local. 4 The scene renders dramatically one 
kind of confrontation that could arise between learned medicine and its patients, 
where the latter frequently contested and curtailed the authority of the former. 5 
 At medieval and Renaissance universities, professors and students studied 
anatomy by reading and discussing books and by dissecting cadavers and animals. 
Annually, a public anatomy demonstration was held in the winter months, and it 
 
1
 Atti della nazione germanica artista [ Acta germanicae artistarum ]  (1911 –1912), 1578, vol. 1, 
143–144: “Circa finem vero Octobris, cum coeli constitutio frigidior aliquanto esset, decreverunt 
mulierum quae in nosocomio illo morirentur, cadavera aperire et auditoribus locos affectos et 
morborum fomites demonstrare.” Hereafter, this source will be cited as  Acta , followed by year, 
volume and page numbers. 
 
2
 Acta , 1578, vol. 1, 143–144: “Id consilium feliciter satis ceptum in duobus corporibus subito fuit 
eversum. Cum enim die sequenti uteros harum mulierum aperire constituissent, et in altera, quae 
marasmo consumta erat et fistulam sub pectore habebat insignem, incidere et commonstrare 
quonam penetrasset fistula, Aemylius Campolongus ipsorum aemulus suis eodem die uteri sec-
tionem pollicitus, uteros horum cadaverum abstulerat; unde factum ut re hac, et quaerelis anicu-
larum idem, si morerentur, timentium, ad praefectos nosocomii delatis, interdictum sit et Oddo et 
Campolongo, sub poena amissionis salarii, ne quod cadaver in posterum aperirent.” 
 
3
 Park  1994 explores the relationship between dissection and disrupted burial. 
 
4
 Statuta Almae Universitatis D. Artistarum et Medicorum Patavini Gymnasii  (1570) , bk. 3, ch. 28: 
“Quod singulis annis fieret anatomia, quodq; pro ea perficienda rectoris urbis, & territoriiq; tener-
entur cadaver cuiuscunq; delinquentis, de quo capitis supplicui summeretnr [sic], dare anatomiae 
deputatis, nisi cadaver esset alicuius civis veneti, aut patavini, quum iam multis dicta anatomia, nisi 
raro facta fuerit cadaverum defectu. Ideo utilitati non modo scholarium, sed etiam universo morta-
lium generi consulentes, non in aliquod quorum vili pendium, statuitur quod urbis prasides, ac 
omnium locorum Patavini districtus praetores teneantur dictis nostris anatomistis dare quodcunque 
cadaver cuiuscunque delinquentis capitis supplicio puniti, nisi sit venetus, aut Paduanus, civis, veli 
ex comitatu ex aliqua familia alicuius aestimationis, & nisi consanguinei eius ex eadem familia 
contradicant. Vel advena nobilis, vel alicuius existimationis, sub poena in dicto statuto contenta. Ad 
quam videndam omnes scholares nostri matriculati possint intrare, dummodo solverint, non 
obstante dicto statuto, quae solutio non possit excedere summam marcellorum trium argentorum, 
ex quibus fiant impensae necessariae, & praefertim exequamur.” See also Carlino  1999 . 
 
5
 Pomata  1998 . 
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was attended by professors and medical students as well as administrators and a few 
dignitaries. 6 Throughout the academic year, but most often in the winter months, 
additional lessons would be held. These were called private and seem to have taken 
place when bodies were found or made available. The public and private traditions 
of anatomical inquiry developed concurrently, often with the one shaping the con-
tent of the other. In Padua, because the private tradition of anatomy gained more 
independence by the end of the sixteenth century, the public anatomy demonstra-
tion became obsolete as a pedagogical venue. Set within this historical context, 
degli Oddi and Campolongo’s lessons were private, and for medical students, 
improvised excursions into the practical, medical issues that arose from anatomical 
inspection. They were medical anatomies, held at the hospital, directed at the 
causes of disease, and attentive to the particular anatomical traits of these female 
bodies. 7 As Campolongo indicated, his dissection would penetrate the body and 
reveal the characteristics and causes of the diseases lodged within. Oriented by 
medical topics – the nature and causes of diseases in the womb and of a fistula – 
these private anatomies featured the activities of dissection as a general method of 
inquiry and one that was more than loosely associated with the masculine, virile 
authority embodied by the professor of medicine. 
 For medical students, these lessons were also a stark contrast to the public 
anatomy demonstrations of Girolamo Fabrici of Aquapendente (Hieronymus 
Fabricius ab Aquapendente, 1533–1619), who took the chair of anatomy and 
surgery in 1565, 3 years after the death of Gabriele Falloppio (1523–1562). 8 
Fabrici did not combine, as Bottoni, degli Oddi and Campolongo did, the processes 
of dissection with the assessment of anatomical particulars; nor did he encourage 
proximity between himself, his students and the specimens. During his long 
tenure at Padua, which lasted into the seventeenth century, he emphasized the 
natural philosophical causes of anatomy, developing a lofty, high style for the 
demonstration of his research. 9 Some students found his eloquence ennobling. 
As early as 1578, the transalpine students, Samuele Keller and Ioanne Wolfango 
Rabus, said that his lecture and private colloquium “filled and elevated their souls 
with many things.” 10 Fabrici inspired his students not because he was dissecting 
corpses and vivisecting animals, but rather because he connected anatomy and 
natural philosophy. He made the focus of anatomy the coordinated processes or 
 
6
 Ferrari  1987 ; Carlino  1999 . 
 
7
 Park  2006 , 39–76 characterizes the medieval origins of this tradition, found in the dissections of 
nuns, done in search of the anatomical signs of sanctity. 
 
8
 These interim anatomists included Prospero Borgarucci and Nicolò Bucella. See Rinaldi  2009 
and Stella  1961 –1962 respectively. For the biography of Fabrici, see  The Embryological Treatises 
of Hieronymus Fabricius of Aquapendente (1942) , 1–32. 
 
9
 Cunningham  1985,  1997 ; Klestinec  2004 . 
 
10
   Acta , 1578, vol. 1, 144: “De Excellentissimo etiam Anatomico compellando tractatum, quod 
tantum minus necessarium videbatur, cum ipse non tamen in publicis praelectionibus sed etiam in 
privatis colloquiis anatomen polliceretur et animos multa spe impleret et erigeret.” 
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actions of the organic soul. 11 These included motion, digestion, respiration, 
sensation and generation. The object of his anatomy lesson was not the many 
anatomical structures that could be isolated within the venter of the body or even 
the various connections between this multitude of structures. Rather, Fabrici’s 
object was a coordinated action, traced through both human and animal speci-
mens and the discussion of their structural and morphological characteristics. 
This approach meant that strange, marvelous, accidental or rare phenomena such 
as a diseased womb or fistula emerged in Fabrici’s teaching and in his publica-
tions as a case to explain at the end of a fully philosophical (and normative) 
account of a process of the soul. They usually emerged as something to explain 
away. As it evolved over the 1570s and 1580s, Fabrici’s program specialized the 
discourse of anatomy by making it contribute more fully and more clearly to 
natural philosophical inquiries. He effectively situated the study of anatomy 
within the theoretical branch of the medical curriculum. It was thus clearly distin-
guished on its own merits and in the minds of students from the practical, medical 
anatomies held in the hospital of S. Francesco. 
 Practical experience meant many things in the early modern worlds of craft 
production, philosophical speculation, experiment, and medical practice. 12 It has 
been associated with practical knowledge, knowledge of contingent effects (trial-
and-error), and the un-theorized perception of phenomena accessible to the senses. 
In the medical anatomies discussed above, practical indicated the kind of anatomy 
lesson underway, a lesson that advanced the understanding of medical topics related 
to disease and did so by investigating the particular traits of the cadaver. Medical 
students did not describe these anatomies in terms of their un-theorized perception 
of the bodies – Campolongo said there was a fistula, and so he would dissect the 
infected area with the preconception of the fistula (and all the commentaries on 
fistulas) in mind. While this sense of practical experience has been used to deter-
mine early signs of an experimental apparatus, it is not evident here (Dear  1995 , 
124–38). Nor did students describe these anatomies in terms of the skillful dissec-
tions that Bottoni, degli Oddi, or Campolongo made. Handiwork was not the issue. 
It was a practical anatomy, a study of particular anatomical signs, found and read 
in the bodies of two female cadavers. Less than two decades later, however, medical 
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 Cunningham  1985 ;  Park 1998 . 
 
12
 On experiment, see Agrimi and Crisciani  1990 ; and Dear  1995 , especially 63–92 and 124–50. 
In medical and related venues, experience came to mean practical knowledge, knowledge of con-
tingent effects, and the un-theorized perception of phenomena accessible to the senses. Experience, 
for example, is especially prominent in the tradition of ‘empirical’ medicine, appearing frequently 
in discussions of recipes and potions and in the marketing strategies of its itinerant practitioners 
(called empirics). It is also mentioned in the context of household physic or domestic knowledge 
held by men and women,  rustici e vecchiette , that derived from trial and error and years and even 
generations of practice with specific ailments, treatments, and conditions. These kinds of experi-
ence have been treated by Eamon  1994 , 134–203, Daston and Park  2001 , 115–139, and Gentilcore 
 2006 , 200–233; on northern traditions, Smith  2004 , 59–94 focuses on experience in the artisanal 
traditions and trades. For the English context, see  Harkness 2006 . 
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students would look to these kinds of events in order to celebrate  peritia or the 
technical, manual skills and expertise associated with dissection and with surgery. 
They would promote  peritia – manual expertise gained from the accumulation of 
experiences (often private experiences) – as a virtue, and in doing so, they would 
help situate it within the academic world of medicine and its study of anatomy 
and surgery. 
 In the late sixteenth century, in fact, the tradition of private anatomy was marked 
by an ebullient reappraisal of  peritia and its transformation into a virtue of the 
university-trained practitioner. The expected division of labor between the physi-
cian and surgeon and the different access to the body (and treatments) meant that 
physicians treated with diet and regimen, the internal, humoral balance of the body 
while surgeons treated external ailments. Despite the fact that medical students 
were training to be physicians, they talked positively and openly about their knowl-
edge of surgery, surgical operations and instruments. For these students, handiwork 
was not relegated to a lower order of practitioners such as barbers or barber sur-
geons. It was pursued. Private rather than public anatomies provided increasingly 
specialized and exclusive opportunities for medical students to encounter lessons 
on the techniques of dissection and especially on the learned traditions of surgery. 
 Students were drawn to these private events initially because they supplemented 
Fabrici’s public and highly philosophical anatomies. Subsequently, however, they 
gravitated to the private arenas of anatomy because they sought exclusive experi-
ences, that is experiences not open to a wider public. Fabrici had opened his public 
anatomies, sometimes called ‘free’ anatomies, to the community. Students were 
outraged by the presence of  meccanici and craftsmen of a lower order at public 
anatomies while they relished the security, familiarity and exclusivity offered by 
private anatomies. From the concerns about mixing orders in these arenas,  peritia 
was secured as an elite, virtue because it was not connected to the experiences of 
 rustici or lower-order crafts and trades. Instead, in the late sixteenth century, it was 
recognized in the technical expertise of professors and learned practitioners, espe-
cially learned surgeons. 
 This transformation can be traced through the extant records of the transalpine 
students at Padua, the  acta of their nation. It is estimated that 6,000 foreign students 
attended the university in the sixteenth century; and the transalpine students consti-
tuted the largest nation of foreign students. 13 This made their complaints especially 
important to administrators, who wished to maintain the number of students at the 
university. The records of the transalpine nation provide a running commentary on 
the activities at the university, including the outcomes of voting assemblies, the 
organization of the nation’s library (and the donation of books for it), and the details 
of pranks, rituals and festivities as well as the content of medical courses and ana-
tomical exercises. With respect to medical and anatomical lessons, students often 
described the pedagogical styles of their medical professors, the degree to which 
such lessons satisfied them, and their desire for more frequent lessons on anatomy. 
 
13
 Kagan  1986 ; M. Saibante et al.  1924 . 
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These aspects serve as the basis for this essay, illuminating the ways in which students 
engaged and responded to the materials of their medical education and to the idea 
of practical experience. Practical knowledge in these accounts was defined as that 
(embodied) knowledge issuing from technical expertise, and by the end of the six-
teenth century, medical students enthusiastically promoted it as a significant part of 
their elite education. 14 
 2  Natural Philosophical Anatomy, Practical Anatomy 
and the Public and Private Spheres of Inquiry 
 By the late 1580s, students attended Fabrici’s natural philosophical anatomies as 
well as the practical anatomies of other professors. They began, however, to judge 
Fabrici’s public demonstration according to the merits of private anatomies. In 1590, 
a transalpine student described one of Fabrici’s demonstrations:
 [Fabrici] has already spent two months on the exposition and description of the bones of 
the head. Having been brought on to the muscles he has completed three, devoting one hour 
to each muscle. There are so many muscles that, proceeding in this way, two years will not 
suffice. When then will he deal with the viscera? In addition, everything is treated con-
fusedly and in a disorderly way: once he discussed the detached arm, going on after many 
days to discuss the foot. I don’t see how anyone can learn the sequence and connection of 
the whole from looking at these. 15 
 Although public demonstrations typically provided an introduction to anatomy 
by covering the external lineaments and the viscera (or “the sequence and connec-
tion of the whole” from the parts), Fabrici here specialized his treatment to deal with 
the muscles alone. 16 He was working on the coordinated action of motion, a focus 
that was pedagogically evident but that this student all but rejected. That focus led 
him to talk about muscles, but not continue his dissection of them. Not only was this 
student tired of hearing Fabrici talk, he was frustrated because Fabrici spent too 
much time on specific parts of the body without connecting them to the larger struc-
tural framework of the body – the bones and the muscles attached to them, a system 
that clarified sequences of muscles from origination to insertion point. 
 The students were subsequently asked, “Why do you desire the private [anatomy], 
do you [not] find the public one pleasing?” In their records, the transalpine student 
recorded his nation’s full response: “We respond that Aquapendente provided a 
 
14
 On this concept of embodied knowledge, see Smith  2004 . 
 
15
 Acta , 1590, vol. 1, 286: “Iam ossium capitis enarrationi et descriptioni duos impendit menses: 
ad musculos devolutus tres absolvit singulis musculis singulas horas tribuens. Tot autem enumer-
antur musculi, ut hac via incedens biennium non sufficiat. Quando igitur de visceribus? Accedit 
quod confuse et tumultuarie omnia pertractantur: iam branchium detruncatum attulit, post multos 
dies pedem allaturus, quando aliquis ex horum inspectione seriem et connexum totius discere pos-
set, non video.” Cited by Cunningham  1985 , 199. 
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 Berengario da Carpi  1521 refers to public or “common” anatomies ( anatomia communi ), 119v, 
489v. 
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most exact anatomy, but that we ask that what the anatomist delivered profusely and 
in a casual style of speaking be put before us in the form of a visual synopsis [or 
chart] that can be remembered, as we do in private anatomy.” 17 The student referred 
to Fabrici’s anatomy as exact, which meant topical – a sense that Fabrici himself 
had used to describe his demonstrations. 18 The student also softened his criticism 
of Fabrici’s teaching, transforming Fabrici’s “confused and disorderly” approach 
into a merely “profuse” and “casual” style. The student also indicated that private 
anatomies contained few words, were memorable, and profoundly visual experi-
ences – that included not only looking at dissected specimens but also looking at 
charts that summarized important anatomical information. By 1590, then, students 
were no longer content with the notion that public and private anatomies belonged 
to separate but equal traditions. Indeed, this student suggested that public demon-
strations could benefit by following the pedagogy and other guidelines that were 
improvised and practiced in private. 
 The student wanted more attention to be devoted not only to the structures of the 
body and their sequences and connections but also to the techniques of dissection. 
These features emerged prominently in private anatomies. Like public anatomy 
demonstrations that helped to specialize the study of anatomy as a natural philo-
sophical enterprise, private anatomies promoted the study of particulars, of the 
medical causes of disease. According to the students, they also emphasized dissect-
ing techniques and treated various parts of the tradition of surgery, thereby provid-
ing a fertile ground for a concept of expertise related to technical skill to take root 
and accrue significance. These private explorations could be undertaken by chance 
during hospital rounds and be led by professors, but more often they were annual 
events, lasting for weeks at a time, and were led by both local practitioners and 
professors, who were all more youthful and engaging than Fabrici. 
 In the 1570s and 1580s, students became dissatisfied with Fabrici, who 
promised to give “most complete and highly illuminating” anatomy demonstra-
tions but who, in the end, provided ones that were “very obscure and imperfect.” 19 
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 Acta , 1590, vol. 1, 288: “Quid, inquit, privatam desideratis, nunquid placuit publica? 
Exactissimam, respondemus, nobis dedit Aquapendens; verum ut illa quae fusius et licentiori 
sermonis genere tradidit Anatomicus, nobis iam quasi in synopsi ob oculos proposita memoriae 
mandemus, de privata agimus.” 
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 Fabrici of Aquapendente  1618 , 3: “Toto hoc tempore, quo non popularem, sed exactam 
anatomen administramus, agere in vestram gratiam, auditores, divino favente auxilio constitui de 
motu, quo totum animal loco movetur: seu de motu locali totius animalis, seu mavis dicas, de 
motu, quo totum animal locum, sue positionem mutat.” 
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 In 1576–1577, Padua witnessed several outbreaks of plague that forced the university to limit 
and then to close its doors, but activities began to resume their normal pace by 1578.  Acta , 
1580–1581, vol. 1, 170–171: “Promiserat hic egregius vir a principio suarum lectionum auditori-
bus suis tractatum de tumoribus praeter naturam, de fracturis et …forte etima de luxationibus. Sed, 
quod maioris erat momenti, pollicebatur nobis anatomen luculentissimam et absolutissimam; 
Namque animum ipsius obstinatum neque praeceptorum intercessiones neque nostrorum preces 
frangere potuerunt, patientia sola nobis reliqua fuit quae et obscurissimam et imperfectissimam 
anatomiam loco luculentissimae et absolutissimae sustinere potuit.” Favaro  1922 explores the 
conflicts between Fabrici and his students. 
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As a result, they eagerly sought to arrange private anatomies. They contacted 
Niccolò Bucella in the winter months of 1572 because he was known to offer anato-
mies from his house in the quarter of S. Maria dei Servi in Padua. 20 They contacted 
the surgeon, Michael Aloisius, about holding an anatomy in the church of St. 
Catherine in January 1582. 21 These events were often delayed or not completed 
because cadavers could not be found. While the administration of the university did 
not immediately satisfy the students’ wishes for more anatomies or explicitly regu-
late the proceedings around private anatomies, it initiated a set of reforms that clari-
fied the distinction between public and private studies of anatomy. 
 In 1583, the administration instituted a series of reforms that encouraged spe-
cialization in the fields and inquiries of anatomy and surgery. One reform 
addressed Fabrici’s lessons in particular, mandating that he would not need to 
interrupt the demonstrations of anatomy with those of surgery because the two 
would be kept separate (and separate resources would be allocated to them). 22 In 
practice, Fabrici did not provide surgery demonstrations. He was fully occupied 
with his anatomical inquiries and his study of natural philosophy. Moreover, the 
statutes allocated only two bodies a year for the study of anatomy, suggesting that 
one would be used for the anatomy demonstration and the other for the surgery 
demonstration. Throughout these years, Fabrici used both cadavers to pursue his 
anatomical inquiries. Information on surgery was transmitted to students in private 
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 Acta , 1572, vol. 1, 85: “Verum huc quoque pertinet, quod Excellentissimus Dominus Buccella 
chirurgus, Nationis Germanicae studiosissimus, ubi constabat brumales ferias absque publica 
anatome frustra scholaribus abire, interpellatus primum a me ipso, deinde et ab aliis, omnem 
operam suam ac benevolentiam in negocio anatomico detulit, paratissimum se aiens cadaver 
aliquod in nostram gratiam secare, dum id ipsi a nobis suggeratur. Mox vero et Itali torpidi illius 
ocii pertaesi, ac praesertim Massarii duo promptitudine Buccellae perspecta (ut lucro etiam ex 
mortuis comparando inhiant), in aedibus ipsius sub natalitia festa anatomen apparent, quae sane 
non exiguum splendorem atque gratiam prae se ferebat, nisi partim incuria et perfidia dictorum 
ministrorum partim difficultate nanciscendorum cadaverum laboratum fuisse laborious.” See 
Stella, n. 6. 
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 Ibid ., “19 Ianuarii Anno 82 habita fuit anatomia privata in collegio Vicentinorum prope templum 
S. Catharinae, quae cum aliquibus Nationis nostrae non approbatur, semel atque iterum me con-
venerunt ac de anatomia privata inter nos facienda mecum deliberarunt, Nationemque convocari 
voluerunt, id quod sequenti die pro ac debui libenter feci. Convenimus omnes in aedibus meis, 
consilium et propositum omnibus placebat, omnes sumptus necessarios contribuere volebant. 
Excellentissimus vir Michael Aloisius chirurgus omnem operam et diligentiam nobis pollicebatur; 
in qua re satis ego quantum potui laboravi, ad quinque parochos ministrum publicum misi, qui 
omnes promittebant se prima quaequam cadavera oblata communicaturos, at quia propter penur-
iam demortuorum cadavera nulla acquirere potuimus, deliberatio nostra irrita fuit.” 
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 Raccolta Minato : 5 February 1583: “Et perchè ognuno sa di quantoa utilità, et honorevolezza sia 
al detto studio il far l’Anatomia ogn’anno…L’andera parte, che’l D. Hieronimo Fabritii sia con-
dotto a legger nello studio nostro di Padoa l’Anatomia ordinamente di anno in anno, et la Chirurgia 
insieme in questo modo però, che tutti li mesi dell’Inverno sia tenuto leggere, tagliare, et mostrare 
l’Anatomia come lettura ordinaria, passati veramente i mesi d’Inverno non possendosi per li tempi 
caldi maneggiare i corpi morti, che si putrefanno sia tenuto legger per ordinaria la Chirurgia non 
intermettendo però quando si possa tagliare, mostrare, e trattare anco le cose di essa Anatomia.” 
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anatomies, taught by a range of local practitioners and professors, including 
Bucella, Paolo Galeotto, and the very successful Giulio Casseri. 23 The allocation 
of corpses for these lessons remains obscure. With its decision, the administration 
distinguished the content of the annual anatomy demonstration from surgery dem-
onstrations. Previously, the same anatomist would move between public and pri-
vate venues; and in both, he would highlight the admirable form of the body and 
the way its study disclosed natural knowledge (natural philosophical), and then 
emphasize the importance of knowing anatomy in order to understand sources of 
disease (medical) and the ways to set fractures (surgical). The administration’s 
decision helped to distribute these aspects among faculty members: Fabrici gave 
public anatomy demonstrations that were more philosophical in character; and 
other professors, especially Giulio Casseri, gave private ones that were oriented 
around medical anatomy and surgery. 
 Though detailed evidence of this private tradition is sometimes scarce, private 
anatomies seemed to have thrived alongside Fabrici’s magnificent public anato-
mies. This parallel development helped focus attention on dissection as a set of 
procedures and on surgery, which was flagged for its manual operations and its 
instruments. Whereas Fabrici demonstrated his work with eloquence and enthu-
siasm (polishing his earlier “disorderly” manner) in the two permanent anatomi-
cal theaters, built consecutively in 1583–1584 and 1594–1595, the professors 
and practitioners who offered private anatomies struck a different note. Casseri 
called it a ‘naked style’, a clear, rhetorically ‘unflowered’ and simple style that 
addressed the topics of anatomy, the procedures of dissection, the maneuvers of 
surgery, and the accompanying visual phenomena of charts, instruments and dis-
sected specimens. 24 
 These private anatomies were smaller events held in the hospital of S. Francesco 
as well as local pharmacies, in the church of St. Catherine, and in the homes or 
basements of these practitioners. These spaces were smaller than the public theater, 
and therefore, the audiences were also smaller. Though exact numbers cannot be 
generated from extant records, the transalpine students rarely mention the attendance 
of other students, suggesting that these private events may have been organized by 
them and held solely for their benefit. In these private venues, attention was paid to 
specimens and structures as well as to dissecting techniques. In 1585–1586, Casseri 
offered a private anatomy, and the transalpine students said that “by dissecting very 
carefully all the parts of the body – not only the internal parts but also the external 
(i.e. the muscles and veins) – and in addition by demonstrating the main surgical 
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 Galeotto remains relatively unknown. Sterzi  1909 –1910 provides a full account of Casseri’s life 
and works. 
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 In his treatise on speech, he refered to his style of presentation by way of his style of speech, 
which he described as both “philosophical” and “nude;” see Casseri  1600 , 4–5: “Dicam autem, 
non oratorio dicendi genere (siquidem vocis dignitatas, et maiestas, pro ineffabili rerum, quae in 
eius celebratione occurrunt, ubertate, sine concinno, ac modulato verborum sono, etiam solis 
instar elucescet) sed dicam, philosophico more, nudis, ac simplicibus verbis; qualia veritatis pro-
pria esse, ait Euripydes.” 
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operations,” he “acquitted himself excellently and satisfied us all.” 25 Galeotto also 
gave a private anatomy for which students commended its “special usefulness.” 26 
In contrast to Fabrici’s soul-elevating treatments of anatomy, these events relied on 
the dissection of the internal and external parts of the body and on the display of 
surgical operations. These descriptions emphasize the careful techniques of dissec-
tion used for the muscles and veins, suggesting that the muscles and veins were the 
objects that best displayed the anatomist’s manual expertise. Moreover, usefulness 
designated surgical knowledge and often a kind of intervention; it was an active, 
operative concept rather than the passive or contemplative one suggested by the 
Galenic category of use. More speculatively, the distinction between internal and 
external treatment, the former done by physicians and the latter by surgeons, 
suggests that the attention to the muscles would be related, for the surgeon, to 
fractures and perhaps also to tumors; and the attention to arteries, veins and nerves 
would be connected to both bloodletting and the cautery of ulcers, sores, and 
wounds. The description indicates a broad interest in the study of anatomy and in 
the uses of anatomy for surgical intervention. It thus runs counter to our expecta-
tions about the division of labor between physicians and surgeons, suggesting that 
medical students in Padua participated in learned medical traditions which included 
the tradition of learned surgery (not barbering). 27 
 The experiences gained at these private anatomies were called “useful” and 
organized around topics and texts as well as manual activity. Praising Galeotto, this 
student noted that the “whole matter” of his demonstration “was useful not to him 
but to his audience,” suggesting by contrast that Fabrici’s demonstrations tended to 
be oriented around his own, topical interests rather than the interests of his 
students. 28 The student explained that “once [the demonstration] had begun and 
the external lineaments of the body had been explained, the Anatomist [Galeotto] 
in the account of the cadaver went straight to the eye, and lectured so clearly 
and so learnedly on its action and structure that he conducted himself as a 
man most experienced [ peritissimum ] in anatomical matters and in optics.” 29 
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 Acta 1585–1586, vol. 1, 210: “In qua sane diligentissime omnes non modo internas corporis 
partes, sed et externas, id est musculos atque vasa dissecando, insuperque praecipuas operationes 
chirurgicas monstrando optime sese gessit, nobisque omnibus satisfecit.” 
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 Ibid ., 211: “Rogamus itaque universos et singulos, ut benevolentiam et labores huius clarissimi 
viri, propriamque utilitatem considerando, frequentes huic interesse velint.” 
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 Although physicians in the sixteenth century tried to reinforce their position in the medical com-
munity by constructing the idea of a tripartite and hierarchical division of labor with physicians 
on top, surgeons in the middle, and apothecaries and barbers on the bottom, these boundaries were 
drawn differently in Venice. Learned surgeons and physicians practiced together, sharing patients 
and networks of associations. See Palmer  1979 and Cipolla 1978. 
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 Acta , 1585–1586, vol. 1, 211: “Potissimum cum sciret nostram prae reliquis Nationem anatomi-
cis ut plurimum delectari studiis, haecque res omnis non in suam sed auditorum suorum utilitatem 
esset redundatura.” 
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 Ibid ., 225–226: “Facto autem principio, post declarata externa corporis lineamenta cadaveris 
ratione protinus ad oculum aggressus Anatomicus, de eius actione et fabrica ita plane ita erudite 
multis disseruit lectionibus, ut virum sese gesserit anatomicarum rerum et opticae peritissimum.” 
43Practical Experience in Anatomy
The student’s preference for Galeotto depended first on Galeotto’s demonstration 
of the external lineaments, his ability to show and explain those parts, and secondly 
on his ability to discuss the eye in relation to optics. Galeotto embodied  peritia , but 
the student extended the category of technical expertise to include both the manual 
activities of dissection and the more theoretical discussion of optics. 
 Galeotto continued to engage students. He was surely gifted, but his success is 
also a sign that students recognized manual skill and technical expertise as impor-
tant. Elaborating on that importance, they began also to assign aesthetic qualities of 
beauty and pleasure to these demonstrations. Although Fabrici sought to have 
Galeotto’s lessons prohibited, Galeotto gave a private anatomy in 1588–1589. 
It lasted for three weeks and took place at a pharmacy near Palazzo del Bo. 30 In that 
practical setting, the students said Galeotto gave “a thorough and complete 
anatomy, in which not only did he demonstrate most clearly and with amazing and 
beautiful ease and method the way to dissect bodies, the structure of all the parts and 
their actions and functions, but he also showed us the ways…through the whole 
body of the veins, arteries and nerves, to the great delight of us all.” 31 In the following 
year, he gave a notable private demonstration, in which “he urged all things complex 
[be presented] with brevity because of the late time of year.” As the student said, 
the warmth of the season did not detract from the demonstration in which he 
“showed to us perfectly the [ways of the] nerves, arteries and veins.” 32 While public 
anatomies in Bologna have been associated with the bawdy spectacles of Carnival 
and those in Padua with a more solemn ceremony, these students found the 
experiences of private anatomies to be delightful, a response notable for its 
consistency and its intensity. 33 In them, they developed an awareness of the process 
of dissection as potentially beautiful or beautifying.  Peritia or technical skill was 
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 Ibid ., 271. 
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 Ibid ., 248: “His itaque peractis, et publica anatome tandem ad finem perducta, Eccellentissimus 
vir Dominus Paulus Galeoti ne quid a pristina sua de scholaribus bene merendi voluntate recessisse 
videretur (quam vis iniuriis publici Anatomici theatrum ipsius esset destructum, ipse variis modis ab 
eodem fuerit lacessitus et in minus commoda carnisprivii tempora reiectus), in officina  al Corallo 
per integras tres septimanas luculentissimam et absolutissimam habuit anatomiam, qua non 
solum mira facilitate ac pulchra methodo, modum secandi corpora, partium omnium structuram ac 
earundem actiones et usus evidentissime monstravit, sed etiam venarum, arteriarum et nervorum 
in universo corpore ductus et propagines, non sine maxima omnium nostrorum iucunditate, sine 
ullis nostris impensis (quamvis ad eas ut aequum erat a spectatoribus exigendas a nobis hortaretur) 
nobis ostendit.” 
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 Ibid ., 290: “Ad XII Kal. Aprilis privatae anatomiae tantopere desyderatae administrationem 
aggreditur Excellentissimus Paullus Galleottus…Quamquam autem tempus anni maturandam 
suadebat, tamen succincta brevitate omnia complexus, parerga praecidens, et fragrantes rerum succos 
libans, nihil praeteribat quod ad rem faceret; immo nervorum, arteriarum et venarum perfectam 
ostensionem nobis exhibuit.” In the same year, Johann Jessenio provided a surgery lesson, which 
the students did not describe with any detail. See  Acta , 1590, vol. 1, 290: “Aquapendens interim 
saepius a quibusdam nostrum et praesertim a Domino Ioanne Iessenio excitus, sese ad VI Kal 
April. Ad administrationes chirurgicas accingit, easque ad finem deducit, sumptus faciente et 
cadaver administrante inclyta nostra Natione.” 
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 Ferrari 1989; Klestinec 2007. 
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also accompanied by the qualities of industry and generosity and linked to the idea 
of expertise found in the world of learned surgery. There were other practical 
lessons at this time – those of Oddi and Mercuriale that dealt with disease and 
mysteries or  secreti – but they were not associated with  peritia , which belonged to 
another class of practical medicine, that of learned surgery. 
 3  Learned Surgery Returns from Exile? 
 Histories of learned medicine have been slow to characterize and incorporate the 
learned traditions of surgery. Surgery and the surgeon, however, have enjoyed a 
ubiquitous presence in histories of vernacular health care in the early modern period. 
In his recent study of the Renaissance hospital, Jon Henderson 34 includes an account 
from one of the institutions in the city of Florence, which paid 3 florins to a bone 
doctor, 6 to a physician and 18 to the surgeon. This distribution, Henderson argues, 
reflects both the expertise and level of activity of each practitioner. The surgeon not 
only spent more time at the hospital doing procedures, but was also able to combine 
the roles of barber, surgeon and apothecary. 35 These categories of healers were, as 
David Gentilcore reminds us, internally unstable in the period: Gentilcore found 
accounts of barbers practicing physic, and Henderson also notes that at hospitals, 
both surgeons and barbers “cut the hair of the staff and patients” and “let blood.” 36 
 Perhaps because the spheres of medical practice overlap, the surgeon has 
remained an ambivalent, protean figure in the history of vernacular health care. 
There was, however, a vibrant tradition of learned surgery in Italian cities, espe-
cially northern ones, in the Renaissance. In their studies, published nearly three 
decades ago, Katharine Park 37 and Richard Palmer 38 indicated that the  medico 
chirurgo or “graduate surgeon” was closely associated with the Renaissance physi-
cian, with colleges of medicine and surgery, with apprenticeships and licensing 
examinations, and with patient care. 39 At Italian universities, students could take a 
doctorate in surgery, and though not many did, most medical students had considerable 
experience with surgery. 40 In Italy, surgery was not limited to manual skill; it also 
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 See also Siraisi  1990 , 153–86. The historiographical situation derives from Cipolla’s  1976 argu-
ment for the radical distinction between physicians and surgeons and O’Malley’s  1970 critique. 
See also Pelling and Webster  1979 . 
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 Palmer  1979 , 453–54 explains that the statutes of the University of Pisa of 1478 required two 
years of university education in surgery plus one year of practical experience for the surgical 
degree, indicating that an academic training was available for Tuscan surgeons at least at that date, 
and precisely the same requirements were laid down in the statutes of the College of Arts and 
Medicine of Padua as revised in 1607. 
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included knowledge of theoretical principles underlying medicine, the practices of 
textual commentary, and specific operations. 41 In contrast, north of the Alps, where 
degrees in surgery were not available, the surgeon was consistently aligned with 
lower trades and the barber. 
 Renaissance medical students were deeply committed to the topic and practices 
of surgery. As the foregoing discussion has indicated, they were fascinated by those 
who exhibited expertise in the hands-on activities of dissection and surgery. That 
fascination could produce surprisingly fervent rhetoric. In a letter from June 1597, 
a medical student at Padua praised his fellow, transalpine colleague Johannes 
Richter for pursuing practical medicine, debating parts of the commentary tradi-
tion, and “devoting himself to the laborious work for the administrations of anat-
omy and surgery.” 42 The student elaborated the topos of devotion by suggesting that 
it was Richter’s diligent study and labors that earned him “so much ingenious and 
erudite honor that it caused the eyes of all to turn to him” and transformed him into 
“an ornament of the entire transalpine nation.” 43 Richter’s devotion to the labors of 
anatomy and surgery was matched by the students’ reverence: he became an ornament 
of the nation while they were converted into his supporters (his followers). Wrapped 
in a rhetoric of religiosity, the praise suggests that among students,  peritia was 
important, a virtue and a sign of virtuosity. 
 The Renaissance university, however, was not an especially fertile environment 
for the development of manual expertise. Or so the claim goes. Scholars have pur-
sued other locations for evidence of applied epistemologies: artisans’ workshops; 
venues and books associated with the marketplace, and starting in the seventeenth 
century, scientific societies, sufficiently detached from the local university. 44 At the 
university in Padua, a similar argument was made about the study of anatomy. 
In  De methodo anatomica (1593), Girolamo Capivacci, then professor of medicine, 
explained, following Galen, that anatomy is not only “to be considered by way of 
dissection, but also truly by way of actions and uses.” 45 Elsewhere, he employed an 
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 Epistolario della nazione artisti , 1565–1647, n. 476–477: Anonymous, letter Johannes Richter 
Oppaviensis, June 1597, 141r–142v: “Is enim Scholar Excellentium Virorum frequentando, praxim 
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 Capivacci  1593 , 3: “Non modo circa dissectionem versari, verum etiam circa actiones et usus…
Artis anatomicae haec sit definitio. Ars Anatomica est ars naturae hominis sectione, actione, et 
usu comparata.” The treatise was formulated earlier alongside other methodological formulations, 
which were subsequently published in the 1590s. 
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Aristotelian terminology of causes, emphasizing the necessity of moving from 
material to formal and final causes. Pursued in this way, he argued, anatomical 
inquiry too could produce philosophical knowledge [ scientia ]. This, Capivacci 
declared, “is to be distinguished from the domain of practica [ peritia ], which is per-
tinent to dissections and to manual activities [ manuales ].” 46 This was the method that 
underlay Fabrici’s anatomical inquiries; and it situated Richter’s handiwork at the 
bottom of a hierarchy of legitimate claims to knowledge. For Capivacci, the anatomist 
did not leave behind the manual activities associated with dissection. Instead, knowl-
edge of causes was seen to derive from the description of a part, although the anato-
mist (along with his students) is celebrated for his ability to explain why a thing 
exists, rather than ‘merely’ describe it. 47 But the students seemed to see it in a differ-
ent way. For them, Richter’s handiwork was praiseworthy by itself. 
 Capivacci constructed an academic medical hierarchy with surgeons at the bot-
tom and philosophers rather than physicians at the top. 48 Although it may seem as 
if he reproduced the age-old division between learned and popular medicine, 
between professors and practitioners, and, finally, between intellectual and manual 
labor, the boundary that he attempted to draw was a response to contemporary 
events: to the innovative work of Fabrici in the field of anatomy, which would be 
given a more secure place in the institution if it was accompanied by a clear, 
humanist method; and to the students who protested at the lack of practical, medical 
and surgical instruction in anatomy demonstrations. 
 Moreover, by the 1580s, both physicians and surgeons were publishing widely 
in Latin and the vernacular; they practiced together, sharing patients as well as 
thoughts on diagnoses and treatments; they collaborated in examinations and voting 
assemblies. 49 These men shared networks of associations that ran to the upper ech-
elons of the Venetian Republic, serving on military expeditions and public health 
boards; their interests and their commitments were part of the medical profession 
as it took shape in the late sixteenth century. It is in this specific intellectual and 
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 Capivacci, 4–5: “Declaro, loco forme et proinde generis dictum fuit, esse scientiam, ut distinguere-
tur a peritia, quae pertinet ad incisiores, ad manuales…Loco autem subiecti, et proinde differentiae 
dictum fuit. Hoc est non modo sensu, sed etiam ratione comparatum; Quantum ad brevem 
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est in causa, ut hoc definitum a quocunque alio magis distinguatur quam ex particulis propositis.” 
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 The  demonstratio propter quid , which gave knowledge of causes, was seen to develop from the 
 demonstratio quia , which was the description of the part. 
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 Although the university curriculum intended a student to pass from logic to natural philosophy, 
on his way to medical studies, Capivacci seemed to reverse the direction, arguing that anatomy 
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geographical context that Capivacci sought to distinguish the professor from the 
practitioner, to make the surgeon subservient to the physician and the philosopher. 
 This world of surgery provided medical students, who were dissatisfied with 
Fabrici’s philosophical treatment of anatomy or perhaps eager to establish profes-
sional relationships and networks with successful practitioners, with a context for 
applied-learned surgery. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Venetian College of 
Surgeons hosted annual anatomies as well as disputations and examinations for 
degrees and licenses. These anatomies attracted both professors and students from 
nearby Padua. 50 They took place more regularly in the second half of the sixteenth 
century at the church of S. Paternita, which is no longer extant, and the church of 
S. Stefano. 51 These public anatomies were not only important because they intro-
duced basic structural anatomy to local practitioners but also because they estab-
lished professional relationships. 52 
 These anatomies did not follow Fabrici’s idea of anatomy as a natural philosophical 
pursuit. Nor did they adhere to Capivacci’s program, for Capivacci focused on the 
philosopher, not the physician, further distancing the academic world from the world 
of professions and practice. They introduced techniques related to surgical operations, 
interventions into the body. As one Venetian surgeon, Giovanni Andrea della Croce 
(discussed more fully below) explained, the surgeon’s activities were aimed at uniting 
and consolidating or mending the broken parts of the human body:
 I say, in the human body (to demonstrate the difference between the art of Surgeons and 
and that of Horsemasters [ marescalchi ], who work upon inhuman or animal bodies); and 
I say living to make it understood that Surgery is very different from anatomical actions, 
which work solely upon dead bodies. 53 
 
50
 Palmer  1983 ; Bernardi  1993 . 
 
51
 BMV, It.VII 2370 (9668), Cap XXXVI, 81, De anotomia. Between 1550 and 1605, the records 
indicate anatomies took place in 1574, 1585, 1594, 1602, 1603. See BMV, It.VII.2327–2335 
(9721–9729) Collegio medico chirurgico di Venezia: Atti (1476–1805), Libro D: 1549–1628 (cc.171). 
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 Palmer 1985, 458 has documented a fascinating case in the 1560s, when the famous surgeon 
Niccolo Massa testified on behalf of Zuata Francesco da Burano, who was then petitioning the 
Doge to allow his son Giacomo to practice with him in the service of the Republic; Massa said 
that Giacomo was not only a doctor in the art of medicine, learned in philosophy and medicine, 
both physic and surgery, but also “a man of worth.” Massa went on to say that this year, when the 
anatomy was held, “finding myself with him and discussing the anatomy, I saw and heard that 
Giacomo has a very good understanding of these matters.” Massa’s father was a doctor of physic, 
and he testified that Giacomo took his doctorate with the College of Physicians in Venice and that 
the vote on him was unanimous; he then noted that Giacomo had “observed anatomies and also 
with his own hands has practiced privately with other doctors.” Giacomo was a learned surgeon, 
a  medico chirurgo , engaged by these public anatomies and “practiced” at private ones. 
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 Croce  1583 , preface: “Et dico, che opera a fine di correggere, over ricuperar la perduta unità di 
alcun membro; perche questa è l’intentione, il commodo fine, e la utilità, che si aspetta, e si con-
seguisce da questa arte: essendo tutte le sue attioni, et ogni suo fine à unire, e consolidare quella 
parte, che è rotta, tagliata, quasta, o altramente divisa; dico, nel corpo humano (per dimostrar la 
differenza fra l’arte Chirurga de’Medici, e quella de’Marescalchi, che operano ne’corpi inhumani, 
e bruti) dico vivente per far conoscer la Cirugia esser molto diversa dall’attioni anatomiche, che 
operano solamente nei corpi morti.” 
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 The distinctions, while not overly refined, did become points of contention. 
These practitioner-based anatomies became a prominent feature of a graduate sur-
geon’s reputation, a prominent feature of his claim to expertise. In  Lo specchio , the 
outspoken empiric, Leonardo Fioravanti (1518–1588) criticized surgeons for their 
faith in anatomy. These surgeons, he claimed, treated their patients like anatomical 
objects, scraping their bones like “the chops of a pig.” 54 Academic anatomists, 
Fioravanti ranted, “continue in public studiums cutting dead men’s bodies, making 
anatomy in order to teach the students how the human body is composed, so that 
they would then know how to treat [patients] when they practice the art of sur-
gery.” 55 Fioravanti has in mind the figure of the graduate surgeon, trained formally 
at the university by professorial anatomists. Ending on a strong note, Fioravanti 
states that unlike the butcher and his art, which “are very necessary to human life,” 
anatomical knowledge is of little importance: dissection is unnatural, for “we see 
many dogs that never give themselves over to destroying the bodies of other, dead 
dogs.” 56 Fioravanti tapped the concern that anatomical practices verged on sacri-
lege. This concern derived from the fact that dissection comprised the integrity of 
the body and often delayed or deferred indefinitely the burial of the body (Park 
 1994 ; Carlino  1999) . Fioravanti, however, set the concerns about dissection within 
the context of the professions of academic anatomists, graduate surgeons, and 
butchers. He deployed the rhetoric typically reserved for the critique of vocations, 
and importantly, made anatomy the occasion and the graduate surgeon the target. 
 While anatomy and surgery were not synonymous, it was in the context of these 
professional debates that different parts of the study of anatomy and of surgery 
entered into constructions of expertise. Capivacci narrowed the surgeon’s role and 
decreased his significance by defining him according to his manual skill; Fioravanti 
criticized what must have been a serious competitor, the graduate surgeon, by con-
necting anatomy to butchery rather than to the traditions of learned medicine 
(where, for example, Vesalius sought to locate the study of anatomy). In contrast, 
the published works of surgeons emphasize the theoretical principles of surgery, the 
ancient sources of the tradition, and the practical benefits of cautery , setting frac-
tures, trepanning the skull and other activities associated with the instruments of the 
art. The rational surgery of the middle ages had emphasized the theoretical princi-
ples of the discipline (McVaugh  2006) , and this aspect was given due attention by 
Venetian surgeons in the sixteenth century. 
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 Fioravanti  1572 , 49–50: “Ma io per me ho sempre veduto, che i cirurgi, che sono buoni anato-
misti, quando medicano pianghe, sempre vogliono fare la loro anatomia coi ferri tagliando le 
povere carni humane, come se fossero brasuole di porco, vogliono raschiare gli ossi, dare fuoco.” 
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 Ibid ., 49: “I Cirugici, i quali volgiono sostenare, che loro sono stati gli inventori di questa anato-
mia, allegando che di continuovo ne’studii publici tagliano huomini morti, facendo notomia di 
essi, per insegnare alli Scolari, come sta la compositione dei corpi humani, accioche poi sappino 
medicare, quando eglino pratticaroanno la Cirugia.” 
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 Ibid ., 53, 51, 51: “La beccaria e arte molto necessaria al vivere humano; e quante vene, nervi, 
muscoli, e ossa vi sono. Ma, al giuditio mio, questo sapere importa molto poco; noi vediamo i 
cani, che mai non danno molestia alcuna a i corpi de cani morti.” 
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 These aspects of the learned tradition of surgery are reflected in the life and 
work of Giovanni Andrea della Croce (Bernardi  1826) . Son of a surgeon and from 
the Dorsoduro parish, Croce was licensed by the College of Surgeons in Venice and 
accepted as a member in 1532. He spent time as a surgeon for the naval fleet and 
subsequently became prior of the medical college, where he entered a culture of 
learned, sophisticated and urbane practitioners. 57 A sign of that sophistication was 
his connection to Francesco Sansovino with whom he worked on an Italian transla-
tion of Giovanni di Vico’s  Practical Surgery (1560). 58 In addition to treatises 
on military medicine and the treatment of wounds (1560), Croce published  The 
Universal and Perfect Surgery (of all the parts necessary for the optimal surgeon) 
in Latin in 1573 and in Italian in 1574. In that monumental work, he identified 
himself as “medico venetiano” and offered “the theory and the practical aspects 
necessary in surgery,” emphasizing his debt (as a humanist surgeon) to Hippocrates, 
Galen, Celsus, and Avicenna. 59 Croce’s concept of surgery was a learned one. He 
explained that surgery required the “work of the hands” and was guided by the 
practical intellect 60 :
 Surgery is the oldest and most certain part of medicine, and it is a habit of the practical 
intellect, acquired with many rules and by experience [isperimenti], that is, with artful 
operations of the hands and proper instruments, joining, separating, and tying together the 
many wounds that run through the parts of the body; I say that one does this quickly, with 
certainty and with little pain, the artificial operation is done by the hands of the Medico, 
which is different from the other operations done by him with the intellect, such as seeing, 
composing, risolving, defining, demonstrating or other various actions completed with the 
parts of the soul…[Surgery] is the artificial operation, done with order, with art, with pru-
dence, and not without a light touch, and it is structured by anatomical learning and 
extended practice. 61 
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 Ibid . 
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 Bareggi  1988 . 
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 Croce  1583 , title page. Nutton  1985 has shown that classical texts on surgery were slowly made 
available in new editions mostly of the sixteenth century: while Celsus was available as early as 
1478; Galen’s  Method of Healing appeared in Latin in 1519; the main surgical sections of 
Avicenna’s  Canon , Books XV and XVI, were not available in Latin until 1549; Book VI of Paul 
of Aegina’s  Compendium of medicine appeared in 1528; and Oribasius’s surgical books were 
translated and made available by Vidius in 1544. 
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 According to Aristotle, the practical intellect had two parts  ars and  prudentia :  ars or artificial 
operation was concerned with changeable things in nature, things which can be manipulated by 
manual, mechanical operations; and prudence, by contrast, was the faculty responsible for making 
moral decisions. Croce wished to include both in his definition of learned surgery. On the practical 
intellect in early medicine, see Ottosson  1984 , p. 90. 
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 Croce, bk. 1, preface: “La cirugia è la più vecchia e la più certa parte di tutte la medicina, e è 
un’habito dell’intelletto prattico, acquistato con molte regole, e isperimenti, accioche con artificiosa 
operatione delle mani, e stromenti accommodati, uniendo, separando, e togliendo via molti affetti 
nel continuo delle parti del corpo humano: presto, sicuramente, e con poco dolore danar possi dico, 
che è artificiosa operatione fatta con le mani del Medico, a differenza di molte altre operationi fatte 
da lui con l’intelletto, di videndo, componendo, risolvendo, diffiniendo, dimostrando, o altramente 
operando con le parti dell’anima…Et è artificiosa operatione, cioè fatta con ordine, con arte, con 
prudenza, e non senza leggiadria, e è regolata dall’anatomia, e da una lunga prattica.” 
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 Croce’s work on surgery is part of a larger development on the part of these 
surgeons to publish often and widely. 62 Their works treated the subjects of medicine 
and public health. In Latin and the vernacular, they demonstrated their knowledge 
of natural philosophy and of the ancients, their ease with traditions of commentary 
and the practices of medical humanism, and their knowledge of current treatments 
(especially for syphilis and plague). They also published in the fields of literature 
and art. Michelangelo Biondo (1497–1565), for example, published Latin treatises 
on physiognomy, memory, and medical topics – both practical and theoretical – and 
in the vernacular, a plague tract, pastoral poem, and study of the  paragone of the 
arts. 63 He moved easily between languages, disciplines and genres. Similarly, at the 
end of the century, in addition to two, short tales, Fabio Glissenti (ca. 1550–1620) 
produced his enormous study on death,  Discorsi morali (1596), which breached 
generic boundaries in order to probe the literary, philosophical and medical signifi-
cance of his subject (McClure,  1998,  2004) . Venice brought medical students into 
contact with these men, with these models of intellectual and professional success. 
Culturally sophisticated, these surgeons could not be reduced to the manual skill 
of a ‘mere’ dissector. Indeed, Croce argued, anatomy was instrumental to surgery 
– not the other way around. 64 
 4  ‘Class-Consciousness’ and the Venues of Anatomical Inquiry 
 Back at the university, various aspects of this tradition of surgery, which was at 
once practical, theoretical, humanist, and cosmopolitan, intersected with the study 
of anatomy. Recalling Richter’s experience with the study and labor of anatomy and 
surgery, we must consider for a moment that this experience was particular not only 
because it depended on particular features of corpses, but also because it indicated 
something exclusive, an experience not available to all medical students. It did not 
derive from the public tradition of anatomical demonstrations, which was open to 
students who paid three “marcelli d’argenti” so long as they had matriculated into 
the university at least 1 year before and were studying medicine. 65 
 Public and private anatomical traditions were never entirely separate, however. 
They continued to respond to each other, reshaping the significance of both, as the 
 
62
 On publishing strategies and professional development, see Carlino  2009 and Harkness 2006, 
introduction. 
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 Biondo  1999 , introduction. This is a modern edition of Biondo’s treatise on physiognomy, 
originally published, in Rome, by Antonio Blado Asolano in 1544. 
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 See n. 38. 
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 Statuta Almae Universitatis D. Artistarum et Medicorum Patavini Gymnasii , bk. 2, ch. 27: 
“D. rector cum uno socio omnes doctores legentes, & omnes doctores de collegio, & ipsi 
duo massarii: ac etiam duo ali scholares pauperes de quorum paurpertate saltem per eorum 
iuramentum constet si fuerint per rectore, & consiliarios electi admittatur fine ulla solutione. 
Reliqui omnes repellantur. Nec rector aut consiliarii, aut ipsi massarii habeant potestatem aliquem 
admittendi non matriculatum, & qui non studuerit in medicina per annum, & quis non solverit.” 
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following example will demonstrate. In 1595, Fabrici had written to the Venetian 
Senate to request permission to host a “free anatomy” in the new anatomical theater 
(1594–1595); and on 12 September 1596, the Senate granted his wish, accepting 
financial responsibility for the annual demonstration and the maintenance of the 
theater. 66 He was likely motivated by the large and diverse crowd that attended 
the premier demonstration in the new theater, a crowd that included (according to 
the student describing the event) “tailors, shoemakers, sandal-makers, butchers, 
fishmongers, and, lower than these, porters [perhaps funereal] and basket-bearers.” 67 
Fabrici’s publicity stunt was not appreciated by all medical students. In the records 
of the transalpine nation, the conciliators, Matthia Jacobaeo Ripensi (a Dane) and 
Georgio Rumbaum Uratislaviensi (a Silesian) wrote passionately against the idea 
of a “free anatomy [ liberam anatomiam ]:”
 I counsel that there should be no credence given to the opinion of those who try to intro-
duce anatomy for free in this academic institution, a sort of disease of the humanities, and 
the most open window of sedition and murder, contrary to our ancient traditions that have 
been preserved all the way to the present age. Indeed, what would agitate more vehemently 
or excite to arms more quickly those noble and learned members of the most famous 
school, those enjoying the extraordinary and unassailable privileges, than to witness with 
a hostile eye or to allow a crowd of the worst sort of gaping craftsmen and vulgar men to 
occupy the lower benches – nay! The whole theater – to trample, diminish and impede that 
sweetest fruit of anatomy? 68 
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 Acta , 1595, vol. 2, 57: “Sed volo ut sit libera, omnes ut videant absolutissimam; et oportet ut 
Universitas Venetiis scribat ut ex pecuniis Studii sumtus habeat, et ego etiam intercedam meis 
literis; et concedo ut eligatis secundum statuta Massarios quibus singulis septimanis dabo florenos 
quatuor.” On free admission, see also Riccoboni  1598 , xviii: De ingressu in theatrum ad spectan-
dam anatomen et honore anatomici. See also  Senato Terra Registro 66, Archivio di Stato di 
Venezia (12 September 1596): “L’andera parte, che per l’avvenir l’Anatomia nel predetto studio 
nostro di Padoa sia libera, si che cadauno possa entrar nel theatro à vederla senza pagar cosa 
alcuna, et per le spese, che occorrono farsi siano delli danari delli danari [sic] della cassa del studio 
ogn’anno che si farà detta Anatomia Ducati XXV. Da esser dati a parte a parte, secondo che farà 
bisogno, il qual bisogno sia conoscuito da lettor di essa alli Massari over Anatomisti da esser eletti 
dalla Università al principio del studio per provinar le cose necessarie d’essa Anatomia non poten-
dosi dar più di fiorini quattro alla settimana; per quelle settimane però, che l’Anatomico taglierà, 
et amminstererà le parti del corpo, et non quanto solamente leggerà, et detti sfiorini quattro hanno 
contati in mano dell’Anatomico, che taglierà, et administrerà et per lui siano dati a detti Massari 
secondo che conoscerà esser bisogno.” 
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 Ibid ., 58: “Confluxerat eo tota quasi civitas, et extremae etiam farinae homines tanquam ad 
forum cupedinis: subsellia occuparunt hebraei, sedentarii magistri, sartores, calceolarii, solearii, 
carnarii, salsamentarii et his inferiores baiuti et corbuli illi.” 
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 Ibid ., 60–61: “Neque eorum standum esse sententiae unquam et consulo et suadeo, qui liberam 
anatomiam quasi rei literariae pestem in hoc statu academico, atque fenestram seditionis ac caedis 
latissimam contra morem antiquum et ad nostram hanc usqu aetatem servatum, introducere conan-
tur. Etenim quid nobilissimos Gymnasii celeberrimi studiosos, privilegiis singularibus praeceteris 
et immunitatibus gaudentes, commoveret vehementius aut ad arma excitaret celerius, quam invido 
conspicere oculo aut pati oscitantium etiam mechanicorum et proletariorum hominum extremae 
sortis catervam, subsellia immo universum theatrum occupare, fructum illum anatomiae iucundis-
simum conculcare quasi, minuere, impedire?” 
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 The transalpine student experienced Fabrici’s free anatomy as contaminating. 
The presence of craftsmen was part of the “disease” afflicting the noble institu-
tion of the university and particularly, the liberal arts. These craftsmen were not 
local, respected medical practitioners, who were welcomed into the theater and 
eagerly sought out by transalpine students. Instead they came from ‘lower’ trades, 
those belonging to the production of food and clothing. 69 Moreover, the student 
flagged the ancient traditions of learning, insisting on the humanist foundation of 
his education in anatomy and on an image of the academy that was exclusive, an 
institution, a pedigree, a set of habits reserved for the noble orders and higher 
trades. The presence of craftsmen in the anatomical theater threatened to diminish 
his humanist education. 
 The description indicates that the craftsmen inhibited the students’ ability to see 
the anatomy. The presence of the former obstructed sight lines and the educational 
agenda of the event. Students had become used to listening to Fabrici during the 
public anatomy demonstration; the anatomical theater, newly built, splendid and 
extravagant, was an auditory space. Fabrici even hired musicians on two occasions 
to join the annual staging of the anatomy. 70 This time, however, something was dif-
ferent. The theater was crowded, as usual, but when it mixed orders – noble and 
non-noble – the result was a searching claim for the visual and not only the auditory 
apprehension of anatomical knowledge. In the language of the description, one 
hears the discourse of civility: the craftsmen looked the wrong way, they “gaped” 
at the spectacle, which prevented the students from  properly seeing its “fruits.” 
 The students’ anger at the integrated audience in the anatomical theater culmi-
nated (on the pages of the nation’s official records) in a rhetorically rich, violent, 
and futile outburst. The students concluded: “Let it remain hated, if we are wise; let 
this incitement to idleness remain hated, since it would be better in the present 
circumstances to use even a slippery knife, however feeble, than it would be to 
enjoy fully an uncertain hope in future circumstances [for our education].” 71 The 
students had been told to maintain peace (incited to idleness), and thus could only 
defend their honor and education with words – violent words rather than deeds 
though they wished to take up weapons, even feeble ones. The metaphor of “ansa 
lubrica” or slippery handle emphasizes the students’ connection to the scene. It was 
an anatomy demonstration, but they felt a connection to the more active students at 
the event, namely the student-assistants ( massarii ), who by election to the position 
 
69
 During the discussion of this paper, Alan Salter pointed out that these lower trades were 
predominantly ones that worked with animals – bleeding and skinning animals, making their parts 
available to eat, and tanning the hides for shoes and clothing. Perhaps these tradesmen thought 
they could learn technical skills from the anatomist, or perhaps they wished to compare their 
technical skills against those of the anatomist. The applicability of anatomical knowledge, however, 
was not the only reason that spectators came to the theater. On the wide appeal of the anatomy 
demonstration in Bologna, see Ferrari  1987 . 
 
70
 Acta , 1594–1595 and 1597. 
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 Acta , 1595, vol. 2, 60–61: “Valeat, si sapiamus, valeat detestandus desidiorum fomes, et ansa 
lubrica, cum melius sit praesentibus exigua uti, quam frui incerta sperandis spe.” 
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were responsible for the details of the event and the preparatory dissections. These 
student-assistants took up knives, even slippery ones. This was the basis of the 
metaphor and however obscure, the clue to this demonstration. Future anatomies 
were uncertain – would bodies be made available; would space be found to demon-
strate; would Fabrici uphold his responsibilities as a teacher? – but the students’ 
remarks extend, with the help of a hyperbaton, that uncertainty to humanist educa-
tion, which at the end of the sixteenth century, looked to them like it was in a state 
of decline. 72 
 This episode should be seen in light of both public and private traditions of stag-
ing and studying anatomy. Fabrici’s public anatomy made students intensely aware 
of the nobility of their education. In concrete terms, they criticized the public pro-
ceedings according to the merits of private anatomies: based, first, on the ability to 
see particulars; secondly, on the ability to participate or follow carefully the manual 
techniques of dissection and surgery; and finally, on the ability to engage in ana-
tomical study and inquiry that was exclusive (private and intimate rather than public 
and open). Importantly, these features were laden with ideas of honor, masculinity 
and the uncertainties about life after graduation (how diminished would their 
degree be if the university was too often ‘open’ to everyone?). 
 5  Conclusion 
 By the end of the sixteenth century, anatomy and surgery were separate fields at the 
university of Padua, a splitting introduced formally during a series of seemingly 
innocuous reforms in the early 1580s. The study of anatomy was recast as a natural 
philosophical enterprise, capable of producing  scientia , and Fabrici worked to 
transform his research in this area into a visible, public anatomical tradition. Fabrici 
promoted this tradition and further refined it in the permanent anatomical theater. 
Not neglected or stunted, the study of surgery also prospered under these new insti-
tutional conditions. Local surgeons and practitioners as well as professors provided 
regular instruction on dissection and surgery in private venues. Students sought out 
these events that were simultaneously useful, participatory, and exclusive. They 
learned about dissecting techniques and surgery; and in accounts of those experi-
ences, they reflect on the nature and importance of technical expertise. Accruing 
significance in these private anatomies, technical expertise ( peritia ) became a vir-
tue, one that students identified as present or absent in their teachers and in their 
colleagues. Students were fascinated by expressions of this expertise and devoted 
to those who embodied it. 
 While technical expertise ( peritia ) has been a feature of recent studies on artisa-
nal traditions and trades, it appeared in Padua when academic life intersected with 
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 Favaro  1922 describes the many ways that the transalpine students were disappointed by Fabrici’s 
anatomy lessons. Fabrici delayed his lessons, refused to offer them, and shortened them. 
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the cosmopolitan ethos of nearby Venice. Graduate surgeons were visible examples 
of successful practitioners and of a new cultural, urban elite – humanist in pedigree 
and entrepreneurial in spirit. The reputation and allure of graduate surgeons also 
influenced medical students, giving them reasons to make technical expertise an 
important part in their academic studies. They considered craftsmen, not surgeons, 
to be beneath them. As ideas about professions were taking shape against an 
increasingly refined and expansive marketplace, students sometimes adopted the 
language of professions, characterizing their teachers and their peers in terms of 
labor, industry and devotion. Technical expertise found a place in this broadly con-
ceived reassessment. 
 Several questions might be asked in the wake of this development: how did the 
various parts of this learned tradition of surgery develop and gain traction in the 
university (Fabrici, at the end of his career, published an encyclopedic study of 
surgery); what kind of relationship was obtained between  peritia , an embodied 
technical skill, and instruments; and how did questions about the vernacular or the 
 questione della lingua provide new legitimacy to vernacular publications, practitio-
ners, and work (is this what Casseri hoped to promote with his desire to use a 
“nude” or “naked” style for anatomy)? 
 In a review essay on the nature of natural philosophy, Adrian Johns  (1999) situ-
ates the critical interest in experiment as the response on the one hand, to the many 
different systems and theories of nature on offer in the early modern period, and on 
the other, to the realization of implicit character assumptions about investigators 
being credible, reliable, honest gentleman. These experiments, Johns explains, 
“entertained, and in entertaining they exemplified a polite way of learning that could 
underpin a more stable society. In an age of all but unlimited contention, experi-
ments alone proved persuasive.” He then cites Roger French’s evocative description 
of William Harvey’s spectacular vivisection of the chambers and structures of the 
heart: “There is a conviction arising from being covered in blood that recognizes no 
philosophical opposition.” 73 Johns ends his review by noting that the sources of that 
conviction are difficult to decipher. Private anatomies, while not experiments per se, 
elicited conviction but not necessarily because they covered the participants with 
blood or gore. Rather (perhaps occasionally, in addition) they offered experiences 
that were private, exclusive and not available to lower social orders and thereby 
reaffirmed the students’ membership in the ruling elite. The students’ conviction 
derived from conceptions of social identity. The conviction had an aesthetic charac-
ter as well. Galeotto’s dissections displayed his technical skills and his expertise 
( peritia ); but his dissections were also ‘exquisite’ and ‘beautiful,’ an aesthetic judg-
ment that emphasized the accumulation of experience – seeing many dissections in 
addition to doing them – and the clarification and disclosure of the body to sight. 
While craftsmen endorsed  peritia in the production of goods and could make quali-
tative judgments about the use-value of goods, the anatomist-surgeon-student 
attained expertise in dissection, a moment identified by its aesthetic character. 
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 Johns  1999 , 1128–1131. 
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Expert dissections not only revealed the body, they transformed the body, via 
dissection, into an aesthetic object. Far from the contaminating presence of lower 
craftsmen and tradesmen, private anatomies were thrilling because they were exclu-
sive; they secured manual expertise as an academic privilege and perhaps also as an 
aesthetic accomplishment. 
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 Abstract  The relationship between science and literary texts in the early seventeenth 
century has only rarely been examined by scholars yet it is of immense importance 
in explaining the achievement of scientists in the period. The emergence of a lan-
guage of empiricism and its usage in genres as eclectic as cosmography and drama 
shaped the practice of science by providing expressions and concepts that could be 
applied by investigators to their inquiries. But it was not just the language that took 
effect. Empiricism and the senses became topics in their own right and the works 
they appeared in displayed energy and intensity and an excitement at the possibilities 
of using new narrative ideas to explain the world. It is my contention that without 
this discourse of the senses the empirical practices that enabled the physiologist 
William Harvey to discover the circulation of the blood and the generation of the 
animal could not have been devised. 
 1  Introduction 
 During the second half of the sixteenth century the key words of empiricism took on 
their modern meanings. Observation came to signify scrutiny, or careful regard or pains-
taking attention to a thing; its earlier usages included custom, or practice or the per-
formance of a devotional rite. Experience now meant personal affect as a source of 
knowledge; it had hitherto meant a trial or an event that affected an individual in some 
unspecified way. And to its prior usages of meaning, as in the meaning of scripture or a 
statement, or faculty, organ or instrument the word sense now served to convey concepts 
such as inward imagination, or the perception of an external object, or as something in 
opposition to intellect or reason. The frequency with which these words appeared 
increased greatly; citations of the word sense, its cognates and variants jumped by a 
factor of four, experience by seven and observation thirteen. Prior usages did not disap-
pear but it was the new empirical usages that accounted for these big increases. The 
number of texts in which these words appeared increased by similar proportions, well 
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above the increase in the number of all books published. So too did the frequency of 
affiliated words such as diligent or industrious, often used to qualify observation. 
 These new significations and the ideas that they gave expression to were not 
limited to scientific texts. They appeared in genres such as poetry, drama, travel and 
pageantry whose audiences extended beyond philosophers and physicians to mer-
chants, artisans and the common man. Authors took the physiology of the senses as 
a foundation on which to construct imaginative treatments of epistemology which in 
turn shaped the new philosophy of empiricism. A discourse of sense emerged that 
infiltrated public imagination and helped to shape the activity and the texts of scien-
tific inquiry. It is the spread and confidence of this discourse – from obscure epic to 
popular entertainment – that makes it possible to argue that a work such as William 
Harvey’s  de Motu Cordis published in 1628 which displays unmistakeable evidence 
of the language and concepts of popular empiricism could not have been written prior 
to the early 1600s and that Harvey could not have made his breakthrough discoveries 
without an intimate familiarity with this public discourse. It is this claim that I discuss 
in my paper, by an examination of five texts representative of this “genre empiricism” 
followed by an analysis of Harvey’s debt to this discourse in his two major works. 
 2  Five Texts 
 2.1  On Experience: Eden’s A Treatise of the New India (1553) 
 Eden’s text is a translation from the original Latin of Sebastian Munster’s work of 
“universall cosmographie.” The book describes strange and wonderful things: of 
events on the voyage south via Aden where the king was hanged, of elephants “very 
docible and apt to be taught,” of the marital customs of Calicut, of the practice of 
suttee, of the sale of elderly parents by their children to cannibals, of timber sawn 
by stone tools and of “the people with great hanging eares.” 
 But it is Eden’s own preface that is of greater interest for in it he claims that 
experience is the necessary and sufficient source of knowledge. Things experi-
enced, he writes, however strange exist: “Whereas in this Booke (wellbeloued 
Reader) y u mayest reade many straunge thinges, and in maner incredible, except 
the same were proued most certayn by dayly experience & approyued auctorie”; 
he marvels that Magellan sailing westward from Spain met the Portuguese 
sailing eastward in the Molucca islands, “(A) thing surely most wonderful, and 
in maner incredible, but that the same is proued most certayne by experience.” 1 
 
1
 This may be a comment on the possibility of a flat earth, an idea still current in England and 
referred to in Eden’s later passage on the errors of St. Augustine. Under the Treaty of Tordesillas 
of 1494 the non-European world was divided into two. Portugal was allotted the Eastern hemi-
sphere, which was defined so as to include Brazil which Portugal already claimed, and Spain the 
Western. The meeting of Magellan in the service of Spain and the Portuguese in the Molucca 
Islands south of modern Borneo would therefore demonstrate by experience the existence of a 
spherical earth. I am grateful to Captain Iain Kirk of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority for 
suggesting the meaning of this passage to me. 
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When in discussing the existence of the Antipodes he writes that “no man 
knoweth further hereof then is tryed and founde by experience” he marks out 
things experienced as the boundary of things known (Eden  1553 , 2, 4, 6). 
 Eden justifies his confidence in experience in part by reference to its success. 
“Wherfore,” he writes, that “whereas men of great knowledge and experience, are 
to great affaires, theyr attemptes haue for the most parte good successe.” Augustine 
failed in the absence of experience; of his errors in astronomy, Eden writes:
 and to declare my opinion in fewe words, I thinke it no greate 
 marueyle that Saincte Augustyne shoulde fall into erroure in the 
 science of Astronomie in whiche he trauayled but as a straunger... 
 And I beleue playnely that, that excellent witte of hys, could not haue 
 remayned longe in y t erruor yf  he had been wel exercysed in 
 Astronomy, or had knowen any suche experyence as is spoken of 
 here beefore. 2 
 Eden’s claim of the sufficiency of experience is more radical. He denies the 
separateness of reason. Reason means knowledge, and knowledge is “what we 
commonly call learning, whether from books or from discourse.” But Castiglione 
showed, Eden writes, that the knowledge found in books is valueless; the wise man 
relies on his own experiences and the experiences of other men and on the contents 
of their minds, themselves reliant on their own experiences and those of other men. 
It follows then that knowledge, or reason, is reducible by infinite regress to experi-
ence. Reason is not a class of rules independent of experience; it is an accumulation 
of individual men’s experiences and thus reducible to it. 
 2.2  On Observation: William Cuningham’s  The Cosmographical 
Glasse  (1559) 
 The Cosmographical Glasse begins with a flamboyant front piece portraying the 
great heroes of cosmography, such as Strabo, Ptolomey and Marinus (probably the 
Phoenician cartographer of the first–second century) as well as classically attired women 
representing arithmetic, astronomy and so on. In the upper centre of the frame is a 
motto “Viscerit Vulnere Veritas,” literally “Truth becomes green from injury” or more 
easily “Truth ripens in pain,” signalling the immense struggle involved in the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. It is a point Cuningham expands on in a short introductory verse:
 In this Glasse if you will beholde 
 The Sterry Skie, and Yearth so wide, 
 The Seas also, with windes so colde, 
 Yea and thy selfe all these to guide: 
 What this Type meane first learn a right 
 So shall the gayne thy trauill quight 3 
 
2
 Eden  1553 , 5. 
 
3
 Cunningham  1559 , 1. 
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 “Type” means a representation or figure so that those who would understand the 
image in the cosmographical glass and would benefit from it must first learn how 
to observe the figure properly, through hard work, practice and habit. 
 The work is part dialogue and part catechism between Spoudaeus, a plodding 
student, and Philonicus his teacher on the necessity of diligent observation in 
acquiring knowledge of the world. Cuningham had a close personal as well as 
professional interest in the topic; though an educated and practicing physician he 
published several almanacs and was a keen astrologer. Of cosmography (a compre-
hensive discipline of geography, astronomy, geology, anthropology and so on) he is 
lavish in his praise:
 If ever there wer Art for all mens vse inuented, Science set forth 
 wherein consisteth Sapience, or Treasure worthy to be had in 
 estimation: no doughte (loungye Reader) either Cosmographie is 
 the same, or els it is not to be founde vppon th’Earth. 4 
 And of his glass, the metaphor of his instrument of inquiry, he writes that:
 I... haue deuised this mirrour…(in) which men may behold not 
 one or two personages, but the heauens with herplanets and 
 starres, th’Earth with her beautifull Regions, and the Seas with her 
 meruellous increse. 5 
 The importance of the text lies in its treatment of observation. Observation, 
Cuningham writes, is necessary for knowledge since man is “in all things ignorant, 
except in such as ther senses and custome teach them” (Cuningham  1559 , 1). 
Language and rhetoric are not knowledge and words prove nothing; only observa-
tion, correctly performed, can discover truth. But observation is not some vague 
procedure or elusive concept; it is an exact and specific technique for the arrange-
ment of our sensory perceptions. Observation can be divided into two parts: the 
observation of a thing and the observation of a sequence of things. The former is 
necessary to establish precision, the meaning of which is explained by Philonicus 
in an example concerning the measurement of geographical dimensions:
 I will in fewe words open up the whole labour. Take a quadrant 
 (...which you shal see among the other instruments) and set it directly 
 vpright vpon some playne in the meridian lyne...and is here marked 
 A.B. as also C...then rayse vp and downe the ruler...vnto the sonne, 
 whan as he is in the meridian line: and obserue diligently that height, 
 in the circle of degrees noted in your quadrant from B. to C. the .xi. or  
 .xii. day of December which is B.D. vntill you find he goeth no lower: and 
 againe in like case the .xi. or .xij. of lune vntyll you perceiue he 
 increaseth nothinge in height. 6 
 These instructions, detailed and precise, are followed in the text by a table of 
longitude, latitude and declination. But this table has more than an informational 
 
4
 Cunningham  1559 , 2. 
 
5
 Cunningham  1559 , 1. 
 
6
 Cunningham  1559 , 15. 
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purpose; by its detail and density it demonstrates the precision and diligence in 
the technique of observation that Philonicus expounds. Philonicus reveres proper 
observation; it is attentive and careful, more like a measurement than a description. 
 The observation of a sequence of things protects the precision of the single 
observation from the possibility of error and establishes its stability over the course 
of time. In a passage from Book 2, Philonicus instructs Spoudaeus on the observa-
tion of the constellations. Spoudaeus is concerned that there is a diversity in the 
declination of stars and planets, perhaps caused by instruments “not exactly made.” 
Philonicus refutes this, saying that it is due to the moving of the heavens, and 
though “it vary not in a mans lyfe any thing sensible” it is important to know “the 
obseuring of it exactly and also teache other that hereafter shal lerne as you are now 
instructed your selfe” in order that future measurements can be made in the same 
way as hitherto. 7 
 This notion of diligence pervades the work. Diligent observation guards against 
the possibility of error, corrects the mistakes of others and protects the inquirer 
against flaws in instruments, for these flaws must be detected and cannot be held 
responsible for faulty observations. Spoudaeus is in awe of Philonicus, often refer-
ring to the methods he has been taught for drawing maps and measuring and calcu-
lating declinations, latitudes and so on; he marvels at the techniques necessary to 
gather the dimensions required for these maps, of diligence, close and painstaking 
attention to the thing and the multiplicity and frequency of single inspections that 
constitute proper observation. 
 2.3  On the Senses: George Chapman’s  Ovids Banquet of Sence 
 (1595) 
 George Chapman moved to London in his early maturity where he mixed in a group 
centred on Sir Walter Raleigh, and which was mocked by Shakespeare in  Love’s 
Labours Lost as the “School of Night.” Other members of the group were 
Christopher Marlowe, Thomas Harriot and Matthew Roydon, a mathematician 
and one of Raleigh’s associates. Chapman dedicated Book 18 of his translation of 
 The Iliad to Harriot, completed Marlowe’s  Hero and Leander following the 
playwright’s death and argued in  De Guiana that Elizabeth should recognize 
Raleigh’s discovery of the territory and fund its colonization. The activities of this 
so called School of Night provide the background for Chapman’s epic. It was, in 
one editor’s words, “a group of men…interested in pushing science and philosophy 
beyond the bounds of contemporary belief and decorum…bound together by a 
common curiosity” and for whom  The Shadow of Night , Chapman’s first published 
work, was its manifesto (Bartlett  1941 , 5). Although we can read  Ovids Banquet of 
Sence in the banquet tradition in which the hero meets a sequence of provocative 
 
7
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challenges to be overcome, we can also read it in an empirical context in which the 
senses are portrayed as discrete instruments of the human body with physiological 
capacities and imaginative powers. 
 Early in the poem Chapman deals with the reliability of sight. He introduces the 
story of Niobe whose statue was brought from Mount Sipylus in Lydia to Augustus’ 
garden in which the action takes place. There Niobe turned into a rock and shed 
everlasting tears after her children were killed by Apollo and Artemis. The myth of 
Niobe is a poetic opportunity for Chapman to treat of sight’s deception:
 So cunningly (is the statue) to optick reason wrought, 
 That a farre of, it shewd a womans face, 
 Heauie, and weeping; but more neerely viewed, 
 Nor weeping, heauy, nor a woman shewed 8 
 Chapman dwells on the opposition inherent in sight when he writes of the physics 
of vision and the eye’s superficial appreciation of its object:
 Betwixt mine Eye and obiect, certayne lynes, 
 Moue in the figure of a Pyramis, 
 Whose chapter in mine eyes gray apple shines, 
 The base within my sacred obiect is: 
 On this I will inscribe in golden verse, 
 The meruailes raigning in my soueraigns blisse, 
 The arcks of sight, and how her arrowes pierse 
 (Chapman  1595 , 69) 
 Chapman means there is a pyramid drawn by rays of light that emanate from Corynna, 
the object of Ovid’s affection, and the peak of this pyramid shines into his eyes. But 
her form, the base of the pyramid, exists only in his mind. He will therefore inscribe a 
poem on his mind to explain how her beauty pierces his eye but is not captured by it. 
 The closing stanzas of the poem deal with touch but Chapman’s touch is not 
the base sense of antiquity and the Renaissance but is the divine sense, “(t)he sence 
wherewith he feeles him deified” that we must use with “feare and reverence” 
(Chapman  1595 , 80, 81). Touch overcomes the blindness of our other senses; it 
is the goal of all our human actions. It renders the body spiritual and is “the sences 
Emperor,” the “King of the King of Sences,” the individual private sense and the sense 
that disputes against reason (Chapman  1595 , 79, 80). It is the true expression of love, 
grounds all other senses, feels and has feeling and creates eternal memories. 
 Chapman’s ideas on sensory materiality occur throughout the work and argue for 
the superiority of the senses over reason. Corynna bestows a kiss on Ovid that throws 
him into a delirium, a swirling of his body and a confusion of his mind; the tunes that 
were “shooke from her braine (and) first conceiued in her mentall wombe” were 
“nourisht” by her animal womb and changed in their material form. Ovid’s unwelcome 
entreaty that Corynna grant him a kiss may show him to be weak in character, but his 
weakness is the result of a sensual strength that claims his reason. It is the senses that 
allow Ovid’s eventual triumph; they satisfy all his exigencies, spiritual and material. 
 
8
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 2.4  On the Senses: Middleton’s  The Triumphs of Truth  (1613) 
 Thomas Middleton’s pageant for the inauguration of Sir Thomas Middleton 9 of the 
Grocers’ Company as Lord Mayor of London in October 1613 was the most 
magnificent of the era, surpassed only by the 1604 coronation entry of James I into 
the city. It cost 1,300 pounds, at a time when the average annual wage of an unskilled 
worker in south-east England was 5 pounds, and consisted of five ships, movable 
islands, small hillocks and elaborate transportation mechanisms. 10 Its subject is the 
contest between truth and error and in it the five senses play the central role. 
 After a song addressed to London, a “Graue Foeminine Shape,” mother to many 
honourable Lords Mayor, the pageant moves to the river, where the first thing it 
sets its eyes upon is a display of five islands “art-fully garnished with all manner 
of Indian Fruite-Trees, Drugges, Spiceries.” 11 The company returns to Barnard’s 
Castle, where his Lordship is attended by Truths Angel, sent by truth to guard and 
guide the mayor, accompanied by Zeale, “Truths Champion…the scourge of 
Sin.” 12 It continues on to Pauls-chaine close by St Paul’s where Error waits and 
implores Middleton on the promise of great riches to forego Truth. But Zeale 
forces Error and Envy, Error’s champion, to retreat and make way for truth, and 
demands of the mayor that he reject Error. Truth is personified as a woman dressed 
in flowing white silk; she recalls her lesson from the past, that there is but one true 
way to truth:
 let not thy Heart be led 
 In ignorant waies of insolence and pride 
 From Her, that to this day hath bene thy guide; 
 I neuer showed thee yet more Paths then one, 
 And thou hast found sufficient That alone 13 
 The company moves to St Paul’s Churchyard, the largest public space in the City. 
At the head of the procession is the chariot of Truth accompanied by Truth’s celes-
tial handmaids, the three graces and the four virtues. Close behind are Zeale and the 
Angel of Truth keeping guard over the Lord Mayor in his chariot, pursued by Error. 
The narrator describes the scene in the churchyard:
 
9
 There is not thought to have been any familial relationship between the playwright and the mayor. 
 
10
 The Russian ambassador Alexis Ziuzin described Middleton’s pageant as ‘the most expensive 
and elaborate lord mayor’s pageant ever produced.’ See Taylor,  2008 . Sir Thomas Smith, of the 
Haberdashers and Skinners and Governor of the East India Company explained to the Russian 
entourage that “except for the King’s coronation there is no other such great ceremony in 
England.” See Taylor, 2007, 977 fn. Bergeron notes that the coronation pageant cost 4100 pounds. 
See Bergeron, 73. 
 
11
 Middleton  1613 , A3, B. It was a customary for pageants to display the products of the Livery 
Company to which the new Mayor belonged. The fruit trees, drugs and spices point to the Grocers 
Company’s foreign trade. 
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 Middleton 1613, B2. 
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 where stand ready the fiue llands, those dumbe 
 Glories that I spake of before vpon the water, vpon 
 the heighth of these fiue llands sit fiue persons, 
 representing the fiue Sences,  Visus, Auditus, Tactus, 
 Gustus, Olfactus ….; at their feete their proper 
 Emblemes,  Aquila, Ceruus, Araneus, Simia, Canis, 
 an  Eagle, a  Hart, a  Spider, an  Ape, a  Dogge 14 
 In what can only be an intentional conjunction of vistas, the islands of the senses, 
first seen on the river, are now the first pageants to be observed by the company 
after Truth’s claim that there is only one pathway to truth. They are arranged in a 
line or a triangle, with sight and smell at the vertices of the base line, hearing and 
taste midway along the inclinations and at the apex touch, which probably occupied 
the largest island. A ship appears, suddenly, with neither pilot nor sailor, but on a 
white streamer “these two words set in letters of gold, Veritate Gubernor, I am 
Steer’d by Truth” and on the ship the King of the Moors and his Queen. On the 
island of touch there stands a castle, where the king’s followers are to be found, two 
or three appearing on its ramparts. 15 
 At this point the procession is led by the five islands who guide the ship, Truth, 
Zeale, Error and the Lord Mayor along Cheapside into “the little Conduite,” 16 where 
stands a mount, bearing the title “Londons Triumphant Mount,” which is the “chief 
Grace and Luster of the whole Triumph.” The mount has been taken over by Error and 
is symbolically shrouded in fog and mist. At each corner stands a monster, each one a 
disciple of Error: barbarism, ignorance, falsehood and impudence. But Truth sends 
Error on its way so that the mount is returned to glory by the lasting power of truth. 
 With this glorious “mount triumphant” the figuration of the pageant changes, 
from the allegory of the power of the senses that point the one true way to truth 
to a celebration of the city of London and its beneficence. At the foot of the 
mount sits mother London; above her Religion and at her sides Liberality and 
Perfect Love, all personified and dressed in manner fitting to their proper charac-
ter. At the rear are four pageants depicting chastity, fame, simplicity and meek-
ness; and to the sides displayed the city’s charitable and religious works. Knowledge 
and Modesty sit on the heights of the mount. Finally to the Guildhall, the site of the 
city’s government, where London and Truth praise the celebration of the day and 
its hero, the mayor, though not before Time, who offering to cut off the glories of 
the day with his scythe, is prevented by his daughter truth. The day ends with the 
death of Error and “all the Beasts that are joynde to it,” set on fire by a flame shot 
from the head of Zeale. 
 The Triumphs of Truth describes the victories attained by truth over error during 
the day, culminating in the final victory, the destruction of error and its beasts. 
Truth’s victory was grounded on the five senses, which show the one true path to 
 
14
 Middleton 1613, B2. 
 
15
 A Moor was an Indian, possibly a reference to the Grocers’ Company’s interests in India. 
 
16
 Little Conduit Street, which according to present day maps lies at the end of Cheapside. 
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truth. The senses dominate the action of the pageant. They appear first, atop the 
islands on the Thames, and next in the long and stately scene in St Paul’s 
Churchyard, where it is most likely that, given the size of the yard, the majority of 
the audience would be found. This scene has a central allegorical role too, for the 
senses “stand ready” to receive Truth and protect her during the next stage of her 
journey. In the previous scene Truth has affirmed that there is one true path to truth 
and in this next scene she immediately comes upon the senses, which signify this 
one true path. This same scene portrays Zeale forcing Error to retire by threats of 
fire and words alone. But these cannot endure for fire is soon extinguished and 
words are forgotten, so the senses must intervene. 17 The islands are physically 
dominating too, five chariots on one of which, the middle one, touch, is a castle in 
which are to be found the followers of the King of the Moors. Though the mount 
triumphant seems to take the head of the procession on the four journeys from 
Cheapside to Leadenhall the allegory has by this stage altered to a more gentle form, 
which tells of the goodness of the City, its religious and charitable works. But the 
threat from Error does not diminish and the five islands though hereafter unmen-
tioned must I think remain part of the company, for the mount triumphant poses no 
material threat to Error and Envy. 
 Middleton has no view on the priority of the senses. It is the case that he prob-
ably places touch at the head of the five islands, perhaps in a triangular format 
borrowed from the Nova foelix Arabia arch erected for James I’s coronation entry 
to the City in 1604, and it is also the case that he accords to touch the responsibility 
of hosting the King of the Moor’s castle, but there is nothing else to suggest that he 
wished to draw attention to the senses’ hierarchy. There is the familiar treatment of 
the senses in the plot and in the language: an air sung at the beginning of the pag-
eant is called sweet, a description also found in Chapman, 18 and the narrator 
says that the opening ceremony will give his Lordship’s “eare a taste of the dayes 
succeeding glory.” 19 But there is no explanation for the presence of the islands or of 
the emblematic representation of the senses by animals. There is no comment on 
the senses’ leadership of the procession, nor of the central role they have in the 
pageant (why did Middleton not call the pageant the triumph of the senses?). 
All this suggests that the treatment of the senses, their natural leadership, their 
personification and even the gesture at the primacy of touch was unsurprising and 
expected. The day is patterned like the passage of life; the Lord Mayor enters into 
it as a child, borne of Mother London, to be handed over to the city at its end by the 
triumphs which have throughout been guided by the senses and the circumstances 
and values of the city so that Middleton elevates the five senses to a position of 
eminence in the life and society of man. 
 
17
 It is possible that fire here is the fire of the four elements of antiquity but it is I think more likely 
to be flame, since it is flame that destroys Error, shot from the head of Zeale in the closing 
spectacle. 
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 Corynna has a “sweete voice.” See Chapman  1596 , 57. 
 
19
 Middleton  1613 , A3. 
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 2.5  On Language, Reason and the Senses: Thomas Tomkis’ 
 Lingua  (1607) 
 Lingua: Or “The combat of the tongue and the five senses for superiority ” was first 
performed in 1607. The plot concerns a fierce, angry and sometimes violent contest 
between Lingua, symbolizing language and reason, and the five senses. The primary 
characters are Lingua, Auditus, Tactus, Olfactus, Visus, Gustus and Communis 
Sensus, but there are important secondary characters too, such as Veritas, Mendacio, 
Lingua’s page, Phantastes and his page Heuresis, and Memoria and his page 
Anamnestes. The action takes place in a grove called Microcosmus. 
 The matter of the play is introduced in the first scene where Lingua and Auditus 
debate her contention that she should be granted the status of a sense. Lingua says 
she will petition Communis Sensus with her demand to be included with the senses 
but Auditus instantly rejects her argument. Language is deceitful, he claims; she 
counters that it is the senses that tyrannize for they pass to mind only what they 
wish the mind to know. I shall take my revenge, she announces, for I know how to 
deceive the senses and how to imitate them: their weakness is their pride and I shall 
be satisfied. In a brief end to the scene she instructs her page Mendacio to lock up 
Veritas and sets about to devise a scheme that will make the senses compete one 
against the other. 
 After a short intervening scene Common Sense enters in grave and sombre dress 
introducing himself as Psyche’s sovereign and proceeds to conduct a strange 
disjointed conversation with Phantastes. Common Sense then instructs Lingua to 
command the senses to attend him, for the contest is about to begin. The format is 
to consist of Lingua and each sense showing the objects by which they are to be 
judged. Lingua begins her advocacy and looks to all her friends to stand with her: 
rhetoricians, lawyers, women and so forth. Her speech is flamboyant and contains 
much gibberish, “Gallemaufry” Common Sense calls it, but she makes the apposite 
point that the senses can only be represented by polished language, for their knowledge 
is only of things present. But the tongue can recount things past and things to be; it 
can charm the animals and the plants and prevent wars when all the senses have 
been defeated; the world would fragment were it not for speech. It is an eloquent 
speech says Common Sense, but it is not enough for these attributes of rhetoric, 
logic and narration are not in the nature of a sense. 
 Appetite, a minor character, then delivers a formal statement signed by the 
senses listing ten charges against Lingua. They assert that she has imprisoned 
Veritas; that she maintains a train of artless Empiricks; has made rhetoric wanton, 
logic to babble and astronomy to lie. To present their own cases the senses arrive in 
high fashion, attired in grand heraldic costume. Visus defends the validity of sight. 
Sight reveals all; light, sight’s page, discovers falsehood; the eye is the soul’s mirror; 
and wisdom is bred by experience which is seen by the eye and conveyed to the brain. 
Auditus, Olfactus and Gustus each chime in. Finally Tactus speaks. The hand, he 
says, is the instrument of all instruments, the root of life, like a spider casting her 
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net over every part of the body. Touch has great skill and all other senses are 
beholden to it; touch can command them all.  20 
 Common Sense gives his judgment. The senses must be classed into two: those 
that are pleasurable, which deserve the crown, and those that are necessary, which 
deserve the robe. Pleasurable senses such as sight and hearing serve the queen (that is, 
the soul), and the necessary senses serve the body. Since sight is the sense of invention 
and hearing the sense of increase it is right that sight takes the crown. Tactus is to 
receive the robe because he is the necessary sense. Auditus, Olfactus and Gustus are 
given minor roles. Lingua however is not a sense for there are only five great bodies 
in the Universe, the four elements and the pure heavens, and so there can be only five 
senses. But since Lingua is a woman, Common Sense decrees that henceforth all 
women shall have six senses, the five known and a sixth, the sense of speaking. Lingua 
is not pleased at this slight and vows revenge. But her revenge is easily and quickly 
defeated and she is punished, to be imprisoned and guarded by Gustus until she is 
80 years old. As for Mendacio, her page, his punishment is never to be believed. 
 Tales of deceit and trickery pervade the play. Language and reason deceive. 
Auditus accuses Lingua “confesse the truth, th’art wont to lie” 21 and Mendacio 
concurs “My Ladie loues me exceedingly; she’s alwayes kissing mee, so that … 
Mendacios never from betwixt her lippes.” 22 The senses also deceive but with this 
important point of difference: they deceive themselves. Visus is deceived by Tactus, 
who pretends he has the plague; Tactus is deceived by his own imagination to think 
he is a prince, a Caesar, a great Alexander, “transform’d, unto the sacred temper of 
a King” when he puts on the robe and crown, laid down by Lingua and Mendacio 
for him to discover. These episodes are intended to amuse but they conceal an acute 
insight into the character of sense perception, that it is arrogant and mistaken. Visus 
has no skill in the recognition of the plague, no prior encounter and no experience 
as a physician; sight can only see. Tactus cannot comprehend language and so is 
tricked by the words of Mendacio; and Olfactus smells but cannot imagine or rea-
son. Lingua is right when she observes that there is no independent mediation by 
the brain of the senses’ input, for they conspire to influence the brain’s judgment:
 O how these senses muzzle common sense: 
 And more and more with pleasing objects strive, 
 To dull his judgment and preuert (sic) his will 
 To their behests 23 
 Nor are the senses objective; they are deceived by context and memory. They can-
not transcend their own experience; they see what they wish to see and smell what 
they wish to smell. 
 
20
 The hand is the “King of the King of Sences.” See Chapman  1595 , 80. 
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 Tomkis  1607 , Act I, scene I. 
 
22
 Tomkis  1607 , Act 3, scene I. 
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 Tomkis  1607 , Act I, scene I. 
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 While there are plenty of clues in the play as to contemporary discourse on 
scientific matters there is only one explicit reference to the increasingly confident 
expression of empiricism in the science and popular culture of this period when 
Common Sense invites Lingua “to speake what you can for your selfe.” She 
 proceeds as follows:
 My Lord, though the Imbecillitas of my feeble 
 sexe, might drawe mee backe, from this Tribunall, 
 with the habenis to wit Timoris and the Catenis 
 Pudoris, notwithstanding beeing so fairely led on 
 with the gratious ( e p i o g c e i a ) of your iustissime 
 ( d i c a i o s o n h z ) Especially so asprimente spurd’ 
 con gli sproni di necessita mia pungente, I will 
 without the helpe of Orators, commit the totam salutem 
 of my action to the Volutabilitati ( t o n  g  v a i c i l o s  l o g o s ), 
 which (avec votre bonne playseur) I will finish with 
 more then Laconica Brevitate. 24 
 The purpose of the passage is to introduce her speech, first apologizing for her 
weakness as a woman and promising to proceed quickly without assistance and 
to conclude briefly. But Common Sense is right when he calls it gibberish. It is 
not so much that the passage uses five languages but rather that in an effort to 
impress and captivate it succeeds only in being affectatious and foppish. Memoria 
steps in and highlights the problem: “I remember about the year 1602, many vsed 
this skew kind of language.” 25 This is how people used to talk he says, but no 
more. We no longer speak this half language, with its Latin, Greek, French and 
Italian but plain English, the language of experience and the senses. Common 
Sense likens this mixture of language to a congealing of English tin and Greek 
gold drawing attention to the contrast between the two. Tin is a hard metal, older 
than gold, utilitarian, that when alloyed to copper and bronze makes tools and 
weapons; gold is soft and superficial, for decoration and jewellery. In this short 
exchange of no more than a few dozen words Tomkis conveys the essence and 
import of his drama: the legitimation of English empiricism, of the victory of the 
senses over the false reason represented by Lingua and the break with the past 
that, though not necessarily caused by the change in monarch, had occurred 
alongside it. 26 Lingua is no knockabout farce but a serious work whose language 
and depiction of the intensity of the contest between empiricism and reason pro-
vides us with a vivid example of the vindictive reality of this epistemological 
 
24
 Tomkis  1607 , Act 3, scene 5. I have placed the Greek text in parentheses because the characters 
are unclear in the EEBO (Early English Books On-Line) version. 
 
25
 Tomkis  1607 , Act 3, scene 5. 
 
26
 James I ascended the throne of England in 1603. James’ ascension was widely regarded as new 
era for the Kingdom, attested in part by the appearance of the phoenix at the Nova Arabia Foelix 
arch in the Coronation pageant and Dekker’s comment in the accompanying text that “vpon this 
day, began a new  Creation .” See Bowers  1955 , vol. II, 258–259. 
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discourse. The work was astonishingly popular, going into five reprints, the last 
in 1657, some 40 years after Tomkis’ death. Its format of naïve comedy, learned 
allusion and close-textured dialogue suggests that it was written for a mixed audi-
ence and that empiricism, reason and learning were topics of intense interest at 
all levels of society and were not restricted to recondite debates in the universi-
ties, philosophical clubs or court. 
 3  The Discourse of the Senses and William Harvey’s 
Idea of Empiricism 
 The association between language and thought is not new. It has already been 
studied in the premodern period by Lucien Febvre who demonstrated that the 
availability of words was critical to the articulation of new beliefs. More recently, 
David Rosen has examined the relationship between the scientific and poetic 
communities in the early modern period, finding a shared discourse and its 
necessary presence in scientific discovery. To Rosen, this “shared discourse” lived 
in the shadows of learned England, solitary, subtle and independent of other cul-
tural currents. But there was another discourse, illustrated by the work of 
Middleton, Tomkis and others. This discourse was public, assertive and self-
confident; it gave birth to new genres, not in rejection of earlier notions of the 
senses and their place in discourse but in acknowledgment of their capacity to 
amplify and enrich it. In this discourse the senses offered explanatory power, 
provided a greater linguistic range with which to describe contemporary celebra-
tions and anxieties and introduced a wholly new subject, the senses themselves. 
The combative action and the flamboyant victories of the senses over language 
and reason in works such as  Lingua and  The Triumphs of Truth introduce an 
empiricism that is vital and energetic. Sense literature in the early modern period 
was disputational and densely descriptive, exemplified especially in the work of 
Chapman; it was as though there was a fervent desire to understand the senses 
and that writing about them would accelerate the attainment of that desire. New 
narrative threads emerged and the senses were now enlisted to describe, imagine 
and explain the world. 
 Harvey drew on these new threads in his work on circulation and generation. 
Two fifths of  de Motu Cordis consists of remarks, reflections and propositions on 
empiricism. Most of these forms make use of its essential words -sense, observa-
tion, experience and their cognates and variants- in meanings that first appeared in 
the second half of the sixteenth century.  De Motu Cordis is as much a text about 
empiricism as it is about physiology and Harvey’s discoveries were only possible 
because of a literature and language that made empirical concepts available to 
investigations of the animal body. 
 Consider Harvey’s frequent use of the words sense and experience. Except when 
he uses it in its ordinary meanings of perception and the organs of perception, he 
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identifies the word sense  (sensus) with knowledge, truth and observation. 27 In the 
Epistle Dedicatory to Dr Argent at the beginning of  de Motu Cordis he praises 
philosophers who are never “so abundantly satisfied in their own knowledge” that 
they do not welcome the truth from elsewhere, 28  and later in chapter 9 refutes 
erroneous opinions of the motion of the heart as being “contrary to observation 
 (sensui) .” 29 The ideas expressed here are exactly what we see in Tomkis when Visus 
claims that all knowledge and experience is revealed by the sense of sight and in 
Middleton who puts the senses in dominion over truth. Like Chapman, Harvey endows 
touch with great imaginative power. His language suggests an acute cognitive capacity, 
a completeness of information at the moment of perception and a remembrance 
more firmly embodied, more enduring than sight or hearing. In  de Motu Cordis , 
he frequently uses the verb to sense  (sentire) to mean feel, and throughout the 
 Prelectiones and much of  De Generatione Animalium he ranks touch as the privi-
leged sense, natural as well as mediated, and material rather than intellectual. 
 As with Eden, for whom experience is the necessary and sufficient source of 
knowledge, so too with Harvey. Following an assertion as to the cause of breath-
lessness in a tertian fever he comments that “I say this as one who has had experi-
ence  (expertus) in the dissection of those who have died at the beginning of an 
attack.” 30 In writing of the contamination of the body by poison, the wound 
itself being unaffected, he writes “the wound made by the bite of a mad dog 
being healed, yet I have seen fever  (experti sumus) and other terrifying symp-
toms ensue.” 31 In chapter 17 he remarks on the reasons for the large vessels in 
the lungs and why they “are filled so full of blood as we know from experience 
and our own eyesight.” 32 
 The relative importance of sense or experience compared to reason appears 
infrequently as a topic of discussion in  de Motu Cordis but is a central theme in 
 
27
 In assessing Harvey’s original Latin I have been mindful of the possibility of modern usages 
creeping into recent translations. I have therefore used the Whitteridge translation which is 
based on the 1653 English edition. I have also consulted Leake’s earlier translation. With very 
few exceptions, Harvey’s Latin was classical rather than Renaissance. In particular, the key 
words of his empiricism -  observatio, observo, experientia, experimentum, experior, sensus, 
sentire, their cognates and variants – are classical not Renaissance. See Giglioni  1994 . And as 
Hoven points out, Renaissance Latin was not really a language but more a supplement to clas-
sical Latin. See Hoven  2006 , xix. Other than a brief comment by Whitteridge on the inadequa-
cies of dictionaries of classical Latin in translating Harvey’s zoological terms neither she nor 
Leake offer any firm views on the sources of his Latin. Accordingly I have assessed both trans-
lations in the context of classical Latin, relying on the Oxford Latin Dictionary and the classical 
sources cited therein. 
 
28
 Harvey 1628a, 6. 
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 Harvey 1628a, 6, 80. 
 
30
 Harvey 1628a, 113. 
 
31
 Harvey 1628a, 113. The 1653 English translation has “we have notwithstanding observed that a 
 feaver and other horrible Symptoms have ensued.” See Harvey  1653 , 110. 
 
32
 Harvey 1628a, 132. 
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 de Generatione Animalium . 33 Harvey’s preface to this work deals in part with the 
reliability of the senses and the mediation of the intellect, both cardinal themes of 
 Lingua and  Ovids Banquet of Sence . Consider, writes Harvey, a painter about to 
paint a portrait. He makes a thousand sketches of the person’s face, yet when he stores 
each drawing in his mind it no longer represents a face but something different, an 
abstraction, an imagined thing, obscured and confused by the act of representation. 
This mental image differs from the thing itself and from every other mental repre-
sentation; the class of all such observations is not a single mental object, for our 
intellect constructs different images of the same object. There is a distinct scepticism 
here that is characteristic of the work of Chapman and Tomkis. For “those who see 
foreign countries and towns or the inward parts of the human body only in drawings 
or paintings, and make for themselves a false representation of the reality” he warns 
that they “will never attain to a solid and certain knowledge.” 34 
 Harvey’s practice of observation is distinguished by the same qualities of 
differentiation, frequency and diligence that we find in Cuningham. Writing of his 
custom of making notes to be later assessed one against the other he writes of 
“collecting and comparing many observations”; of the motion of the blood in the right 
auricle of the heart close to death he comments that he had “observed (it) at different 
times”; and of the lungs in  de Motu Cordis he notes that “I have discovered many 
things from the countless observations I have made.” 35 When he writes that 
“what has been rightly spoken may be confirmed, and what is false corrected in 
the light of anatomical dissection, personal experience many times repeated and 
diligent and precise observation,” of “using daily more search and diligence,” of the 
indistinguishability of systole and diastole that “I have observed these things for 
hours together” and of “(H)aving observed these things with much caution and 
circumspection in a great number of eggs” we can be sure that he considers proper 
observation – diligent, precise and assiduous - as something that lies at the core of 
his investigative practice. 36 It is a technique vindicated by its empirical success. 
“(A)t last” he says “using daily more diligence, by often looking into many 
and different sorts of living creatures, I believed I had hit the nail on the head ... 
and had gained the knowledge I so much desired, that of the movement and use 
of the heart and arteries.” 37 
 
33
 Harvey’s concerns for the questionable reliability of reason date from his early inquiries. Though 
not published until  1651 , his research into generation was well underway by the time he finished 
his inquiries into the heart and the blood. In  de Motu Cordis he writes that ‘(T)hese things con-
cerning the formation of the foetus will be proved elsewhere by a great many observations’. See 
Harvey 1628, 128–129. On the possibility that  de Generatione Animalium was available in manu-
script form in 1638, a claim made by Sir Thomas Browne, see Whitteridge  1971 , 210, citing 
Webster, 262–274. 
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 Harvey  1651 , 11, 13. 
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 Harvey 1628, 29, 44, 62. 
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 Harvey  1616 , 265; 1628, 10, 29. 
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 Abstract  Samuel Cottereau Duclos (1598–1685) established the chymical research 
program at the newly inaugurated Parisian Academy of Sciences (est. 1666). While 
in the years following his election Duclos enjoyed an unmatched level of activity and 
influence among academicians, during the 1670s, his institutional status and authority 
had dwindled considerably. The origins of this decline are examined in light of 
Duclos’ preference of solution chymistry over traditional distillation analysis, high-
lighted by his research into alkahest. The assessment reveals metaphysical conten-
tions within the Academy concerning the nature of matter and the scope chymical 
analysis. A crucial turning point in these disputes is signaled by Duclos’  confrontation 
with Denis Dodart, defender of distillation, over the direction of the ‘Natural History 
of Plants’ project. In epistemological and philosophical contexts, an examination of 
the debate illustrates the interplay between conflicting perceptions employed in nego-
tiating distinctions such as physical/chymical and organic/mechanic. The different 
approaches to plants’ constitution, or ‘inner’ natures, depict the interrelationship 
between empiricism and natural history. 
 1  Introduction 
 In 1666 , in a letter to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV’s minister of finance 
and the first protector of the French Academy of Science, Christiaan Huygens 
referred to what would soon become the assembly of members comprising the 
Academy, established at the end of that year. 1 Huygens referred specifically to 
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the physics or natural philosophy faction (as opposed to the mathematical 
group 2 ), suggesting that,
 the most useful occupation for such an assembly would be to work on a natural history 
project, modeled on Baconian precepts; a history that would consist of experiments and 
remarks as a supreme way for attaining knowledge of the causes of all that can be seen in 
nature; for knowing the causes of gravity (heaviness), heat, cold, attraction, magnetism, 
light, colors, the composition of air, of water, of fire and of all other bodies; that which 
ascertains animal respiration, the ways metals, stones and plants grow, investigating all 
things unknown or poorly understood… the method must be one of proceeding from 
effects to causes… the descriptions should be numerous and detailed. 3 
 Despite the broadly defined research program, Huygens specified that chymistry 4 
and the dissection of animals should be part of such a project, which should primar-
ily treat “matters judged good, beneficial and useful.” 5 In his vision of a “useful 
occupation” for the Academy, Huygens linked natural history with “knowledge of 
the causes” seamlessly, while referring to controversial themes such the causes of 
gravity, attraction, and the composition of bodies. Huygens’ proposal represents 
a way by which natural investigations, informed by Baconian natural historical 
methods, could touch upon contentious subjects in a relatively inconspicuous man-
ner. The reference to Bacon and to natural history implied a meticulous, extended, 
and varied collection of natural phenomena and effects, “the descriptions [of 
which] should be numerous and detailed.” Despite this emphasis, however, Huygens 
spoke clearly of “proceeding from effects to causes.” 
 Huygens’ formal proposal helped not only to convince Colbert and his advisers to 
found the Academy but also played an influential role in shaping the early Academy’s 
research agenda. When the Academy was established in 1666 two chemists had been 
appointed: the senior Samuel Cottereau Duclos (1598–1685), who soon became the 
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most active and influential of all founder-members; the younger Bourdelin (1621–
1699), practicing apothecary and skillful experimenter, was hired to help Duclos 
equip, build up and manage the intended laboratories, and to help him develop the 
program for chymical analysis. 6 Duclos led the Academy’s inaugural meeting of 
December 1666, presenting a memoir entitled “recherche des principes de mixtes 
naturels.” Discussing ways of analyzing  mixtes , Duclos pointed to the importance of 
understanding the  generative capacities of water, since “all natural mixts are pro-
duced with water, and that without it none could be produced.” Duclos mentioned 
four examples: meteors, which originated from the union of exhalations and water; 
simple minerals, “which are engendered by water, from earth”; plants, which germi-
nate and grow only in the presence of water; and living bodies, which originate from 
an “aqueous humor.” 7 Duclos’ latter two references have been grafted onto Huygens’ 
general proposal to give rise to the early Academy’s two major natural history proj-
ects: the natural history of plants and the natural history of animals. 
 Shortly after the establishment of the Academy, its members became increas-
ingly involved in a prolonged series of animal dissections, brought together in 
Claude Perrault’s ‘Comparative Anatomy of Animals’ project, which was pub-
lished in 1671 as  Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire naturelle des animaux . Chymical 
research was even more prominent and was mainly represented by Duclos and 
Bourdelin, his assistant. Duclos was a highly capable experimenter who performed 
numerous lecture-demonstrations for the assembly. 8 Yet even the experimental 
aspects of his work carried a pronounced theoretical mark. 9 Bourdelin, in contrast, 
remained solely within the practical realm. Between 1666 and his death in 1699 he 
performed and systematically recorded vast numbers of distillations, mostly of 
plant matter. Some of Bourdelin’s distillations were commissioned by Duclos for 
various research purposes, but for the most part they were carried out in the context 
of the second natural history project of the early Academy – the ‘Natural History of 
Plants’ – initially drafted and proposed by Perrault, Huygens’ friend, in January 1667. 
 Perrault distinguished between two types of research required for a comprehen-
sive study of plants: either by collecting plant material and studying its external 
features and medical applications (natural history;  l’histoire ); or, by examining the 
causes of the medical properties of plants and of vegetable reproduction and 
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nutrition mechanisms (natural philosophy;  la physique 10 ). The latter way, Perrault 
thought, would require a broad application of chymical analysis, alongside 
microscopic observations of seeds and shoots, evaluation of theories of propagation 
and generation as well as studies of sap circulation, mostly related to the question 
whether sap circulated like blood. 11 Having been proposed only a short while after 
the establishment of the Academy, the Natural History of Plants started slowly 
and on a conservative note, consisting mostly of critical assessments of previously 
published botanical works (such as Gaspard Bauhin’s  Pinax theatri botanici , 
which academician–botanist Nicholas Marchant had already started to revise). 12 
 Academicians, however, keen to study nature rather than texts, soon undermined 
Perrault’s bookish natural history and focused on empirical work, incorporating 
chymical analyses as means to provide causal explanations to their descriptive matter. 
This was Duclos’ main contribution to the project. By June 1668 he delivered a mem-
oir delineating the method to be applied in the natural history of plants. Duclos found 
Perrault’s plan, which focused on illustrations, incomplete. He subsequently added 
the requirement for further various textual descriptive details such as whether a plant 
was tall or rested its branches on the ground; whether it sent out roots from these 
branches; he also demanded precise descriptions of the root, trunk, leaves, flowers, 
seeds, fruit and other natural products such as resins, gums or liquids. 13 
 2  Duclos’ Chymical Natural History of Plants 
 Duclos’ main contribution was the addition of chymical analysis to the work plan. 
The combination of a natural historical investigation and chymical analyses indeed 
formed a “most treacherous intellectual problem,” in Alice Stroup’s words. Between 
the late 1660s and the early 1680s the project suffered from various problems such as 
inconsistent funding, tensions between collaborating academicians, and editorial 
rivalries. 14 Yet in a sense, most of these difficulties – especially the institutional 
funding problems, which reached a peak with Louvois’ 1686 memoir, as well as the 
editorial rivalry between Duclos’ and Denis Dodart (1634–1707) – can be attributed 
to the introduction of chymical analysis. The most controversial aspects of the project 
stemmed from a clash between chymical analysis as a causal (natural philosophical) 
means of inquiry and explanation, and an enduring insistence on a descriptive 
natural historical methodology. Chymical analysis encompassed both dimensions. 
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As such, under the hands of academicians of various philosophical inclinations, 
it increasingly came to be both the central object and subject of controversy 
within the project. 
 The general framework Duclos suggested consisted of seven major points 
concerning the study of plants: “species; differences; denominations; place [prove-
nance]; time [season of growth and maturation]; culture; and uses [medical or other].” 
Under the heading “differences,” Duclos included “differences which can be gleaned 
from the plant’s size, its appearance [“port,” carriage], its parts and their products.” 
As to parts, Duclos specified that each of the following parts – “stem or trunk, leaves 
and flowers, fruits or seeds, etc” – must be examined according to “size, number, 
figure, consistence, color, odor and taste,” followed by an examination of “their  consti-
tution .” 15 Duclos’ emphasis on a close empirical observation of the plants is evident. 
The “place and culture” of a plant, he specified, “must be reported by way of observa-
tion and practice instead of [drawing upon] the traditional writers, most of whom do 
nothing but copy things already written.” 16 By constitution Duclos meant chymical 
composition and prescribed the employment of color indicators. 17 The other means of 
analysis would be distillation, followed by a study of the crystals obtained from the 
coagulated (dried up) received juices. Duclos remarked that “one can finally know the 
constitution of plants by the qualities of their separated constituent parts, which are 
their distilled juices ( eau distillées ), their spirits, both acrid and sulfurous as well as 
acidic and mercurial, their oils and their fixed or volatile salts.” 18 
 Duclos’ consideration of water, acid, oil and salt, squares well with contemporary 
views regarding the received products of distillatory fractions, usually consisting of 
the Paracelsian triad of salt, sulfur, and mercury ( Tria Prima ) with the common 
addition of water and earth; the former three were regarded as active constituents 
and the latter two as passive. By referring to these distillants or constituent parts as 
extractions or the end products of  extractive processes, however, Duclos hinted at 
their status as products of a non-radical separation or partial decomposition. This is 
further evidenced by his recommendation that “after such extractions, we must 
proceed to examine each extracted substance.” 19 The examinations implied revolved 
around the content and characteristics of various salts, typically considered, 
in traditional chymical philosophy, as vital-generative constitutive elements. 20 
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For instance, Duclos noted that, “the distilled water of plants that are humid and 
cold, such as lettuce, purslane or chicory, carries with it some portion of a sulfurous 
salt.” This salt could be traced when the corresponding distilled water was mixed 
with a solution of salt of lead, which rendered the solution milky and turbulent. 
In contrast, the same could not be observed in distilled waters proceeding from dry 
and earthy plants since their salts were less volatile. Dryness, Duclos argued, 
impeded volatility, change, and action while fermentation and humidity encouraged 
vitality, motion, and growth. Accordingly, the particular combination of constitu-
tive salts indicated the chymical composition of the plant in question. Similarly, the 
presence of fixed or alkali salts – typically found in burnt plant matter – was ascer-
tained by the dissolution of vitriol of iron in common water; upon mixing the two 
liquids, if fixed salts were present, the iron was precipitated, as indicated by the 
apparent yellowish-reddish color of the solution. 21 
 The significance of the salts as vital-constitutive entities could not be overstated. 
Duclos went as far as to propose that,
 the various salts of all the constituent parts of a plant can be reunited into one single salt, 
which will contain all the virtues of that plant. This salt can then be finally resolved into 
an insipid watery liquid and a pure and dead earth, devoid of all virtue, [and that,] without 
any notable diminution of weight. This is the extreme [radical] analysis of plants, which 
serves in acquiring the most exact knowledge of the constitution of a subject. 22 
 Duclos’ view of what constitutes a radical analysis of plants, or other mixts, 
echoes his vision of matter. In line with Van Helmont, Duclos held that a radical 
chymical resolution or decomposition of matter should yield “an insipid watery 
liquid.” Over the following two weeks, in two consecutive memoirs, dated 16 and 23 
June 1668, Duclos communicated to the assembly his views concerning chymical 
analysis, pitting distillation against solution analytical chymistry and physical mecha-
nism against organic chymical vitalism, in the context of particulate theories. 
These memoirs elucidate how a traditional chymist like Duclos charted the physical–
chymical territory against the backdrop of the emergent mechanical philosophy. 
 Duclos’ decision to dedicate two consecutive meetings to the theoretical aspects 
of chymical practice is telling, especially in light of the early Academy’s pro-
nounced empirical-Baconian agenda, upheld in attempt to minimize debate among 
members of a new and varied collective research enterprise. The informal reason 
behind Duclos decision to discuss these topics was clearly linked to his research 
plans for the Natural History of Plants project, which by 1668, given the signifi-
cance of chymical analysis and research, Duclos presided over. The official 
excuse, however, is found at the beginning of the first memoir, dedicated to fire 
analysis, or distillation:
 
21
 AdS, PV, 4: 51v–52v. 
 
22
 AdS, PV, 4: 53r–54v: “le divers sels de toutes les parties constitutives d’une plante peuvent estre 
réunis en un sel, qui contiendra toute la vertu de la plante. Et ce sel peut finalement estre reduict 
en eau insipide et en terre pure et morte, sans diminution notable de son poids. Et cela est 
l’extreme analyse de la plante, qui ne sert qu’a avoir une connoissance plus exacte de la constitution 
du subiect.” 
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 Mr. Duclos has said that, lacking a laboratory for conducting chymical analyses, and wishing 
to avoid idleness, while all other members of the company are busy working, he had made 
up his mind to propose to the assembly to render advice as to the methods for performing 
chymical analyses, which will be useful once a laboratory is established; having received 
the company’s approval, he went on to claim that the principal means of analysis are fire, 
air and dissolutive liquors. 23 
 The last statement in this passage sets the background to the ensuing discussion. 
Fire, Duclos noted, acts to separate (decompose) the parts of a mixt in two ways: 
either by the action of its heat alone, in which case no inflammation occurs, or by 
way of combustion and inflammation. 24 He explained the mechanism underlying 
fire analysis, or distillation, in the following manner:
 The heat of the fire excites a motion in the mobile parts [of the mixt], according to their 
degree of mobility, to the effect that those that share the same degree of mobility cannot sepa-
rate at the same degree of heat, which in agitating them equally, makes them rise together, 
and [hence] they separate only from the [relatively] less mobile parts. And those that are 
unequally mobile separate from each other, because the easiest to move [most prone to 
motion and excitability], being most agitated and most rapidly rarified by the heat, rise first 
and detach from the less mobile, that can follow when chased by a stronger fire. 25 
 This explained at once how distillation works to separate between the constitu-
ents of mixts and signaled the limitations of fire as an analytical tool; the underlying 
principle being that two constituents can be  different (in essence, nature, or constitu-
tion) yet by virtue of sharing the same degree of mobility (excitability), will not be 
separated during distillation, since the fire will cause them to “rise together.” 
 Duclos underscored the relation between heat and motion by challenging “those 
who say that it is a property of heat to bring together things of the same nature and to 
separate those of various natures.” This conveys Duclos’ critique of traditional 
Scholastic and Paracelsian views according to which like acts upon like, as applied to 
distillation practices. In effect, it is not the heat that actively either separates or unites 
the constituents of bodies, since its  sole action is to impart motion, according to the 
given constituents’ degrees of mobility. The subsequent separations or unions are but 
consequences of the  motion – which depends upon the constituents’  propensity to move 
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– and not of the  heat itself. Duclos’ discussion of possible  unions suggests yet another 
sense in which he was critical of the analytical capacity of fire, since some constituents 
will “only liquefy and attach to those which are fixed, producing a new composition of 
parts.” 26 Significantly, Duclos avoided interpreting such unions by recourse to affini-
ties, resemblances, or correspondences (whether understood as occult qualities or not) 
acting between two entities that bear essential similarities. Duclos allowed for only the 
physico-mechanical principle of motion in explaining the separation as well as creation 
of new compounds during distillation. Echoing Boyle’s critique of fire analysis 
(especially as seen in his  Sceptical Chymist ), Duclos suggested that fire may alter the 
components – not only did fire fail to decompose mixts into their elementary con-
stituents, but it created new ones that were not part of the initial mixt. 27 
 Closely acquainted with chymical experimental reality, Duclos admitted that, “fire 
can occasion, by the power of its heat, not only separation, but also union.” Herein, 
then, lies the explanation of volatility or fixity of chymical substances, since fire
 separates the volatile parts from the fixed ones by the motion occasioned by its heat … and 
it unites, into a new compound, the parts which are less fixed with those that are more 
fixed, melting and liquefying the humid parts which penetrate into the dry ones, combining 
together, as in the case of carbon and glass. 28 
 Heat, however, can produce some unions that will resist all degrees of heat; 
such unions can be resolved by means of “inflammation and combustion” alone. 
The latter necessitate the presence of air and hence point to the limited capacities 
of distillation, which customarily takes place “in closed vessels,” joined and “sealed 
carefully.” This also supports the claim that air is a “means of analysis.” By means 
of its heat and inflammation, fire can resolve “mixts that [were] composed of 
volatile or combustible parts.” For the analysis of the most fixed (i.e. immobile, 
non-volatile) mixts – those that are usually earthy and dry, since fixity is related to 
lack of humidity – Duclos prescribed the use of “resolutive menstrua.” 29 
 At the beginning of the following memoir, dedicated to solution analysis and 
“dissolutive liquors” Duclos provided a crucial clue regarding the action mechanism 
of such solvents:
 since most mixts that do not have a strong compaction between their parts, are indepen-
dently resolved [resolve themselves] by way of putrefaction in their own humidity, the 
chymists have taken the opportunity to conduct the resolution of less humid substances by 
way of putrefaction, by the addition of some regulative liquor. 30 
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 The common function of the “regulative” liquors is to “facilitate putrefaction” or 
fermentation. Duclos distinguished between three kinds of menstrua, solvents, or 
regulative liquors: corrosive, extractive, and resolutive. The corrosive, when applied 
to solid mixts, brings about the discontinuation of their mass and breaks them down 
into “integrant, highly subtle, particles”; the extractive is employed for the extrac-
tion of a certain part of the mixt (usually acts by precipitation); and the resolutive 
is used for occasioning a “radical resolution.” 31 Duclos referred to the latter in his 
research proposal for plant analysis as the “extreme analysis of plants, which serves 
for acquiring the most exact knowledge of the constitution of a subject.” 32 This type 
of resolution, moreover, was highly regarded and sought after in analytical chymis-
try; hence Duclos’ suggestion that resolutive menstrua and their actions should be 
studied most closely. The corrosive resolution, on the other hand, is considered as 
a preparatory step to the extreme resolution in that it rarifies the parts of the mixt 
and endows them with a kind of heightened activity and enhanced mobility, making 
them less compact. 
 All these menstrua, Duclos proclaimed, consist of “salts, resolved and spiri-
tualized,” that is, “reduced into highly penetrating liquors.” These salts are either 
mercurial, sulfurous, or mixt. 33 The mercurial liquors are acidic and merely cor-
rosive (like  aqua fortis ) while the liquors of sulfurous salts are acrid and merely 
extractive (like spirit of wine or alcohol). The mixt spirits, containing both mer-
curial and sulfurous salts joined together, are solely capable of occasioning a 
radical resolution: “these mixt menstrua are the true solvents, intended for real 
chymical analyses… they are useful in the research of the principles of natural 
mixts as well as in performing analytical observations, which facilitate our 
knowledge of the nature and qualities of mixts.” 34 The radical resolutive analysis, 
then, is an organic-vital process. Its activity generated by the combination of 
mercurial and sulfurous salts, it is analogous, like other types of resolution, to 
putrefaction and fermentative processes. 
 By 1668, when Duclos expounded his views on chymical solution analysis and 
argued for its relevance to plant analysis – a matter that had been recognized by the 
assembly – a basic framework for the natural history of plants existed. The plan was 
multi-authored to some extent, drawing on an accumulation of ideas and proposals 
by Huygens, Perrault, and Duclos. For carrying out the actual research, however, 
the Academy depended almost entirely on Bourdelin to analyze plants in the 
laboratory and on the botanists Nicolas and Jean Marchant to cultivate and describe 
them. Bourdelin refined chemical techniques, especially for analyzing oils, and 
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kept detailed records of his experiments and laboratory expenses. 35 The Marchants, 
father and son, cultivated rare plants for the Academy’s use and were in charge of 
sections of the Royal Gardens, nurseries and the  orangerie ; they cultivated seeds 
from all over the world, collected by friends and colleagues. After cultivating a 
plant, the Marchants described it, gave it to the illustrators and supplied the rest to 
Bourdelin for analysis. 36 
 3  Dodart Enters the Arena: Natural History by Fire 
 The ambitious Natural History of Plants collective project went down in the chron-
icles of the Academy as an overall failure. Despite efforts to minimize controversy, 
it was plagued by numerous disputes between academicians over theory as well as 
practice, and was never completed or published as intended. After Colbert’s death 
in 1682, Louvois became the Academy’s protector and it was under his inconsistent 
financial support that the project suffered and deteriorated. 37 Almost a decade after 
it was first proposed by Perrault and subsequently expanded by Duclos, in 1676, 
two publications appeared, drawing on the vast work carried out under the banner 
of this project: Marchant’s  Descriptions de quelques plantes nouvelles and Dodart’s 
 Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire des plantes . True to its title, the  Descriptions 
consisted of a descriptive history of plants, featuring illustrations but lacking refer-
ence to plant analysis. Dodart’s  Mémoires , in contrast, discussed chymical analysis 
at great length. Dodart, however, advanced a different view of the subject than the 
one envisioned by Duclos’, the initial director of the project. 
 Since 1671, the year Dodart joined the Academy, Duclos’ power over the project 
as well as his general status within the Academy dwindled manifestly. 38 Dodart was 
about 35 years younger than Duclos, who was 68 years old when he had initially 
joined the Academy in 1666. Dodart was ambitious and energetic and soon took 
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over the Natural History of Plants, marginalizing Duclos. 39 Duclos’ institutional 
power decline cannot be attributed to one single reason but the most prominent 
factor in his demise arose from his research agenda, and particularly his promotion 
of solution analysis alongside – but mostly over and above – distillation. The minutes 
of the Academy chart this decline. During the late 1660s, Duclos was by far the 
most active academician; between 1667 and 1669 his memoirs fill roughly 500 pages 
of the  procès-verbaux , discussing chymical analysis, coagulation and cohesion, as 
well as providing a detailed scrutiny of Boyle’s  Certain Physiological Essays 
and  The Origin of Forms and Qualities ; from 1675 to 1683 his memoirs fill some 
20 odd pages. 40 
 Dodart was Perrault’s  protégé and both subscribed, in different fashions, to both 
traditional as well as mechanistic views. Inspired by the greater intellectual climate 
and by Louvois’ public demand for practical, useful, and non-speculative research, 
Dodart increasingly privileged natural historical over natural philosophical pursuits. 
Preceding the brief preface, the “avertissement” to the  Mémoires is instructive in 
this respect; of particular interest is Dodart’s depiction of the division of labor 
within the project and the general characteristics of the research collaboration. 
“This book,” he began, “is the work of all the Academy” and it “is the result of 
propositions, experiments, and reflections.” Accordingly, Dodart proceeded, 
whereas nearly all chymical subjects (“chymie”) were handled by Duclos (and 
some by Pierre Borel), Bourdelin performed virtually all the “operations chymiques.” 
The reflections, drawing on the former two, are attributed to most academicians 
involved in the project. Although they would seem to pertain most closely to the 
author of the book, Dodart singled out Bourdelin as having “provided many 
advices, made many remarks, and handled most the records, from which I have 
drawn the chymical experiments discussed in this book.” 41 The emphasis on the 
practical, non-speculative, and natural historical aspects of the project is evident. 
 As seen, Duclos did not reject mechanistic principles; he even upheld a version 
of corpuscularianism, mentioning particles under the influence of motion. Yet he 
drew a clear and distinct line between the  physical (mechanical) and the  chymical 
(vital), arguing that physical reactions were superficial. Distillation, being based upon 
separation by heat according to degrees of mobility, was an incomplete method for 
decomposition, a partial analytical tool. Solution analysis, in contrast, since based on 
essentially vital and fermentative processes, represented chymical deep-level resolution. 
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 On Dodart and the various research tensions within the Natural History of Plants project see 
Holmes  2004 , esp. 277–288, where he claims that by early 1674 Dodart was “leader of the project 
of plant analysis” (277). See also Holmes  2004 ; Kim  2003 , 53. For some general information on 
Dodart and the Academy see Sturdy  1995 , 184–189. 
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By way of analogy, whereas physico-mechanical decomposition processes, such 
as separation by heat, were the opposite of mixtion or physical aggregation of 
constituents, chymico-vital resolutive processes, such as the ones generated by 
radical solvents were the opposite of generation. Such notions can be traced back 
in time to Paracelsian and especially Helmontian doctrines, closely identified 
with alchemical, Platonic and Hermetic precepts, all of which were controversial, 
especially during the 1670s and 1680s. The young Academy, hosting members 
from a wide variety of backgrounds and closely dependent on royal funding for 
its existence preferred to distance itself from any apparently subversive views asso-
ciated with natural magic, Platonism, or occultism. 
 In his second memoir on chymical analysis, treating resolutive menstrua, Duclos 
observed that such
 menstrua are either universal or particular. The universal [ones] must originate from the 
less specific salts, of a mixt and tempered nature. Such is the salt out of which Paracelsus 
produced his great solvent [Paracelsus’ alkahest], which he named Sel Circulé. 42 
 Two months later, in August 1668, Duclos discussed at length this Paracelsian salt, 
alongside Van Helmont’s alkahest, the utopian universal solvent, presenting the 
assembly with a detailed survey and interpretation of alchemical literature concerning 
menstrua and seminal principles. 43 Duclos repeatedly drew the distinction between 
vulgar (distillatory, mechanical, physical) and philosophical (vegetal, chymical, 
transformative) practices. 
 In this sense Bourdelin was a vulgar chymist, a lifelong supporter of distillation 
analysis, a practice he doggedly refused to abandon, performing for the Academy 
thousands of distillations until his death 14 years after Duclos. The task of interpreting 
Bourdelin’s results fell first on Duclos and later on Dodart. The wealth of records and 
information was copious: from the weight of distillants to temperature records, to 
accounts of colors, tastes and odors, to a range of distillation techniques such as sub-
sequent replacements of recipients for each fraction, or the practice of heat control by 
employing a double boiler, to name a few. This abundance of data left academicians, 
and especially Dodart, puzzled. Nonetheless, the Academy remained largely committed 
to distillation throughout the rest of the seventeenth-century. Duclos did not live to see 
the application of his visionary views of solution analytical chymistry. 44 
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 AdS, PV, 4: 65v: “Les menstrües sont ou universels, ou particuliers. Les universels doivent estre 
tirez des sels les moins spécifiez, mais de nature mixte et tempérée. Tel est le sel commun, duquel 
Paraclese a fait son grand dissolvant, qu’il nomme Sel Circulé.” 
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 Shortly after Bourdelin’s death Simon Bouldoc proposed the use of solution over distillation 
analysis. Kim  2003 , 79. See also Stroup  1979 . 
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 Distillation, or fire analysis, was challenged as a legitimate means for the 
extraction of elementary constituents. But while research into the ultimate principles 
of mixts had been mostly Duclos’ aim, Dodart was mainly interested in the medical 
virtues and uses of plants and in their nutritive values and mechanisms. This is 
not to say that Dodart had no qualms about distillation, which he attempted to 
scrupulously defend and justify in his  Mémoires . Forced to support increasingly 
convoluted interpretations of experimental instances, he still remained committed 
to fire analysis. In his 1676  Mémoires , more than half of which had to be dedicated 
to justifying the shortcomings and inaccuracies of distillation, Dodart stated clearly 
why the alternative, long since promoted by Duclos, could not be tolerated:
 for knowing that which plants are, we do not have to make the great efforts of resolving them 
into that which the chymists call their primary principles; that is, to irreversibly resolve 
them into a simple solution, containing their virtues, by means of allegedly universal 
solvents, enigmatically described by Paracelsus, Van Helmont, Deiconti, etc. 45 
 This reference is unmistakable since these are the very three authors whom 
Duclos discussed at length in 1668 in the context of the  sel circulé , alkahest, and 
universal solvents. 46 
 Dodart proceeded to dismiss any such ideas, claiming that, “these solvents are 
found only in books.” He further noted that it would probably be more difficult to 
grasp the nature of these solvents than the nature of the plants themselves. 47 Judging 
these chymical views harshly, Dodart struggled to find ways to compensate for the 
deficiencies of fire analysis, undermining its empirically inaccurate and controver-
sial nature while arguing for the inadequacy of chymistry – in the traditional 
Helmontian and Duclosian sense – to the pursuit of natural knowledge. Clearly, this 
was a far cry from Huygens’ early vision of a natural history providing a “supreme 
way for attaining knowledge of [natural] causes,” or of Duclos’ similar allusions. 
 4  “We Must Stay Within These Limits”: Empiricism 
and Natural History 
 Dodart’s overall natural historical scheme consisted of four parts: “1. the description 
of plants, 2. their figures. 3. their culture [development and growth]. 4. their virtues, 
and the studies one can pursue, and those that we have pursued, for knowing the 
constitution of plants.” 48 The study of plants’ virtues comprised, by far, the most 
extensive section; it was divided into two segments: the knowledge (or study) 
of plants in themselves and the knowledge of plants through their effects. 
While the former spanned 34 pages (out of a total of fifty), the latter occupied 
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only four; distillation was part of the former. In his conclusion to a section 
entitled “Reflexions particulieres sur l’usage du feu dans les analyses des Plantes,” 
Dodart surmised that,
 it is  not completely impossible to arrive, by the [chymical] analysis, at a  certain degree 
of knowledge, which may serve  at least for forming  some conjectures, reasonable 
 enough to be examined, and  possibly incorporated into physics,  almost as ordinary 
descriptions… 2. that it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to attain by analysis 
an accurate and certain knowledge of the natural constitution of each plant; 3. that in 
employing chymistry, we do not actually engage in the pursuit of the principles of 
natural mixts, or as the chymists call them simple and inalterable… It is not that we do 
not seek greater certitude, but we believe that  we must stay within these limits , hoping 
that more reasonable [capable] persons, well aware of the great difficulties in attaining 
the knowledge of the simpler things, and who know that even the possession of such 
knowledge will not remove all difficulties, will be content with what we have to 
offer… chymical inquiries which one day, we hope, will be employed as the basis for 
 reasonable , even if  not certain , conjectures. 49 
 At first glance, Dodart’s disillusionment with chymical analysis seems striking. 
With efficient solvents “found only in books” he accorded distillation a “certain” 
and “reasonable” degree of legitimacy. His unrelenting commitment to distillation 
is at odds with his explicit admission of its profoundly limited nature. Should this 
passage be read as expounding a methodologically convoluted and epistemologically 
impoverished discourse, bordering on simplistic skepticism? Should it be read as 
decisive evidence of the utter failure of the Natural History of Plants project? Or, 
should Dodart’s stance be interpreted as a stubborn reaction against any and all 
applications of metaphysical and speculative aspects to natural philosophy, such as 
Duclos’ alkahest or vital salts? Or, yet from a different perspective, should Dodart 
be understood as an avid proponent of natural historical empirical research, in the 
received traditional Baconian vein? 50 
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 A comparison between Dodart’s and Duclos’ approaches to plants’ composition, 
 inner nature, or “constitution,” set against the background of their corresponding 
epistemological motivations within the natural historical project provides insights 
into these questions. In this respect, one of the crucial differences between the two 
natural philosophers derives from their different research goals. Simply put, Duclos 
was interested in the nature of matter, elements, and natural change; Dodart focused 
on the medicinal virtues of the plants and their corresponding uses. Duclos hoped 
that the analysis of plants will throw light on the ultimate (elementary) principles 
of vegetable substances and will subsequently bear upon the constitution of matter 
in general. Dodart sought to establish an accurate classification of plants, along 
various coordinates, one of which was their constitution, which further pointed to 
their potential medicinal uses. 
 For Duclos, the chymical constitution of a plant preceded its other qualities, 
both epistemologically and ontologically, since its properties and virtues derived 
from its constitution. The constitution would also reveal a mixt’s place within a 
cosmological web of correspondences and connections, the framework of which 
drew on Paracelsian and Platonic ideas. 51 In this sense, a radical or complete chymi-
cal analysis promised not only to reveal the inner virtues of a plant (or mixts in 
general) but also to causally  explain them. Once the ultimate principles or elemen-
tary constituents are made empirically known, the essence of the plant can be 
understood, since a plant could be theoretically resolved into one “single salt, 
which will contain all the virtues of that plant.” This type of resolution provides the 
investigator with essential knowledge, not readily accessible by the senses, knowl-
edge of organic and vital  principles of growth and generation. Distillation, accord-
ing to Duclos, was merely akin to physical separation between non-elementary 
constituents and hence was not considered a chymical process. Duclos employed 
this distinction in drawing the boundaries between the two domains, claiming the 
autonomy and specificity of chymical knowledge. 
 Unlike Duclos, Dodart was uninterested in the epistemological status of 
chymical knowledge in itself. Nor was he interested in the metaphysical role 
of chymical agents and entities. On distinct empirical grounds, seeking to establish 
an accurate and detailed natural history of plants, with their myriad properties, 
figures, cultures, and virtues, Dodart rejected the postulation of solvents. Although 
Duclos rejected the appeal to authorities in describing plants, in his examinations 
of the alkahest and various salts, he discussed at length Paracelsus, Van Helmont, 
and others. But Dodart rejected solution analysis for yet another significant reason, 
arguing that, “if we could possess these [utopian solvents] they would not further 
our knowledge of the nature of each plant, since it would be reduced into a certain 
[state of] universality.” Dodart went on to deny any means that might “render 
general that which we would like to particularize.” Subsequently, Dodart preferred 
the extraction from plants of the different substances of which they are composed 
and since we can know these substances “only through our senses,” even if we 
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cannot perceive “that which is more intimate,” we still gain a certain degree of 
knowledge. Distillation, Dodart added, enables us to see that which was hidden 
before, exposing it so that we can “separately examine its taste, smell, and other 
sensible properties,” which would ordinarily be mixed with other substances and 
hence be unrecognizable. 52 
 For Dodart, then, distillation was akin to a microscope, revealing hidden details 
and exposing them to the senses; it is, in a sense, analogous to dissection. The notion 
of fire as the chymist’s scalpel is not new but it has been obscured by the forceful 
early modern critiques concerning the accuracy of this analytic tool (culminating with 
Boyle’s  Skeptical Chymist ). Despite all the shortcomings of this method, Dodart 
defends it as the only legitimate means for pursuing the natural historical examination 
precisely because it is in epistemological and methodological full accord with his 
goals. Distillation is for him an essentially  descriptive tool and not an explanatory one 
in itself. It is analytical in that it  shows various features of the plant, rendering them 
empirically accessible to the human senses. Distillation and its products are meant as 
an internal description, a complementary addition to the external image of the plant. 
This is why Dodart had defended it persistently and this is the background against 
which it should be interpreted concerning its place within Dodart’s natural historical 
pursuits. The result appears less limited and skeptical when considered in relation to 
the overall epistemological consistency of the project, its pragmatic goals, and 
Dodart’s strict belief that “we must stay within these limits.” 
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 Abstract  This paper examines the sources and nature of Locke’s medical thought. 
It is argued from a sampling of entries in Locke’s medical notebooks and his 
correspondence, that Locke was a chymical physician. His medical thought 
contains two interlocking strands: he was an adherent of mercurialist transmutational 
alchemy and Helmontian iatrochemistry. The major, though not the only, influence on 
these aspects of Locke’s thought was Robert Boyle. 
 1  Introduction 
 What sort of physician was John Locke? In asking this question I am not inquiring 
as to how effective he was in his medical practice, but rather how best can we 
characterise his approach to physic. An accurate answer to this question requires a 
thorough survey of Locke’s medical milieu, the influences on Locke, his medical 
remains and other relevant writings. Surprisingly, such an appraisal of Locke as a 
physician has never been undertaken. 1  One of the reasons for this, I believe, lies in 
the general neglect of what today are known as the ‘life sciences’ in the interplay 
between the historiography of the scientific revolution and the neo-Kantian catego-
ries of Rationalism and Empiricism through which much early modern philosophy 
has been interpreted. A second related reason is the poverty of our understanding 
of early modern chymistry until the last two decades. 
 John Locke and Helmontian Medicine 
 Peter R.  Anstey* 
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 There is no need to substantiate the claim about the effect of recent historiogra-
phy on Lockean interpretation here. But it is important that a positive alternative set 
of terms of reference be substituted for Locke the empiricist and Locke the mechanical 
philosopher. I have argued elsewhere that the historical distinction, a distinction 
which informed Locke’s own thought, between experimental and speculative natural 
philosophy, provides an illuminating and historically grounded way of ordering and 
highlighting the methodological, natural philosophical and even medical doctrines 
which flourished in mid-seventeenth-century England. 2 It can also help to illuminate 
the medical thought of John Locke. 
 In this paper I intend to use this distinction between experimental and specula-
tive natural philosophy as the background terms of reference for a survey of the 
salient aspects of Locke’s medical thought. The survey will not be uniform in its 
coverage because detailed treatment of some of the issues has appeared in other 
studies which can simply be summarised here. But the cumulative picture will, I 
hope, provide an insight into the salient features of Locke’s medical thought. To this 
end, after a summary of the medical context, the survey covers Locke’s medical 
methodology, his chymistry, his nosology (or theory of disease) and therapeutics, 
and his approach to physiology. 
 2  Medicine in England in the 1660s 
 From around 1659 through to early 1667, during the time when he was at Christ 
Church, Oxford, Locke invested considerable effort to equip himself in the cognate 
fields of medicine and chymistry. This period of self-directed study and practice 
coincided with an extraordinarily vexed phase in the history of English medicine. 
The institutional status of the College of Physicians and the theoretical status of 
Galenic medicine as a whole, were subject to serious challenges, and much of the 
debate was centred on physicians, chymists and natural philosophers within Locke’s 
ambit. It is, therefore, impossible to understand the contours of Locke’s medical 
remains from this seminal period of his development without first coming to grips 
with the storm that erupted around him. 
 In mid-seventeenth-century England qualified physicians received their training 
in the universities where they were taught the principles of medical theory and 
practice. This included the physiological, pathological, semiotical, hygenical and 
therapeutical parts of medicine. The dominant authority in the teaching of each of 
these subjects was Galen whose medical methodology was founded upon a largely 
Aristotelian natural philosophy. To be sure, medical students read widely amongst 
the recent medical authorities, but the underlying conceptual framework remained 
that of Galen, while the  methodus medendi studied included both ancient authori-
ties and the methods of treatment that had built up since the rediscovery of Galen’s 
works in the sixteenth century. 
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 Thus, for example, disease was conceived in terms of imbalances of the humours 
of the body and diagnosis and therapy were carried out by the application of the 
Aristotelian theory of qualities. From the time of Paracelsus there had been calls for the 
reform of medicine and these gathered in intensity in the writings of Francis Bacon and 
Joan Baptiste van Helmont. Pressure for medical reform intensified as new discoveries 
in anatomy and physiology undermined the authority of Galen, as alternative natural 
philosophies emerged as rivals to Aristotelianism, and as new chymical remedies were 
developed by Paracelsian and Helmontian chymists. A group of outspoken chymists 
and chymical physicians emerged in London and Oxford in the 1650s who began to 
challenge the Galenists or Methodists (who applied the  methodus medendi ). One of the 
severest critics of the traditional practice of physic was the American émigré George 
Starkey who accused Galenic medicine of being “erroneous and defective, dangerous 
and impotent, partly lame and ridiculous, partly lamentable and desperate.” 3 
 The situation came to a head in 1664 when a bill to approve a new charter for 
the bastion of the Galenists, the College of Physicians, was defeated in Parliament. 
Soon a rival Society of Chymical Physicians was proposed and the ‘chymical physi-
cian’ Thomas O’Dowde published an ‘engagement’ giving notice of the intention 
to incorporate the new society. 4 Reinforcing moves by the chymical physicians on 
the political front, Marchamont Nedham published a scathing attack on the College 
in 1665 called  Medela medicinae . A bitter and highly charged pamphlet war imme-
diately broke out between the chymical physicians and the Galenists which was to 
continue into the early 1670s. 
 The parties to the ongoing dispute can be divided into at least five groups. First 
there were the traditional Galenists, often members of the College (Henry Stubbe, 
Robert Sprackling, John Twysden); second there were the chymical physicians, most 
of whom had not received university training in physic (George Starkey, Thomas 
O’Dowde); third there were the promoters of the Royal Society, the new rival institu-
tion of the natural philosophers (Thomas Sprat, Joseph Glanvill); fourth there were 
those who are styled the ‘virtuoso-physicians’ who were sympathetic to the new natu-
ral philosophy and often members of both the Royal Society and the College (Timothy 
Clarke, Daniel Coxe); and fifth there was a small group of natural philosophers and 
physicians (Robert Boyle, Sir George Ent, Thomas Willis) who somehow transcended 
the debates and whose views and authority were appealed to by both sides. 5 
 This was the highly charged and complex medical milieu in which Locke under-
took to equip himself as a physician. Locke was not merely fully apprised of these 
disputes, 6 but was actually acquainted, in some cases intimately, with many of the 
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main actors, including some of the signatories to O’Dowde’s ‘engagement’. The 
key evidence for this connection has only recently come to light in the correspon-
dence of the itinerant chymist John Read. Read had an altercation with Locke 
around April 1665 over Read’s and Thomas Williams’ refusal to reveal the recipe 
of a secret substance to Locke, a substance by which Locke thought, according to 
Read, ‘all nature might be discovered’. 7  Locke was angered by Read’s refusal, 
especially in view of the fact that Locke had introduced him to Williams, one of the 
agitators for the establishment of a Society of Chymical Physicians and a signatory 
to O’Dowde’s ‘engagement’. Read later wrote to Locke via Boyle, apparently in 
early 1666, in an attempt to appease him by revealing to him something of the ‘holy 
water’ which he had previously refused to divulge. The whole incident is of great 
interest, because of what it reveals about Locke’s and Boyle’s knowledge of the 
Society of Chymical Physicians in this critical stage of plans for its establishment. 
Apart from the fact that Read should have chosen to communicate to Locke about 
the holy water and the Society through Boyle, thus reinforcing the evidence for 
their close association in chymical matters during this period, we also learn that 
Read included for Locke a letter to Marchamont Nedham which contained not only 
information about the holy water, but also many details about the Society and 
Read’s hopes to be affiliated with it. Before this correspondence came to light there 
was no known connection between Locke and the Society, nor of Locke’s early 
connection with Williams who went on to become chymical physician to Charles II. 8 
Nor was there such clear evidence of Locke’ interest in alchemical secrets or his 
knowledge of Nedham and the latter’s central role in the Society. 
 3  Methodology 
 The chymical physicians were a diverse bunch in both their theoretical commit-
ments and the practical applications of their chymistry. They were, however, united 
by their opposition to Galenic medicine and by a loose cluster of methodological 
doctrines. The chymical physicians, to a man, called for an instauration in physic, 
but what each one thought should replace the hegemonic Galenism varied. Few, for 
example, would have subscribed to the somewhat bizarre ‘wormatick’ theory of 
disease espoused by Nedham. 9 As for their methodological views, many denied the 
utility of anatomy; some even denied the usefulness of botany. In keeping with the 
new experimental philosophy they all privileged observation and experiment over 
learning based upon authority, and they decried the use of speculative theories and 
hypotheses in physic. Many were highly critical of some of the mainstays of the 
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Galenic  methodus such as phlebotomy and purging, and most of them based their 
criticisms of the  methodus medendi on their critique of the humoral theory of dis-
ease and its concomitant theory of qualities. 
 Locke’s medical writings from the 1660s subscribe to most of these method-
ological doctrines. His essay “De arte medica” is an attempt at the reform of physic 
and contains a strong denunciation of speculative hypotheses and champions obser-
vation and experiment. His essay “Anatomia” is a critique of the efficacy of gross 
anatomy for physic. His essay on disease, “Morbus,” contains a seminal theory of 
disease that is typical of the writings of the chymical physicians such as George 
Thomson. 10 Thus, it is clear that Locke aligned himself with the chymical physi-
cians and against the Galenists. 
 However, once we descend into the details of Locke’s views, we find that his 
position has its own subtleties and emphases which are best set in sharp relief by 
contrasting them with the views of other chymical physicians with whom he was 
broadly aligned. For example, in “Morbus” he does not merely develop a patho-
genic theory of disease in opposition to the humoral theory, but announces that he 
is seeking a  via media between Galenists and Paracelsians – in fact he espouses a 
Helmontian theory (see below). Furthermore, in contrast to some chymical physi-
cians Locke maintained an active interest in botany, assembling his own herbarium 
in the summer months of 1664 and 1665, 11 and he never opposed bloodletting. 
 Now by the 1670s much of the heat had dissipated from the debate between the 
chymical physicians and the Galenists, and while Locke’s other intellectual and 
vocational pursuits competed with and often obstructed his interest in physic, he 
continued to practise physic intermittently for the rest of his life. It would be wrong, 
therefore, simply to characterise Locke as a chymical physician if this appellation 
only connotes his polemical stance and affiliations in the formative 1660s. Locke 
remained a chymical physician throughout his life. Furthermore, it would be wrong 
to characterise Locke as an open critic of the College of Physicians. As it happens, 
arguably the most important experience of clinical medicine that he was to have in 
his life involved the advice of a handful of the most eminent members of the 
College. 12 This was his close involvement in Anthony Ashley Cooper’s operation in 
June 1668 to drain a large hydatid cyst above his liver. Furthermore, it appears that 
Locke remained on good terms with John Micklethwaite whose advice he sought 
on a later occasion and who remained faithful to Shaftesbury during his time in the 
Tower. 13 Thus, we must resist defining Locke the physician solely in terms of 
the polemical context in which his views were forged and examine more closely the 
actual contents of his medical and chymical remains. 
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 4  Chymistry 
 Mention of Locke’s medical and chymical remains brings us to the important question 
of the relation between physic and chymistry in Locke’s day. By the early seven-
teenth century the preparation of medical remedies was one of the primary applica-
tions of chymistry. In fact, the Wittenberg chymist Daniel Sennert claimed,
 Chymistry is not a peculiar Art, but belongs to Physick, and is the perfection of it, for it is 
the part only of the Physitian to use and apply Chymical medicines for cure, and [he] may 
be called then a Chymical Physitian, and the Medicines Chymical, which are the perfection 
of Physick. 14 
 The theory of disease, its diagnosis and treatment, as well as many facets of animal 
physiology, such as respiration and digestion, were founded upon chymical theories of 
one sort or another. Almost every leading chymist in England in the 1660s practised 
physic. 15 The diversity amongst them can be accounted for, in part, by the differences 
in the respective chymical theories and techniques that they deployed. 
 Locke’s involvement in chymistry, and therefore in chymical medicine, probably 
began around 1659 and continued well into the 1690s. There were two important 
strands to Locke’s chymistry. First, it is clear that he was deeply influenced by and 
practised chymistry in conformity to the mercurialist school who believed that the 
Philosophical Mercury, an essential ingredient in preparing the Stone, could be 
derived from common mercury. But there is a second, Helmontian strain in Locke’s 
chymistry which is evident in his chymical notebooks, his correspondence and his 
medical receipts, and which is easily accounted for in terms of important sources 
of influence such as Boyle and his good friend, the Helmontian physician David 
Thomas. To be sure it is slightly artificial to separate out these two strands of 
Locke’s chymical thought and practice, and yet it is true to say that the mercurialist 
strand is the most fascinating in terms of Locke’s chymical practice, while the 
Helmontian elements are most important for understanding Locke’s approach to 
physic. I will deal with each of these strands of Locke’s chymistry in turn. The 
evidence presented is illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
 4.1  Locke and Mercurialist Chymistry 
 The derivation of the Philosophical or ‘Sophic’ Mercury involved two processes: 
first the removal of ‘external’ impurities using well-established purification techniques 
such as washing, grinding and distillation; second the removal of internal impurities. 
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It was this process that was believed to be essential for the animation of the Sophic 
Mercury. Once purified the Sophic Mercury would then be able to liberate and 
nourish the seeds of gold and so enable transmutation. 16 The actual process that 
Boyle used to develop the Sophic Mercury involved combining mercury with an 
alloy of pure metallic antimony and silver. William Newman has shown that Boyle 
learnt the technique from George Starkey who in turn had derived it from Alexander 
von Suchten. Where does Locke fit into all of this? 
 On 20 May 1660 Dr. Ayliffe Ivye wrote to Locke at Oxford hoping for Locke’s 
assistance:
 I hope Sir, you will lett slippe noe occasion whereby you may better your selfe, and soe 
me, by your aquaintance with Mr. Boyle, I longe to have an accounte of my Quaeries; I 
made Panacaea 17 Last weeke and have sent you two dragmes, tis the First preparation cal-
cined via  humida , liquore alkahestico then, washed and dryed you may go higher and with 
spirite of wine acuated etc. drawe off his perfect tincture; but truelye this worked admirable 
well and noethinge standeth in his way, and tis most safe to administer it secundum 
Glauberi modum … 18 
 Ivye’s request suggests that he had sent some chymical queries to Boyle and that he 
hoped that Locke would follow them up for him. It is clear from this letter that Ivye 
believes that Locke is interested in his chymical preparations, not least because he had 
sent Locke two drachms of his Panacea and some details of his method of preparation 
of the expectorant: he refers to the  via humida (the use of liquid solvents), alludes to 
van Helmont’s alkahest and refers to the method of the German chymist Glauber. 
Moreover, this is the earliest known connection between Locke and Boyle and it 
suggests that they were already discussing chymistry together by May 1660. 
 Three months later we find Locke writing to one J. O. that he had failed to find 
in the study of Mr. B, that is Robert Boyle, the second part of a work by Alexander 
von Suchten (which he had promised him) and that instead he was sending a newly 
arrived work by Glauber. 19 In fact, Locke seems to have promised J. O. a manu-
script translation of the second treatise of von Suchten’s work on the secrets of 
antimony, the  Tractatus secundus de antimonio vulgari (1604). 20 Two copies of a 
Latin translation of von Suchten’s  Concordantia chymica (1606) survive amongst 
the Boyle Papers. 21 It is therefore of great interest to note that Locke seems to have 
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believed that Boyle also had a copy of a translation of von Suchten’s tract on antimony. 
It is important not to be misled by Locke’s comment in this letter that “Mr. B pre-
fers Glauber to Suchten” because, as mentioned above, von Suchten’s method of 
preparing his Sophic Mercury as spelt out in the second treatise to which Locke 
refers, was absolutely crucial to George Starkey’s preparation of the Philosophical 
Mercury; a preparation that Starkey transmitted to Boyle. 22 And, of course, we now 
know that Boyle was preoccupied with the preparation of the Sophic Mercury for 
over four decades because the preparation of Philosophical Mercury was thought to 
be a necessary preliminary to the preparation of the Philosophers’ Stone. 23 
 Was the young Locke cognizant of all of this? His chymical remains reveal that 
indeed he was. For in Bodleian Library (Bodl.) MS Locke f. 18 which he used from 
1659–1660, that is at the time of his correspondence with Ivye and J. O., Locke 
records his opinion of a substance called Hews Powder as described by his chymi-
cal friend and physician Dr. William Currer (d. 1668). Currer, it should be noted, 
who was later to be a signatory to O’Dowde’s ‘engagement’, had had an acrimoni-
ous dispute with Starkey in  1657 –1658. 24 Locke records his view as follows,
 My opinion is Hews his powder is noething but mercury of antimony fixed with gold which 
workth as this doth witnesse Suchtenius 25 
 We learn from this entry that Locke knew of Suchten’s mercury of antimony either 
from Boyle’s Latin translation of Suchten’s work and/or from conversation with 
Boyle himself. But was Locke, under the influence of Boyle, to become a covert 
chrysopoeian seeking the recipe for the Sophic Mercury? Was he a mercurialist 
when it came to developing techniques for generating the Stone? Did he also seek 
the alkahest, the universal solvent, through the purification of salts after the manner 
of van Helmont, Starkey and Boyle? Was Locke a philosopher by fire? And most 
importantly, what light does this shed on Locke’s views on the nature and practice 
of physic? 
 Around 1660 there was clearly a need in Oxford for some sort of instruction in 
chymistry for the clutch of young talented physicians that were associated with 
those practising the new philosophy there. To this end Boyle arranged for the 
German chymist Peter Stahl to teach a course in chymistry and Locke attended a 
course from 23 April to late May 1663. 26 Detailed notes from this course survive in 
Bodl. MS Locke f. 25 and, together with similar notes recorded by others, we can 
glean a fairly clear picture of what Locke was taught. Stahl was a physician and he 
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taught basic laboratory techniques for preparing chymical remedies many of which, 
according to John Ward, derived from Oswald Croll a student of the German 
chymist Johann Hartmann. 27 If there is any truth to Anthony Wood’s charge that 
during the course Locke was “prating and troublesome” it might be because Locke 
had already been inducted into the chymical arts and had well developed chymical 
views of his own. 28 
 But Bodl. MS Locke f. 25 contains far more than simply notes from the course 
with Stahl. Interestingly, it includes extensive entries relating to antimony and 
mercury and in particular the mercury of antimony, the alkahest and even the 
Philosophical Mercury. 29 Their presence is strong evidence that an important seam 
in Locke’s own chymical outlook was mercurialist and that the various preparations 
relating to antimony were conceived within the theoretical framework deriving 
from the lineage of von Suchten→Starkey→Boyle. 30 On the whole Locke’s 
preoccupation was with chymical preparations that had some application in 
physic and the entries in Bodl. MS Locke f. 25 coincide with the period in 
which Locke was equipping himself as a physician. So, for example, the fact 
that the chymist John Read could write to Locke asking him “What it is in mettells 
& Minnerall that is Medicinal,” 31 indicates that Locke was associated with the 
medicinal applications of chymistry. Moreover, it is, as we have seen, but a small 
step from the medical applications of the mercurialist theoretical framework to a 
full engagement in the teleological structure of this approach to chymistry, that 
is, the quest for the Stone. Yet soon after this Read and Williams were to run into 
trouble over a chymical substance through which Locke feared “all nature might 
be discovered.” Is it surprising then, that Locke supplied Boyle with his own recipe 
for an antimony of mercury  sub sigillo , in confidence, which still survives in the 
Boyle Papers? 32 
 Locke’s chymical notebook (Bodl. MS Locke f. 25) also contains records of 
recipes derived from various chymists and chymical physicians within his 
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ambit, including William Currer and Thomas Williams (with whom Locke 
had had the altercation). 33 The most important of these is Boyle himself, and 
indeed, Boyle remains the single most important source of chymical advice and 
opinions in all of Locke’s notebooks and many of Locke’s chymical connections 
involve Boyle as well. One important example is Johann Schard whom Locke met 
on his visit to Cleves during the winter of 1665–1666. Locke had complained to 
Boyle of Cleves that “their physicians go the old road, I am told, and also easily 
guess by their apothecary’s shops, which are unacquainted with chymical remedies. 
This, I suppose, makes this town so ill furnished with books of that kind, there 
being few here curious enough to enquire after chymistry or experimental 
learning.” 34 But his meeting with Schard was productive. The many chymical 
recipes from Schard in Bodl. MS Locke f. 25 derive from the memorandum 
book Bodl. MS Locke f. 27, which Locke took with him to Cleves and this latter 
notebook reveals that Locke almost certainly spent time in Schard’ chymical 
laboratory and that in addition to the preparation of various chymical remedies, 
they worked on mercury of antimony. 35 
 After his return from Cleves in February 1666 Locke engaged in another period 
of chymical experimentation for which notes also survive in Bodl. MS Locke f. 25. 
1666 was also an important year in Locke’s development as a physician and we will 
have cause to examine his medical writings from this period below. Locke seems to 
have been practising chymistry with his friend Dr. David Thomas during the period 
from his return from Cleves on 18 February 1666 to the time of his departure for 
the household of Anthony Ashley Cooper in early April 1667. On 18 November 
Thomas wrote to Locke, who was visiting Lord Ashley in London, saying “If you 
bring with you mercury … we will make mercury sublimate our selves which wilbe 
much cheaper then to buy it.” 36 Once established in Ashley’s household he wrote to 
Boyle that his fingers still itched to practise chymistry again. 37 In fact, there was a 
chymical laboratory at Exeter House, but there is little evidence of his engaging 
in chymical experimentation. He did, however, practise physic and the period 
from September 1667 to September 1670 proved to be the most intense years of 
medical practice that Locke was ever to experience. During these years Locke was 
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able to start to apply some of the vast knowledge of chymical remedies which he 
had begun to accumulate in the late 1650s. 
 Locke’s chymical interests never ceased. There are chymical preparations, notes 
and observations in his journal that testify to his ongoing interest in chymistry 
during his travels in France. Of particular interest is his discussion of Samuel 
Cottereau Duclos’ potable gold, one of the most prized medicines in the armoury 
of chymical medicine. Locke’s entry for 22 June 1678 provides the recipe for 
Duclos’ potable gold which had apparently “cured quartans and dropsy,” though 
Locke records that “Mr. Briot told me Duclos was a great liar.” 38 He goes on to 
enter a query intended for Thomas Williams with whom he had clashed over the 
 sal circulatum in 1665.
 Q. of Sr T. Williams concerning the processe of this aurum potabile of Dr. F. Anthony 
found amongst the papers of the Bishop of Winchester. 39 
 A decade later, near the end of Locke’s exile in the Netherlands Thomas wrote to 
him again, this time about the potable gold.
 I receaved the chymicall processes and have read Philalethes 40 more then once and doubt 
whether water in the receaver in the purification of the mercury may prejudice it That being 
in other processes prescribed. I desire you to read Jodocus Greverus in Theatr Chym vol 3: 
p. 699 to the same purpose. I entend and am now prepareing materialls for the potible gold 
which m Boyle assures though formerly of a contrary opinion is of very greate use and 
efficacy in physicke. 41 
 Boyle had indeed been sceptical of the potable gold in his  Usefulness of Natural 
Philosophy , II, i, published in 1663. 42 However, his view changed, perhaps due to 
his involvement with the mysterious ambassador of the asterism Georges Pierre 
who sent him a recipe for the potent medicine. In fact, Boyle finally published his 
own recipe for the potable gold in his  Observationes physicae in 1691. 43 
 After Locke’s return from France, David Thomas wrote to him on 16 January 
1682 hoping to see Locke because “this wilbe a convenient time for chemestry” 
and expressing to Locke that he believed that he could make a “principall remedy” 
approaching the alkahest. 44 The next notable episode in Locke’s chymical 
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engagements involved Francis Mercurius van Helmont, the son of the great 
Flemish chymist, whom Locke met in the Netherlands in late 1686 while in exile. 
Francis Mercurius van Helmont had edited his father’s literary remains which were 
published as  Ortus medicinae in 1648. Locke was reading them carefully as early 
as 1657/8. 45 Francis Mercurius van Helmont was a peripatetic chymist and theologian 
whose most distinctive views concerned the transmigration of souls. In December 
1690 after Locke had returned to England, Francis Mercurius, Locke’s “Chymicall 
friend,” 46 provided him with a new furnace. 47 This signals a return to chymical trials 
on Locke’s part that is almost certainly tied to his involvement with Boyle. 
 We now know that some months before Boyle’s death, Locke received from 
Boyle part of a recipe for the Sophic Mercury. It is recorded in shorthand and 
code in Locke’s Journal entry for 25 September 1691. A month later he men-
tioned in a letter to Boyle that “I have water, and I have vessels, I only want soap 
to be at work.” 48 Lawrence Principe has shown that the ‘soap’ is the cleansing 
alloy for the internal process of purification of common mercury. After Boyle’s 
death Locke corresponded with Newton concerning the preparation of the Sophic 
Mercury. 49 He made sure too that while he had access to Boyle’s chymical papers 
he had copies made of some of them totalling about two-hundred pages, includ-
ing the crucial letter from Starkey to Boyle of early 1651 outlining the method of 
von Suchten for preparing the Sophic Mercury. 50 There is no doubt then, that in 
the early 1690s Locke was still keenly interested in Boyle’s chrysopoeian ambi-
tions and that he himself took measures to record them and to try them out 
experimentally. 
 Finally, in October 1694 in a letter to Locke, James Tyrrell says, “I have no more 
but to assure you that as for the Manuscript you mention of the Course of Chymistry 
I doe not remember I ever so much as saw it.” 51 This suggests that even as late as 
1694 Locke remained interested in chymical matters. It also seems likely that the 
manuscript containing the “Course of Chymistry” is Bodl. MS Locke f. 25 which 
we have discussed above. All of this evidence shows that Locke maintained a keen 
interest in chymistry and specifically in mercurialist transmutational alchemy over 
four decades. 
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 4.2  Locke and Helmontian Chymistry 
 Van Helmont died in 1644 and his substantial manuscript remains were published by 
his son Francis Mercurius van Helmont in 1648. His writings exerted a significant 
impact on the Hartlib circle including George Starkey and the young Robert Boyle. 
By 1660 when Locke was beginning in chymistry, Helmontian iatrochemisty was 
embedded in and had become one of the mainstays of reformist English medicine. 52 
 The story of the transmission and assimilation of Helmontian ideas in England 
from the 1650s is multifaceted. However, as is the case with the mercurialist 
approach to chrysopoeia, Locke’s main instructor in the application of Helmontian 
ideas was Robert Boyle. But Locke also read widely amongst the works of van 
Helmont and counted a number of Helmontian physicians amongst his friends, 
including, as we have seen, David Thomas whom Locke seems to have befriended 
in the mid-1660s and who remained one of his closest friends. 
 Van Helmont’s chymistry is predicated upon the view that the fundamental ele-
ments are water and air, and that water is the primal principle to which all sub-
stances can be reduced. Van Helmont claimed that there is a universal solvent, the 
alkahest, which can reduce vegetables and minerals to their constituents and then 
to primal water. He identified Paracelsus’  sal circulatum with his own alkahest. The 
alkahest operates by stripping substances of their forms, which forms are produced 
by the seminal principles that reside in the substance. Once the reduction has taken 
place the alkahest can then be separated off and reused because it is not affected by 
that which it works upon. Of particular importance for medicine was the fact that 
the alkahest could work on the essence of a substance and isolate the active ingredi-
ent within a substance from its inert and noxious matrix. This in turn enabled the 
development of more powerful specific medicines which, stripped of their noxious 
matrix, were able to work in harmony with the  archeus of each person and be 
absorbed by the intestines and thence ameliorate the diseased condition of the 
patient. By contrast, Galenic remedies were rejected by the  archeus which purged 
the body of their gummous poisons. 
 According to van Helmont, other substances over and above the alkahest had 
medicinal value. Of particular importance was the volatile salt of tartar which 
worked, not on the essence or crasis of the substance to be ingested, but on its nox-
ious impurities. This process converted natural substances into perfected sulphurs 
which were by this process prepared for ingestion by the patient. The volatile salt 
of tartar was, therefore, an important succedaneum to the aklahest in Helmontian 
medicine. Other Paracelsian medicines promoted by van Helmont include the tinc-
ture of Lili and  Mercurius diaphoreticus . 53 
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 It was mentioned above that van Helmont identified his alkahest with Paracelsus’ 
 sal circulatum and thus regarded it as a special species of salt. In fact, van Helmont 
had a well-developed classification of salts and a theory concerning their manner 
of interacting with other chymical substances. Van Helmont’s tripartite distinction 
between acid, alkaline and urinous salts was taken up and adapted by Boyle who 
also derived a further tripartite division of spirits from Starkey. Boyle also adopted 
the Helmontian theory of exantlation by which it was supposed that acids lost their 
corrosive power when acting upon other substances, which Boyle explained in 
terms of the mechanical affections of the subtle bodies involved rather than in the 
more vitalistic explanatory categories of van Helmont. 54 
 Now van Helmont deployed two features derived from Renaissance chymistry 
in the service of his iatrochemistry. First, he developed and applied quantitative 
techniques of gravimetrics for his chymical analyses of substances. Second, he used 
corpuscular explanations of the sub-microscopic material changes that gave rise to 
the chymical phenomena that he observed. He also developed the Paracelsian onto-
logical conception of disease as pathogenic  semina which have their own  archeus 
which comes into conflict with the  archeus of the patient. This conception of dis-
ease was naturally tied to the chymical theory of the therapeutic applications of the 
alkahest and volatile salt of tartar, but also had radical implications for the tradi-
tional Galenic  methodus medendi . No longer was disease to be considered in terms 
of humoral imbalance and treatment determined in terms of addressing excesses 
and privations of the Aristotelian primary qualities, hot, cold, wet and dry. Instead, 
van Helmont decried the use of venesection and other traditional therapeutic tech-
niques and advocated the development of chymical remedies based upon his con-
ception of the operation of the  archei and the transformative power of his solvent 
and salts. 55 
 Van Helmont’s was not the only conception of the alkahest, nor is it clear that 
the term ‘alkahest’ referred to one determinate substance in his  oeuvre . 56 Others 
such as the German chymist Glauber developed and applied their own alkahests. 57 
There was also a plethora of seminal theories of disease deriving from Paracelsus. 
In this regard, the views of the Dane Severinus provide a nice counterpoint to the 
Helmontian seminal theory of disease. 58 However, Helmont’s ideas and laboratory 
techniques were undoubtedly the most influential in mid-seventeenth-century 
English medicine, and the most important locus of their development and deploy-
ment was in the work of Starkey and Boyle. 
 As it happens, all of these Helmontian substances and notions (the efficacy in 
physic of the alkahest and the volatile salt of tartar; the theory of salts; the seminal 
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theory of disease; a concern with quantitative chymical experimentation and even 
the  archeus ) are to be found in Locke’s chymical and medical notebooks and 
correspondence. 59 Locke also sought out specific receipts deriving from van 
Helmont. Let us first examine the trail of Helmontian ideas Locke’s chymical 
notebooks and his correspondence before turning to his more focused treatments 
of the nature of disease and animal physiology. We turn first to the alkahest. In 
late 1666 Locke wrote,
 Sal Circulatus Paracelsi est Alkahest Cellarius p. 26  61 60 
 Clearly he is aware of the relation between van Helmont’s solvent and Paracelsus’ 
circulatory salt. In the same year he recorded a long note on Schard’s recipe for the 
alkahest in Bodl. MS Locke f. 25, pp. 194/301. Another entry from around the same time 
records Boyle’s view of the medicinal value of the alkahest or similar substance, 
 Alkahest    Or a menstruum like it dissolvd crud antimony, & when drawn of <f> left 
christall of very great efficacy in physick, pourd upon salt of tartar & 
drawn of<f> & the remainder dissolvd in water afforded strange chrys-
talls Mr. Boyle 
 Just before leaving for London to join Ashley’s household Locke wrote to Boyle 
concerning one of van Helmont’s recipes for the use of warts cut from horses. 
Locke wonders 
 [w]hether they are to be taken from live horses, since (if I forget not) Helmont some where 
says, that if in histerical fits, (for in that disease he commends them) you use those that are 
taken from an horse,  æstuante venere , they have different effects from others. 61 
 Locke also seeks from Boyle advice on the correct dosage of  sal ammoniac . 62 Years 
later Thomas told him
 I thinke a principall remedy may be made by Armoniacke salts satiated with acid salts and 
volatilized which I beleeve may be by a short way effected and farther advanced to allmost 
the Alkahest. 63 
 Of course the alkahest was not the only Helmontian substance in which Locke took 
an ongoing interest. He also seems to have adopted, probably via Boyle, Helmont’s 
theory of salts. For example, in Bodl. MS Locke d. 9 we find a signed entry implying 
a belief in the Helmontian tripartite division.
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 Whether volatil or urinous salts, acid & alkali may by any art of chymistry be changed one 
into another & what difference is to be found amongst the particulars of each of these 3 
species JL 64 
 Locke is clearly aware of the Helmontian origins of this theory. The very next entry 
concerns the derivation of volatile salts from herbs with a reference to van 
Helmont’s  Ortus :
 How the oyls of hearbs may be turned into volatil salts v. Helmont de Feb. c. 15 §7  52 . 65 
 Moreover, as will become apparent below, the Helmontian view of salts and spirits 
plays an important role in Locke’s views on the use of respiration in animals and 
humans. 
 It may be objected that much of what Locke appropriated from van Helmont was 
undergirded by a speculative theory that included abstruse ontological categories 
such as  gas ,  blas and ferments and that this is inconsistent with the experimental 
philosophy with its opposition to speculation and hypotheses. However, this is to 
miss three crucial features of the Helmontian legacy in Locke’s thought. First, it 
must be said that almost all of Locke’s chymical notes concern practical chymistry 
and there is no sustained discussion of underlying ontological categories. Locke’s 
Helmontianism was practically and therapeutically oriented. Where Helmontian 
notions do appear, as in his theory of seminal disease (to be discussed below), there 
is no detailed explanation of what these categories actually are. 
 Second, on the rare occasions when Locke actually does report explanations of 
what is happening at the sub-microscopic level in chymical reactions, he is either 
reporting Boyle’s corpuscular explanations or providing corpuscular musings of his 
own. For example, a marginal comment in Bodl. MS Locke f. 25, p. 309 for an 
entry on “Mercury of Antimony made by ascending at an intense heat by distilling 
in a retort” says “This calx fixes the oyly parts, & fastens imbibes them to itself Mr. 
Boyle.” 66 The important point here is that, as Newman and Principe have shown, 67 
Boyle tended to give mechanical explanations of Helmontian processes and it is this 
‘de-vitalised’ Helmontianism that he transmitted to Locke. 
 5  Nosology and Therapeutics 
 Turning now to Locke’s views on the nature of disease, we find that they are typical 
of those held by the chymical physicians of the 1660s and that the salient doctrines 
were widely held amongst Locke’s peers. The  locus classicus of Locke’s view of 
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disease is his “Morbus” entry in British Library Add. MS 32554 about which much 
has been written. This espouses a seminal theory of some diseases as a  via media 
between the views of the Paracelsians and the Galenists. Locke’s treatment of 
disease in this long entry from c. 1666 is strongly Helmontian and illustrates the 
manner in which Helmontian medical ideas were seen as being in opposition to 
Paracelsian notions. 
 Of particular interest in “Morbus” is the strong corpuscularism that underlies the 
theory. Locke delimits generation to two kinds: generation by seed and generation 
by the mixtion of parts,
 some things are producd by seminall principles, & some other by bare mistion of the parts, 
to which might be added the circumstantiall assistances of heat & cold &c, by seminall 
principles or ferments I meane some small & subtile parcelles of matter which are apt to 
transmute far greater portions of matter into a new nature & new qualitys, which change 
could not be brought about by any other knowne means, soe that this change seems wholy 
to depend upon the operation or activity of this seminall principle, & not on the difference 
of the matter its self that is changd. 68 
 Note too the reference to the Helmontian notion of ferments which for van Helmont 
are equivalent to the formative power of seeds. Locke also speaks of the  archeus of 
the disease,
 How these small & insensible ferments, this potent Archeus works I confesse I cannot 
satisfactorily comprehend, though the effects are evident but yet I believe ‘twould be 
worth considering, to finde what deseases spring from these ferments, such as I beleive 
are contagions. 69 
 This is strongly Helmontian in tone and is typical of the theories of disease which 
Locke was reading in the mid-1660s. The seminal ferments are regarded, following 
van Helmont, as invasive pathogenic agents which have their own  archeus . 
Interestingly, Locke’s discussion contains a residue of Galenism in his references 
to temperaments:
 it may be observd that in many deseases of this nature, the particular constitution of the 
body doth not make the deseases though some tempers be better fitted to be wrought on by 
this & some by that ferment, though if the seminall virtue be strong enough it will lay hold 
on any soe most seeds will grow almost in any soyle, though in some they thrive much 
better & others starve & dwindle. soe sanguine complexions are observd most easily to 
admit the seminall principles of the plague easily melancholy tempers more difficultly. 70 
 The seminal theory of disease combined naturally with the miasmic view of 
Fracastorius and others that was promoted by Boyle, Hooke and later by 
Sydenham. 71 Locke’s own later foray into environmental medicine with Charles 
Goodall was predicated on this miasma theory and is evidence for Locke’s continued 
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belief in the seminal theory itself. And in fact, we find in his Journal entry for 22 
July of 1678 that he claims “certain body types may carry seeds of certain diseases, 
or are more predisposed to contract them.” 72 
 As many scholars have pointed out, this ontological conception of disease lends 
itself to the view that there are different species of pathogenic agents. Locke seems 
to have been particularly attracted to Thomas Sydenham’s classification of fevers 
in the 1670s and its susceptibility to the method of natural history which, probably 
under Locke’s own influence, became the hallmark of Sydenham’s medical meth-
odology and to which Locke had, under the influence of Boyle, long subscribed. 73 
It is important to stress, however, that Locke concedes that not all diseases have 
this cause,
 Other deseases I suppose may probably be conceivd to be producd by a bare mistion of 
two unfitt ingredient<s>, as when acid & volatile salts are mixd, there presently is pro-
ducd an ebullition, & then the two differing salts coagulate into a 3 d substance far enough 
different from either of the ingredients. which I suppose not to be donne by any seminall 
principle. 74 
 One cannot help but note the implicit commitment to a Helmontian theory of salts 
which seems to have played an important role in Locke’s understanding of his own 
medical receipts as he went on and practised physic in later years. The depth of 
this commitment to this common theory of salts at this early stage in Locke’s 
development as a physician is perhaps best illustrated in his short disputation on the 
use of respiration and it is to Locke’s physiology that we now turn. 
 6  Physiology 
 In 1666 Locke drafted a medical disputation on the use of respiration. It now 
survives in the Shaftesbury Papers in the National Archives in Kew. It is entitled 
“Respirationis usus” and is written in small difficult Latin. 75 Before we examine 
some of its contents, a note of caution is in order. Locke despised the disputations 
of the Schools which he regarded as vacuous performances designed to titillate 
rather than to instruct. It seems most likely that he composed this disputation in 
order to cover himself, or at least his conscience, in his bid to have the degree of 
Doctor of Medicine conferred on him without fulfilling the requirements of the 
degree. With this in mind, we can surmise that there was in Locke’s heart a degree 
of reluctance as he composed this draft and that its contents were designed more 
for the occasion than to record his own precise theoretical reflections on a very 
vexed problem in animal physiology. In other words, we should not take all of what 
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Locke says in the “Respirationis usus” too seriously, at least not as the definitive 
statement of his views. It was not composed as a record of research findings, but as 
an academic exercise, a necessary evil in order to secure a Medical Studentship at 
Christ Church. 
 With these preliminaries in hand, let us turn to the text. The first thing to notice 
is the dramatic disputational form that it takes. While this is most evident to the 
reader of Latin, there is enough in translation to capture the theatricality of the 
prose. It opens in Heraclitean tones,
 Nature never hides and flees from us more than when she seems to come forth openly and 
to show herself to anyone as obvious and easy. The vital breath of air that we draw in and 
expel with continuous labor from the first moment of life to its final extent seems merely 
to jeer at us. It pours itself into our inner breast only to slip away, and it cheats the embraces 
into which it rushed at first, and with the same subtlety it escapes the sharpness of both 
mind and eyes. 76 
 And it is not long before the Helmontian themes start to leap off the page. After 
speaking of the “vestal fire of life” that nourishes us we are told that it is not the 
function of respiration to cool this fire but rather
 there are so many kitchens [ culinae ] of digestion and coction in the body, hence there are 
such various ferments of the internal parts all of which appear to work together so that there 
is finally something that can be inflamed and so that the vital flame may have tinder; to this 
purpose above all else, respiration seems to be devoted. 77 
 The kitchen metaphor is classic van Helmont and the reference to the “various 
ferments of the internal parts” speaks of the Helmontian theory of digestion. Locke 
then moves on to the theory of the role of fermentation in the generation of animal 
spirits in terms redolent of Van Helmont, 
 It is now generally acknowledged by everyone that the life of animals consists in the con-
tinuous generation and flow of subtle spirits. It is evident that these spirits of the heart are 
generated either by heat or fermentation by means of a previous digestion of ingested 
substances in the stomach, the intestines, the mesentery, and other workshops [ officinis ]. 78 
 It is the next stage of the process that brings us to the Helmontian theory of salts:
 animal life turns upon this hinge, that a continuous and constant supply of animal spirit be 
produced, that is, that the parts of the blood be exalted into a subtle and volatile material. 79 
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 This “subtle and volatile material” is diffused throughout the body and when it has 
“played its role”
 these mature effluvia of the blood finally transpire and fly off into the breeze, thus furnishing 
a place for the spirits following behind them. In this way, by repeated circuits through the 
heart and lungs the mass of blood furnishes material to the vital flame, and finally the whole 
mass of blood, having been made volatile (leaving no residue behind) and transmuted into 
the nature of spirits, is breathed out and vanishes through sweat; this could never be done 
without the air’s fellowship. 80 
 What is the solvent in the air that brings enables it to “agitate, subtilize, volatilize, 
and finally kindle” the body? Following Robert Hooke, Locke speculates that
 It would seem to be a certain highly volatile nitrous spirit, <for> some have not 
unaptly observed that saltpetre is the proper menstruum for sulphureous and inflam-
mable bodies. Especially since it is well known that the volatile salts of animals 
(for example, of blood and of urine) produce niter when cofermented with earth exposed 
to solar rays. 81 
 This is, in fact, the widely held Helmontian account of the role of the volatilisation of 
blood venous blood in respiration. Locke even deploys the corpuscular terminology 
so characteristic of Van Helmont:
 it is probable that it is air which consumes bodies and makes them burn, not fire, which 
seems to be nothing other than the greatest agitation of the minute parts, while the air 
loosens their texture and shatters them. 82 
 The point here is not that Locke was a thorough-going Helmontian, but 
that these were the tropes, the turns of phrase, the theoretical framework that 
Locke had at hand to work with. To be sure, in his own notebook entries 
concerning respiration and air he is more circumspect and less flowery, but 
even there the stamp of Helmontian chymistry and physiological theory are 
everywhere apparent. 83 
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 7  Conclusion 
 Let us turn again to the question with which this paper began: What kind of physician 
was Locke? It seems undeniable that he was a chymical physician, a mercurialist 
and a Helmontian. Locke was almost certainly inducted into the chymical arcana 
by Robert Boyle at least by early 1660 when he had access to Boyle’s chymical 
papers and laboratory. It is little wonder then that Locke was one of three physi-
cians to whom Boyle entrusted his chymical papers on his death and that it is 
through Locke’s copies of some of them that one of the keys to unlocking Boyle’s 
own quest for the Sophic Mercury was discovered. It is somehow so appropriate 
that Locke should be a key to the chymical Boyle because so much of Locke’s own 
development as a chymical physician was inspired by Boyle. 
 Five things are worth noting in conclusion. First, while Locke was a mercurialist 
and was tantalised by the prospect of securing the Sophic Mercury, there is, to my 
knowledge, no evidence of Locke as a crypto-chrysopoeian. Unlike Boyle, who 
secretly pursued transmutation and was even duped by unscrupulous pretenders, 
such as Georges Pierre, Locke remained first and foremost one who sought to apply 
mercurialist and Helmontian chymistry in physic. Locke was not attempting to be 
an adept of chrysopoeia. 
 Second, note the absence of Thomas Sydenham from this study. Many have and 
do hold that the seminal influence on Locke’s formation as a physician, both meth-
odologically and practically was Sydenham. Yet Sydenham was not, in spite of the 
efforts of Daniel Coxe, 84 attracted to chymistry, and before he met Locke, he seems 
to have had little if anything in common with the physicians within Locke’s ambit. 
It was, I believe, Locke who influenced Sydenham in the matter of methodology, 
while Locke learnt from him much about the treatment and classification of 
fevers. 85 More importantly, however, what I hope that this study shows is that the 
distinctive character of Locke as a physician was set before Locke met Sydenham. 
 Third, Locke was not uncritical of his sources, teachers and those whom he read. 
He would have had no truck with the pretensions to revelation of the likes of 
Starkey and van Helmont himself. This, for Locke, would smack of enthusiasm, 
though, to my knowledge, there is no record of his response to the revelatory claims 
of the chymists. 
 Fourth, it should be noted that there is a natural fit between Locke and van 
Helmont. Van Helmont was a serious experimenter who contributed significantly to 
experimental method in chymistry. In this he was a significant source for the experi-
mental philosophy: his gravimetric techniques were deployed by Boyle who also 
performed some of his experiments, most famously the willow tree experiment. 86 
Now from the early drafts of  An Essay concerning Human Understanding ( Essay ) 
composed in 1671 we know that Locke was deeply concerned with standards of 
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measure and that his ideal natural philosophy was to be based upon a corpusuclar 
metric. 87 The corpuscular matter theory of Boyle was conducive both to Locke’s 
ideal for a fully quantified natural philosophy and at the same time was part and 
parcel of the Boylean application of Helmontian ideas. If we add to this the iatro-
chemical focus of van Helmont’s writings, it is clear that the whole package fits 
nicely with Locke’s natural philosophical and medical outlook. Observation, 
experiment, measurement and cure were the hallmarks of this approach to medicine 
and these were central to the experimental philosophy. 
 Note too that Locke’s appropriation of Helmontian medicine dovetails nicely 
with his other natural philosophical interests and methodological views. A life-long 
interest in botany fed into Locke’s training and practice as a physician, as did his 
involvement in Boyle’s researches into the air. All of this was subsumed under the 
Baconian rubric of the need to assemble natural histories, and the classification of 
plants, the classification of diseases, as well as the assembling of meteorological 
readings, and even his foray into environmental medicine, form parts of an inte-
grated whole that preoccupied Locke for four decades. 
 And this brings us fifth and finally to the historiography underlying so much 
Lockean interpretation. How are we to square Locke’s commitment to seminal 
principles and the teleological substructure of mercurialist matter theory with a 
commitment to the sparse ontology of a corpuscular matter theory and the primary 
and secondary quality distinction? There are three considerations that need to be 
brought to bear on this question. First, as is typical of Locke in many areas of 
natural philosophy, he declares his nescience concerning the manner of operation 
of the seeds: “[h]ow these small & insensible ferments, this potent Archeus works 
I confesse I cannot satisfactorily comprehend.” 88 This reflects Boyle’s own claims 
of ignorance about the mode of operation of seminal principles and is consistent 
with Locke’s reflections in “Anatomia” of 1668 and the corpuscular scepticism of 
the drafts and the  Essay itself. A second important consideration is that Locke’s 
commitment to transmutational mercurialist chymistry is predicated upon a 
homogeneous matter that underlies the corpuscular concretions that provide the 
stable materials with which the chymists worked. It is this homogeneous, solid 
matter which Locke describes in the  Essay as “every where the same, every where 
uniform” 89 that when modified with determinate shape, size and motion, gives 
rise to the conceptual problems for the corpuscular philosophy that Locke discusses 
in Book Two of the  Essay . 
 However, and this is the third consideration, not only did Locke bring corpuscular 
analyses to bear wherever he could upon matters of chymical analysis and interpre-
tation, but he clearly thought that such analyses would eventually be constituents of 
a demonstrative natural philosophy. Here is how he puts it in the chapter on universal 
propositions in Book Four:
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 [c]ould we begin at the other end, and discover what it was, wherein that Colour consisted, 
what made a Body lighter or heavier, what texture of Parts made it malleable, fusible, and 
fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this sort of Liquor, and not in another; if (I say) we had such 
an  Idea as this of Bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible Qualities originally con-
sist, and how they are produced; we might frame such abstract  Ideas of them, as would 
furnish us with matter of more general Knowledge, and enable us to make universal 
Propositions, that should carry  general Truth and  Certainty with them. 90 
 Such universal propositions would not be merely general and certain truths, but like 
the truths of mathematics, they would be  instructive . 
 Locke left no legacy in chymistry or in physic, but his philosophical legacy is 
unchallenged. And it is possible when reading the  Essay concerning Human 
Understanding to be in blissful ignorance of Locke’s involvement in chymistry and 
medicine. However, apprised as we now are of his mercurialist commitments is it 
any wonder that the most common illustrations in Book Three, in which Locke 
discusses the nature of species, are chymical ones; gold, antimony and vitriol? 
Perhaps there is an autobiographical element in Locke’s claim
 [t]hat we find many of the Individuals that are ranked into one Sort, called by one common 
Name, and so received as being of one  Species , have yet Qualities, depending on their real 
Constitutions, as far different one from another as from others, from which they are 
accounted to differ  specifically . This, as it is easy to be observed by all, who have to do 
with natural Bodies; so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinced of it, 
when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, 
Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others. 91 
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Part II
The Body as Instrument

121
 Abstract  The optical instruments developed through the seventeenth century 
allowed peering into the very far and the very small; a spectacle never before 
experienced. The telescope, and later the microscope, was now expected to answer 
fundamental questions and resolve cosmological riddles by direct observation into 
the foundations of nature. But this ability came at an unexpected price and with 
unexpected results. For Kepler and Galileo, the new instruments did not offer exten-
sion and improvement to the senses; they replaced them altogether. To rely on their 
authority was to admit that the human eye is nothing but an instrument, and a flawed 
one at that. Rather than the intellect’s window to the world, the human senses became 
a part of this world, a source of obscure and unreliable data, demanding uncertain 
deciphering. Accurate scientific observation meant that we are always wrong. 
 1  Introduction 
 On receiving news of Galileo’s observations of the four satellites of Jupiter and the 
rugged face of the moon through his newly invented  perspicillum , Kepler in great 
excitement exclaimed:
 Therefore let Galileo take his stand by Kepler’s side. Let the former observe the moon with 
his face turned skyward, while the latter studies the sun by looking down at a screen (lest 
the lens injure his eyes). Let each employ his own device, and from this partnership may 
there some day arise an absolutely perfect theory of the distances. 1 
 This Hollywood-like scene of the two astronomers marching hand in hand toward 
the dawn of a new scientific era was no attempt by Kepler to appropriate Galileo’s 
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success or to diminish the novelty of the telescope. 2 On the contrary, Kepler repeatedly 
asserted how short sighted he was in misjudging the potential for astronomical 
observations inherent in lenses, and how radically Galileo’s instrument transformed 
the science of astronomy. It was a deep sense of recognition that beyond their dif-
ferent scientific temperaments and projects, they shared a common agenda of a new 
mode of empirical engagement with the phenomenal world: the instrument. For 
Kepler and Galileo, empirical investigation was no longer a direct engagement with 
nature, but an  essentially mediated endeavor. The new instruments were not to 
assist the human senses, but to replace them. 
 2  Galileo: An Instrument for an Eye 
 The eye, in this new scheme, was to become a part of the instrument. When Kepler 
describes the nipple shaped lens, which he suggests as an improvement to Galileo’s 
telescope, he explains that the position of the observer’s eye depends on the “spot 
where the rays from all points of the object under observation converge at a com-
mon focus (this is the function of the hyperbolic nipple).” 3 The rays coming parallel 
from a distant point are converged by the nipple shaped lens at the crystalline 
humor and are continually refracted within the eye until “they strike the retina.” The 
resulting image is “quite confused” and in order to set it right, Kepler suggests 
another lens to manipulate these inner refractions by adjusting the coming of the 
rays as if “they come from some nearby point.” The result will be that the rays will 
“find their points of convergence on the retina itself. This is the definition of clear 
vision.” 4 Kepler does not differentiate between the “natural” ocular membranes – 
the crystalline humor and retina – and the artificial lenses and screens; they are all 
integrated into a continuous process that creates from the rays of light a clear pic-
ture on a flat opaque surface. 
 Kepler’s account of his suggested improvement to Galileo’s invention accords 
well with Galileo’s own instructions for its use. Such special instructions are 
required, and provided in the first pages of his  Sidereus Nuncius , because unlike 
 
2 
 Kepler’s ulterior motives constitute the crux of Biagioli’s recent reconstruction of this exchange 
(Biagioli  2006 , esp. 33–39). Biagioli queries Kepler’s hasty and enthusiastic reply to Galileo’s 
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ing lens production and not to lack of theory about how telescopes work and how lenses magnify. 
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optical predecessors such as the spectacles, the scientific instrument does not sim-
ply strengthen the weak eye. It thoroughly replaces the ‘natural’ function of the 
sense organ with reasoned procedure of observation, into which measurement and 
comparison are built and into which the eyes should be assimilated. Galileo first 
cautions the readers that they have to “prepare a most accurate glass that shows 
objects brightly, distinctly, and not veiled by any obscurity.” He then asks them to 
verify the power of magnification through an exercise that demands both the ability 
to produce accurate geometrical drawings of two circles, one 400 times larger than 
the other- together with the ability to force the eyes to gaze each at different objects, 
yet still be able to compare their sizes. After adjusting the eyes to the instrument, 
Galileo proceeds to his sketchy instructions as to how to measure distances viewed 
through the telescope’s lenses. 5 
 These instructions did not reveal to Galileo’s readers how fundamentally novel 
was the status he assigned to his instrument. The telescope was accepted with great 
fanfare and immediately embraced by the scholarly community. 6 In fact, it seemed 
like an excellent way to conduct innovative astronomy without being entangled 
with the cosmological ramifications of the new astronomical theories, and was 
enthusiastically endorsed for this reason by the Jesuits. 7 “Now no part of the sky 
escapes our glance,” they rhapsodized about “the lynx eyes:”
 nor is the beauty of the moon so great as it was for us formerly. We have been able to 
distinguish the circular motions of Venus and Mercury, and who does not blush to see the 
sun occasionally disfigured? We have laid bare the stratagems of Mars in approaching the 
earth and we have exposed the attendance of Jupiter and Saturn, hitherto hidden away to 
no purpose. 8 
 But these very words, written a decade after the introduction of the telescope, did 
nothing but set up the inevitable clash between the radical epistemology that 
Galileo attached to the new instrument and the traditionalist project to which the 
Jesuits were attempting to harness it. The occasion for drawing clear lines between 
the modes of instrument-aided observation was introduced by the appearance of a 
sequence of three comets in the European sky during 1618 (Fig.  1 ). 
 The three comets – especially the third – were most impressive and had been 
carefully observed in late November by astronomers all over Europe, initiating a 
masquerade of astronomical treatises in which anonymous writers, pseudonyms 
and false authorship paraded through the European astronomical community, 
examining the demarcation lines between appearances and substances, optical illu-
sions and authentic events. 
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 Galileo’s entrée into this parade and the positions he expresses in it are very 
surprising. Never having observed the comets himself, he waited until an anony-
mous treatise by the Jesuit mathematician Horatio Grassi,  De Tribus Cometis Anni 
1618 Disputatio Astronomica (1619) introduced the issues of the scholarly discus-
sion about these spectacular objects. Grassi’s views are ones that Galileo should 
 Fig. 1  The Comets of 1618 
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have been delighted with. Not only does he begin with the tribute to Galileo and his 
instrument cited above, his main conclusion is one that should have particularly 
appealed to Galileo: “our comet was not sublunar” he declares, “but clearly celestial.” 9 
Tycho Brahe had already arrived at this conclusion concerning the comet of 1577, 
as well as the  Nova Stella of 1572, but the idea that comets and other transient 
objects are superlunary did not lose its revolutionary cosmological significance. 
The sharp dichotomy between the realm under and above the moon, which the 
heavenly position of comets undermined, was not an arcane scholarly conviction; it 
was well entrenched in religion and commonsense. 10 If Galileo was engaged in “a 
polemic against the Aristotelian and scholastic physics,” 11 as is commonly assumed, 
Grassi and Tycho should have been his close allies and the superlunary position of 
the comets his cherished weapon. 
 Yet Galileo chooses to join the discussion with a fierce assault on Grassi’s 
 Disputatio . He does it stealthily, dictating a  Discourse on the Comets in Tuscan 
through his disciple and fellow academician Mario Guiducci  (1619) . 12 Grassi, how-
ever, is not fooled. He mocks “Galileo [for] order[ing] the matter to be discussed 
through intermediaries and interpreters” and joins the play of “secrets of mind” by 
replying with  Astronomical and Philosophical Balance , apparently composed with 
other members of the  Collegio Romano , under the anagram Lothario Sarsi of 
Siguenza (Sigensano 1619). For the celebrated climax of the debate Galileo 
unmasked and answered ‘Sarsi’s’ Latin  Balance ( Libra ) with his own – again 
Tuscan –  The Assayer ( Il Saggiatore ,  1623) , simultaneously denying that he was 
behind Guiducci  and complaining about Sarsi’s lack of manners in exposing him. 13 
This was more than literary playfulness. In  The Assayer Galileo not only discloses 
his own true identity and points to that of his rivals, but urges the reader to unmask 
Nature herself to see beyond “the bounty [of] her effects.” 14 
 Modern historians and philosophers of science, ensnared by these playful 
polemics, usually read  The Assayer as a defense of Copernican astronomy against 
a complex of theological and conservative views of nature. But Galileo’s arguments 
and those of Grassi’s he chooses to refute demonstrate that the polemics are about 
the power and significance of instrumental observation. Yet Galileo does not defend 
the value of the telescope, which Grassi, we saw, has never doubted. Galileo takes 
 
9 
 Grassi  1619 , 14. 
 
10 
 Concerning the significance of the superlunary position of comets see Van Nouhuys 1998. On 
the difficulties the Jesuits had with Tycho’s cosmology see: Baldini 1992, 217–250; Blackwell 
1992, esp. 148–153; Lattis 1994, 94–102, 211–216. 
 
11 
 Cassirer 1942, 316. 
 
12 
 Favaro asserts that “the pages of the first part … have corrections and additions in Galileo’s 
handwriting. A second part … is entirely in Galileo’s writing. The third part in Guiducci’s hand 
… but there are correction by [Galileo]” and concludes that “the entire discourse may be said to 
be essentially his work.” Quoted in Drake and O’Malley 1960, xvi–xvii. 
 
13 
 Galileo  1623 , 169. 
 
14 
 Galilei  1623 , 236. “La ricchezza della natura.” In Galilei  1890 –1909, 6: 281. 
126 Ofer Gal and R. Chen-Morris
the opportunity of the discussion about comets to pursue his (and Kepler’s) new 
empiricism, in which instruments are to replace the human senses. 
 Galileo reveals these intentions by targeting Grassi’s two main arguments for the 
superlunary position of comets. The first one is based on the same method Tycho 
had perfected a generation earlier to make his claims about the celestial position of 
comets:
 If the comet was observed from different places and compared with the stars of the firma-
ment, and if it preserved the same distance from them, it must be regarded as either in the 
firmament or certainly not far removed from it. But if it underwent parallax, it must be 
placed below the firmament in proportion to the amount of the difference of aspect. 15 
 Parallax calculations – the comparison of the angles of sight from different posi-
tions – was a traditional and most venerable method of observational astronomy. 
For Grassi and the Jesuits, it gained further support through their intricate network 
of scholars and institutions deployed all over Europe. When observers in “Milan 
and in Parma … from Innsbruck in Germany and from France and Belgium” report 
the same position for the comet, and when finally two particularly accurate obser-
vations from Rome and Cologne completely coalesce in time and place, Grassi 
feels validated. The claim for the superlunary position of the comets does not 
“exceed the boundaries of our knowledge” and remains within the realm of empiri-
cal modesty. 16 
 Yet what for Grassi is a carefully measured factual conclusion is completely 
unacceptable for Galileo. “Parallax operates reliably,” he lets Guiducci claim on his 
behalf, “in real and permanent things whose essence is not affected by anyone’s 
vision; these do not change place when the eye is moved. But parallax does not 
function in mere appearances,” and comets are among those
 reflections of light, images, and wandering simulacra which are so dependent for their 
existence upon the vision of the observer that not only do they change position when he 
does, but … would vanish entirely if his vision were taken away. 17 
 Galileo’s real target should not be mistaken. It is neither the case that he harbored 
some deep aversion to parallax considerations, nor that he was particularly commit-
ted to Aristotelian meteorology or convinced in the errors of Tycho’s way, or even 
that he was indeed so careful in his own parallax observations as to limit them only 
to unquestionably solid celestial bodies. In a series of public lectures following the 
supernova of 1604, for example, he took a clear Tychonic position and used the lack 
of parallax to argue that the new star was super lunar. 18 What Galileo is really 
assaulting is a particular type of empiricism, encapsulated in Grassi’s knock-down 
parallax argument:
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 If at the same time from other regions the same star was also observed very near to the 
comet, no stronger and clearer argument could be hoped for by which it might be 
demonstrated that the comet had very little or no parallax, since this could be observed 
without any instrument and by  observation with the unaided eye . 19 
 This last clause captures for Galileo the Jesuit-Tychonic position on parallax, an 
approach to scientific observation which he is obliged to confront and against 
which he defines his own empiricism. For Grassi and the Jesuits, the final arbitrator 
and the measure of all observations is the “unaided eye.” Their parallax observa-
tions are particularly trustworthy, they assume, because they can be conducted 
“without any instrument.” Galileo’s arguments aim at the conditions of visibility 
necessary for parallax measurements because he wishes to undermine the funda-
mental assumption of the Jesuits’ epistemology – the reliability of observation by 
the naked eye:
 in order to have the comet appear as without parallax to all observers, and still originate in 
the elemental sphere, it would suffice for vapours … to be diffused on high and to be 
capable of reflecting the sun’s light through distances and spaces equal to … those from 
which the comet is perceived. 20 
 Parallax is liable to the baffling effects of appearances and optical illusions because 
it is dependent on the naked eye. This is the crux of Galileo’s surprising assault: 
observation “without any instrument” is not preferable, it is, on the contrary, fun-
damentally suspect. 
 Galileo further focuses the attack on the naked eye in answering Grassi’s other 
main argument for the superlunary position of comets.  “It has been discovered by 
long experience,” claims Grassi,
 and proved by optical reason that all things observed with this instrument [the telescope] 
seem larger than they appear to the naked eye; yet according to the law that the enlargement 
appears less and less the farther away [the observed things] are removed from the eye, it 
results that fixed stars, the most remote of all from us, receive no perceptible magnification 
from the telescope. Therefore, since the comet appeared to be enlarged very little it … is 
more remote from us than the moon, since when [the moon] has been observed through the 
telescope it appears much larger. 21 
 This is the one argument that Galileo would not forgive. He would not allow that 
one can conclude about the distance of the comets from the failure of the telescope 
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to magnify them, because he will not admit to this failure; the telescope magnifies 
regardless of distance:
 If a surface of a ball seen through the telescope at a distance of half a mile increases a 
thousand times, then so will the moon’s disc increase a thousand times and no less; so will 
that of Jupiter and finally that of a fixed star. 22 
 It is important to stress again that Grassi is an avowed supporter of the telescope 
and “the lynx eyes.” The telescope is a legitimate, marvelous extension of the eye, 
strengthening its weaknesses and repairing its errors. Indeed, interpreting Galileo 
as arguing for this legitimacy, Grassi bitterly protests (under the name of Sarsi and 
on behalf of his Jesuit colleagues) what he perceives to be his portrayal as a scien-
tific reactionary. Nothing is farther from the truth, the author of  Libra complains; 
he is a champion of progress and a staunch defender of Galileo and his 
instruments:
 There were not lacking those who … asserted that … the telescope carries spectres to the 
eyes and deludes the mind with various images; therefore it does not display genuinely and 
without deception even those things which we observe close at hand, much less those 
which are far removed from us, except it will show them bewitched and deformed. We … 
publicly confuted the ignorance of those for whom this instrument was of no significance 
… we hoped that by protecting from invidious calumnies this telescope … we might there-
fore deserve well of [Galileo] rather than ill. 23 
 There is no particular reason for Grassi to reject the telescope. Traditional mathe-
matical optics provides him with a clear and trustworthy account of the principles 
of the instrument’s operation:
 Objects are enlarged by the telescope because these objects are carried from it to the eye 
under a greater angle then they are observed without this instrument … according to optics, 
whatever things are observed under a larger angle seem larger. 24 
 This analysis also provides him with an explanation, again in terms taken directly 
from traditional eye-centered, Euclidean-based optics, why the fixed stars, and 
presumably comets, should elude magnification:
 Be the visible objective whatever it may, the more it is removed from the eye the smaller 
and smaller the angle at which it is seen … thus, the angle of incidence of the images at 
the telescope scarcely vary after the objects have reached a very great distance, for then it 
is just as if all the rays fell perpendicularly on the lens. 25 
 Note how ‘modern’ Grassi is, how well entrenched in the most contemporary 
cosmology: Copernican or Tychonian, Grassi’s world offers “very great dis-
tance” for the fixed stars. Yet Kepler and Galileo’s move towards the abolition 
of the dichotomy between eye and instrument, if Grassi is aware of either, has 
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left him completely unaffected. The “visible object,” for him, is seen  by the eye . 
The telescope is of a different status altogether; it is a part of the medium  through 
which vision occurs, and subject to the same mathematical analysis. It helps like 
any instrument might – hence the title  Libra – but it does not change the principal 
onus of evidence and argument. This lies, always, with what “could be observed 
without any instrument and by observation with the unaided eye.” 26 
 With this loyalty to the naked eye, as far as Galileo is concerned, Grassi com-
pletely misses the import of the telescope. Grassi, we saw, was taken aback by the 
vehemence of Galileo’s replies, and understood them as a defense of telescopic 
observation. But his baffled defense of his credentials in this respect was misplaced. 
Galileo had even less patience for his hearty support than for his mild criticism: 
“Sig. Sarsi, give up trying to exalt this instrument with this admirable new proper-
ties of yours unless you wish to throw it into utter disrepute.” 27 His sarcasm aside, 
what is clear is that Galileo was not disturbed by Grassi’s empirical claims but by 
his analysis and arguments, and disturbed enough that he felt compelled to reject 
both Grassi’s support and his conclusions. 
 Galileo has no qualms about Grassi’s geometrical analysis of magnification “for 
objects seen naturally.” In that case, “the diminution of the angle is made in a con-
tinually greater ratio the more the object is removed.” 28 But Galileo has little respect 
for the way objects are “seen naturally.” From Galileo’s point of view, the instru-
ment does not extend the sense organ, but replaces it altogether, and in the process 
it is the naked eye that loses its legitimacy as a source of knowledge:
 The naked eye distinguishes none of these shapes [of the heavenly bodies] without the 
telescope.  29 
 Galileo, then, does not reject Grassi’s cosmological conclusions because he nur-
tures some deep-held belief in the sublunary nature of comets. Rather, he finds 
himself placing the comets in the “elemental sphere” because he is adamant to 
reject the implications of Grassi’s main arguments to the contrary. Namely: that 
fixed stars, like comets, are not magnified by the telescope, which implies that the 
telescope does not magnify  all objects; and that absence of parallax is  the unassail-
able testimony for the great distance of comets, which implies the supremacy of 
what “could be observed without any instrument and by observation with the 
unaided eye.” 
 It will be a mistake to think of Galileo as defending the telescope or apologizing 
for its failure to magnify very distant objects. There is no such failure, he insists: 
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comets and fixed stars do not appear magnified  to the eye because of a distortion 
produced  by the eye and repaired by the telescope:
 what we meant by saying the telescope ‘robs the stars of irradiation’ … is that it operates 
upon the stars in such a way [as to circumvent] the irradiation which disturbs the naked eye 
and impedes precise perception. 30 
 The eye introduces a spurious splendor around stars and comets that makes them 
appear larger. This is not real magnification, of course: the body of the celestial 
objects remains invisible to the naked eye. Because the telescope removes this 
“irradiation,” the eye fails to notice that it has also magnified and made visible the 
celestial bodies themselves. This is not an  apologia for the instrument. Rather, it is 
a charge against the eye, which errs twice: once in introducing the false “wig” and 
once in failing to notice the correction and magnification. 31 Grassi’s claim that fixed 
stars and comets “suffered scarcely any enlargement” meant that they did not 
appear larger  to the eye . But the eye, in Galileo’s new radical instrumentalism, is no 
longer the main point of reference for visual phenomena, and definitely not the final 
adjudicator of their trustworthiness. 
 3  Looking at the Sun 
 Kepler’s excitement over Galileo’s instrument was genuine. The coming of the 
telescope facilitated a new level of accuracy that far exceeds the abilities of the 
human naked eye. The resulting, artificially-produced image made Tycho Brahe’s 
accurate and meticulous observations obsolete. Kepler, who regarded Brahe’s 
observations as “the pinnacle” of human scientific enterprise, had to admit that 
“your telescope, Galileo, surpasses these attainments.” 32 It is true that Tycho mea-
sured celestial degrees most accurately, but with the new instrument the astronomer 
“subdivides [Tycho’s celestial degrees] with the utmost nicety into minutes and 
fractions of minutes.” Consequently, the intellect, which until the invention of the 
telescope could have only abstractly fathom certain generalities about the heaven, 
could now be assisted with exact and concrete observations of the distant realms. 
The intellectual imaginations of ancient philosophers as well as of Copernicus, 
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Bruno and Kepler himself were disassociated from the limitations of sense experi-
ence. The telescope allowed the new philosopher to compare these fantasies on the 
shape and character of the planets to real observations. 
 The excitement was genuine, because by the time he was presented with 
Galileo’s instrument, Kepler himself was already pursuing the astronomical use 
of optical (that is – lens based) instruments for some time. Even more important, 
Kepler shared with Galileo an understanding of the significance of the tele-
scope: optical instruments were to take primacy in observation, and the eye 
would need to be integrated into them. This epistemological novelty, that Galileo 
would hint at in the  Sidereus Nuncius of 1610 and attempt to explain in the con-
troversy over the comets a decade later, was already explicated in Kepler’s 1604 
optical  opus magnum , the  Optical Part of Astronomy ( Ad Vitellionem 
Paralipomena ). 33 Kepler provides a vivid example for this new instrumental 
empiricism in describing his observation of a lunar eclipse through a  Camera 
Obscura. Introducing an artificially-produced image, Kepler turns his instru-
ment of observation into the locus of astronomical knowledge, and lets the 
human observer slip out of his optics:
 On 1602 21/31 December at 6h in the morning, through a device described in Ch. 2 
[camera obscura] and an instrument made for this purpose, a description of which is 
furnished below, the moon made an image of itself brightly upon the paper lying below, 
inverted in situation, just as it was in the heavens, gibbous … You should not think that 
what I would consider to be in the moon’s ray was in the paper, for both the gibbous face 
and the spot in its middle were carried over to all parts of the paper whatever that was 
placed beneath it; rather, indeed, it was from moving the paper that the spot was first 
discovered. 34 
 The observation, Kepler stresses, is not  his . It is no-one’s. The image of the moon 
is not the culmination of a cognitive process. It does not require an observer; a piece 
of paper is enough. In fact, even the paper is not necessary: it can be moved around 
without affecting the production of the image. 35 A decade later and a few years 
before entangling himself in the debate over the comets, Galileo observed the sun 
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spots in a similar way; only instead of the simple  Camera Obscura he posited a 
telescope between the observed object (the sun) and the paper:
 Direct the telescope upon the Sun as if you were going to observe that body. Having 
focused and steadied it, expose a flat white sheet of paper about a foot from the concave 
lens; upon this will fall a circular image of the Sun’s disk, with all the spots that are on 
it arranged and disposed with exactly the same symmetry as in the Sun. The more the 
paper is moved away from the tube, the larger this image will become, and the better 
the spots will be depicted … In order to picture them accurately, I first describe on the 
paper a circle of the size that best suits me, and then by moving the paper towards or 
away from the tube I find the exact place where the image of the Sun is enlarged to the 
measure of the circle I have drawn. This also serves me as a norm and rule for getting 
the plane of the paper right, so that it will not be tilted to the luminous cone of sunlight 
that emerges from the telescope. … By tilting the paper the proper position is easily 
found, and then with a pen one may mark out the spots in their right sizes, shapes, and 
position. 36 
 As Galileo does in his lunar observations, Kepler relegates the eye to a secondary role, 
as the sunlight imprints ( stampata ) the image on the paper. The observer is turned into 
a draughtsman whose role is to stabilize and trace the outlines of the image. 
 Galileo’s telescope thrust into public attention the assumptions implicit in 
Kepler’s highly professional new optics with its direct challenge to the traditional 
eye-oriented modes of astronomical observation. It compelled astronomers to 
reconsider their epistemological manual as to what is a valid observational practice, 
but not many were willing to adopt Kepler and Galileo’s epistemology together 
with their instruments. The Jesuits, loyal to their mandate to employ the novelties 
of the New Science in the service of the mores of counter-reformation church, 37 
were particularly conspicuous in their efforts to implement the new means and 
techniques of observation while completely ignoring the marginalization of the 
human eye that for Kepler and Galileo was a necessary implication. Their debate 
with Galileo over the sunspots was, in this respect, analogous to the comets debate 
to follow. Their representative, Christoph Scheiner, fiercely competed with Galileo 
for credit on the empirical discovery, and between them, Scheiner’s interpretation 
of it was, metaphysically, the more radical: the spots, he suggested, were shadows 
of hitherto unknown planets. Epistemologically, however, he remained unwavering 
in his commitment to the superiority of the naked eye. Ignoring the obvious haz-
ards, he insistently used his eyes to look at the sun. This in spite of the different 
filtering devices he had to apply in order to protect his eyes that distorted and 
obscured the observations. Like Grassi, Scheiner was proficient with the new 
instruments and techniques, and experimented with projecting images from the 
telescope on a white surface (Fig.  2 ). These projections, however, were not intended 
to produce pictures of the sunspots but merely to examine any flaws in the lenses 
as well as other optical effects produced by them. Scheiner invested much energy 
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to minimize the role of the instrumental mediation so the sunspots will be “seen 
without a tube, by the eye of any man.” 38 
 Like the ensuing one over the comets, the controversy over the sunspots was not 
primarily over observations and their interpretation. Rather, it revealed a deeper 
level of contention concerning what the role of vision is in the production of knowl-
edge. The Jesuits, following Scheiner, devoted most of their efforts to preserving 
the status of the eye as the guarantor of any knowledge of nature. Disregarding 
Kepler’s rejection of the traditional distinction between direct and mediated vision, 
Jesuit mathematicians held on to the Pauline belief in the supremacy of “face to 
face” acquaintance. In his 1613 large volume containing  Opticorum libri sex: 
Philosophis iuxta ac Mathematicis utiles the Jesuit Fransciscus Agvilonius most 
emphatically reaffirmed traditional hierarchy of sight:
 All the things that are contained in Optics are considered under a triple reason, [compared] 
to the triple mode through which creatures come to know God. First direct [vision], that is 
our eye, as it turns towards the thing in front of it, so it is compared to the cognition of the 
minds of the blessed contemplating the presence of God, as St. Paul said: face to face. The 
second [part] is reflection [repercussion] that is the perception of those things, whose 
 Fig. 2  Chistophoro Scheiner, Rosa Ursina (1626–1630) 
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images come back to us from mirrors, this is not unlike that cognition, that through faith 
we see God in the created things as in a kind of mirror or in enigmas. Thence the third, that 
we call infraction; this is how the species of things are transmitted through dissimilar 
diaphanous [media], and from them [the species] enter the eye as if deformed and frac-
tured. Thus some of the divinatory notions of the heathens, corrupted by many errors, are 
affected by the light of nature only. 39 
 Whether he is ignorant of Kepler and Galileo’s new concept of the eye and its place 
in visual perception or consciously rejecting it, Agvilonius’ commitment to the 
traditional cognitive hierarchy and especially the distinction between mediated and 
direct vision remains unwavering: any mediation is a source of enigmas, distortions 
or heathen delusions and errors. 
 4  Kepler: the Eye as an Instrument 
 For Kepler, the introduction of the telescope provided another demonstration of the 
poverty of this hierarchy and the need to undo the supremacy of “face to face” 
vision that Grassi, Scheiner and Agvilonius assumed. Galileo’s observations made 
it ever clearer that true knowledge of heavenly bodies was produced through the 
mediation of lenses and their complex and multiple refractions. Kepler was very 
explicit that his own treatise on optics was to provide optical foundations for a new, 
instrument-based astronomical observation : artificiosa observationes , as he calls 
them in the subtitle. 
 Published 5 years before the advent of the telescope, the main artificial instrument 
of observation to occupy Kepler’s attention in the  Ad Vitellionem is, as we saw, the 
 camera obscura . Kepler first establishes its legitimacy and efficiency by demon-
strating that the image obtained through it is indeed that of the observed object. 40 
He goes on to elucidate by way of physical simulation its underlying principle, 
namely – the formation of an image on a screen behind a small aperture:
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 I set a book in a high place, which was to stand for a luminous body. Between this and the 
pavement a tablet with a polygonal hole was set up. Next, a thread was sent down from one 
corner of the book through the hole to the pavement, falling upon the pavement in such a 
way as to graze the edges of the hole, the image of which I traced with chalk. In this way 
a figure was created upon the pavement similar to the hole. The same thing occurred when 
an additional thread was added from the second, third and fourth corner of the book, as well 
as from the infinite points of the edges. In this way, a narrow row of infinite figures of the 
whole outlined the large quadrangular figure of the book on the pavement. 41 
 The threads from the book’s corners pass through the polygonal hole, grazing its 
edges and projecting images in the shape of the hole – a hole-shaped image for each 
corner of the book. The four images of the book’s corners are arranged on the floor 
in reverse order, and when this process is repeated from (ideally) every point of the 
book, a multitude of hole-shaped images will be projected on the floor, arranged in 
the (reversed) pattern of the book. 
 This is a neat solution to an age old mystery, but the solution is not where the 
novelty of Kepler’s optics rests. Neither the phenomenon of pinhole images, on 
which the  camera obscura is based, nor its account in terms of intersecting rays is 
new to the optical tradition. 42 Explanations of the phenomena based on geometrical 
analysis of rays were available to the optical tradition at least since Levi ben 
Gershon (Gersonides) in the beginning of the fourteenth century. 
 Kepler’s novelty is in setting the stage to the radical instrumentalization of 
observation he would share with Galileo by eradicating from his explanation any 
references to the eye and human vision. For the perspectivist account from 
Gersonides to Maurolyco in the first half of the sixteenth century, the pinhole image 
was not just a reliable projection of its source. It was a unique  re-presentation of 
the sun. 43 The circular image was not  caused by the sun and by light; it was the true 
form of the sun or the perfect dissemination proper of light, as John Pecham in the 
late thirteenth century explains:
 The spherical shape is associated with light and is in harmony with all the bodies of the 
world as being to the highest degree conservative of nature, all parts of which join together 
most perfectly within itself. This is why a raindrop assumes roundness. Therefore, light is 
naturally moved toward this shape and gradually assumes it when propagated some 
distance. 44 
 Understood this way, the circularity of the image does not simply testify to a property 
of its source; it is a sign of the image’s indubitable authenticity. This essential relation 
between source and image completely disappears from Kepler’s account, together 
with the exactness of representation it insures. There is nothing unique to the 
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circularity of the pinhole image: a rectangular body will produce a rectangular 
image, as the experiment with the book shows. Neither does the pinhole image 
 represent light: it is light that is simulated by the threads pulled through the hole, 
but the image projected on the pavement can be of any object, not necessarily lumi-
nous – a book. The trustworthiness of the projection, for Kepler, does not rest on 
its perfect loyalty to the object projected but on understanding the physical process 
of projection. Indeed, Kepler discovers, one cannot hope for such loyalty: The 
book-pattern on the floor is created by a “narrow row” of partially overlapping 
“figures,” so not only is the image reversed, its boundaries are fuzzy. Moreover, 
these stains are reflections of the  aperture . Even for those perspectivists, like 
Maurolyco, who appear to suggest a similar account, the image cast through the 
aperture is composed of many images  of the  luminous body . These are merged 
together as the distance of the screen from the aperture grows and the images of the 
source grow respectively. 45 Kepler’s “figures” bear no resemblance to the light 
source. The complete, smooth, upright perception of the book on the pavement is a 
construct. 
 What Galileo would try to affect with his fierce rhetoric – the takeover of 
astronomy by  artificiosa observationes – Kepler attempts to legitimize by turning 
optics into a mathematical-physical study of the production of images by light:
 from the Sun, and from the colors illuminated by the Sun, species exactly alike are flowing, 
diminished by the flow itself, until for whatever reason, they fall on an opaque medium, 
where they paint their source: and vision is produced, when the opaque screen of the eye 
is painted this way 46 
 In any act of visual perception, light is a necessary mediator in communicating 
visual data. It is light that carries images, bouncing of “an opaque medium” and 
falling on an “opaque screen.” If the screen happens to be the eye, “vision is pro-
duced,” but there is nothing unique to the eye: any screen will do. 47 Even though 
there can be no doubt that Kepler is deeply indebted to the perspectivist tradition, 48 
indebtedness he generously acknowledges by titling his book after Witelo, Kepler’s 
transformation of optics is a fundamental. 
 The subject matter of traditional optics was human vision. Vision, so was its 
basic assumption, is a direct acquaintance of the visual faculty with visible objects, 
and optics is the study of the agents whose function is to communicate these objects 
to the eye. 49 This communication – the optical process – has always been self-
evidently teleological. It was aimed at providing adequate images of visible objects 
for the intellect: “a species produced by a visible object has the essential property 
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of manifesting the object of which it is the likeness” says Pecham. 50 Kepler was 
well aware of this: “Aristotle defines light,” he writes, “not … in its nature, but to 
the extent that it is characteristic of the process of vision.” 51 The teleology survived 
throughout the Renaissance, for practical as well as theoretical optics: “Alberti’s 
picture,” Alpers points out, “begins not with the world seen, but with a viewer who 
is actively looking out at objects.” 52 And indeed, summarizing scholastic optics for 
his audience of painters, humanists and art patrons, it is this teleology that Alberti 
chooses to stress:
 Philosophers … Say that surfaces are measured by certain rays, ministers of vision as it is 
( quasi visendi ministris ), which they therefore call visual rays, since by their agency the 
images of things are impressed upon the senses. 53 
 The physical nature of the “ministers of vision” was debated since antiquity: simu-
lacra or forms, visual rays or species, but their teleology and authenticity were 
never in doubt. Grosseteste, for instance, founds them on the premise that it is an 
essential property of the visible object itself, its agency or ‘virtue’, which ‘multi-
plies’ itself until it made itself present to the eye:
 A natural agent continuously multiplies its power from itself to the recipient, whether it 
acts on sense or on matter. This power is sometimes called species, sometimes a likeness, 
and it is the same thing whatever it may be called. 54 
 Following Grosseteste’s teachings, Roger Bacon underscores the essential relation 
which assures the fidelity of the visual agents, the multiplied species, to the visible 
object: “species is similar in essence and definition to the agent and the things gener-
ating it.”  55 The authenticity of species was a fundamental assumption not only of 
optics but of medieval Aristotelianism as a whole; optics legitimated natural philoso-
phy by accounting for the fundamental knowability of His Creation. 56 Visual rays 
guarantied the veracity of vision and the geometrical analysis of their propagation 
was always subordinate to the assumption of their intentionality and their consequent 
indubitability. 57 So was the analysis of the eye, as Pecham stresses: “vision takes place 
by the arrangement of the species on [the surface of] the glacial humor  exactly as [the 
parts] of the object [are arranged] outside.” 58 This is so, precisely because “ unless this 
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were so, the eye would not see the object distinctly.” 59 Optics, Pecham assumes, is 
a theory of visual perception, and any such theory that failed to account for the 
adequacy of the seen image is  ipso facto false. 
 Kepler does away with this line of reasoning. The optical process, he declares, 
is strictly the effect of light: “genuine vision occurs when the folding door or pupil 
of the eye is exposed most closely to the arriving ray of light.” 60 Gone are all inten-
tional agents, and with them – the privileged import of the eye. Passively receiving 
“illumination” like any instrument, the eye is not merely comparable to “a closed 
chamber”: the cornea is truly nothing but a lens; the retina nothing but a screen, 
essentially the same as the paper or the pavement; the pupil is just another aperture, 
“for the pupil takes the place of the window.” 61 
 This is Kepler’s way of justifying the new observational astronomy. With light as 
the sole agent of all optical phenomena, there is no fundamental epistemological 
difficulty with observing the distant celestial phenomena: the mathematical nature 
of light and the assertion that the rays do not decay, only disperse (propositions 
6 and 7 of  Ad Vitellionem ) turns distance into nothing but an element in the 
geometrical analysis of observation. 62 Even more important, with light there is no 
epistemological difficulty with  artificiosa observationes . The image on the pave-
ment is reversed and fuzzy, but so is the one on the retina. The instrument is trust-
worthy not because it does not interfere with the visual flow, but because it is no 
worse than the eye. 63 
 5  Epistemological Considerations 
 Kepler was well aware of the primary rival to radical instrumentalism: the tradi-
tional, Aristotelian empiricism assumed by Galileo’s Jesuit competitors, with its 
strict preference to the human sense,and he did not hesitate to challenge it directly 
and in detail. 
 According to Aristotle the initial state of cognition is perception; all that the 
intellect knows was previously in the senses. 64 This assumption, Kepler insists, does 
not agree well with astronomical practice; it does not seem that “the motions of the 
heaven come immediately into the perception of the eyes.” The eye’s physiology 
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does not allow for such immediate perception: it is “attached to the posterior part 
of the head;” it has a spherical shape and it depends for its proper functioning on 
“the use of multiple refractions.” There is no lack of evidence that the eye judges 
motion erroneously, especially motion of distant objects, and Kepler provides a 
handful. 65 
 These shortcomings are unavoidable, Kepler claims, and in fact the eyes will 
fault even the most acute observer, such as Tycho Brahe. His own instrumental 
empiricism was much more radical in intellectual ambitions and commitments than 
that of his mentor in matters of astronomical observations, and Kepler did not shy 
away from the difference. Tycho utilized the  Camera Obscura to observe solar 
eclipses, Kepler points out, under the assumption that the astronomer’s eye remains 
the chief arbitrator and the instrument is but a prosthesis; a secondary aid to the 
sense of sight. Tycho thus “noticed that eclipses of the sun, whether the ray be 
allowed in through a notch or received by the eyes, always show the moon’s diam-
eter to be much less than it appears at oppositions.” Trusting the accuracy of his 
visual perception, Tycho concluded that the real lunar diameter is smaller than was 
assumed. He was, however, wrong, because he did not take into account “the actual 
structure of the sense of sight” and its tendency to enlarge “the edges of luminous 
bodies, particularly in darkness.” Kepler admonishes that the “astronomer should 
carefully take note of this … that unless he be endowed with the sharpest and most 
powerful sense of sight, he is not equal to measuring that moon’s diameter at the 
full with the eyes without error.” Therefore
 one has to distinguish carefully … between those things that happen to the sense of sight 
and those that happen when the consideration of the sense of sight is removed. For those 
things that happen to the sense of sight vary by individual cases, but those things that really 
happen are uniform within a single horizon. … Astronomers will now take note of this: that 
one must not trust the sense of sight… it cannot therefore be argued from this accident of 
the sense of sight to what happens outside the consideration of the sense of sight … For 
astronomers should not present anything other than those things that in actual fact occur. 
The sense of vision, however, we leave to the physicians to remedy. 66 
 The remedy of astronomical observation and measurements is relegating the eyes 
in favor of an instrument. The careful application of the  Camera Obscura allows “a 
most certain procedure for measuring the quantities of eclipses … If this device be 
correctly applied, the diameter of the moon appears decidedly greater than the 
amount that Tycho’s table shows.” 67 
 In spite of his insistence that the application of instruments to astronomical 
investigation was the only way to avoid “the inadequacies of the eyes,” 68 Kepler 
was not promoting skepticism about the human senses. The purpose of his optics 
is to “subdue the hostile fortress of doubt,” 69 not to reinforce it, and much of 
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 Ad Vitellionem is dedicated to accounting for the reliability of the retinal image. 
Galileo, unperturbed by Kepler’s careful optical and epistemological delibera-
tions, is significantly more extreme in his stand for the instrument:  the eye medi-
ates and distorts; the instrument provides the standard of trustworthy perception 
against which the eye is to be judged. In a sense, Galileo re-introduces the dis-
tinction between direct and mediated vision that Kepler labored to abolish, 
reversing the epistemological order between eye and instrument. The two ways 
of observation, he argues during the controversy over the comets, provide data 
of entirely different value, not to be conflated or compared, and his adversary 
Grassi is fundamentally wrong to submit the telescope to the same analysis as 
ocular vision:
 Your error lies in comparing the star taken together with its irradiation when seen with the 
naked eye to the body of the star alone when seen with the telescope and distinguished 
from the irradiated regions. 70 
 If Kepler was keen to hold the skeptical ramifications of his optics at bay, Galileo 
is unhesitant: his endorsement of the instrument comes at the expense and with the 
explicit distrust in the eye. The human organ is not merely weak but a positive 
source of various deceptions, which he makes a point to enumerate:
 There is another illumination here, made by refraction in the moist surface of the eye, and 
by this, the real object appears to us to be surrounded by a luminous circle … there is a 
third vivid splendor here, almost as bright as that of the original light itself; this is produced 
by reflection of the primary rays in the moisture at the edges of the eyelids, and it extends 
over the convexity of the pupil … this radiant crown [is] a sensation of the eye … it does 
not depend upon the illumination of the surrounding area. 71 
 Like Kepler, Galileo thrusts the eye into the outside world. From a veridical conduit 
of knowledge it becomes part of a causal process of material nature, producing 
phenomena to be studied and explained physically. And while the eye mediates, 
adds spurious and distorting brilliance, the telescope is not only a reliable source, 
but the standard against which to judge the observation made through the eye and 
the means by which to remove the errors it introduces:
 Fancy to yourself some definite size for [a] wig, and in the center of this imagine a very 
tiny luminous body. The shape of this will be lost, being crowned by excessively long hair 
… the telescope, by enlarging the star but not the wig, makes the tiny disc which originally 
was imperceptible … so that its shape may be well distinguished.  72 
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 6  The Eye of the Mind 
 The metaphor of the “wig” – this paradigm of artificiality – to denote the eye-added 
splendor stresses Galileo’s deliberate inversion of natural and artificial, direct and 
mediated. Galileo encapsulates his argument for this inversion of epistemological 
roles and standing in his most famous phrase of the “Assayer:”
 Philosophy is written in this grand book – I mean the universe … in the language of 
mathematics. 73 
 The eye had always been, and for Grassi, Scheiner, and Agvilonius still was, the 
divinely assigned instrument of visual knowledge. This is nicely and simply put by 
Scheiner in his  Oculus published in 1619, with no immediate reference to any of 
the controversies: “in order to see, the eye of the animal fulfils the duty it was 
ordained by God, grasping the presence of visible things.” 74 For Kepler and Galileo, 
the eye loses this independent “duty” and becomes part of the “things.” It intro-
duces error because it is immersed in the confusing nature to be observed and its 
passions and affects are causally-bound physical phenomena. 
 The telescope, on the other hand, is not bound to the physical world. It is math-
ematical  in essence , argues Galileo; it is fully captured by the mathematical laws 
governing the shape and relative placing of its lenses; “the convex lens unites the 
rays, the concave glass expands them and forms an inverted cone.”  75 The asymp-
totic diminution of the angle of vision to the eye, with which Grassi accounted for 
the apparent lack of magnification, is thus of no significance. Magnification is 
strictly a mathematical relation, and the telescope always magnifies, whether the 
eye is capable of perceiving it or not. In a pedantic mood, Galileo even insists that 
changing the mutual position of the lenses results in having a completely different 
instrument:
 [Sarsi] says that a telescope which is now long and now short may be called the same 
instrument though differently applied … Our case is just the reverse, for the use of the 
telescope is always the same … while the instrument itself is diversified by its alteration in 
one essential respect, which is the interval between its lenses. 76 
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 This pedantry is not merely a rhetorical maneuver. As Sven Dupré has recently 
shown against what has been long assumed, Galileo did develop a mathematical 
understanding of the telescope. 77 This was based on contemporary optics, which 
owed as much to new lens and mirror grinding techniques as to traditional perspec-
tive theory, and it was not informed by Kepler’s innovations, but it provided Galileo 
with the confidence to insist on the mathematical nature of his instrument. Being 
thoroughly mathematical, the telescope is not an extension of the eye but of reason. 
As was beautifully put by his fellow Lyncean Johann Faber, Galileo,
 with marvellous skill so fit spectacles to an aging world that with mind still sound but eyes 
dimmed and body weakened it might see through two glasses.  78 
 In an important sense, we saw, Faber was missing Galileo’s point: the telescope was 
 not a pair of spectacles. But he did capture the dream of an instrument of mind, 
superior to the eye and answering directly to the laws of reason, which a few years 
earlier Kepler put into more careful, less exhilarating prose:
 Certainly, the mind itself, if it never had the use of an eye at all, would demand an eye for 
itself for the comprehension of things outside it, and would lay down laws of its structure 
which were drawn from itself (if in fact it were pure and sound and without hindrance, that 
is, if it were only what it is). 79 
 In Kepler’s terms, Galileo could have said that the telescope is the sense organ that 
reason  would have had. For this reason he finds it is very important to stress that 
in contrast to its Dutch predecessor, his telescope was “discovered by the way of 
reason.” “The original contraption was accidentally discovered by a “simple maker 
of ordinary spectacles” (he does not honor Hans Lipperhey by name) who “in 
casually handling pieces of glass of various sorts happened to look through two at 
once, one convex and the other concave, and placed at different distances from the 
eye.” His instrument, on the other hand, followed a “reasoning” which he cursorily 
recounts, allegedly to “render less incredulous those people who, like Sarsi, may 
wish to diminish whatever praise there is in it that belongs to me.” 80 One can easily 
identify with Grassi’s astonishment at the ingratitude of the one he dubbed “the 
Lynx,” but it was less important for Galileo to gather supporters than to clarify that 
his instrument was no pair of spectacles (and he, of course, no “simple maker”). It 
does not assist the eye; it is an extension of reason, an embodied mathematical 
entity, and it can allow reason an unmediated approach to reality because  reality 
is mathematical, “written in this grand book … the universe … in the language of 
mathematics.” 
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 This is the import of the celebrated idiom on the mathematical language of 
nature: to re-construct observed reality so it can be approached by reason, through 
the instrument. It is not an ontological justification for mathematical theorizing but 
for radical instrumental empiricism; nature is written in a language legible  only 
through the instrument. The telescope does not mediate – it reveals the real makeup 
of nature; shapes, figures, quantities – directly to Reason.  The senses mediate, cre-
ating appearances which are not proper representations of the “external bodies:”
 I do not believe that for exciting in us tastes, odors and sounds there are required in external 
bodies anything but sizes, shapes, numbers, and slow or fast movements; and I think that 
if ears, tongues, and noses were taken away, shapes and numbers and motions would 
remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds. These, I believe, are nothing but names, apart 
from the living animal just as tickling and titillation are nothing but names when armpits 
and the skin around the nose are upset. 81 
 “Sizes, shapes, numbers, and slow or fast movements;” nature is comprised of ele-
ments the instrument makes apparent, but the senses mask by with “tastes, odors 
and sound … tickling and titillation.” And what is true for noses and armpits is just 
as true for the eye:
 I believe that vision, the sense which is eminent above all others, is related to light, but in 
that ratio of excellence which exists between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and 
the instantaneous, the quantity and the indivisible; between darkness and light. 82 
 7  Conclusion: The Price 
 Some 50 years later, Robert Hooke, the seventeenth century’s most definitive 
beneficiary from and prominent follower of the legacy of radical instrumental 
empiricism, would give the conquest of the artificial over the natural a religious aura. 
In terms of “observations” and the capacity to “behold the works of nature” through 
the senses, Mankind is essentially inferior to “Beasts:”
 As for the actions of our  Senses , we cannot but observe them to be in many particulars 
much outdone by those of other Creatures, and when at best, to be far short of the perfec-
tion they seem capable of. 83 
 This ‘shortness of perfection” is our own doing, but deliverance is also within our 
grasp:
 By the addition of such  artificial Instruments and  methods , there may be, in some manner, 
a reparation made for the mischiefs, and imperfection, mankind has drawn upon it self, by 
negligence, and intemperance, and a wilful and superstitious deserting the Prescripts and 
Rules of Nature, whereby every man, both from a deriv’d corruption, innate and born with 
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him, and from his breeding and converse with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of 
errors. 84 
 Hooke may be overstated, but he is completely sincere. It is appropriate to discuss 
instruments in terms of fall and redemption, “the only way which now remains for 
us to recover some degree of those former perfections” (Hooke  1665 , xvii), because 
they represent the one divine advantage that humans enjoy over beasts:
 It is the great prerogative of Mankind above other Creatures, that we are not only able to 
 behold the works of Nature, or barely to  sustein our lives by them, but we have also the 
power of  considering, comparing, altering, assisting, and improving them to various uses. 
And as this is the peculiar priviledge of humane Nature in general, so is it capable of being 
so far advanced by the helps of Art, and Experience, as to make some Men excel others in 
their Observations, and Deductions, almost as much as they do Beasts. 85 
 For Hooke, the arguments that have turned proper observation to the work of the 
mind rather than the senses have become almost a commonplace. He ignores, or 
suppresses, the great tensions and anxieties with which these arguments came. Such 
indifference was not an option for Galileo and Kepler. Hooke can marvel at 
“Telescopes or Microscopes producing new Worlds and Terra-Incognita’s to our 
view” (Hooke  1665 , xxxii), but Galileo, anxious to defend the mathematical rapport 
by which he legitimized the inversion of epistemological standings, finds himself 
defending the simplicity of its revelation. Gone are the marvels and wonders of the 
 Sidereus Nuncius ; radical instrumentalism requires the bare bones representation of 
the heavens as the “triangles, circles and other geometrical figures” of Fig.  3 . And 
Hooke can simply complain that “the eye cannot distinguish a smaller object then 
[ sic .] appears within the angle of half a minute,” 86 but Kepler has to admit that 
vision, as a whole, has become a complete mystery: 
 How this image or picture is joined together with the visual spirits that reside in the retina 
and in the nerve, and whether it is arraigned within by the spirits into the caverns of the 
cerebrum to the tribunal of the soul or of the visual faculty; whether the visual faculty, like 
a magistrate, given by the soul, descending from the headquarters of the cerebrum outside 
to the visual nerve itself and the retina, as to lower courts, might go forth to meet this image – 
this, I say, I leave to the natural philosophers to argue about. 87 
 The mediation of light justified radical instrumentalism. It supported and explained 
the marvellous achievements of the  camera obscura , the telescope and later the 
microscope, and provided a most convincing account of the function of the eye 
itself. But it came at a most difficult price, a bewilderment that would haunt the 
New Science: how is it that we see at all? 
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 Quindi si va lustrando la selva de le cose naturali dove son 
tanti oggetti sotto l’ombra e manto, e come in spessa, densa e 
deserta solitudine la verità suol aver gli antri e cavernosi rice-
tti; fatti intessuti de spine, conchiusi de boscose, ruvide e fron-
dose piante: dove con le raggioni più degne et eccellenti 
maggiormente s’asconde, s’avvela e si profonda con diligenza 
maggiore, come noi sogliamo gli tesori più grandi celare con 
maggior diligenza e cura, acciocché dalla moltitudine e varietà 
de cacciatori (de quali altri son più exquisiti et exercitati, altri 
meno) non vegna senza gran fatica discuoperta. 
 Giordano Bruno,  Degli eroici furori 
 Abstract  Francis Bacon’s  Sylva Sylvarum (published posthumously in 1627) occu-
pies a paradoxical place in the history of seventeenth-century medicine and natural 
philosophy. It is the work where Bacon expounded, at his clearest and best, in ver-
nacular and not in Latin, his views on the material appetites of nature, and did so not 
by writing in the abstract, but by describing and performing experiments aimed at 
disclosing the appetitive nature of matter. However, such an original model of experi-
mental investigations on the appetites of matter was abandoned by the great majority 
of Bacon’s followers, especially those associated with the Royal Society, replaced with 
the more reassuring project to mechanise the natural forms and passions of matter. By 
doing so, man was restored as the proper subject of knowledge and appetite, whereas 
nature was left with its status of lifeless object of dispassionate study. In this paper I 
explore the theoretical and experimental strategies deployed by Bacon to investigate 
the appetites of matter. It will become apparent that a characteristic hermeneutical 
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circle underlies Bacon’s natural philosophy, a circle that, depending on the chosen 
point of view, could be regarded at the time as either virtuous or vicious. On the one 
hand, Bacon was convinced that man’s self-knowledge rested on the knowledge that 
nature has of itself, since nature is first and foremost appetite and man’s essence is 
rooted in appetite. On the other hand, he was also convinced that knowledge of nature 
was based on knowledge of the self, since the best accounts concerning the nature 
of the appetites were to be found in the works of poets and historians (rather than 
in Renaissance systematisers of natural magic and natural philosophy). This is what 
Bacon meant by ‘georgics of the mind’: the understanding of the material appetites of 
nature cannot be separated from an ethical and political consideration of the mecha-
nisms mediating knowledge and appetite in human societies. 
 1  Introduction 
 Francis Bacon’s  Sylva Sylvarum (published posthumously in 1627) occupies a para-
doxical place in the history of seventeenth-century medicine and natural philosophy. 
Here we have a work in which Bacon expounded, unambiguously, in vernacular and 
not in Latin, his characteristic views on the material appetites of nature, and did so 
not by writing in the abstract, but by describing and performing experiments that 
aimed specifically to disclose the appetitive nature of matter. Despite his clear adher-
ence to a theory of natural appetites, though, the great majority of natural philoso-
phers who pledged their allegiance to Bacon’s philosophy – especially those whose 
names are often associated with the birth of the Royal Society – decided very early 
on to ignore Bacon’s original injunction to provide experimental descriptions of 
material appetites. Instead, they concentrated on the project of providing mechanical 
interpretations of material forms. By highlighting one part of Bacon’s thought and 
disregarding another, post-Baconian experimental philosophers reinforced the idea 
of the human being as the sole subject capable of knowing and desiring while demot-
ing nature to the status of a lifeless object of dispassionate study. 
 In this paper I will take  Sylva Sylvarum as my principal focus of analysis and I will 
explore the theoretical and experimental strategies which Bacon deployed to investi-
gate the appetites of matter. It is my contention that a characteristic hermeneutical 
circle underlies Bacon’s natural philosophy, a circle that in his day could be seen as 
either virtuous or vicious depending on the chosen point of view. Bacon believed that 
human self-knowledge could not and should not sever its ties with nature’s self-
knowledge, that is, with the very knowledge that nature has of itself, for nature, in 
Bacon’s view, was first and foremost appetite (or a form of unsentient perception 
driven by appetite) 1 and man’s essence was rooted in appetite. At the same time, he 
 
1 
 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 602: ‘It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet 
they have perception: for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace 
that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate: and whether the body be alter-
ant or altered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies would be alike one to 
another. And sometimes this perception, in some kind of bodies, is far more subtle than the sense; 
so that the sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it’. See also Bacon  1857 –1874, I, 610. 
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also believed that the very knowledge which nature has of itself, despite its level of 
obscurity, implied a kind of primal and elementary self, a supple, quivering and yet 
stable subject, capable of accounting for all sorts of natural actions, from the formation 
of a bubble out of soap to the passions of a vainglorious man. Since the best accounts 
of the nature of the appetites were to be found in the works of poets and historians 
(rather than in Renaissance systematisers of natural magic and natural philosophy), a 
historical and political understanding of desires could find fruitful applications in the 
study of the appetitive life of nature. Bacon referred to this peculiar hermeneutic situ-
ation as the “georgics of the mind,” meaning that the understanding of the material 
appetites of nature could not be separated from an ethical and political consideration 
of the mechanisms that mediate knowledge and appetite in human societies. 
 Three basic interpretative principles concerning Bacon’s philosophy inspire my 
reading of  Sylva Sylvarum and the project of experimental physics contained in it. 
First, Bacon’s philosophy rests on a fully-fledged metaphysics of matter. This meta-
physics contains a bold assertion of realism and materialism in a period when both 
philosophy and science were increasingly turning to forms of phenomenalism and 
idealism. Second, the notion of appetite is at the very centre of Bacon’s meta-
physics of matter. In contrast to the assumption that appetite is always driven by 
some degree of knowledge, obscure as it may be – an assumption that has prevailed 
in the history of philosophy – Bacon considers appetite as a blind and unrestrainable 
drive. Finally, Bacon is not the father of any of the following cultural movements: 
mechanical philosophy, empiricism and experimental science. Or, put in a less 
dogmatic way: Bacon is certainly not the father of mechanical philosophy. He 
might be seen as the putative father of empiricism (if by empiricism we mean a 
historiographical device useful for outlining tidy lineages in early modern thought) 
and might be considered the adoptive father of experimental science (if by experi-
mental science we mean a programme of conducting experiments on the primordial 
appetites of matter – a statement with which many scientists and historians of sci-
ence will certainly feel uncomfortable, and understandably so). 
 2  A Physics of Material Appetites 
 Sylva Sylvarum contains as it were Bacon’s experimental physics. In it, to use 
Bacon’s own words, he joined “the contemplative and active part together,” the 
“materiate” and the “immateriate.” 2 The book combines a view of method as a 
rigorous discipline of the mind with a positive consideration of manual and material 
experience. “I practise as I do advise,” he tells his readers who are asked to follow 
his experiments; “which is, after long inquiry of things immerse in matter, to inter-
pose some subject which is immateriate, or less materiate; such as this of sounds; 
to the end that the intellect may be rectified, and become not partial.” 3 The very 
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 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 385. 
 
3 
 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 390. 
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word  sylva , with all its rhetorical and metaphorical accretions, indicates a situation 
of analytical drifts and digressions, intractable farragoes and tangles of disparate 
topics – the “vast wood of experience,” the “undigested heap of particulars.” 4 In the 
 Sylva Sylvarum Bacon also joined the high with the low of experience. In the pref-
ace to the reader, William Rawley, Bacon’s chaplain and editor of many of his 
posthumous works, including the  Sylva , reminded the reader that “his lordship” was 
fully aware of the “vulgar,” “trivial,” “mean,” “sordid,” “curious” and “fruitless” 
nature of the experiments he had collected and examined. In a programmatic way, 
Bacon declared his lack of interest in any form of conspicuous consumption of 
wonders. On the contrary, he undertook the project with the specific purpose of 
rendering the very notion of wonder banal. (Significantly, in the  Advancement of 
Learning , Bacon had called wonder a kind of “broken knowledge,” whereas in 
 Sylva Sylvarum , he described the passion of wonder as a form of unilateral, unpro-
ductive focus, “the fixing of the mind upon one object of cogitation.”) 5 
 Bacon’s main aim in his experimental study of nature was therefore to provide 
a description of the basic appetites of matter at work in the most common opera-
tions of nature. In his preface, Rawley reported that his lordship was particularly 
concerned that his readers would not understand “the difference between this 
Natural History and others”:
 For those Natural Histories which are extant, being gathered for delight and use, are full of 
pleasant descriptions and pictures, and affect and seek after admiration, rarities, and secrets. 
But contrariwise, the scope which his lordship intendeth, is to write such a Natural History 
as may be fundamental to the erecting and building of a true philosophy; for the illumination 
of the understanding, the extracting of axioms, and the producing of nobles works and 
effects. 6 
 Bacon – Rawley added in his account – saw his task in the realm of knowledge as 
that of an architect who, in planning his building, did not disdain “to dig the clay 
and burn the brick,” to work as a “workman” and a “labourer.” 7 He justified “the 
baseness of many of the experiments” as perfectly legitimate instances of “God’s 
works,” and vindicated their “vulgareness” by claiming that “true axioms must be 
drawn from plain experience and not from doubtful.” Again: Bacon’s “course” was 
“to make wonders plain, and not plain things wonders.” Finally, “his lordship” 
intimated that experience needed to “be broken and grinded, and not whole, or as 
it groweth.” 8 In other words, Bacon intended the experimental practice to be  prosaic , 
 plain and  parcelled : its course should not be hampered by its material and undignified 
aspects, but it should concentrate on precisely such ordinary phenomena without its 
practitioner being mesmerised by isolated and rare occurrences. Finally, holistic 
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withal’. 
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and structural patterns of experience and dynamic processes should be reduced to 
their constituent, static elements. 
 For Bacon, then, the most ‘sublime’ works of both nature and art were in fact 
ordinary expressions of material cupidity. This is one of the fundamental reasons 
behind Bacon’s decision in  Sylva Sylvarum to focus on the cognitive significance 
of seemingly ‘base’ phenomena of nature. “The eye of the understanding,” he 
claimed, “is like the eye of the sense; for as you may see great objects through small 
crannies or levels, so you may see great axioms of nature through small and con-
temptible instances.” 9 And it is true that the experiments which Bacon performed 
or suggested in  Sylva Sylvarum are extremely simple, if considered from the point 
of view of technical apparatuses or observational protocols. Their complexity 
belongs rather to the level of analytical scrutiny, the level that Bacon characterised 
as  interpretatio naturae . For the prosaic, plain and parcelled character of Bacon’s 
experimental inquiry depended on the very object of analysis, i.e., material cupidity. 
Appetites are by definition of a low and yet powerful nature. It is not by accident, 
therefore, that Bacon’s observations and experiments often combined, in a strik-
ingly vivid manner, heightened attention to the most prosaic details of material 
experience with a special focus on the intensity of material desires:
 houswives do find a difference in waters, for the bearing or not bearing of soap: and it is 
likely that the more fat water will bear soap best; for the hungry water doth kill the unctu-
ous nature of the soap. 10 
 Here there is no metaphorical transfer. Water’s hunger is real, as it is the soap’s 
desire to adhere to other bodies. 
 Bacon’s metaphysics of matter – which is the rationale behind his “sylvan” 
model of experimental practice – is therefore a metaphysics of appetites. A cluster 
of interrelated concepts that are notoriously difficult to define (forms, simple 
natures, schematisms and natural motions) forms the backbone of his philosophical 
system. At the risk of simplifying a very complex subject, we might say that natural 
bodies are defined by forms, that forms are structural patterns determined by natu-
ral motions, and that natural motions result from the basic appetites of matter. 
Bodies, therefore, might be defined as crystallizations of natural appetites. 11 
Conflicting tendencies deriving from conflicting appetites manage to coexist in 
each single body; indeed, such tendencies form bodies precisely as a result of the 
tension created by their antagonistic desires. Solid, fluid and aerial states of matter 
depend on the intensity of matter’s appetites. The appetite of continuity, for 
instance, is weak in fluid bodies and stronger in solid ones. 12 The  Novum organum 
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 Bacon  2004 , 118–120, 382. See Bacon  2004 , 278: “Cum enim omne corpus suscipiat multas 
naturarum formas copulatas et in concreto, fit ut alia aliam retundat, deprimat, frangat, et liget; 
unde obscurantur formae singulae.” 
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 Bacon  1857 –1874, III, 26: “constat appetitum continuitatis etiam liquidis inesse, sed debilem. 
At contra in rebus solidis viget, et motui naturali sive gravitati praedominatur.” 
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(1620) records nineteen structural motions: motion of resistance, connection, 
liberty, hyle, continuity, of profit and want ( lucrum et indigentia ), of greater and 
lesser congregation, magnetic motion, motion of flight, of assimilation, of stimula-
tion, of impression, of configuration, of passing through ( pertransitio ), royal or 
political, of rotation, of trepidation, of rest ( decubitus ). 13 Despite their large num-
ber, the first three and the last two seem to be the most important motions: matter 
is riddled with tendencies to resistance, liberty and union; as a result, matter finds 
itself in a constant state of agitation, always aiming at restoring the previous condi-
tion of balance. All the natural, basic motions enumerated in the  Novum organum 
are manifestations of underlying primordial appetites. They are of a limited number 
and form the letters of the so-called alphabet of nature. These primordial appetites 
are what Bacon also calls “simple natures.” 
 In  Sylva Sylvarum , the “centuries” of experiments and observations aimed at 
disclosing the inner life of matter lay bare series of binary structures resulting from 
the ultimate contrarieties of nature. Motions of desire are primordial, caused by 
original tensions between opposing forces. Corruption and generation, for instance, 
are “nature’s two terms or boundaries” and “the guides to life and death.” 14 The 
basic oppositions of matter crystallise into what Bacon calls the “first congrega-
tions” of matter. They represent “two great families of things,” identified by com-
plementary names: “sulphureous” and “mercurial,” “inflammable” and “not 
inflammable,” “mature” and “crude,” “oily” and “watery.” These pairs, Bacon con-
tinues, “though they be unlike in the primitive differences of matter,” nonetheless 
they “seem to have many consents.” The study of these original oppositions and 
attractions in matter is “one of the profoundest inquiries of nature.” Bacon com-
pares “the first congregations of matter” to “a general assembly of estates” which 
“doth give law to all bodies.” 15 From this point of view, the operations of nature are 
from the very beginning “political” and “economical,” in that they result from a 
whole range of mediations and transactions among conflicting and competing 
spheres of interest and power. 
 This view of nature as a theatre of conflicts underpins the setting and the inter-
pretation of Bacon’s experiments. Here are some examples. The behaviour of 
bubbles reveals the presence of the “appetite of continuation,” namely, “the appetite 
to resist separation or discontinuance,” stronger in solid bodies, “fainter and 
weaker” in fluid bodies. 16 Experiments conducted on flames demonstrate that, in 
itself, “fire is not violent or furious.” It becomes so only when “it is checked and 
pent.” 17 The reason why kernels of grapes placed close to the root of a vine seem to 
help the growth of the vine itself might be that “the root being of greater strength, 
 
13 
 Bacon  2004 , 382–416. 
 
14 
 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 451. 
 
15 
 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 459–460. 
 
16 
 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 347. 
 
17 
 Bacon  1857 –1874, II, 353. 
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robbeth and devoureth the nourishment, when they have drawn it; as great fishes 
devour little.” 18 Nowhere is the pervasive nature of material appetite more apparent 
than in the whole body of air surrounding the earth. Not only are the spirits (also 
called “pneumaticals” by Bacon) inside natural bodies “unquiet to get forth and 
congregate with the air” (a tendency that for Bacon is at the basis of numerous natu-
ral processes, such as colliquation, digestion, putrefaction, vivification, figuration, 
desiccation, induration and consumption) 19 ; the very body of air, too, is made up of 
tendencies and desires. While experimenting with the nature of sounds, Bacon 
considers it very likely that “air doth willingly imbibe the sound as grateful, but 
cannot maintain it”; and the reason is that “the air hath (as it should seem) a secret 
and hidden appetite of receiving the sound at the first; but then other gross and more 
materiate qualities of the air straightways suffocate it; like unto flame, which is 
generated with alacrity, but straight quenched by the enmity of the air or other 
ambient bodies.” 20 
 Natural phenomena can therefore be seen as the result of elaborate motions 
caused by searching and unsettling appetites. Every time they are under pressure, 
material particles are eager to find the easiest way to release the tension accumu-
lated in a particular arrangement of matter:
 whensoever a solid body (as wood, stone, metal, etc.) is pressed there is an inward tumult 
in the parts thereof, seeking to deliver themselves from the compression. And this is the 
cause of all violent motion. Wherein it is strange in the highest degree, that this motion hath 
never been observed nor inquired; it being of all motions the most common, and the chief 
root of all mechanical operations. 21 This motion worketh in round at first, by way of proof 
and search which way to deliver itself; and then worketh in progress, where it findeth the 
deliverance easiest. 22 
 Bacon’s description of material particles recalls that of a stampede, in which people 
who are caught in an unforeseeable disaster try every possible way to reach safety. 
He calls this structural tendency in matter the “motion of liberty.” 23 
 Another original appetite of matter – an appetite that is complementary to the 
motion of liberty – is the “appetite of union” and “evitation of solution of continu-
ity.” As already stated, Bacon claims that this appetite is present in three degrees: 
weak in fluids, strong in solids and intermediate in “bodies cleaving or tenacious.” 
Bacon makes clear that “all solid bodies are cleaving, more or less,” but “those 
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bodies which are noted to be clammy and cleaving, are such as have a more 
indifferent appetite (at once) to follow another body, and to hold to themselves. 
And therefore they are commonly bodies ill mixed; and which take more pleasure 
in a foreign body, than in preserving their own consistence.” 24 
 The primordial tension caused by these two basic appetites of matter – the 
motion of liberty and motion of union – was the original spark which began the 
various natural processes of corruption and generation; as a result, these appetites 
engendered the “two great families of things,” the two dynasties that have ruled 
nature since its creation. The original tension still affects the particles of matter by 
keeping them in a constant state of “trepidation.” 25 Indeed, matter  qua matter for 
Bacon “trepidates.” Every time material corpuscles perceive external pressure as a 
condition that might imperil their safety, they react by fleeing or rebelling, depend-
ing on the particular situation. Motion of liberty is fundamental in Bacon’s physics 
because matter is constantly reacting to situations of potential violence, constantly 
dealing with pressures to be assimilated. Processes of generation and corruption, 
therefore, seem to follow the same cycles of formation and dissolution that affect 
political structures. To accelerate motions of putrefaction in experimental situa-
tions, for instance, Bacon suggests to “dissolve” the “government” of the “principal 
spirits” so that every part abandons the current state of affairs and “returneth to his 
nature or homogeny.” Bacon uses the same analogy of political volatility to explain 
such phenomena as the spread of infections and contagious diseases, “for that the 
malignity of the infecting vapour daunteth the principal spirits, and maketh them 
fly and leave their regiment; and then the humours, flesh, and secondary spirits, do 
dissolve and break, as in an anarchy.” 26 In solid bodies, the general state of trepida-
tion is less intense than in fluid or spirituous bodies, for these bodies are in a natural 
state of “torpor.” This intrinsic torpor is caused by a “motion of gravity” and a 
“natural appetite not to move at all.” 27 Bacon sees this motion of self-gravity as one 
of the most powerful and original in matter: “this same motion of weight or gravity 
(which is a mere motion of matter, and hath no affinity with the form or kind) doth 
kill the other motion, except itself be killed by a violent motion.” 28 
 As I said at the beginning of this paper, Bacon recommends that the experimen-
tal study of matter be “broken” and “grinded.” Put differently, the inherently plural 
nature of material appetites demands an experimental approach that relies on a 
particulate view of matter. In such an atomistic view of material appetites, Bacon 
tends to regards all natural operations as combinations of primal appetites, which 
may cluster into larger units and then break down again into the original appetitive 
atoms. This atomism of the appetites has far-reaching implications for both the 
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organisation of the experimental strategies and the reshuffling of traditional 
divisions in the hierarchies of the senses. In Bacon’s opinion, that is, the fact that 
sight has been the prevailing sense in leading natural investigations has caused 
natural philosophers to overlook such decisive factors as the “fineness of the body,” 
the “smallness of the parts” and the “subtilty of the motion,” although these are the 
“things that govern nature principally.” This, warns Bacon, is not “a question of 
words.” On the contrary, it is “infinitely material in nature,” for philosophers, by 
overemphasising the sense of sight, have developed such dominant notions as 
vacuum, soul and incorporeal virtues. 29 Instead, a more material consideration of 
the senses, an emphasis on touch and tactile reactivity for instance, would have 
shifted the focus from visible shapes to invisible motions, from structures to 
dynamic processes. Bacon likens his view of atomic appetites – “the motions of the 
minute parts of bodies” – to Democritus’ theory of material atoms. 30 Natural phi-
losophers have ignored “the tumult in the parts of solid bodies when they are com-
pressed, which is the cause of all flight of bodies through the air, and of other 
mechanical motions.” 31 Not only is the motion of the minute parts invisible (“unob-
served”); often it also “passeth without sound.” 32 As already said, matter trepidates by 
its very nature. This constant state of trepidation is the result of innumerable appetitive 
drives, what Bacon calls the “secret” trepidation of the “minute parts” of matter. 33 
 3  Experimental Practice and Discipline of the Appetites 
 Although it may seem like a trite statement, it is safe to say that Bacon was concerned 
with action more than contemplation. In metaphysical terms, the same statement can 
be rephrased by saying that Bacon’s philosophy is an original attempt to find success-
ful ways of intervening in and modifying the very fabric of matter. As he argued in 
aphorism 127 of the first part of the  Novum organum , the new method of interpreting 
nature – induction – was not to be applied only to “the motions and discourses of the 
mind,” but also to “the nature of things.” Since for Bacon appetite constituted the 
innermost nature of things, acquisition of knowledge could not be separated from the 
mastery of appetites, both natural and civil. Bacon argued that there could not be a 
proper management of human affairs without a study of natural bodies. In the 
 Advancement of Learning , he had already characterised civil knowledge as “a subject 
which of all others is most immersed in matter,” meaning that the complexity and 
opaqueness of the appetitive life are particularly evident in that domain. 34 In the 
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 Sapientia veterum , in which Bacon chose Orpheus to represent philosophy, the Greek 
poet is characteristically portrayed as capable of attracting both infernal powers (i.e., 
of dealing with natural philosophy given the hidden and lower nature of the spirits) 
and wild beasts (i.e., of dealing with human passions, which are the basic constituents 
of moral and civil philosophy). In Bacon’s sumptuously emblematic language, this 
means that in the domain of natural knowledge philosophy aims at the conservation 
of natural things (“restoration and renovation of perishable things”), while in the 
domain of civil knowledge it teaches men “to forget their unrestrained affects.” In 
both cases, it is a matter of securing the control of the appetites. 35 
 Orpheus had already made his appearance in the  Advancement of Learning 
(1605). There he symbolised the power that learning exercises on both “relieving 
the necessities which arise from nature” and “repressing the inconveniences which 
grow from man to man”:
 which merite was liuely set forth by the Ancients in that fayned relation of  Orpheus 
Theater; where all beasts and birds assembled: and forgetting their seuerall appetites; some 
of pray, some of game, some of quarrell, stood all sociably together listening vnto the ayres 
and accords of the Harpe; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some 
lowder noyse; but euerie beast returned to his owne nature. 36 
 This mythological device, Bacon went on, throws light upon “the nature and condi-
tion of men,” who “are full of savage and unreclaymed desires; of profite, of lust, 
of revenge.” The moral behind Orpheus’ myth is that the domestication of the appe-
tites passes through the civilising effect of culture:
 as long as they [the appetites] giue eare to precepts, to lawes, to religion, sweetly touched 
with eloquence and perswasion of Bookes, of Sermons, of haranges; so long is societie and 
peace maintained; but if these instruments bee silent; or that sedition and tumult make them 
not audible; all things dissolue into Anarchie and Confusion. 37 
 Given such a view of nature, Bacon’s search for ways of both arousing and contain-
ing appetites should not therefore come as too much of a surprise. On many occa-
sions, he investigated the power of laws, customs, habits and opinions in channelling 
the energy of human appetites. He no doubt assumed that laws exercised a certain 
influence over the appetites, but in general he considered laws to work like pallia-
tive remedies. 38 In the section of the  Advancement of Learning devoted to the “cul-
ture and cure of the mynde,” Bacon acknowledged the fact that fortune and nature 
are “without our commaund”; in cases like these, Bacon recommended proceeding 
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by “application” (or “accommodation”), that is, by gradually adjusting ourselves to 
each single situation determined by natural conditionings and contingent events. 
In “Morall and Ciuile matters,” Bacon found particularly useful the application of 
strategies of mutual control based on sophisticated systems of checks and balances. 
In this way, he argued, we know how “to set affection against affection, and to 
master one by another” – “as we use to hunt beast with beaste and flye byrd with 
birde.” He specified that, by definition, appetites were factional (and therefore 
atomic). For a shrewd politician, however, factions could also be seen as a resource, 
“for as in the gouernmente of states it is sometimes necessarye to bridle one faction 
with another, so it is in the gouernmente within.” 39 
 Bacon thought that custom – “the Principall Magistrate of Mans life”– was more 
powerful than the institution of laws and a cunning use of factional disputes. 40 In  A 
Letter and Discourse to Sir Henry Savile ,  Touching Helps for the Intellectual 
Powers , Bacon expanded on this power of habit:
 as to the body of man, we find many and strange experiences how nature is overwrought by 
custom, even in actions that seem of most difficulty and least possible. As first in Voluntary 
Motion; which though it be termed voluntary, yet the highest degrees of it are not voluntary; 
for it is in my power and will to run; but to run faster than according to my lightness or 
disposition of body, is not in my power nor will. We see the industry and practice of tum-
blers and funambulos, what effects of great wonder it bringeth the body of man unto. 41 
 Bacon added a list of other instances to demonstrate “how variously, and to how high 
points and degrees” the human body “may be (as it were) moulded and wrought.” 
After the body, he turned his attention to the will. In this domain, he considered 
religion to be “the most sovereign of all,” being able to change and transform the will 
“in the deepest and most inward inclinations and motions.” Immediately after reli-
gion he placed “opinion and apprehension” (“whether it be infused by tradition and 
institution, or wraught in by disputation and persuasion”), then the use of examples 
and the technique of using one affect to heal and correct another. “And lastly” – 
Bacon concluded this section – “when all these means, or any of them, have new 
framed or formed human will, then both custom and habit corroborate and confirm 
all the rest.” 42 In the  Essays (1601), Bacon attributed such an exceptional power to 
habit that men, for all their protestations to the contrary, in fact act “[a]s if they were 
Dead Images, and Engines moved onely by the wheeles of  Custome .” 43 Once custom 
turns into a social force, Bacon explained, then its power increases:
 if the Force of  Custome Simple and Separate, be Great; the Force of  Custome Copulate, 
and Conjoyned, and Collegiate, is far Greater. For there Example teacheth; Company 
comfortheth; Emulation quickeneth; Glory raiseth: So as in such Places the Force of 
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 Custome is in his Exaltation. Certainly, the great Multiplication of Vertues upon Humane 
Nature, resteth upon Societies well Ordained, and Disciplined. 44 
 Laws, customs, habits, religious beliefs and opinions were all forces which, in 
Bacon’s view, could be used to master human appetites. 
 Analogous forces could be found to control the appetites of matter. In his search 
for possible ways of connecting the realms of nature and man, Bacon concentrated 
his efforts on the material spirits. He thus explained the influence of the passions 
of the human soul upon the body in the same way as he described the primordial 
reactions of the spirits. As already mentioned, Bacon’s natural philosophy is char-
acterised by a deliberate overlapping of explanatory levels. He described the 
motions of matter in terms of animal appetites, while interpreting human emotions 
as one of the most sophisticated forms of vital reactivity in the material universe. 
 Here, for instance, is the way Bacon examined the passion of fear in the experi-
mental setting of  Sylva Sylvarum . The analysis works on two levels: human and 
natural.
 Fear causeth paleness, trembling, the standing of the hair upright, starting, and skriching. 
The paleness is caused, for that the blood runneth inward to succour the heart. The trem-
bling is caused, for that through the flight of the spirits inward, the outward parts are des-
tituted, and not sustained. Standing upright of the hair is caused, for that by shutting of the 
pores of the skin, the hair that lieth aslope must needs rise. Starting is both an apprehension 
of the thing feared, (and in that kind it is a motion of shrinking,) and likewise an inquisi-
tion, in the beginning, what the matter should be, (and in that kind it is a motion of erec-
tion); and therefore when a man would listen suddenly to any thing, he starteth; for the 
starting is an erection of the spirits to attend. Skriching is an appetite of expelling that 
which suddenly striketh the spirits: for it must be noted that many motions, though they be 
unprofitable to expel that which hurteth, yet they are offers of nature, and cause motions 
by consent: as in groaning or crying upon pain. 45 
 The important contribution of Bernardino Telesio’s natural philosophy to Bacon’s 
theory of spirits has been long recognised. 46 In his  De natura iuxta propria prin-
cipia (1565, 1570, 1586), Telesio had provided a systematic account of man’s 
emotional and ethical life based on the natural motions of the spirits and their ten-
dency to self-preservation. Bacon was very keen on adopting this explanatory 
framework and on applying it to the analysis of both natural and social phenomena. 
His most accurate analysis of Telesian philosophy can be found in  De principiis 
atque originibus (c.1610s). In Telesio’s cosmological model, Bacon asserted, con-
flicts are deemed to be less widespread than they actually are, for Telesio confined 
them to the outermost borders of the only two spheres of activity, cold (earth) and 
heat (heaven). There, in the interface separating the two kingdoms – a sort of rind 
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( cortex ) and coating ( incrustatio ) surrounding the inner core of the universe – the 
hostile forces of nature meet and fight each other. Bacon gave a brief outline of the 
Telesian cosmos, a cosmos ravaged by wars led by opposing armies:
 after he [Telesio] has sufficiently fortified the innermost parts of both kingdoms, he sets a 
military campaign in motion, for all tumult, conflict and infernal disorder can be found in 
those spaces between the outmost parts of the heaven and the innermost parts of earth as 
happens in empires where the borders are exposed to incursions and aggressions, while the 
internal provinces enjoy peace and security. Thus these natures [hot and cold] and their 
concretions have the appetite and faculty of generating and multiplying themselves con-
tinually, of spreading out in every direction, of occupying the whole mass of matter, of 
fighting and invading each other, of ousting and driving away each other from their respec-
tive domains and settling in the places that have been conquered; furthermore, they have 
the appetite and faculty of perceiving and apprehending ( appetitus et facultas percipiendi 
et prehendendi ) the force and the actions of another nature and their own, and of moving 
and adjusting themselves according to such perception. All the differences of beings, action 
and power are derived from this battling ( decertatio ). 47 
 Bacon acknowledged the value of Telesio’s cosmology. In particular, he praised the 
way in which the Italian philosopher had characterised the turbulent conflicts per-
vading nature, which he called the “implacable and deadly war”: “one nature 
desires, strives and tries hard to destroy the other and to impose its exclusive 
domain on matter.” Bacon did not accuse Telesio of having underestimated the 
seriousness of the war. Like Bacon, he had described the contrast dividing 
the active natures (heat and cold) in terms of a war where no alliance is possible 
and no prisoners are taken. “Every generation and every effect in a natural body are 
the result of a settlement based on victory and predominance ( praedominantia ), and 
not on an agreement or covenant.” 48 Constant conflict is the rule, and if some sort 
of harmony seems to keep the world together it is only because the unbounded 
energy of one nature’s power is curbed by the similarly unbounded energy of 
another’s. The disposition of the universe, seemingly stable but in fact precarious 
and always on the point of breaking into complete anarchy, “does not result from the 
laws that regulate covenants and agreements, but from sheer power” ( impotentia , in 
the sense of inability to restrain one’s own power); 49  “every increase and decrease 
in power and action does not derive from a moderation of the force ( intensionis 
moderamen ) – it being a force that desires ( concupiscit ) the whole ( integrum 
quiddam ) – but from the blow and resistance of the opposite nature.” Telesio, 
Bacon went on, managed to identify three factors that account for the order and 
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variety of the universe: the “force of heat,” the “disposition of matter” and the “type 
of subjection.” These three factors “are related to each other in some sort of a nexus 
and one is cause to the other” ( nexu quodam inter se implicantur, atque sibi ipsis 
concausae sunt ). 50 More specifically, with respect to subjection ( subactio ), Bacon 
distinguished two possible ways in which such action of subjection manifests itself 
in nature: by rejection ( ejectio ) or by “going over to the enemy” ( versio ). Like two 
enemy armies, when they are both large and fully arrayed for battle, heat and cold 
try to conquer each other’s position ( Nam entia, veluti acies, loco moventur et 
impelluntur ); when the quantity of matter is smaller, “then acts of defection ( versio ) 
follow, for beings are destroyed, and they change their own nature rather than their 
place.” 51 
 Bacon’s use of this characteristically Telesian framework is particularly evident 
when he discusses the nature of material and human appetites, as when in  Sylva 
Sylvarum he presents his experimental observations conducted on such passions as 
fear, grief and pain, joy, anger, dislike, shame, pity, wonder and laughing. 
Compression, contraction and contention are all motions involved in the expression 
of emotions, based on the alternation of opposing tendencies to resist and relax. 52 
In an “experiment solitary” concerning “the flight of the spirits upon odious 
objects,” Bacon accounts for various reactions of fear by referring to the most origi-
nal appetites of matter. “All objects of the senses which are very offensive,” he 
notices, “do cause the spirits to retire: and upon their flight the parts are (in some 
degree) destitute: and so there is induced in them a trepidation and horror.” 53 The 
most striking aspect of his argument is the ease with which Bacon switches back 
and forth from the level of human senses to that of natural sentience. It is not merely 
that matter is in an unremitting state of trepidation: such a state of physical trepida-
tion seems to be a condition of animal trepidation as well. If this is really the case, 
what prevents Bacon’s view of nature and his form of experimental practice from 
ending in a form of crass animism and delusion? Is not Bacon’s new “magic” after 
all just a kind of primitive magic? 54 
 A plausible answer to this difficult question can be found if we turn our attention 
to Bacon’s ideas regarding longevity. In  Sylva Sylvarum , we find a series of inter-
esting remarks concerning the possibility of prolonging life, in which Bacon seems 
to admit forms of direct control over the life of matter. Since Bacon’s spirits have 
a predatory nature, prolongation of life depends on finding ways of producing a 
“more placid motion of the spirits,” which “thereby do less prey and consume the 
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juice of the body.” Bacon recommends two possible strategies: “either that men’s 
actions be free and voluntary, that nothing be done  invita Minerva , but  secundum 
genium ,” or “that the actions of men be full of regulation and commands within 
themselves: for then the victory and performing of the command giveth a good 
disposition to the spirits.” In this last case, Bacon points out the beneficial effects 
that the idea of accomplishing great results through gradual training may have on 
the mind of men (“especially if there be a proceeding from degree to degree; for 
then the sense of victory is the greater”). To extend the course of his life, therefore, 
man can rely either on fostering the absolute spontaneity of the natural functions or 
on moulding these functions through rigorous self-control and discipline. He pro-
vides an example for each of the two lifestyles: “a country life” and the life of 
“monks and philosophers.” 55 The shift from one level to the other – from the body 
to the soul, so to speak – is possible because of the ubiquitous character of material 
cupidity. Therefore man can exercise the power of his will on his body, and a par-
ticular disposition of his body can increase the power of his will. The passions of 
matter are like the passions of human nature in that they are both governed by 
motions of liberty and continuity, and, even more deeply, by motions of trepidation 
and rest. Country life (that is, a life centred around the motion of liberty) and philo-
sophical life (a life centred around the motion of resistance) represent the two 
alternatives available to man in his attempt to control the appetites of matter, from 
the original motions of matter up to the motions of the will. 
 4  Conclusion 
 According to a famous anecdote reported by John Aubrey in his  Brief Lives , 
William Harvey, asked about his opinion concerning Bacon’s philosophy, came up 
with the often quoted sentence: Bacon writes of natural philosophy like a Lord 
Chancellor. 56 To be sure, we should take this statement with a grain of salt. Whether 
Harvey was being malicious (which is highly likely, as Aubrey himself assumes) or 
whether he was expressing a sincere compliment, the fact remains that,  malgré 
Harvey, this statement can be used as an excellent way of summing up Bacon’s 
agenda and peculiar style of philosophising. Once stripped of the original authorial 
intention, Harvey’s opinion, far from sounding like an insult or a piece of learned 
gossip, can thus be used as a convenient interpretative tool. 
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 That Bacon writes of natural philosophy like a Lord Chancellor can be read in 
at least two ways. It can mean that he applies (or projects, Harvey would say) politi-
cal and legal views onto the understanding of nature. Or, on a less judgemental and 
more stimulating level, we can say that Bacon writes like a Lord Chancellor in the 
sense that a bold form of political realism may be the key to understand the inner 
workings of both nature and human society. As I hope I have shown in this paper, 
it is not too much to say that, in Bacon’s view,  war and  interest are the ultimate 
moving forces in the world of nature, long before they make their appearance in the 
world of man. 
 We also may come close to addressing the question of why Bacon decided to 
devote so much time and energy to the reform of natural philosophy when his main 
preoccupations were of a legal and political matter. It is well known that the 
advancement of learning, and especially of learning concerning nature, was an 
integral part of Bacon’s programme of universal reform. One might argue that, 
precisely because he adhered to a view of nature grounded on ontological realism 
and on the primacy of appetite over knowledge (that is to say, the activity of nature, 
and not the knowledge that man has of nature, comes first; appetites, and not men’s 
representations of nature, are the essential thing), Bacon was seeking in nature a 
solid basis upon which to reorganise the human commonwealth. He offered us a 
view of the conflicts of nature based on political realism and a view of human 
society based on materialism. In such a view, it is not always easy to establish what 
comes first, whether political realism or naturalism. Worst of all, it is difficult to 
avoid the impression that Bacon falls short of animism when the two levels of 
analysis – the natural and the political – are so muddled. 
 A possible key to understanding such a controversial view of nature lies in 
Bacon’s notion of appetitive atomism. As shown in the previous sections, appetites 
are atomic and self-interested. They have no long-term knowledge concerning the 
purpose of their actions. The direction of their tendencies depends on the need to 
find immediate satisfaction for their desires and on matter’s overall tendency to 
defuse the tension that accumulates from conflicting motions. Particles of matter 
are under constant pressure; they are caged, ready to flee or to attack depending on 
the circumstances. Bacons’ matter is extremely sensitive and delicate. It perceives 
the slightest touch as a threat. We know that  trepidatio is its normal condition. 
Unsettled by actions and reactions, upset by constant motions of assault and resis-
tance, matter is therefore divided within itself, an unstable aggregate of conflicting 
particles. Bacon’s constantly ambivalent attitude towards both particulate and 
homogenous views of matter may therefore be interpreted as an attempt to devise a 
view of matter in which conflicts can be controlled and reabsorbed into a broader 
unitary vision. As an important political figure during both Elizabeth’s and James’ 
reigns (Solicitor-General, Attorney-General, Lord Chancellor), a man interested in 
programmes of legal and state reforms, he knew very well that a centrally organised 
state must cope with the centrifugal tendencies of unruly and intractable elements; 57 
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likewise, matter understood as a unitary continuous substratum may be seen as 
capable of curbing the turbulent and divisive propensities of numberless material 
particles. In this case, too, Bacon writes of philosophy as a Lord Chancellor. 
 Since tensions created by conflicting appetites are more original than states of 
motion and rest, there is no condition of absolute rest in Bacon’s material universe. 
Indeed, appetite is even more original than life and death (or than any vital and 
mechanical properties of matter). Natural appetites are more original than vital 
motions and they are an indication of matter’s tendency to remain the same and 
resist any attempt to change its configuration. Rest prevails over change because the 
primordial appetite is the appetite which always seeks to re-establish the original 
condition. Every change is produced in order to resist change. It may sound like a 
paradox, but life, for Bacon, has a predatory quality (a view that is particularly 
evident in his account of the vital spirits) because the innermost tendency is the one 
to restore the original balance: any vital reaction is a reaction on the part of matter 
against being forced to change. 
 It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the list of the basic motions of 
matter given in the  Novum organum ends with the “motion of trepidation” ( motus 
trepidationis ) and the “motion of rest,” also called “dread of motion” ( motus decu-
bitus sive exhorrentiae motus ). The two final motions recapitulate the whole 
account of motions provided in the  Novum organum and they also represent the 
metaphysical background for Bacon’s apparently haphazard collection of experi-
ments in  Sylva Sylvarum . In the  Novum organum , the motion of trepidation is also 
called the motion of “eternal captivity” ( aeterna captivitas ) and it occurs every time 
“bodies are placed in situations that are not suitable to their nature, and yet they do 
not feel completely uncomfortable. As a result, they quiver with trepidation and feel 
restless, not content with their condition and yet not daring to move further.” This 
motion characterises the state of tension and fluctuation ( status anceps ) between 
easiness ( commoda ) and uneasiness ( incommoda ), in which “bodies, drawn in dif-
ferent directions, try to free themselves, and again they are rejected, and neverthe-
less they still keep trying to free themselves.” The motion of rest, too, is at the very 
core of matter, occurring when matter reaches its highest level of density. In this 
case, bodies abhor motion and their only desire is the desire not to move. They are 
“teased ( vellicentur ) and provoked to motion in infinite ways,” but “they maintain 
their nature as much as they can.” And even when they are forced to move, “they 
always seem to do this in order to restore their condition of rest and not to move 
any longer.” 58 These two motions, the motion of trepidation and the motion of rest, 
are both expression of matter’s longing for repose and, at the same time, of its ulti-
mate inability to avoid motion and change. Reaching a state of rest is the deepest 
desire in matter and yet the atomistic constitution of the appetites, their factional 
and divisive nature, prevents the particles of matter from reaching a state of peaceful 
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coexistence. Matter is constantly at war with itself, for the state of desire is 
ambivalent to the point of contradiction. It is not by accident that Bacon calls such 
condition  status anceps . Here  anceps is definitely an adjective fraught with mean-
ing: literally, it means “facing in two directions,” but also, “critically poised,” 
“wavering,” “indecisive,” “unsettled.” The two directions that constantly destabilise 
the appetites of matter are, on one hand, the search for ways to put an end to the 
state of motion and, on the other, the condition of perpetual motion. We can now 
understand better, I hope, why Bacon decided to refer to the last type of motion he 
examined in the  Novum organum , paradoxically, as “motion of dread of motion.” 
Not  horror vacui (one of the typical bugbears of atomism), but  horror motus is the 
real linchpin of Bacon’s natural philosophy. 
 Once Baconian appetites are seen as manifestations of matter’s innermost ten-
dency to reduce the tension of the system, then we may venture a possible explana-
tion of the reason why the “families of things” manage to persist despite conflicts 
and oppositions. If there is a telos in Bacon’s universe, it is the dread of motion and 
the ensuing sense of agitation and alarm. Many of Bacon’s descriptions in  Sylva 
Sylvarum assume that cohesion and coherence result from counterbalancing appe-
tites. The universe as a whole forcefully exerts its natural equilibrium against a 
world constantly thrown out of balance. Bacon never tires of alerting the reader that 
every time he refers to the motions of liberty and union, attraction and gravity, 
sympathy and antipathy, trepidation and rest, he is not assuming the existence of a 
harmoniously organised system of nature based on intentional design. While deal-
ing with the tendencies of sympathy and antipathy allegedly inherent in plants, for 
example, Bacon explains that every plant is in fact “an enemy to any other plant” 
because they all compete to draw the best juices from the soil. 59 Competition for 
food, not attraction to the like, is the principle that accounts for a large number of 
actions in nature. Fulfilment of particular and immediate urges, rather than deferral 
to long-term planning, is the driving force behind the life of nature. The experimen-
tal evidence resulting from  Sylva Sylvarum confirms the self-adjusting and inevita-
bly precarious character of material reality. The universe persists in its course 
because it is a steady-state system pervaded by a general condition of uneasiness 
and trepidation. 
 It is only by knowing and subduing the appetites of matter that man can master 
the intractable forces of nature, thereby restoring humankind’s original control of 
its appetites – i.e., the original paragon of cognitive and moral perfection embodied 
by the pre-lapsarian Adam. In Bacon’s philosophy, then, there is a basic correspon-
dence between the motions of the mind and the motions of the bodies, a correspon-
dence which derives from the fact that both orders of reality are rooted in the 
unstable realm of appetitive drives. Bacon is of the opinion that both human and 
natural creativity, both  ingenia and  conatus are arbitrary forces. Just as a “ruler” 
( regula ) is presented in  Novum organum as the remedy for the bewilderment of 
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knowledge, so custom is the force that disciplines the unruliness of human action. 
The  New Organon – the reorganisation of man’s mental faculties – and the 
 New Atlantis – the reorganisation of the social order – work in parallel. This is the 
fundamental reason that the chief institution in Bensalem (the utopian political 
organisation in  New Atlantis ), which is devoted to the study of the appetites in mat-
ter (the “secret motions of things”), is also in charge of preserving the political 
order. Men of science are in power because by knowing the appetites of matter they 
have a better knowledge of the very roots of human appetites. 
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 Abstract  Francis Bacon, in his 1605 work  The Proficience and Advancement of 
Learning , analyzes “Notes of Cogitations” into “twoo sortes... [t]he one when the 
Note hath some Similitude, or Congruitie with the Notion; [t]he other... hauing 
force onely by Contract or Acception.” The latter are either “Hierogliphickes” or 
“Gestures,” and the latter of these “are as Transitorie Hierogliphickes, and are to 
Hierogliphickes, as Words spoken are to Wordes written, in that they abide not.” 
In some fashion or other, it is the first kind of hieroglyphics that will dominate in 
the seventeenth-century efforts to develop an ideal, artificial writing system, one 
that would not be based on mere convention, but would instead serve transparently 
for producing emblems of the things one wishes to denote. The second variety 
Bacon identifies, gesture, will in contrast gain little attention. Yet little attention 
is not none at all. Over the course of the 1640s, the obscure Baconian natural 
philosopher John Bulwer would develop his predecessor’s notion of transitory 
hieroglyphics into an elaborate system, one that would serve as the starting point 
for the later sciences of, among other things, sign language and sociolinguistics. 
Bulwer’s theory of gesture reveals an important rift in seventeenth-century debates 
about the universal character, between those who believe that this can be nothing 
other than an artificial language, and those who believe that it is precisely artifice 
that obscures meanings, and that any universally comprehensible system of 
communication will be perfectly natural as opposed to artificial. In exploring this 
rift, we are also able to gain access to a curious, if not terribly influential, theory 
constituting a point of contact between early modern philosophy of language on the 
one hand and the early modern metaphysics of body on the other. 
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 1  Introduction 
 Francis Bacon, in his 1605 work  The Proficience and Advancement of Learning , 
argued for a ‘real character’ or artificial language that would be able to communicate 
intended meanings from one person to another with perfect transparency. This is a 
project that would be important throughout the rest of the century, with thinkers 
such as Samuel Hartlib, John Wilkins, and G. W. Leibniz all making significant 
contributions to the study of artificial and formal languages.
 Notes of Cogitations are of twoo sortes; The one when the Note hath some Similitude, or 
Congruitie with the Notion; The other Ad Placitum, hauing force onely by Contract or 
Acception. Of the former sort are Hierogliphickes, and Gestures. For as to Hierogliphickes, 
(things of Ancient vse, and embraced chiefly by the AEgyptians, one of the most ancient 
Nations) they are but as continued Impreases and Emblemes. And as for Gestures, they are 
as Transitorie Hierogliphickes, and are to Hierogliphickes, as Words spoken are to Wordes 
written, in that they abide not. 1 
 In some fashion or other, it is the first kind of ‘Hierogliphickes’, in the sense 
Bacon describes here, that will dominate in the seventeenth-century efforts to 
develop an ideal, artificial writing system, one that would not be based on mere 
convention, but would instead serve transparently for producing ‘Emblemes’ of the 
things one wishes to denote. The second variety Bacon identifies, gesture, will in 
contrast gain little attention. Yet little attention is not none at all. Over the course 
of the 1640s, the obscure Baconian natural philosopher John Bulwer would develop 
his predecessor’s notion of transitory hieroglyphics into an elaborate system, one 
that would indeed serve as the starting point for the later sciences of, among other 
things, sign language and sociolinguistics. 
 According to Jeffrey Wollock, Bulwer would entirely ignore Bacon’s interest in 
an ideal language, focusing instead exclusively upon Bacon’s characterization of 
gesture, indeed turning this into the centerpiece of his chirological project. 
According to Wollock, “this was in part because [Bulwer] retained older views on 
the inherent ontological harmony between man and the universe, but also because, 
for Bulwer the physician, the underlying neurophysiological basis of gesture 
confirmed it as the universal ‘language’ of humanity.” 2 It would be more correct to 
say, however, that Bulwer does not abandon the search for an ideal language, but 
indeed believes that he has  already found one in gesture. In examining why he 
believes this, we might be able to discern an important rift in seventeenth-century 
debates about the universal character, between those who believe that this can be 
nothing other than an artificial language, and those who believe that it is precisely 
artifice that obscures meanings, and that any universally comprehensible system of 
communication will be perfectly natural as opposed to artificial. But in considering 
Bulwer’s understanding of the natural, and of the way that nature equips bodies with 
a sort of mute natural language, we are also able to gain access to a curious, if not 
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terribly influential, 3 theory constituting a point of contact between early modern 
philosophy of language on the one hand and the early modern metaphysics of body 
on the other. The best way to draw this connection out, over the course of the 
following two sections, will be to focus on Bulwer’s very different – and at first 
glance unjustifiably different – judgments about two different ways in which the 
body is implicated in human activity: as the vehicle of meanings in body language, 
and as the object of human artifice in tattooing, foot-binding, and other forms of 
body modification. 
 2  ‘The Hand’ as Extended Mind 
 According to William H. Sherman, in contrast with Wollock, Bulwer’s work was in 
fact a continuation of the seventeenth-century, and in part Baconian, project of 
developing a universal language, “one that would not only allow people from different 
places to communicate with each other but would, more importantly, recover the 
integrity of language before the Tower of Babel and even before the Fall itself.” 4 
In the  Chirologia , Bulwer explicitly cites Bacon as the inspiration for his own 
philosophy of gesture, and in the prefatory poem even describes his own work as a 
sort of completion of what Bacon did not live long enough to do: “Let  Bacons soul 
sleep sweet: the time is come / That Gesture shall s[no?]o longer be dumbe.” 5 
But how does a gesturology amount to the culmination of something left incomplete 
in Bacon’s own work? 
 Bulwer often invokes the metonymy of ‘the hand’ to describe body language in 
general. The hand, he proclaims, “speakes all languages, and as an  universall 
 character of Reason , is generally understood and known by all Nations, among the 
formall differences of their Tongue.” For Bulwer, the mutual comprehensibility of 
different human groups by means of gesture proves that this is “the onely speech that 
is naturall to Man,” and that
 it may well be called the  Tongue and generall language of Humane Nature , which, without 
teaching, men in all regions of the habitable world doe at the first sight most easily understand. 
This is evident by that trade and commerce with those salvage Nations who have long 
injoyèd the late discovered principalities of the West, with whom (although their Language 
be strange and unknowne) our Merchants barter and exchange their Wares, driving a rich 
and silent Trade, by signes, whereby many a dumb bargaine without the crafty Brocage of 
the Tongue, is advantageously made. 6 
 
3
 As Lewis notes, Bulwer was far from being an important player in seventeenth-century discussions 
of the universal character: “Although it is certain that [Samuel] Hartlib was familiar with his 
work, and that he passed details of it on to those he knew to have an interest in universal 
communication, it does not appear that Bulwer’s work had much impact on the main body of 
language projectors” (Lewis  2007 , 46). 
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 Notwithstanding Bulwer’s intense cultural chauvinism, to which we shall be 
exposed shortly, here he is making an ethnologically subtle point, one repeated 
frequently in the following centuries, that whatever the otherness of different 
cultures consists in, it is not an absolute otherness, permitting no foothold in like 
responses and behaviors under like conditions that may serve as a starting point for 
exploring differences. Human groups are, in short, both similar  and different 
enough to make comparison meaningful. It is, moreover, with respect to the pre- or 
sublinguistic expression of meanings or intentions that they are similar, while language 
is the principle source of differentiation and so also of miscomprehension. 
 Most early modern theories of a primordial Adamic language held that it was not 
spoken language as such that compromised true meanings in favour of their mere 
approximation in the sounds that humans agree by convention will stand in for 
them. But Bulwer appears to want to argue that speaking, whether pre- or 
post-lapsarian, corrupts meanings precisely because sounds can only ever be 
conventional. For this reason, the true primordial embodiment of meaning is only 
to be found in the body itself, which is to say in gesture. As William Diconson 
writes in the commendatory verse that opens Bulwer’s  Chirologia :
 …At first sight we learne to read; and then 
 By Natures rules to perce and construe Men: 
 So commenting upon their Gesture, finde 
 In them the truest copie of the Minde. 
 The Tongue and Heart th’intention oft divide: 
 The  Hand and Meaning ever are ally’de. 7 
 One might think that gesture is itself already artificial, already a sort of technol-
ogy of the body. Aristotle had said that the hand is “the instrument of instru-
ments,” 8 and Bulwer interprets the hand’s unique place among instruments as 
consisting in the fact that nothing is lost through its mediation. Intention is not 
divided. If we think of the extended-mind hypothesis as holding that technolo-
gies can store and transmit information that initiates in the mind, and keep this 
information available for future access, 9 then for Bulwer the hand is certainly the 
paradigm instance of the extended mind. But unlike writing in a natural lan-
guage, or the recording of spoken language in a magic sponge, 10 in the case of 
the hand, to speak with the information theorists, the signal does not degrade at 
all, and it can be transmitted from anyone to anyone, without prior agreement 
upon a key for decoding the message. 
 This is not to say that all gestures are universal. In his  Anthropometamorphosis , 
treated in detail in the following section, Bulwer distinguishes between the ‘native’ 
and the ‘naturall’: 11 The latter is what comes directly from nature, the former what 
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may accompany one from birth, but only as a result of one’s cultural environment. 
The ‘native’ is the ‘nationall’, and while there are many gestures that may be native 
in this sense, these are the object of the special domain of study Bulwer calls 
“Chirethnicalogia, or the Nationall expression of the Hand.” Yet there are also 
many gestures that are in fact natural, in contrast with ‘native’ in the sense just 
described. Thus he explains in the  Chirologia that “[t]o extend out the right Hand 
by the arme foreright, is the naturall habit wherein we sometimes allure, invite, 
speak to, cry after, call, or wanre to come, bring into, exhort, give warning, admon-
ish, protect, pacifie, rebuke,” and so on. 12 And further on: “To lift up the right Hand 
to heaven, is the naturall forme and ceremony of an oath, used by those who call God 
to witness.” 13 Even what is sometimes called ‘giving the finger’ is qualified by 
Bulwer as ‘naturall’: “The putting forth of the middle-Finger, the rest drawn into a 
Fist on each side, which is then called... vulgarly  Higa , in the ancient tongue, 
 pugner ..., is a naturall expression of scorne and contempt. Hence also Martial calls 
this Finger,  Digitum impudicum .” Bulwer’s insight here seems to be that the middle 
finger functions as a sort of ‘natural symbol’ 14 in virtue of certain anatomical cor-
respondences that are transparent to any observer. It thus has a meaning that human 
beings could not have made up, any more than the correspondence between a hiero-
glyph of a beetle and an actual beetle is established by convention. 
 In the  Philocophus, or, The Deafe and Dumbe Mans Friend of 1648, Bulwer 
extends his theory of gesture from the hand to the face, arguing that the deaf can, 
by learning how to read lips, attain to a sort of ‘Ocular Audition’:
 a treasure reserved for these times, which had escaped their privy search, who guided by 
the illumination of their owne endeavours had in  sudore vultus ransackt the bosome of 
nature, wherein wisdome had hid it among other Arts and Sciences which have their 
foundation in Nature, and neither grow nor encrease but appeare when time and observa-
tion unlockt them unto us: Having well scanned this  Magnale naturae , I found it to be one 
of the subtlest pieces of Recondit learning, and that it bordered upon other avenewes unto 
the braine, as Orall and Dentall Audition, of which wee have discovered sufficient ground to 
raise a new Art upon, directing how to convey intelligible and articulate sounds another 
way to the braine then by the eare or eye; shewing that a man may heare as well as speake 
with his mouth. 15 
 Why does Bulwer believe that this new science has waited until the present age 
to reveal itself? The answer would appear to be connected to his Baconian 
method, his commitment, as he says, to the growth of knowledge by observation, 
and to the establishment of “Phylosophicall verity” through “unanswerable 
Demonstration from matter of fact.” 16 Bulwer is extremely loyal to the ancient 
 
12
 Bulwer  1644 , 43. 
 
13
 Bulwer  1644 , 50. 
 
14
 See Douglas  1996 . 
 
15
 Bulwer  1648 , Preface, no page numbers. Of course, lip-reading could only ever involve ‘nationall’ 
signs in the body, since what is being read are not natural gestures, but only the bodily counterpart 
to spoken, and thus merely conventional, language. For more on Bulwer’s contributions to sign 
language and to the science of deafness, see Wollock  1996 ; Norman  1942 –1943; Rée  1999 . 
 
16
 Bulwer  1648 : Preface, no page numbers. 
174 J.E.H. Smith
Rhetoricians, and seldom makes a claim without extensive corroboration from 
Cicero, Martial, and/or? Julius Caesar. But his appreciation of ancient authority 
does not compromise his commitment to the Baconian commitment to the primacy 
of observed matters of fact. 
 ‘The hand’, by which Bulwer means the body, is as we have seen both an exten-
sion of the mind as well as its most faithful reflection. It conveys in hieroglyphic form 
the passing states of the mind. Writing constitutes an advance over oral communica-
tion because it can be preserved and transmitted across long distances with little 
degradation of meaning. Even if the gesture is a more faithful representative of the 
thought, without webcam technology or something comparable it still requires the 
‘reader’ of the gesture to be in the same place and time as the person doing the gestur-
ing. Nor is it clear what advantage the transience of a gesture confers. If the conven-
tionality and arbitrariness of written alphabetic language is something that is 
overcome by ideogrammatic writing, then it seems that even if what is preferrable 
about gesture is its naturalness and its non-conventionalness, these are nonetheless 
features of a certain kind of writing as well, which also has the virtue of being non-
transient. Why, in short, should the hand, with its gestures, be preferred to the page, 
with its permanent inscriptions, so long as these meet the criterion of non-convention-
alness that is also met by gesture? In order to adequately answer these questions, we 
should perhaps first consider Bulwer’s views on what we might call the permanent 
hieroglyphics of the body, that is, bodily modifications, and in particular tattoos. 
 3  Foolish Bravery 
 Why should the transient hieroglyphics of the body be preferred to permanent 
ones? Beyond the mere xenophobia provoking Bulwer to revolt against exotic 
practices, there is an important lesson to be learned about the project of Baconian 
natural philosophy, and about the preference within nascent empiricism for direct 
observation of nature over the authority of writing. 
 As many historians and sociologists of knowledge have argued, 17 the technology 
of inscription may have been an important weapon in the arsenal of expanding 
Western powers in their encounter with other cultures. This technology enabled 
the transmission of information across far-flung and complex networks. Yet the 
exclusively Western character of writing has been called into question by recent 
scholars. Simon Schaffer, in a compelling article on the encounter between 
British seafarers and Polynesians in the late eighteenth century, 18 has shown 
the various respects in which Polynesian tattooing fulfilled many of the same 
network-sustaining purposes as conventional writing did for the global network 
sustained by the British. 
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 The most widely accepted definition of writing characterizes it as “a system 
which records sequences of words in durable signs.” 19 These sequences of words 
are generally supposed (with the exception of Jacques Derrida’s puzzling tale of the 
‘primacy of writing’) to have their origin and basis in spoken language, and to be 
in turn ‘cashable’ by their readers through vocal pronunciation of them. Writing 
 stricto sensu is thus distinct from semasiography, which records ideas in the form 
of pictograms and ideograms, which in turn could be rendered into speech by 
different linguistic communities in different, mutually incomprehensible ways. 
 There is considerable scholarly debate as to which early civilizations developed 
information-encoding systems worthy of the name ‘writing’, and which in contrast 
remained at the level of semasiography. It is certain that the tattooing practices 
described by Schaffer were at most semasiographic, but as his account of the inter-
action between the British and the Polynesians shows, there was in this instance 
certainly no perception of the superiority of the writing on paper over ‘quasi-writing’ 
on the body. Moreover, if we are correct in characterizing Bulwer’s chirology as part 
of the broader early modern project of developing an ideal universal language, then 
we certainly cannot take alphabetic and phonetic writing as in any respect superior to 
semasiography: from Bulwer’s point of view ideographic and pictographic writing 
are as we have seen preferable to phonetic writing, since only the former could be 
understood by people belonging to separate spoken-language communities. So when 
it comes to the permanent hieroglyphs of the body, it could not be out of any disdain for 
hieroglyphics as merely semasiographic that Bulwer would have denounced them. 
 Curiously, Bulwer himself describes writing, in particular his own writing, as a 
sort of spasm of the body, and thus, one would suppose, as deriving its meaning 
from the state of the body of the writer during a text’s composition. In the preface 
to the  Anthropometamorphosis , dedicated to Thomas Diconson, Bulwer begins:
 The Heroique Disease of Writing hath (as you well know) long since seized on me, this 
being the Fifth Publique Paroxisme I have had thereof. It hath been ever the humour of my 
Genius to put me upon untrodden Pathes, and to make up aggregate Bodies of very scarce 
and wide dispersed Notions. 
 He describes his latest ‘paroxisme’ as
 an Enditement framed against most of the Nations under the Sun; whereby they are arraigned 
at the Tribunall of Nature, as guilty of High-treason, in Abasing, Counterfeiting, Defacing, 
and Clipping her Coine, instampt with her Image and Superscription on the Body of Man. 
 In the breathtaking screed that follows, against all forms of bodily modification, set 
to verse and included as a prefatory poem to the  Anthropometamorphosis , Bulwer 
denounces not just tattooing, but also ear-piercing: “What Gallantry is this, wherein 
th’appears/So Hell-hound like with long out-stretched Eares?/Whose bored Tips 
torn wide with the fond weight/Of glittering Stones, thy shoulders over-fraight”; 
lip-piercing: “The neather Lip’s bor’d through to yield a vent/To them, who are not 
with one mouth content”; the sharpening and cosmetic extraction of teeth: 
“Here thy Teeth are as sharp as Needles fil’d,/There, in a foolish bravery exil’d.” 
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After moving, in a similar vein, through nipple-piercing, genital mutilation, 
foot-binding, and so on, Bulwer finally comes to tattooing:
 Thus we most foolishly our life invade, 
 For to advance the Body-makers trade. 
 Painted with lists, here, naked arms behold, 
 Branded and pounc’d with colours manifold, 
 Rich tinctur’d Red, Blacke, Tawny, Yellow, White, 
 All badges of the gallants gay delight. 20 
 Bulwer’s preferred examples of tattooing come from exotic nations, in particular 
from the ethnographic materials to which he had access concerning the customs and 
appearance of Native Americans. He writes that ‘the Virginian women’
 pounce and rase their Faces and whole Bodies with a sharp iron, which makes a stampe in 
curious knots, and drawes the proportions of Fowles, Fishes, or Beasts; then with painting 
of sundry live colours they rub it into the stamp, which will never be taken away, because 
it is dried into the flesh. 21 
 He returns to this same practice a few pages later, this time openly paraphrasing 
John Smith’s  Generall Historie of Virginia of 1624 (see Fig.  1 ): 
 The Virginian women adorne themselves with paintings; some have their Face, Breasts, 
Hands, and Legs, cunningly embroidered with divers workes, as Beasts, Serpents, artifi-
cially wrought into their flesh with black spots. 22 
 Fig. 1  Bulwer  1653 . 
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 Yet Bulwer certainly does not see this sort of practice as limited to far-away and 
exotic cultures. He adds that
 Our Ladies here have lately entertained a vaine Custome of spotting their Faces, out of an 
affectation of a Mole to set off? their beauty, such as Venus had, and it is well if one black 
patch will serve to make their Faces remarkable; for some fill their Visages full of them, 
varied into all manner of shapes and figures. 23 
 In general, Bulwer does not seem to distinguish between different forms of body 
‘painting’, which include tattooed representations, or simply designs, or even the use 
of cosmetics to change the hue of the skin (see Fig.  2 ). Thus he denounces the 
Virginian women for the same ‘bravery’ he sees in ‘the Ladies of Italy’, who, “to 
seeme fairer than the rest, take a pride to besmeare and paint themselves.” 24 He also 
tends to mention more instances of non-representational tattooing than the rare case 
of the fish or beast, such as the practice of the ‘Egyptian Moores, both men and 
women,” who “for love of each other, distaine their Chins into knots, and flowers of 
blew, made by the pricking of the skin with needles, and rubbing it over with inke and 
the juyce of an herb.” 25 He complains of all of these ‘Nations’, the Virginians, the 
Englishwomen, the Italians, and the Moors alike, “what needlesse paine they put 
themselves unto to maintaine their cruell bravery! Nay, which is yet stranger, they 
 Fig. 2  Bulwer  1653 
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seeme to love this unnaturall and bloudy Gallantry so well, that they hate their own 
flesh and bloud, whereof they freely sacrifice to their fantasticall imaginations.” 26 
 Let us return for a moment to the South Sea encounter described by Schaffer. 
According to him, when the astronomer aboard the  Daedalus , a certain Gooch, 
brought out his pen and ink on deck, one of the islanders lay down in front of him. 
Gooch reports that the man “wished me to tattoo his hip, but I did not understand 
the task… On seeing me write, [he] deem’d it tattooing.” 27 Unlike the astronomer, 
Bulwer sees no symmetry between his writing and the tattooing of the Virginian 
women. He does not, again, take their representation of fish upon their faces as 
significantly different from the simple use of rouge. Yet at the same time, again, he 
takes the body as itself a sort of ‘writing’ in the broad sense of a report upon the 
state of the soul, and he condemns all forms of bodily modification, including 
tattooing, on the grounds that these irreversibly freeze the body in a condition in 
which nature did not intend for it to be. Thus bodily modification is a degradation 
of what is given by nature, and thus a moral degradation of the soul of the person 
whose body has been modified. Writing in the strict sense as well is in the end a 
modification of the body, but one that does not lead to its temporary alteration. 
It is, like gesture, fleeting, but unlike gesture it leaves a permanent record, or a 
permanent hieroglyphic, outside of the body on the written page. Whether 
this permanent record is morally blameworthy or not would, one supposes, be 
determined by the content; yet even in such a case its blameworthiness would be more 
akin to that of an obscene gesture than that of a self-inflicted bodily deformation. 
 Interestingly, Bulwer must concede that not every form of bodily modification 
amounts to an unnatural intervention in the divinely instituted course of nature. 
Some things were set up in nature in order to guide human beings toward the right 
sort of conduct, including those excrescences of the body that require regular 
grooming. While Bulwer believes that for a man to shave his beard would be to 
unnaturally do away with the “naturall ensigne of Manhood, appearing about the 
mouth,” 28 he nonetheless will not go so far as to claim that clipping one’s nails is 
an impermissible derailing of a natural process. Instead, he maintains, in all parts 
“there is an appointed end, a certain commoderation of the quantity of parts to the 
actions of them, according to the faculties using the Organ in the Body.” He maintains 
that the “continuall increase [of the nails] in man is an Argument of a Divine 
Nature, a prerogative in which beasts cannot participate, and teacheth us charity to 
our Bodies.” 29 Bulwer goes on to argue that, before the Fall, in the absence of iron 
tools, Adam must have kept his nails short by biting them. Why should the line be 
drawn between nails and facial hair? Why is it in keeping with God’s appointed 
ends to curtail growth in the one case, but an abortion of the same ends to do the 
same in the other? Clearly, in the end Bulwer’s conception of what is natural comes 
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out looking like a list of his preferred conventions. What is interesting for our 
purposes, however, is Bulwer’s conviction that there is a proper way to maintain the 
body and that this way is dictated by nature. The full elaboration of which modification 
practices are unnatural and which, in contrast, are there in testimony to the divine 
nature, will amount to nothing less than ‘a corporall Philosophy’. 
 How, now, does Bulwer’s gesturology fit into this philosophy? Interestingly, the 
 Anthropometamorphosis is introduced with a commendatory poem by Francis 
Goldsmith, who makes explicit reference to the continuity of the project of the 
 Chirologia with that of the more recent work. He writes of Bulwer:
 He, whose first Lecture was on Natures hand, 
 Now all her Features hath exactly scan’d… 
 Pliny but Natures History us gave; 
 Thou, her Great Champion, dost her honour save. 30 
 The project of the  Chirologia was to give an account of how the body reports upon 
internal states; the  Anthropometamorphosis , in turn, draws out the explicitly moral 
implications of the insight that the body is in the end nothing but a report of this 
sort. The most important implication is that the body must not be made to deviate 
irreversibly from the ends appointed to it by nature. Naturally, a human being may 
on occasion think of fish, but there is nothing so naturally ichthyous about a human 
being that the form of a fish should deserve a place upon the human face. 
 What Bulwer argues is, in effect, that physiognomy philosophically understood 
just is the view that the soul makes the body. For Bulwer, ‘the hand’ is such an 
adequate representative of the states of the soul, because it is in the end nothing 
other than the soul’s outward sign. If the soul is in harmony with nature, which is to 
say for Bulwer in harmony with reason, then the body will only ever grow or move 
naturally and rationally. In traditional physiognomy, the soul makes the body simply 
as an outward reflection of an inward state. This can be either the reflection of an 
individual personality, as in the case of a simpleton with droopy eyes and mouth, or 
of national or ethnic character traits. Bulwer however has the soul shaping the body 
through directly willed intervention in the ordinary development of the body. Again, 
this can be either individual or ‘national’, but what is different about Bulwer’s account 
is that he sees the deformation of the body as an end in itself of morally degenerate 
people, rather than as an unintended consequence or side effect of moral degeneracy. 
In this respect, Bulwer moralizes the artificial like none of his contemporaries. 
 4  Bulwer’s Stoic Anthropopoeia 
 We may now be in a better position to return to the question as to why Bulwer 
should have picked up and continued the Baconian project of developing a universal 
character, while at the same time abandoning that part of this project that sought to 
develop an artificial language for the ideal transmission of meanings between 
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people. It appears that, for Bulwer, the ideal universal character would not be an 
artificial language at all, but the true natural language, that differs from what we would 
call ‘natural languages’ (e.g., English, Latin), to the extent that it is transparently 
meaningful to all human beings, and to the extent that these latter ‘natural’ are in 
fact only ‘native’, and already involve a distancing or disconnection from the 
immediate expression of meaning of which the body is naturally capable. Bulwer’s 
place in the history of early modern thinking about artificial languages, then, is 
marked out by his opposition to artificiality  tout court , and by his conviction that 
we must distinguish between the project of developing artificial languages, on the 
one hand, and that of developing a universal character on the other. Whatever is 
going to be truly universal will be natural, and not artificial. 
 Bulwer does not entirely disdain ‘body-making’: in the  Chirologia , he refers to 
his own project as an ‘anthropopoeia’. 31 Let us recall that the final component of this 
two-part neologism means both ‘making’ (as in ‘chrysopoiesis’ or ‘gold-making’) 
as well as ‘poetry’. We might use this instance – one of many – of linguistic creativity 
in Bulwer to highlight an interesting division in early modern thought about artificial 
languages in particular, and in general about the division between the artificial or 
technological on the one hand, and the natural on the other. For Bulwer, anthro-
popoeia should only be the poetry of the human being, but never the making of such 
a being by way of intervention in the course of nature. The proper human poetry, 
moreover, is the one dictated directly by nature. Indeed, to present any other poetry 
as anthropopoeia is already to cross over into poiesis as technological intervention, 
or, which is the same, as deformation of what is given by nature. 
 The complete pedigree of Bulwer’s strict identification of the natural with the 
rational, and these in turn with the moral, would be difficult to elaborate in full. 
But one undeniable component of it is the Baconian rediscovery of the Stoic 
identification of nature and reason, and the corollary view that the best way to live is 
the way that is most in keeping with nature’s dictates. 32 Part of Bacon’s own version 
of the Stoic philosophy of nature had been the view that, through the new method of 
observation of nature, an ideal language could be reconstituted, for the first time since 
the Fall. What Bulwer’s version of this idea makes clear, however, is that there is a 
division among the early modern advocates of an ideal language, separating those 
who would want to build it up artificially and de novo, from those who believe it is 
dictated directly by nature and that it is in some way primordial, or something to be 
 re discovered. G. W. Leibniz is a prominent representative of the former camp: 
he believes, for example, that Hebrew is just a natural language among others, as 
its corrupted verb forms show, and that in part for this reason the attainment of an 
ideal language will only arrive when we overcome our interest in finding a form of 
communication that is primordial, pure, and coeval with the creation, and instead seek 
to create that language ourselves by means of artifice. In sharp contrast, Bulwer’s 
project gives a whole new meaning to the notion of ‘natural language’, and insists, 
 
31
 Bulwer  1644 , 44. 
 
32
 For a classic exposition of Stoic elements in Bacon’s writing, even if focused principally on 
rhetorical matters, see Croll  1989 . 
181‘A Corporall Philosophy’: Language and ‘Body-Making’ in the Work of John Bulwer
against the advocates of an ideal, artificial language, that it is precisely by leaving all 
artifice behind that one arrives at the truly transparent embodiment of meanings. 
 As this last phrase suggests, and as Bulwer’s  oeuvre vividly shows, meanings 
may be thought of as literally embodied, and there may be an important connection 
between early modern debates about the nature of the ideal language, on the one 
hand, and on the other the contemporary debates as to the role of the soul, if any, 
in the body. Again, for Bulwer the physiognomist, the soul makes the body in the 
most direct way possible: through active, willful intervention, whether of the sort 
practiced at a ‘nationall’ level, or as the result of an? individual caprice. The best 
body is the one had by a moral soul, which is to say the one left to develop as nature 
intends. Failure to respect this intention can lead even to the loss of a properly 
human nature. Thus Bulwer relates in the  Anthropometamophosis that “in discourse 
I have heard to fall, somewhat in earnest, from the mouth of a Philosopher (one in 
points of common beliefe (indeed) too scepticall) That man was a meer Artificial 
creature, and was at first but a kind of Ape or Baboon, who through his industry… 
by degrees in time had improved his Figure & his Reason up to the perfection of 
man.” Bulwer believes that the ‘Philosopher’s’ opinion, in comparison with those 
of Plato and Galen, constitutes a symptom of the moral decline of the modern 
period. For, he thinks, if mutation of humanity over time can occur, it will not, as 
the Philosopher thinks, take the character of an ascent from beast to man, but rather 
the reverse, a descent into ape-likeness:
 But by this new History of abused Nature it will appeare a sad truth, that mans indeavours 
have run so farr from raising himselfe above the pitch of his Originall endowments, that he 
is muchfallen below himselfe; and in many parts of the world is practically degenerated 
into the similitude of a Beast. 33 
 As with the body, so too with language, the best expression of meaning is the one 
that respects a human being’s ‘Originall endowments’ by, so to speak, leaving 
intentionality to nature. This means that speaking – not to mention alphabetic 
writing – is already, for Bulwer, a denaturing artifice. The transient hieroglyphics 
of gesture, in contrast, or at least those of them that are not merely ‘native’, amount 
to a universal  natural character, as opposed to a universal  artificial language, 
insofar as they convey nature’s meanings directly. 
 It is hard to imagine that Bulwer might have thought that any proposition 
whatsoever could be expressed by natural gesture. Did he really think that one 
could debate, say, transubstantiation vs. consubstantiation without resorting to 
conventional signs? Probably not, but he also probably does not think that such 
doctrinal disputes, or adherence to doctrine, is necessary for the possession of 
natural wisdom. In this connection, Bulwer again seems to be in agreement with 
ancient Stoic, and perhaps Cynic, doctrine, according to which animals are the 
supreme embodiment of reason. The language of the hand, which is to say gesture, 
is for Bulwer just the language of animals, which, while lacking hands strictly 
speaking, nonetheless comport themselves in such a way that their internal states 
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can be read directly off of their bodies. He writes of “the common tongue of Beasts, 
who by gestures declare their senses, and dumb affections,” adding:
 [A]s Montaigne (in that elegant Essay of his, where he in imitation of Plutarch, maintaines 
that Beasts participate with us in the rationality of thier discourses) shewes, that even they 
that have no voyce at all, by their reciprocall kindnesse, which we see in them, we easily 
inferre there are some other meanes of entercommunication: their gestures treat, and their 
motions discourse. 34 
 Bodily modifications of any sort, in turn, including the permanent hieroglyphics 
stamped into the body by tattooing, cannot convey nature’s meanings, even if they 
can, perhaps, denote fish or beasts, since nature never meant for the face of a human 
to permanently convey the idea of a fish or a beast. Body modification is for Bulwer 
an unnatural anthropopoeia or body-making, while the anthropopoeia that is in 
agreement with nature is the one that does not interfere with the body’s natural 
form, even as it allows the body to express the passing states of the soul through the 
transitory hieroglyphics of gesture. 
 5  Conclusion 
 This is only the beginning of a sketch showing the intersection of some important 
themes in the work of an obscure and colourful seventeenth-century thinker. In the 
future, it will perhaps be fruitful to further investigate the relationship between, on 
the one hand, the emerging ethnography of the early modern period, with its 
inevitable accounts of the causes and nature of ‘racial’ difference, and on the other 
hand theories of language and meaning, which often sought to move back behind 
‘natural’ languages in order to find features of human existence that served as 
natural vehicles of communication, and which thereby worked in a complementary 
fashion to the protoethnography of the period, to the extent that both were preoc-
cupied with determining the limits of universalist thinking about the human race. 
Finally, it will be useful to think about both of these issues in relation to the perhaps 
more familiar metaphysical questions in the early modern period about the nature 
and ontology of the body, and about the causal influence of the soul upon the body. 
As is familiar to historians of early modern philosophy, the idea that the soul 
somehow makes the body was one widely available option (alongside preestablished 
harmony, occasionalism, and many other theories), often associated with, but 
certainly not limited to, Platonist schools of thought, in accounting for the way in 
which a particular soul has this particular body, with its unique conformation and 
capacities. As Bulwer’s work shows, ‘body-making’ was not necessarily just an 
abstract metaphysical process, but could also be carried out through technological 
intervention in the course of nature: a power enjoyed by human beings but not 
animals, and one that was and is accompanied by moral concerns as to its proper use. 
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 Much memory, or memory of many things, is called  Experience . 
 Thomas Hobbes,  Leviathan 1 
 Abstract  Robert Boyle and John Beale had connections with Samuel Hartlib and 
his correspondence circle. The position of these three figures can be taken as an 
‘empirical’ one in the sense that they favoured ‘particulars’ over ‘systems’. But 
differences emerge if we consider their attitudes towards the role of memory in 
Baconian natural histories. Hartlib’s call for empirical particulars coexisted with 
an expectation that information could be reduced and arranged to aid both memory 
and thinking. As one model, William Petty promoted John Pell’s reductions of 
mathematical knowledge. Beale’s letters to Boyle (in the 1660s) urged systematic 
ordering of empirical data in the service of memory and hypotheses. Although 
Boyle did believe that a disciplined individual memory could embody multifari-
ous experiences, he resisted Beale’s advice. What we accept as Boyle’s ‘empiri-
cal’ attitude was not so much a distinctive commitment to gathering matters of 
fact – something also professed by Hartlib and Beale – but a refusal to condense 
and arrange material in the way they demanded. Beale’s promotion of memory 
 techniques that relied on highly structured arrangements of units seems to have 
aggravated Boyle’s existing suspicion of premature systems. 
 Memory and Empirical Information: Samuel 
Hartlib, John Beale and Robert Boyle 
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 1  Introduction 
 John Passmore once remarked that if William Whewell, the nineteenth-century 
historian and philosopher of science, had not lived, J. S. Mill would have had to 
invent him. Mill himself admitted that he needed Whewell’s strong statement of an 
idealist philosophy of science before he was able to express his own empiricist 
account. 2 Their debate made epistemology the basis of an argument between rival 
twins – empiricism and idealism – that spread across domains from science to 
morality, from aesthetics to politics. In early modern England, the term empiricism 
(or, more usually, variants such as ‘empirick’ or ‘empirical’) did not stand for a 
well-defined epistemological position delineated against a clear alternative. For the 
purposes of this paper, I want to consider the ways in which it is helpful to speak 
of an ‘empirical stance’ (rather than a doctrine of ‘empiricism’) as characterising 
those who favoured ‘particulars’ over ‘systems’. 3 In his  Experimental Philosophy 
 (1663 –1664), Henry Power ridiculed excessive attachment to systems as entirely at 
odds with the spirit of the new science:
 Me-thinks, I see how all the old Rubbish must be thrown away, and the rotten Buildings be 
overthrown, and carried away with so powerful an Inundation. These are the days that must 
lay a new Foundation of a more magnificent Philosophy, never to be overthrown: that will 
Empirically and Sensibly canvas the  Phaenomena of Nature. 4 
 Of course, as Power’s title indicated, experimental inquiry was crucial to his posi-
tion; but I think it is instructive to consider the word ‘empirical’ as describing the 
quest for information derived from books, testimony, and observations as 
well as experiments. 5 This broader set of referents captures the sense in which 
Robert Boyle defined “Experience” to include “all those ways of Information, 
whereby we attain any Knowledge that we do not owe to abstracted  Reason .” 6 As he 
elaborated, this “ Experience ” was wider than “ Personal Experience ”; it encom-
passed “the knowledge we have of any matter of Fact, which, without owing to 
Ratiocination, either we acquire by the Immediate Testimony of our Own Senses and 
other Faculties, or accrews to us by the Communicated Testimony of Others.” 7 He 
championed “the modern Virtuosi” over members of other philosophical sects, 
 arguing that it was the builders of Systems who “make little use of Experience; 
contenting themselves for the most part to employ but few and obvious Experiments, 
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and vulgar Traditions, usually Uncertain, and oftentimes False.” 8 Boyle portrayed 
the Christian  virtuoso as one who carefully collected and examined empirical infor-
mation from diverse sources:
 That, when, in this Discourse, I speak of an Experimental Philosopher, or Virtuoso; I do 
not mean, either, on this hand, a Libertine, tho’ Ingenious; or a Sensualist, though Curious; 
or, on that hand, a mere Empirick, or some vulgar Chymist, that looks upon nothing as 
Experimental, wherein Chymistry, Mechanicks, &c are not employ’d; and who too often 
makes Experiments, without making Reflection on them, as having it more in his aim to 
Produce Effects, than to Discover Truths. But the Person I here mean, is such a one, as by 
attentively looking about him, gathers Experience, not from his own Tryals alone, but from 
divers other  matters of fact , which he heedfully observes, though he had no share in the 
effecting them. 9 
 What is the link – implied in the title of my chapter – between this ‘empirical’ 
stance and the role of memory? In promoting sensory evidence of particulars 
against false universals or premature theoretical systems, Boyle confronted the 
problem Francis Bacon had diagnosed: how to manage the plethora of empirical 
particulars demanded by the new philosophy? 10 As early as 1657, in “A Proemial 
Essay,” Boyle expressed suspicion of ‘systems’ and ‘superstructures’ not founded 
on observation or experiment. 11 But one virtue of systems was their ability to 
order and condense material. This is the admission in a suggestive passage from 
 The General History of the Air  (1692) . When canvassing the “Peripatetic Doctrine 
about the Limits and Temperaments of the three Regions, into which they divide 
the Air.” Boyle cautioned that “it becomes a  Naturalist to consider, not so much 
how easy a Doctrine is, by reason of its Concinity [internal harmony], to be  remembred 
or s upposed , as how strongly “tis to be  proved .” 12 He thus conceded that certain 
features of leading doctrines might make them easy to remember, but insisted that 
this was not a voucher for their truth. Although harmony and order might be 
 seductive  aide-mémoires , he preferred an honest mass of empirical particulars, even 
if not yet methodized and unable to be remembered. Why did he need to issue such 
a warning? 13 
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 I think that one answer lies in Boyle’s lifelong preoccupation with the proper 
role of memory in the custody and organization of empirical information and ideas. 
Some sensibilities about memory are highlighted in the letters Boyle received from 
John Beale between 1663 and 1666. 14 These reveal interestingly  different approaches 
to the question of how far collaborative Baconian natural histories (collections of 
medical, chemical and other data) should rely on individual memory, either natural 
or trained. Beale was an avid contributor of empirical information (especially, but 
not only, about fruit trees) to the Royal Society; but he claimed that such informa-
tion must be arranged to assist memory and thinking. Boyle tried to extend his own 
empirical collections by pooling data gathered by others, and thus confronted the 
sheer mass of information potentially entailed by Baconian natural histories. He 
also developed his own memory discipline, but cautioned against the artificial clas-
sification that mnemonic arts usually relied upon. 
 2  Samuel Hartlib and His Circle 
 Before coming to Boyle’s own approach and his exchange with Beale, we need to 
consider the Prussian émigré, Samuel Hartlib, the ‘great intelligencer’ with whom 
they were both linked. Beale had corresponded with Hartlib from the spring of 
1656; he continued to write to him, almost on a weekly basis, until Hartlib’s death 
in 1662. 15 Members of Hartlib’s correspondence network were among the young 
Boyle’s earliest intellectual contacts. 16 His first letter to Hartlib dates from early 
1647, and from early 1648 there are frequent references to him in Hartlib’s diary (his 
Ephemerides) as the source of reports, recipes (or ‘receipts’) and observations. 17 
Boyle’s first publication, “An Invitation to Free and Generous Communication”  (1655) , 
appeared in a volume orchestrated by Hartlib; its message was that ‘empiricks’ should 
share their secret knowledge, such as cures for the stone. 18 Boyle was sympathetic 
to the general tenor of Hartlib’s approach: in a letter to John Mallett, he punned on 
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“The Legacy of Husbandry” (a Hartlib publication), affirming that “for my part I 
make no doubt that the Husbandry of Knowledge will be dayly improv’d too: 
(though by throwing downe of Enclosures) & all Parts of Philosophy, be both better 
cultivated & more fruitfull.” 19 
 Hartlib pressed the need for what we might call empirical information, or what 
he and his correspondents referred to as ‘particulars’ gained from observations 
and experiments. It is difficult to find a precise definition of this notion, and I 
leave aside the question of how such ‘particulars’ relate to Boyle’s notion of 
‘matters of fact’; but Hartlib invariably used this term in the context of rejecting 
excessive deductive methods. For example, in 1640 he noted in his diary that 
“Those abstract Axioms which are made in Philosophy breed but a slavish assent 
in men. For they must beleeve only that they are true not knowing out of what 
particulars they come to bee so … It is a very hard matter to come once to know 
throughly that a thing is certain and true. Therfore wee must labour principally in 
the Historical part of all things.” 20 Hartlib professed that “The more new particu-
lars wee meet withal the more knowledge will bee enlarged.” 21 This assertion was 
pitched against both the scholastic pedagogy of the ‘schools’ or universities and, 
less aggressively, against modern philosophical systems, including that of René 
Descartes. 22 
 In a letter of 13 September 1630, Hartlib told John Dury [or Durie] that he was 
sending something from “my by-collections,” so named because he happily rejected 
“ordered Systemes.” 23 Hartlib favoured Bacon’s “Aphorismes as the onliest way for 
deliverie of Knowledge … For discourse of Illustration must bee cut of.” He sus-
pected “the shew of a Totall … Whereas the Aphorismes representing a knowledge 
broken doe invite men to inquire further.” 24 Writing five years later he declared that: 
“the only way to write for the encreasing of Learning is to write Truths by way of 
Aphorismes. Systematical Method is like a bag or sack which come bound up.” 25 
Like Bacon, Hartlib viewed aphorisms not as pithy compressions of authoritative 
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notions, but as spurs to further investigation and collection of particulars. 26 But his 
support of Bacon was not unreserved. As Stephen Clucas has indicated, Hartlib was 
consciously eclectic, aiming to combine the best of insights from a range of 
authors; he sometimes expressed preference for Giacomo Aconzio (or Acontius), 
Joachim Jungius or Joachim Hüber over Bacon. 27 
 In Hartlib’s estimate, even Bacon had underestimated the scale of effort and time 
dictated by his programme. The question was how to gather, order and store infor-
mation, especially when much of it was at first necessarily disconnected. Although 
Hartlib sponsored Jan Comenius’ visit to England in 1641, he complained that 
the Czech reformer “play[ed] so much upon … [the point that] all things are reduc-
ible to certaine maine heades and principles from whence all other particulars can 
bee deduced.” Hartlib responded that the collection of “a great Copia Rerum” must 
take precedence over the quest for an “Ars Universalis.” 28 Referring to the ideal of 
a “Pansophia,” he cautioned that first “wee must labor to get more particularia. Else 
wee shall repeate the selfe-same Notions by several expressions and advance not a 
whit further. Wheras when wee must write of particulars wee must always bring 
some new matter or other … wee can not say the same things of a dog and a pea-
cock, but must needs bring new notions of them.” 29 The endemic problem here was 
that “Every body will flie presently to abstractions and generals but they are loath 
to meddle with the gathering of the Experimental History because it is more trou-
blesome then the other, 2. because a man cannot here compendiat as in the other 
but must bee as large as the things require themselves.” 30 
 How did Hartlib propose to manage and process this information? Two features 
of his thinking (and that of some close associates such as the physician, William 
Petty and the mathematician, John Pell) are relevant here: first, the emphasis on the 
role of memory in storing experience of empirical particulars, such as observations 
and experiments; second, the importance given to selecting and commonplacing 
material found in books. 
 Hartlib maintained that the proper collection of ‘particulars’ required the cultiva-
tion of both observation and memory. He believed that individuals should build up 
their experiences of particulars in memory, beginning in childhood and continuing 
until at least the age of twenty-five. Writing in his Ephemerides for 1639, he 
asserted that “wisdome of Arts, Sciences and Inventions will never bee enlarged till 
Men furnish themselves in their yonger yeares with a World of all manner of 
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 particulars til 16–25, or 30, or more. Afterwards when they are come to maturity of 
judgment, they will bee able to some purpose to exercise their reason and philos-
ophat upon them.” 31  Castigating traditional pedagogy, he alleged that children were 
taught “the most abstractive things and that in a most verbal way.” Instead, there 
was no reason “why Children should very soone learne to write, … that from their 
very infancy they may bee taught how to make observations and how to write into 
their Ephemerides of whatever they shall see and heare which afterwards being 
reduced into Loci Communes when they are of judgment, would make them 
learned in the whole Encyclopaedia or Pansophia before they are aware of.” 32 This 
preoccupation appeared in his correspondence with Beale, who agreed that from an 
early age each individual should build up a cognitive structure into which later, and 
novel, material can be embedded. He told Hartlib that the categories and themes 
internalised from “your Child-hoode” will be the “best & truest Topiques for our 
future improvement of Memory during life.” 33 Two years later, Beale repeated this 
advice to Boyle, asserting that the strength of memory could be prolonged if an 
early mental structure has been established, if “the studdes or Nayles were engrafted 
in our childehood.” 34 I return to the significance of this below. 
 The second of these commitments – reading and summarizing books – appears 
to clash with Bacon’s rhetorical contrast of books with nature. However, it was 
mainly Thomas Sprat and other polemicists who exaggerated this; Bacon himself 
said that the best books needed to be examined and new ones written. 35 Hartlib 
contended that the classical texts could still be read with profit: 
 Now these particulars are to bee learned by Sensual observation in conversation as likewise 
by reading of Histories where there is nothing required then Memory and faith to beleeve 
it. Those wee see that from their yonger years have read all manner of Classick Authors 
exceed all your pedantick Systematik’s in true knowledge, because those Authors containe 
a World of realitys in them which their other bookes doe not. 36 
 The aim was to extract useful knowledge from all extant books, both ancient and 
modern, by commonplacing material under identifiable Heads. This method was 
constantly recommended. Hartlib and his colleagues believed that orderly reduction 
and summary of knowledge would show up duplication and repetition, thus allow-
ing an economical compression. Then the collection of new material could proceed, 
following up gaps revealed by this accounting process. 37 
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 In this thinking there was a juxtaposition of two seemingly incompatible 
assumptions: a call for collections of copious information  and the conviction that 
memory could master its essential elements. In one sense, this combination was 
not unusual, since it underpinned standard Renaissance rhetorical techniques. 
The  copia of tropes and quotations had to be counterbalanced by  brevitas – hence 
the use of pithy aphorisms and parables that put an idea in a nutshell. However, the 
Baconian imperative to collect ‘particulars’ could result in  copia of data without 
the advantages of  brevitas . Nevertheless, Hartlib did not despair that such a mass 
of particulars would overwhelm memory. The benefit of ordered information 
was that it functioned as a prompt for the recollection of related material; it light-
ened the load on memory by offering external support. Hartlib decided as early 
as 1639 that the putative merit of artificial memory as a technique for recalling 
and juggling long lists of names or textual passages ( copia verborum ) was point-
less. Instead, he averred that:  “ A Rational Reminiscentia to remember things 
apposite when wee would have them is far better than a bare Memoria of con-
fused things at random which the Localists are able to doe. But that is the best 
Memory that helpes most the judgement.” 38 The contrast here signals Aristotle’s 
distinction between  memoria (memory) and  reminiscentia (recollection), the latter 
being a deliberate search for something stored in memory. 39 Hartlib recognized 
that the ‘judgement’ (or understanding) was best served if recollection delivered 
salient material quickly from memory; in turn, attention, judgement and choice 
exercised while material was being committed to memory enhanced efficient 
recollection. As he put it: “that which is to be learned may be comprehended by 
the least labor et in the shortest time, et may be easiest kept in memorie.” 40 In his 
 True & Readie Way to learne the Latine  (1654) , Hartlib recommended this coop-
eration of mental faculties: “For man’s memory, imagination, and reason hath this 
peculiar, that the more Things it knowes, the more it can still further receive.” 41 
On this basis, we can appreciate the faith in careful commonplacing of informa-
tion under Heads: by forcing selection of material and allocation to categories, 
this method created a set of prompts for recollection. 
 In William Petty’s  Advice … to Hartlib  (1647) we find a programme deriving 
from these assumptions. Petty suggested a set of eight desiderata, including the 
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following: that “all the Real and Experimental Learning” should be “sifted and 
collected”; the “appointment of able Readers” suitably instructed “with certain and 
well-limited Directions”; and finally, “Out of all these Books one Book, or great 
Work, may be made, though consisting of many Volumes.” In show-casing a model 
for this approach, Petty cited John Pell’s  An idea of mathematicks (1638). 42 As he 
explained, “for the more explicit understanding of our Meaning herein, we refer to 
Mr.  Pell’s most excellent Idea [of mathematics] thereof written to Master  Hartlib .” 43 
Pell sought to epitomise mathematical knowledge in a form that would allow the 
user to “lay them [all necessary axioms and principles] up in their heads, so as to 
need no booke at all.” 44 Significantly, the abstract level of the subject matter did not 
deter Petty from affirming that it contained lessons for  other forms of inquiry. This 
assumption requires notice because there is a substantive difference between reduc-
ing already established knowledge into its key elements and gradually developing 
propositions, themes and concepts from disaggregated ‘particulars’. 45 Indeed, 
Hartlib championed the latter task and underscored the different levels of knowl-
edge. In 1639 he made this entry in his diary: “Two great Faults have beene com-
mitted in our philosophy the one is that it hase not beene made truly universal. 2. 
that it hase not begun a particularibus.” 46 In the following year he noted, as the view 
of Joachim Hubner, that both Descartes and Jungius “make always in knowledge 
an 1. Historical and 2. scientifical Part and to distinguish betweene those two accu-
rately… If wee know how to universalize every particular truth wee shall store 
ourselves with a world of new notions continually.” But this would only happen if 
the proper sequence were followed: empirical (including experimental) data gath-
ered under ‘Historia’ should be arranged in ways that helped reason to perceive 
patterns and relationships. This method would facilitate the progress from  historia 
to  scientia . 47 
 On this basis, it is possible to appreciate that Pell’s  Idea was an aspirational 
document; it was more ambitious than a preliminary commonplacing of material 
under Heads. For Pell, once various domains of knowledge had been systematized 
it would be possible to crystallize the essentials, shedding all unnecessary informa-
tion. Then, as he said, an individual might carry these fundamental propositions, 
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concepts, and axioms in a pandect or pocket booke, or even “laie them up in their 
heads, as to need  no Book at all ”; a mathematician “utterly destitute of bookes and 
instruments” might solve any problem “exactly as if he had a complete  Library by 
him.” 48 Pell admitted that such a goal “will perhaps seem utterly impossible to 
most,” but indicated that it all rested on the appropriate use of external aids, such 
as his pandects and summaries, acting in consort to “fortifie the imagination, to 
prompt the memory, to regulate our reason.” 49 
 3  Improving Memory, Enlarging Experience: 
Boyle’s Early Writings 
 What was Boyle doing at this time, that is, during the 1640s and 1650s? In short, 
he was preoccupied with memory in a way that seemed to follow Hartlib’s recom-
mendation about the individual building up experiences in youth. As several schol-
ars (for example, Hunter, Harwood and Principe) have indicated, Boyle began as an 
author of works on moral edification, such as  Seraphic Love (1659) and  Occasional 
Reflections  (1665) . 50 These were composed in the late 1640s, together with unpub-
lished manuscripts such as “The Aretology” (1645–1647), “The Dayly Reflection” 
(1646), and “The Doctrine of Thinking” (late 1640s). 51 Parts of the last two sur-
faced in  Occasional Reflections . As Michael Hunter has put it, these writings dealt 
with the “pursuit of moral balance, self control and piety.” 52 They did so via a con-
sideration of the reading of romances for moral lessons and the proper direction 
of thoughts in meditation. 53 Since Boyle was only about eighteen when the earliest 
of these was written, it might be objected that we are dealing with juvenilia; but the 
themes treated appeared in the later published works. 54 In fact, there is a chronological 
overlap between these moral writings and his earliest ‘scientific’ publications: 
 New Experiments Physico-Mechanicall (1660),  The Sceptical Chemist (1661), and 
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 Some considerations touching the Usefulness of Natural Philosophy (1663; com-
posed from late 1650s) appeared before  Occasional Reflections (1665). 55 
 I am interested in the strong role that Boyle assigned to memory in the cultiva-
tion of a virtuous self, and how this relates to his concern with enlarging individual 
experience, both moral and empirical. What kind of ‘experience’ did Boyle recom-
mend and seek? In these early writings he meant the incidents, behaviour and 
thoughts that touched upon his moral self. Thus the purpose of  Occasional 
Reflections was to “make the little Accidents of his Life, and the very flowers of his 
Garden, read him Lectures of Ethicks or Divinity.” 56 In his autobiography, “An 
account of Philaretus” (written during 1648 and 1649), Boyle said that as a young 
student he was “a passionate Friend to Reading” and confident in his own memory: 
“what time he [Boyle] could spare from a Schollar’s taskes (which his retentive 
Memory made him not find uneasy) he would usually employ so greedily in 
Reading.” 57 This assessment was backed by those who knew him at Eton: Robert 
Carew (a member of the staff reporting to Boyle’s father) said that he possessed 
“the rarest memory that I ever knew.” 58 In writings from the late 1640s, Boyle 
assumed that memory could be trained via practice, not necessarily by classical 
memory techniques (mainly using sequences of places, or  loci , combined with 
vivid images), but rather by drawing out the circumstances and consequences of 
observations and ideas, through careful attention, repetition, and recollection. His 
emphasis was on choosing and selecting what to commit to memory. This was one 
basis for his attack on “those memorys now so much in Fashion, which are stuff’t 
with almost nothing else then what deserves to be excluded.” His target here was 
the exercise of mnemonic techniques without proper regard to the content of what 
was stored. Thus Boyle derided those memories that keep “nought but Strawes, 
Dust, Feather, and such lighter Trash.” 59 
 Boyle discussed memory in relation to the practices of reading and thinking, or 
meditation, by which he meant a carefully directed train of thoughts. In “The 
Doctrine of Thinking” he explained how he “set my Thoughts awork upon in those 
shreds of Time … to recall to mind any thing I have almost forgotten, or repeate 
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any thing I desire to retaine more firmly in my Memory.” 60 He gave a list of six 
exhortations to himself about how best to exercise his mind. The pervading theme 
was that active reflection was necessary to guard against “Intervening Fancys” and 
the proclivity of the mind to wander. 61 This watchfulness is also apparent in the 
“Dayly Reflection” in which he advised that we should “recall orderly to mind” 
whatever we have read or observed or thought “the foregoing Day. The memory 
may be commanded to make this Restitution either in the order their Seniority/
Priority … gives them, or that which their Considerablenesse assignes them in your 
Esteem.” 62 
 Boyle affirmed that experience could be magnified and extended by intensifying 
observation. The central purpose of his “Dayly Reflection” was to dispense experi-
ence from “the Lawes of Time” and to improve the “Judgment.” He contended that 
“what men Commonly stile Experience is nothing else but a certin Dexterity of 
conduct, resulting from the Remembrance and Consideration of [the] Occasions 
suitably circumstanced.” 63 But the retention of experiences in memory depended on 
active engagement with the world. Experiences must be examined and analysed so 
that “our Reflections on what we have observ’d, improves it into consequences new 
Axioms and Uses.” Such a practice helped memorization because “the Repetition 
of what we learn greatly contributes to secure our Acquists from (the Danger of 
Oblivion).” 64 In this way, Boyle promised, an individual can gather more experience 
than his age might seem to allow, because “Experience Consists, not in the multi-
tude of yeares, but in that of Observations, Experience is the result, not of yeares 
but of Observations.” 65 He elaborated on this theme in  Occasional Reflections , 
claiming that by such meditations “a man comes to discover a multitude of particu-
lars even in obvious things.” He added that “this exercise of the mind must prove a 
compendious way to Experience, and make it attainable without grey-hairs; for 
that, we know, consists not in the multitude of years, but of observations, from 
Numbers and variety of which it results.” 66 Boyle applied this conceit in a letter to 
Hartlib when describing John Hall, the poet and pamphleteer, as having “September 
in his judgment, whilst we can scarce find April upon his chin.” 67 
 Cultivated in this fashion, memory supported thinking by providing a stock of 
experiences and by retaining previously forged links between them. The discipline 
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Boyle prescribed – careful selection of materials, repeated reflection on key themes, 
and rehearsal of a skeletal direction of meditation etc – promised to expand the 
experience stored in memory and facilitate its retrieval. Boyle aimed to enrich his 
experiences by building up associations to the places, times and circumstances in 
which these occurred. He argued that by taking “notice of the properties and circum-
stances of most things that Occur to him,” and by relating them by “Resemblance 
or Dissimilitude” 68 to each other, a person can not only “Revive the Memory” of 
good thoughts, but make “almost the whole World a great  Conclave Mnemonicum , 
and a well furnished  Promptuary , for the service of Piety and Vertue.” 69 In this way, 
the individual is made self-sufficient, a walking library: 
 Besides, whereas Men are wont, for the most part, when they would Study hard, to repair 
to their Libraries, or to Stationers Shops; the Occasional Reflector [i.e. a person following 
Boyle’s method] has his Library always with him, and his Books lying always open before 
him, and the World it self, and the Actions of the Men that live in it, and an almost infinite 
Variety of other Occurrences being capable of proving Objects of his Contemplation; he 
can turn his eyes no whither, where he may not perceive somewhat or other to suggest him 
a Reflection. 70 
 When Boyle developed his interest in natural philosophy, he continued to find 
moral lessons in the study of nature and regarded the ‘experimental life’ as a mor-
ally worthy one. Indeed, he forecast that the habits acquired in daily meditations 
might be applied not only to moral topics, but to “Oeconomical, Political, or 
Physical matters.” 71 In the manuscript “Of the Study of the Book of Nature,” Boyle 
extrapolated what he said about the effects of gathering moral and devotional 
thoughts: “the Study of Nature is the Noblest Memoria Localis of a Christian, & 
that he may turne the whole world into a  Conclave Mnemonicum .” 72 
 Does this notion of a self-sufficient memory equate with John Pell’s plans for 
mathematics? There is some resemblance, but in these early writings Boyle was not 
concerned with the organization of specific bodies of knowledge. Explaining the term 
‘Mnemonicum’ in a marginal note, he wrote: “So they call a certain Room, Artificially 
furnish’d with Pictures or other Images of things, whereby to help the Memory.” 73 
Yet he said nothing about the crucial complementary device in the classical 
technique – the ordered sequence or chain ( catena ) of places ( loci ) that allowed the 
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recollection of one thing after another. Although he did refer to having a “Modell” 
or plan for the direction of his meditations, there is nothing indicating the use of a 
mnemonic structure in the early accounts of his memory practice. 74 Boyle’s reports 
of his memory of ideas and experiences were often instances of  remembering the 
experience of learning something, of seeing, doing, or touching certain things. 75 In 
the terms suggested by Julia Annas, this can usefully be classed as “personal 
memory,” as opposed to “non-personal memory” of a fact, a date, or a theorem – 
one that “lacks those features of [personal] memory which make the past acquiring 
of knowledge part of what is remembered.” 76 In any case, Boyle showed little inter-
est in putting his knowledge into the kind of condensed and codified form that Pell 
imagined. Boyle’s “Library” and “Mnemonicum” were personal, deriving from 
intense practices of observation and meditation that seem closer to the tradition of 
Protestant poetics than to the Baconian legacy. 77 
 4  Advice to Boyle 
 Boyle’s position can be set in sharper relief by examining two pieces of advice from 
Petty and Beale, both members of Hartlib’s circle. Writing in April 1653 in the role 
of a physician, Petty counselled Boyle about the dangers of “your continual read-
ing.” He joked that 
 like a Quacksalver [an ‘empirick’] I might tell you how it weakens the brain, how that 
weakness causeth defluxions, and how those defluxions hurt the lungs and the like. But I 
had rather tell you that although you read 12 hours  per diem or more, that you shall really 
profit by no more of what you read, then by what you remember, nor by what you remem-
ber, but by so much as you understand & digest, nor by that, but by so much as is new unto 
you, and pertinently set down. 78 
 Petty was asking Boyle to give more weight to reason than to memory. This is 
the point of his rhetorical questions: “what a stock of experience have you already 
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in most things? What a faculty have you of making every thing you see an argument 
of some usefull conclusion or other? How much are you practiced in the method of 
cleere and scientifical reasoning?” 79 John Harwood cites these remarks as praise of 
what he calls Boyle’s ‘ method ’ of thinking; but I suggest that Petty was chiding 
Boyle for trying to remember without appropriate abbreviation and rational order-
ing of ideas. 80 Petty believed that Boyle was overloading his memory with  copia 
that he had not thus reduced. This message was put more insistently by Beale. 
 By 1663, when Beale began advising Boyle about various ways of improving his 
memory, he was addressing someone who might listen. What transpired, I think, is 
that Beale urged Boyle to provide, in effect, a version of Pell’s  Idea for natural his-
tory, including experimental work. This required a systematic arrangement of 
Boyle’s ideas and results which would, in turn, serve as a mnemonic framework. 
Even though both men espoused the collection of empirical information, their 
exchange reveals a clash about the way natural history and natural philosophy 
should be done. Beale stressed early systematic ordering of empirical information 
because this aided memory; Boyle accepted the value of Heads for the collection 
and storage of particulars, but his existing antipathy towards hasty systems seems 
to have been inflamed by Beale’s focus on memory training. 81 It may be that this 
was a delicate point for Boyle, since his references to a personal mnemonicum 
(published in 1665, during his exchange with Beale) suggest that he had confronted 
the problem of how memory could be improved without acceding to premature 
systems, more generally. 
 In 1658 Hartlib told Boyle about the Somerset virtuoso, John Beale, saying that 
there was no one in the world to match his universal knowledge and Baconian enthu-
siasm. 82 When introducing himself to Hartlib, Beale had declared himself “very 
willing to bee an incendiary to inflame with the Love of profitable knowledge ... You 
will finde mee a diligent collector, and fayre interpreter of other mens notions, but 
noe greater plagiary.” 83 Beale first wrote to Boyle on 23 February 1663, prefacing 
his letter with a long Latin ode to Boyle’s accomplishments. Beale revealed that he 
had acquired “the Nic Name of Erasmus Junior,” and he threatened weekly letters. 84 
The next day he sent a long letter titled ‘The Mnemonicalls’ (or mnemonics), and 
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confided that before going to Eton he had “in secrete corners, conceald from other 
eyes” read and memorized key texts. Then “afterwards in Cambridge proceeding 
in the same order, & diligence with their Logicians, philosophers, & Schoolmen, 
I could at last learne them by hearte faster than I could read them.” 85 They continued 
to exchange letters until Beale’s death in 1682 but, frustratingly, we no longer have 
Boyle’s side of the correspondence. 86 
 There were two main preoccupations in Beale’s letters to Boyle from February 
1663 to August 1666: the art of memory, and the best arrangement of Boyle’s pub-
lications. 87 These were linked since, as all adepts of memory training agreed, 
orderly arrangement was a reliable aid. Beale announced his own scheme for an art 
of memory in the next extant letter of 29 September 1663 (it is hard to believe that 
he waited seven months without writing again). In what is actually an essay of 
about 8000 words, Beale outlined a series of lessons about memory drawn from a 
wide range of sources: classical mnemonic techniques, implications of the Cartesian 
theory of brain processes, and his own observations about the habits of individuals 
endowed with both naturally powerful, and expertly trained, memories. 88 He offered 
Boyle a range of hints on memory improvement, some drawn from anecdotes about 
his mother’s astonishing memory, others from his own experience. Some of these 
were proverbial, as seen in these extracts: “whatever is not offered to the Memory 
upon very easy Termes, is not duely tendred”; “The more we acquire, & the more 
often wee visite & imploy Memory, the firmer & stronger wee find it.” 89 
 Beale’s own memory art was a development of the classical technique. Instead 
of visual images, usually contrived and chosen by each individual, he proposed a 
grid of symbolic characters that had universal pretensions. 90 He announced to 
Hartlib that he set out “To devise Millions of Millions of Characters, each one soe 
apparently differing from each other throughout the whole immense variety, That 
the eye at first glance shall discerne, & distinguish the difference.” 91 Beale was 
confident that these characters would be “retained in the minde, & in a moment 
producible in fit order for any kind of occasion.” Moreover, he promised: “All this, 
the reading, writing, use & practise, soe y e Learner bee willing, & of ordinary capacity 
& skill in Clerkship, I undertake to teach with ease, due vacancyes & refreshmen ts 
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in one weeke.” 92 This optimism was apparent in his assurance that the characters 
could be taken in “as by one glance or blink of the eyes.” 93 
 Beale acknowledged that the classical art of memory had fallen out of favour, 
mentioning the “prejudice most learned men have against all discourses of 
Artificiall Memory.” For this reason, he was not seeking, via Boyle, “to engage the 
Royal Society in it” – although he had suggested precisely this about his  own 
scheme in what he sent to Hartlib. 94 His main message was that natural memory was 
not harmed by mnemonic techniques, and that a constitutionally weak memory 
could be enhanced by various methods. 95 Indeed, he added a warning for Boyle: 
“And I know I could once boaste of a naturall memory beyond beliefe, but I found 
it true, that … The first grey hayre would signify the decay of it.” 96 Without the 
appropriate habits, Beale predicted, each of us would live the fate of the “Merchant 
Whose wares are not placed in order, Or He seldome in his owne shoppe or 
Warehouses. His store confounds him, When the Fayre comes.” 97 The insinuation 
was that for someone trying to manage a large array of material, such habits were 
crucial. Beale added an incentive that must have resonated with Boyle: namely, that 
his method was one “which heapes up, digests, & firmly retaines whole 
Libraryes.” 98 
 From 18 April 1666, Beale turned his attention to the best publishing format and 
sequence for Boyle’s works. Much of what he suggested was influenced by his 
preoccupation with memory. For example, printed material could benefit from spe-
cial typography, coloured ink and visual symbols, like those in medieval manu-
scripts. In his second letter of 25 February 1663, he referred to “the beautifying 
letters” which marked “the fronts of Chapters, & Sections” in old manuscripts, and 
stressed what a “vaste ayde might be to the Memory in the very printing of bookes 
that are worthy to be learned in the reading.” 99 In terms of the physical format 
of Boyle’s works, Beale advised that it was best that they “were abroad in Quarto, 
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& rather in thinner Tomes, than in thicker.” Thin volumes were desirable because 
“every man may sorte them in a Methode more agreeable to his owne humour & 
concernments.” 100 He reinforced this strategy in a subsequent letter, reminding 
Boyle that the Jesuits had already pioneered it with success. These zealots had real-
ized the power of short pamphlets, or even single pages, which could win hearts and 
minds more quickly than larger tomes. In this way, he observed, the “Jesuits, doe 
infatuate the world, as well by their shorte manualls, as by their endlesse volumnes 
… [for] by their single sheetes they catch him that runneth by.” These brief pieces, 
like “shorte daggers” used against an enemy, did the job quickly, allowing one to 
move on to the next task. Beale urged that all proponents of the new philosophy, 
especially Boyle, should do likewise. 101 
 Apart from having Boyle’s readers in mind, Beale wanted to make it easier for 
him to manage his own unpublished manuscripts. He may have known about 
Boyle’s workdiaries, containing entries of “Promiscuous Experiments,” for he sug-
gested that once these reached 100 experiments they should be published: “That 
assoone as they amounted to a Century, they deserv[d] to be abroad. For thus you 
may empty your deskes often; & be lesse overwhelmed with your owne abun-
dance.” 102 Nevertheless, in Beale’s view, the density of empirical information did 
not entail a diminished role for memory. Having acknowledged the particularity 
and scale of empirical data, he reiterated the point about not publishing “your 
Pandects, or promiscuous Experiments … more than a Century at a Time,” now 
adding that “they may easily overwhelme an ordinary Industry, & confound 
Memory.” 103 In the same letter it is clear that this stress on brevity was meant to 
facilitate the rehearsal of information: “Tis impossible that we should keepe  our 
Memories firme for our own improvements , if by thiese strong impressions, 
renewalls, ruminations, & inculcations they should not be fortifyed.” 104 
 What might Boyle have made of all this? Was he spooked by Beale’s tales of 
decaying memory capacity? Did he feel that his own memory was becoming impotent 
in the face of empirical particulars, as Bacon had warned? Unfortunately, Boyle’s 
replies are not extant; but we can detect something of what he might have said from 
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the conciliatory mood of two letters from Beale in 1666. There is a sign in the letter 
of 13 July 1666 that Beale recognized (perhaps because Boyle raised it) that this 
preoccupation with brevity, order and memory might not be appropriate for the new 
empirical Baconian sciences. Beale acknowledged that some heavily systematised 
subjects (he refers to these as “loosely notionall” but does not cite examples), might 
be “skim’d over, as with the glance of the eye” and understood, and remembered. 
He accepted that this was not the case with the material of “Experimentall 
Philosophy,” in which the various observations and experiments needed to be con-
tinually revisited and revised: “But thiese [new sciences] doe require a frequent & 
assiduous reviewe, & a kind in incubation, as for innumerable applications, for 
remoter discoveryes, & for seasonable inventions upon all imaginable occasions.” 
Nevertheless, his compulsion to look for brevity and compression is seen in a mar-
ginal addition suggesting “Howe you may make 100 experiments serve for 1,000 
uses, & escape all oppositions.” 105 
 In the letter of 10 August 1666 (about 5,000 words), Beale acknowledged 
Boyle’s suspicion of premature systems: “I do not forget that you have renderd suf-
ficient reasons against the praesumptuous affectation of Methodes, & hasty 
Systemes.” He did not relent, however, drawing attention to Boyle’s “Concessions 
in  your Proæmiall Essay pag. 5. & 6 That there is a Usefullnes & a Seasone for 
Systems. And certainely when store off good materialls are collected, … It will 
have more usefullnesse, ornament, & strength, if skillfully Ordered into a fit build-
ing, than in a confused heape.” 106 His plea to Boyle was “ to drawe foorth your 
Experiments & Observations into Hypothesis, such as they  doe fayrely beare, & 
unite them as far as  they give mutuall strength, & light, & assistance .” 107 Beale 
maintained that Boyle owed it to the world to publish a systematic presentation of 
the new philosophy, one that might compete with the traditional doctrines. 
 Beale’s advocacy of a nomenclature of plants offers an example of his convic-
tion that multifarious data could be reduced to a simple, and memorisable, form. 
The background is a letter from Cyprian Kinner (an associate of Comenius) to 
Hartlib of 27 June 1647. Addressing the difficulty of remembering the huge number 
of details about the qualities of plants, Kinner asked: “For how few of the most 
experienced Botanists are there who know all the virtues and names of every plant, 
when the Authors are so at variance with one another about every single one of 
them; and how few of them can by the common way of learning impress them on 
the memory and retain them in it?” Kinner thought this was impossible, and called 
for a new botanical terminology that captured the qualities and powers of plants, 
herbs etc. Combinations of consonants and vowels in syllables would indicate these 
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common and differentiated natures, so that “if someone can at least memorise that 
kind of technical word in this way, he will have fully in his grasp all the virtue of 
the whole plant denoted by that word, its usage and its common nomenclature, in a 
wondrous, easy and pleasant small compass.” 108 
 On 11 October 1665, Beale mentioned to Boyle a manuscript he received from 
Hartlib called  De Herbis sine Duce cognoscendis (A way of recognizing plants 
without a guide). He gave this to William Brereton to pass on to Boyle. 109 Beale 
referred to it again on 28 April 1666, expanding the title to say that it enabled one 
to distinguish “all plants by their affinityes & differences, in their rootes, stemms, 
branches, blades, stature, color, leaves blossoms, fruites, seedes &c.” Beale wanted 
it made more public because he saw it as a model “allso for the collections of those 
infinite varietyes into fewe heades”; we might then “cleare our apprehensions of the 
nature of gravity, & levity, It may give us some satisfaction concerning the Systeme 
of the World.” Beale called it the “ Cribrum divinum ” (“divine sieve”) by which the 
essential natures of things in the world are sorted. 110 
 We do not know whether Boyle commented on this, having received it from 
Brereton; in any case, Beale had to remind him of it in a letter 13 July 1666. Now 
he asked Boyle to have the pamphlet translated into English and disseminated. 
Importantly, he thought this way of reducing and codifying information could work 
just as well for Boyle’s own experimental natural history: “to Exemplify what you 
have written of colors, & other qualityes in that Generall Physiology.” 111 Here Beale 
seemed to endorse the view that there are simple natures, or primitive forms, which 
are few in number and underlie all complex phenomena. 112 One implication of this 
outlook was that once these forms had been identified, results would follow 
quickly. 113 This is certainly what Beale professed in a letter to Hartlib: “Tis my great 
joy that Mr. B[oyle] is so far engaged to give us the rest of his notes and following 
experiments. In these he hath obliged all the intelligent inhabitants of this world, 
and hath given us hope, that we shall  shortly complete humane sciences .” 114 
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 5  Conclusion 
 On the basis of this exchange between Beale and Boyle, we might conclude that 
their quest for information from observation and experiment signified a shared 
 empirical stance. But these letters also reveal a tension among the Baconians, 
despite agreement about the collection of particulars and the rejection of premature 
systems. Pell and Petty, and especially Beale, sought to condense knowledge and 
information into an ordered structure that facilitated learning and recollection. To 
various degrees, they hoped that essentials, radicals, or simple natures, could be 
discerned after current information was sifted and arranged; and that this ordering 
would provide a sound basis for the integration of new discoveries. They aimed for 
an agreed set of abbreviations in various subjects and, potentially, a classification 
of the world that supported a shared mnemonic system. 
 Boyle’s early writings show some affinity with Hartlib’s emphasis on individual 
memory as a store of embodied experiences. Boyle wanted to thicken and deepen 
his own experiences so that these would be more securely impressed in his memory. 
He aimed to select experiences (from observations and experiments) and draw out 
inferences; but he was far less interested in placing the facts and ideas thus acquired 
in a sequence within some mnemonic grid. What we accept as Boyle’s “empirical” 
attitude was not so much a greater commitment to gathering matters of fact – also 
professed by Hartlib and Beale – but a refusal to condense and arrange material in 
the way they demanded. Beale’s promotion of memory techniques that relied on 
highly structured arrangements of units seems to have aggravated Boyle’s existing 
suspicion of premature systems. 
 During 1666, the final year of this particular correspondence between Boyle and 
Beale, there were several important discussions within the Royal Society about the 
proper management of information. These included Robert Hooke’s unpublished 
papers entitled “Lectures of things requisite to a Ntral History” and “A general 
scheme, or idea of the present state of natural philosophy”; and Boyle’s own 
“General Heads” of April 1666 and his “Designe about Natural History” of June 
1666 – all of which concern the best methods of gathering, storing and analysing 
both old and new information. 115 These documents stressed the need for a long-term 
view. Oldenburg underlined the scale envisaged when he told Boyle that “Mr Hook 
has also ready … A Method for writing a Naturall History, which, I think, cutts out 
work enough for all Naturalists in the World.” 116 Yet we now know that it was pre-
cisely in this context that Hooke speculated about the possibility of enhancing 
Baconian “Natural Inquiry” by seeking a higher level of abstraction, one that might 
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“not improperly be call’d a Philosophical Algebra, or an Art of directing the Mind 
in the search after Philosophical Truths.” He promised that this would be “a vast 
Help to the Understanding and Memory, as in Geometrical Algebra, the expressing 
of many and very perplex Quantities by a few obvious and plain Symbols.” 117 This 
kind of expectation is not usually associated with Boyle; but in a manuscript from 
this time there is indeed the suggestion that “We may also give Symbolical marks 
to our  Data , and other Particulars and by adding, subtracting &c. in a way suitable 
to the nature of this Physical Algebra, we may frame new Propositions, whence will 
oftentimes result new Truths.” 118 
 This is a reminder that the optimism of some members of the Hartlib circle 
about reducing data for ease of memory, recollection and thinking was not wholly 
alien to some key figures in the Royal Society. 119 One difference in emphasis, 
however, was that Boyle stressed the time and collective effort required to reach 
this stage. The study of nature, he noted to himself, was “a subject so vast & 
comprehensive, [it] will afford exercise to y e Curiosity & Industry of more than 
one Writer, perhaps more than one Age.” 120 In the meantime he insisted that the 
focus must be on the collection of copious particulars, complete with their cir-
cumstances, even to the point of including some that “seem mean trivial and as 
to immediate use barren.” 121 We can see that Boyle did exactly this in his note-
books and workdiaries that recorded reading, observations and experiments. 122 In 
the quantity and detail of these notes, there is possibly some trace of his preoc-
cupation with cultivating a personal memory of thick observations and reflec-
tions, as expressed in his notion of a mnemonicum. However, Boyle did not want 
memory aids to sanction premature systematizing of empirical observations and 
experiments; such a choice might lead the mind away from the world. Thus when 
he warned about the attraction of systems or doctrines in  The General History of 
the Air (1692), it is quite likely that Boyle was thinking about his earlier 
exchanges with John Beale. 
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 Abstract  Lamarck’s theory of ‘ sentimens ’ (feelings) is presented. Within this 
framework, what he called ‘ sentiment intérieur - sentiment d’existence ’ (‘inner feeling’) 
and his conception of ‘attention’ are analyzed. It is argued that Lamarck’s innovative 
stance stemmed from his evolutionary perspective on “mental events” and his 
conception of ‘self’ that derived from it. The ‘mental events’ of empiricism – 
subsumed under the experiencing of ‘feelings’ – were assumed by Lamarck to be 
direct consequences of physiological processes. The transition from experience 
to feeling which Lamarck posited could not, in a strict sense, be justified within 
the sensationalist framework. He argued that the capacity of experiencing was 
dependent on bodily structures that were emergent. The resulting experiencing and 
the resulting ‘feelings’ were also an emergent category, embodied, yet endowed 
with a qualitative surplus. Organisms, as well as their components, were assumed 
to be in constant interaction with their specific environment. Consequently, the 
feelings-events in the body, through the processes of the body as integral parts of 
the body, bore the specificities of this or that particular body, and were embodied 
in this double sense. Lamarck’s assumption of a gradually emergent  sentiment 
intérieur was intended to resolve the empiricist dead-end on identity-and-continuity 
of the self. The evolutionary perspective which assumed both growing complexifi-
cation, openness to environment and interaction with it, compelled Lamarck to look 
for a unifying cohering foundation for the individualized entities which populated 
his theory. This foundation had to cater to the demands of ‘science’ as well as those 
of ‘experience’. Thus he produced the first version of an evolutionary ‘self’, and a 
new conception of ‘internality’. 
 This is an elaboration of a paper presented at the February 2009 University of 
Sydney workshop on “Embodied Empiricism.” 
 Lamarck on Feelings: From Worms to Humans 
 Snait B. Gissis 
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Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University.
C.T. Wolfe and O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied 
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 1  Introduction 
 Lamarck 1 was a transitional figure, who was deeply conscious of the contemporaneous 
attempts 2 to explain the macroscopic features of the inanimate world in terms of the 
motions of, and forces between, the constituent microscopic entities. He ascribed to 
the observed phenomena involving living forms on earth the attribute of “transformism” 3 
and attempted to give a systematic and all encompassing “microscopic” explanation 
to them. Given that he belonged to the rapidly dwindling community of naturalists for 
whom the elementary entities grounding physics and chemistry were still part of 
earlier systems, e.g. the caloric and electric fluids, he did not reduce his mechanisms 
and processes of life and that of experiencing to the elementary units of the new 
contemporaneous physics and chemistry. Yet his endeavour was in a deep sense 
analogous to that of the ‘new science’, with a marked emphasis: he was acutely aware 
of both the complexity and the time directedness characterizing the phenomena of 
life. He considered organization and self organization their principal features, and 
thus complexification as an inherent property of life. He consequently was deeply 
cognizant of the enormity of the task to provide such explanations. 4 
 
1 
 Lamarck has been re-instituted as an important contributor to “evolutionism” in the early nineteenth 
century, and in particular, as an important influence on Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, Frédéric Cuvier, 
Grant, Chambers, Spencer, Darwin, Baden Powell, and others who concerned themselves with the 
history of life on earth during the first half of the nineteenth century in France and in Great Britain. 
Corsi 1997,  2005 has corroborated this by making clear the role Lamarck and his students played 
in making the history of life on earth a central issue. He and Barsanti  1995,  1997a , have also 
pointed to the extensive considerations of the subject matter instigated or influenced by Lamarck 
or his auditors outside of France and Great Britain, the latter two countries being the locations 
usually addressed by scholars in the field until the last decades of the twentieth century. 
 
2 
 For example, Lavoisier, Laplace and others. See Fox  1990 , Gillispie  2004 . 
 
3 
 A later term, not his own. 
 
4 
 Lamarck saw the phenomena of the environment as falling under physical explanation, though 
subdivided among chemistry, geology, hydrogeology, meteorology etc. He did not reduce the 
phenomena of life to physico-chemical explanation but assumed that their understanding was a 
necessary though not a sufficient, condition for understanding living organisms. He believed in a 
physics of the four elements, with a major role ascribed to fire/heat (in its three assumed states). 
The tendency of these elements to return to their simple state was used as an explanation of the decay 
of their compounds, both organic and inorganic. He assumed (mostly until around 1799–1800) 
that the existence of “delicate fluids” accounted for phenomena such as heat and magnetism, and 
served as an element in the explanation of gravity. His positions in his numerous chemical–physical–
geological publications both before and after 1795 on some of the major issues debated at the time 
(e.g. the geology of earth, the new chemistry of Lavoisier and its implications, the explanation of 
respiration, Spallanzani’s explanation of digestion, …) had been such that they were shunned by 
those at the head of the science teaching institutions and at the forefront of the contemporaneous 
science. See Cuvier  1810,  1815 /1989,  1860 . Likewise, his views on the formation of the earth’s 
surface through constant changes, most importantly on the location of the seas and the impact of the 
atmosphere, estranged him from those scientists with whom he had much in common concerning 
chemistry. The same goes for his assumption regarding the constant dying out of organisms as 
the source of inanimate materials of earth. Lamarck’s views on chemistry and geology and the 
explanation of what he termed” physical phenomena,” including their revision after the turn of the 
century, have been expounded in detail in a number of studies, notably in Barsanti  1997b , 
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 One can notice changes in Lamarck’s publications written during the last years 
of the eighteenth century. Foremost among them was the distinction he introduced 
between living and non living entities in which the concept of organization played 
a subtle role. At first, it merely distinguished between living and non living, and 
somewhat later it drew lines between different kinds of living entities. Instead of 
the simply ‘graduated nuanced differences’ of the early botanical period, one now 
had differences in accordance with the degree of complexity of the organization. 5 
The latter was to be gauged according to faculties, functions and modes of activity, 
and later according to the existence of specific organs shaped by them. 6 In order to 
discuss his novel conceptualization, one has to include both the function played by 
the directionality of time and the role of the environment in the shaping of a living 
entity and its life span. Incidentally, Lamarck’s conceptual grid coincided in 
interesting ways with the ‘organizational’ discourse and rhetoric of both the 
revolutionary period and the early Thermidorean post-Jacobin regime. It was 
also very much in line with the part of the ‘progress discourse’ that compared the 
socio-organizational forms of various societies encountered in colonial journeys 
and exploratory voyages, and constructed hierarchies on the basis of the complexity 
of social institutions and the functions they fulfilled in those societies. 7 
 A comment is in order here regarding a significant departure by Lamarck 
from the practice of Buffon, and that of many naturalists of his time. 8 Numerous 
contemporaries, particularly the  idéologues , and emphatically so Cabanis and 
physicians in general, used the human individual, usually termed ‘man’, as the 
starting point of their discussion of living nature. Even though they looked upon 
‘man’ as part of nature, they devoted long and protracted discussions to man’s special, 
at times even separate, status within nature, and to the particular conceptual tools 
needed to analyze his unique faculties. 9 Not so Lamarck. Lamarck instead started with 
a panorama of living nature. He felt it incumbent upon him to provide explanations 
for experiencing, feeling and intellection across the branching scale of the living. 
Burkhardt  1977,  1995a , Corsi  1988 , Gohau 1997a, b, Jordanova  1984 , and Roger  1979 and most 
recently in Gohau  2006, Gohau 1977a . See also the sympathetic eulogy by Geoffroy Saint Hilaire 
in Latreille and Geoffroy 1829. 
 
5 
 For example, already in  Biologie and in the  Discours of 1801. 
 
6 
 Note that this was the opposite way from Cuvier’s view on the relationship between functions, 
structures and activity (behavior). Cuvier  1799,  1805 . 
 
7 
 See Gissis  2009 . 
 
8 
 But not so with regard to at least two of his predecessors, Charles Bonnet and Benoît de Maîllet. 
Furthermore, most current histories of eighteenth century diverse traditions of natural history 
assume a certain measure of continuity throughout that century. Lamarck (1744–1829) spent most 
of his adult life within that framework. However, there had been marked changes within that 
framework towards the last two decades of the eighteenth century and during the first decade of 
the nineteenth century. I would suggest that Lamarck, in his new capacities within the Museum 
National d’Histoire Naturelle, was struggling rather with the newer cluster of problems, which 
arose during the last decades of the eighteenth century and the very beginning of the nineteenth 
century, transforming and deploying earlier solutions to serve the new ones. 
 
9 
 In this sense, some of the members of the  Société des observateurs de l’homme were within the 
Buffonian tradition; see also Blanckaert  1992 . 
214 S. Gissis
When he finally discussed man, 10 he deemed it necessary to emphasize that all a 
naturalist – i.e. he, Lamarck – could do was to apply uniformly the laws of physics, 
i.e. his Lamarckian chemistry, geology and physics. For Lamarck, the faculty of 
reason itself was looked upon as depending causally – physically, functionally – on 
matter, matter being the sole entity the naturalist could observe, investigate and 
explicate. Though Man had been mentioned earlier, it was only in the  Philosophie 
Zoologique of 1809 that Lamarck started detailed discussion of humans. 
 During the latter part of the eighteenth century the term “sensibility” was used 
in a number of fields – within philosophy, natural history, the sciences, as well as 
in culture, art, morals and politics, and also in medicine and in literature. Thus 
the term (in the culture within which it was used) was polysemic. Almost all 
the historians of the last third of the eighteenth century either used the term, or 
explicated it within their specific work or did both. Its primary signification related 
to the senses and to the significant status assigned to the ability to use the senses 
– that is, to have sensations – as a venue of the world of phenomena and of 
meaning. This over and above that of reflection on one hand, and above the 
‘response’ of sentiment to the sensation on the other. Towards the end of the century 
sensibility was conceived as the locus of interactions between mind and body. 
Thus sensory experience and sentiment constituted the foundations of the 
self, as well as of both subjectivity and sociability. Though originating in 
Locke’s sensationalist epistemology, Rousseau, Helvetius, Condillac, Buffon and 
Diderot can be viewed as some of principal proponents of “sensibility.” ‘Sensibility’ 
was translated into the moral-political idiom during the revolutionary decade. 11 
I view ‘sensation’ and ‘feeling’ and their derivatives in Lamarck’s writings as an 
outgrowth of a predominant epistemology and its transposition to a scheme of 
nature in which matter and modes of organization relevant to it served as the major 
formative assumptions. To give an account on how the world was apprehended 
by living organisms/organized bodies within such a framework meant that it 
was related to their specific bodily functioning and their specific bodily structures. 
That is to say ‘sensations’ and ‘feelings’ had to be embodied in order to be; 
they could not be related to semi-external sense organs whose outputs would 
then become located and worked out in a disembodied mind, psyche, or non 
descriptive mediating organ. 
 I shall discuss aspects of Lamarck’s treatment of sensations and feelings during 
the period that started with his 1800 opening lecture course and ended with his 
1820  Système Analytique 12 with the following questions in mind: “In what ways 
was the presupposition of evolution significant?” and “In what ways did Lamarck’s 
 
10 
 See below. 
 
11 
 See the by now classic essay, Moravia  1978 . Within the limits of the present paper I cannot 
provide even a semblance of a detailed contextualized narrative for that history. 
 
12 
 The following writings of Lamarck will be used:  Lamarck 1800,  1800/1944 , 1801,  1802,  1809,  1812, 
 1815 –1822,  1817,  1820,  1907,  1933,  1972 . See Pietro Corsi’s website (http://www.lamarck.net). 
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particular models that dealt with sensation and feeling reflect his evolutionary 
entwining of behaviour and inheritance?” 13 
 More specifically, the main emphasis will be on Lamarck’s work from 1806 
onwards, when his transformist perspective had been worked out in more detail and 
was assumed in everything he said. My presentation is mostly an internalist one, in 
that the main body of texts used will be Lamarck’s. However, in my attempt 
to describe, analyze and conceptualize, 14 I shall also resort to the writings of 
earlier naturalists and physicians and also those of some of his contemporaries. 
My discussion is sectioned into two unequal parts:
 1.  ‘ Sentimens ’ – ‘Feelings’ – discussed through an evolutionary sieve, 
 2.  ‘ Sentiment intérieur ’ – Inner feeling – the more traditional functions of the ‘soul’ 
and the emergent evolving ‘self’, with a short note on ‘Attention’. 15 
 Lamarck’s methodological reflections will be briefly commented upon in both 
parts, and related to specific issues. ‘Habit’, ‘need’, ‘use’, ‘instinct’, will be discussed 
only in relation to the  sentiment intérieur . The higher mental functions will not be 
discussed. Likewise, I shall not discuss Lamarck’s general view of human nature, 
individual and social, except in so far as it is relevant to support my argument on 
the emergent evolving ‘self’. 
 2  Sentimens 
 Lamarck’s discussion of feelings braided together environment, living body (i.e. an 
organism), nerves-nervous system, behaviour as components and attempted to draw 
a systematic evolutionary account of the interactions – the “ rapports ” – among 
them. Loosely speaking, it was conducted within the framework of sensationalism, 
later also called associationism, 16 and I would argue that the events and the processes 
at its focus were considered as being neither solely physical nor solely mental. 
However – time-wise and space-wise – these events and processes did happen and 
 
13 
 In this connection let me note that in order not to use the term ‘evolution’ anachronistically, 
I use it only to depict Lamarck’s  transformism or his ‘march of nature’. I do use the term 
‘evolutionary’ to refer to processes related to the dynamics of Lamarck’s transformism. 
 
14 
 I have used as secondary sources primarily the following: Duchesneau  1982 , Dixon  1988 , Farber 
 1981 , Gross  1979 , Hannaway and La Berge  1998 , Jacyna  1987 , Lesch  1984 , Moravia  1972 , Reil 
 2005 , Rey  2000 , Roger  1993 , Sloan  1990,  1995 , Smith  1973 , Spary  1996 , Steinke  2005 , Williams 
 2002 ; and with a different perspective Reddy  2001 . 
 
15 
 Wherever I use terms and categories used by the subjects of this study, I have tried to put 
them in quotes or in italics when not in English. I also took the liberty of changing these into 
researchers’ – i.e. contemporary – terms and categories where deemed useful e.g. physiological-in 
modern usage, rather than physical, even though in Lamarck’s time ‘physiology’ was deemed to 
be more closely related to medicine than to zoology and natural history. 
 
16 
 O’Neale  1996 , Riskin  2002 , Richards  1979 . 
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did take place inside the organism, and were to be detected through the reactions 
and the actions of its various subsystems and parts. Having adopted an empirical 
stance Lamarck was not unique in trying to discuss the phenomena of the traditional 
category of mind within the empiricist range of available models. 17 In Lamarck’s 
case, being empirical meant using the materials in natural history cabinets, 18 making 
use of the diverse findings (whether experimentally or observationally empirical) of 
other contemporary or earlier eighteenth century naturalists and zoologists, as well 
as those of anatomists and physicians, though he carefully distinguished his positions 
from all these practitioners. 19 However, his discussion of mind was anchored in 
the discourse of ‘faculties’ that had been firmly established in the planning of the 
 Encyclopédie , but became somewhat attenuated in its entries. Thus, though presented 
evolutionarily, Lamarck’s discussion of the faculties was devoid of historical 
context-dependence. In fact they were treated as “natural kinds.” When tracing the 
development and crystallization of Lamarck’s position on feelings, I emphasize 
the more general framework of changes in his discussion of feelings, emotions, 
sensibility and movement during the last decades of the eighteenth and the first of 
the nineteenth century. 20 These changes consisted in a more focused discussion of 
the kind of organic  system that was deemed capable of feeling and of movements, 
i.e. not any organism or any of its parts, nor of the relationships among them, 
e.g. nerves and muscles. These changes can be characterized as exhibiting
 
17 
 In Lamarck’s later writings the scientific status of the work and the conclusions of others were 
dealt with in two ways: (a) In the discussion of the multilayered use of imagination (not only in 
his later works but also in the dictionary item by that name) (b) In the distinction made between 
the immutable laws of nature and their representation in the laws of science. For example, “Aussi, 
jamais les principes des sciences, quelles quelles soient, et qui sont tous des résultats de nos 
jugemens, ne pourront égaler en certitude les observation bien faites et les faits constatés qui y ont 
donné lieu” and this is because “Les objects et les faits observés appartient à la nature” while 
scientific laws bear the mark of human means. These appear in his  Apperçu des connaissances 
humaines 1810–1814, Lamarck  1972 , 37. See also Daston  2005,  2008 , Daston and Pomata  2003 , 
Farber  1981 , Pickstone  2007 , Sloan  1995 , Terrall  2004 . 
 
18 
 These were extremely rich at the  Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle (MHN), in part by virtue of 
confiscations during the revolutionary decade and the Napoléonic wars. Lamarck took an active 
part in the sorting, classifications and organization of these cabinets. He did venture once to do 
actual field work – beyond cabinet-work – when he collected materials for the  Flore Françoise . 
 
19  
 From the late 1790s on Lamarck added philosophy to his professional self-definition. In his 
 Système of 1801, he succinctly identified himself as: “naturaliste observateur et philosophe” (359). 
In almost every opening of his lecture courses he insisted on the need to exercise the imagination 
in order to encompass the vast variety and diversity of living nature, and to contemplate the meaning 
of the impact of environment on living organisms. In 1806 he actually suggested to his audience 
the following thought experiment (repeated almost verbatim in later texts): Suppose that the whole 
of nature were laid out for a spectator to contemplate as if it were a collection, could one then 
classify nature in a way that would cut it really at its joints? For example, “… il est nécessaire 
avant tout d’embrasser par l’imagination le vaste ensemble des productions de la nature …” in the 
introductory lessons in 1800, An 9 et An 10, Lamarck  1972 , 10. On this see also Gohau  2006 . 
 
20 
 The distinction between zoological and medical questions, assumptions and interests had begun 
to diverge during this period. Lamarck’s treatment of these issues seems to be on the finely drawn 
line between these two. 
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 a.  A growing differentiation between the more generalized notions of irritability 
and sensibility, 
 b.  A differentiation within specifi c organic systems related to their functions e.g. the 
various parts of the nervous system, 
 c.  The rethinking of the relations between feeling and thinking, 
 d.  The questioning as to which are to be considered the basic functions of an 
organism. 
 In Lamarck’s earlier “transformist” writings (1800–1806) the influence of the 
(constantly changing) environment on living organisms was considered to be direct. 21 
He practiced classifying the non-vegetable living organisms in accordance with 
their functioning. In the early writings in which transformism was announced, the 
three functions – and thus the three organic structures or organic components, 
deemed essential for a non-vegetable living organism – were sensibility, digestion 
and movement (voluntary). This in fact indicated that Lamarck at the time was 
using a generally accepted definition. Cuvier somewhat later used a variation of it 
in which functions were modelled on those of vertebrates, 22 and he became severely 
criticized for it by Lamarck in his late writings. The division among the invertebrates 
was based directly on the presence or absence of specialized organic structures for 
respiration, movement of body fluids and feeling  (sentiment ), rather than on functions. 
If we follow Lamarck in his works we find that in some sense, he tended to posit the 
invertebrates as “model organisms.” One can call them model organisms because 
they were selected as exemplars of widely observed features, were accessible, were 
perceived as typical, and thus they served as an index to the group of instances, and 
to the set of  problématiques . . He applied fine distinctions and divisions among them 
in a mode analogous to distinctions and divisions in living nature at large. The same 
was true for the relationships between functions and structures. 
 Operating within the Hallerian legacy, 23 in his first article in which a transformist 
ascending scale appeared, – the  Prodrome de l’histoire naturelle des animaux 
invertébrés , which he presumably edited in 1799–1800 – Lamarck was starting to 
distinguish between sensibility and irritability, 24 and to relate them to different levels 
of complexity of structure, and thus to different stages in the order of organisms. 
Though the separate mechanisms and supporting organic structures of sensibility 
and irritability were not as yet specified, it was not the case that both stretched over the 
whole animal scale. Furthermore, individuation meant animalization (and vice versa). 
Plants were not endowed with animalization. Thus combining irritability with 
 
21 
 See Burkhardt  1977,  1995a , Conry  1994 , Corsi  1988 , Herbert  2005 , Hodge  1995 , Jordanova 
 1984,  1989 , Spary  2000 . 
 
22 
 Lamarck looked upon the distinction between invertebrates and vertebrates as one of his important 
original contributions. It effectively changed both the boundaries of, and the perspective on, the 
realm of animals he had been nominated to investigate at the  Muséum d’histoire naturelle . 
 
23 
 For example, see Duchesneau  1982 , Steinke  2005 , Boury  2008 . 
 
24 
 Due to space constraints I cannot provide an adequate contextualized narrative of the rich history 
of these terms, central to understanding eighteenth century debates on the nature of the living. 
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lower, simpler – one would say more  elementary in an  evolutionary sense – forms 
of organized animal life (in this case, the polyps which had the most basic form of 
animalization), signified establishing the connection between order of appearance 
in evolutionary time, and scantiness of functions. 25 
 In the other writings from this period two features stand out that illustrate the 
gradual crystallization of Lamarck’s views:
 a.  The explicative discussion of functions, their impact on organic organization – on 
structures – was conducted either as if it did not matter which way one started 
on the scale; or that the order of explanation was from the more complex to the 
simple, even though in most of these early writings at some earlier or later stage 
in the work there was a statement as to the ‘right order of nature’. 26 
 b.  The distinction between sensibility and irritability became sharper; and the 
comparison between elementary forms and more complex ones of the nervous 
system became a heuristic feature of the distinguishing tool among organisms. 27 
 In Lamarck’s  Système des animaux sans vertèbres (1801) irritability was still 
considered a derivation or modification of sensibility, which had appeared in the very 
rudimentary forms of living bodies as “ébauches de l’animalisation” – preliminary 
forms of animalization – in spite of the fact that these organisms have: “Neither 
brain, nor an elongated cord nor nerves.” “In sum, all the points of their bodies have 
in them, no doubt, this mode of the faculty of sensing which constitutes 
irritability.” 28 
 But in 1806, in the introductory lecture to his course on invertebrates the 
distinctions and differentiations were clear cut. Feelings and sensibility at large 
were completely dependent on the existence of any vestige of nerves, and muscular 
movement at large depended on it too. Irritability became totally separated from 
sensibility. It could be found in the most elementary forms of organized life, and 
in them bodily movements were caused from the outside. Thus instead of the 
definition of living organism used earlier, Lamarck suggested a new one based 
on the most general feature found in the lowest forms of organization, rather 
than on the most sophisticated ones, i.e. feelings and voluntary movement. 
 
25  
 In his Prodrome d’une nouvelle classification des coquilles 1799, (Lamarck  1972 , 4). 
 
26  
 “…. et qu’il est plus convenable de procéder du connu à l’inconnu, je vais prendre l’ordre en 
sens inverse de celui de la nature …” Lamarck  1802 , 14. 
 
27  
 For example, in his  Recherches sur l’organisation (in book I under  Les mammaux ) Lamarck 
states “remarquez que vers cette extrémité de l’échelle animale, tous les organes essentials sont 
isolés ou ont des foyers isolés en des lieux particuliers. Vous verrez bientôt que le contraire a 
parfaitement lieu vers l’autre extrémité de la mème echelle” (Lamarck  1802 , I 16). Note though 
that in the  Ancien discours de mon cours of 1806 the notion of a natural order was becoming 
more stable and the changes, mutations etc were supposed to take place within that order and 
its immutable laws: ”un ordre afin qui ne permet dans ses masses aucun arbitraire de notre part, 
et qui doit offrir à ses deux extrêmités les corps vivans les plus dissemblables ou les plus éloignés 
sous tous les rapports” (Lamarck  1972 , 195). 
 
28  
 “ni cerveau, ni moelle longitudinale, ni nerfs … Enfin, tous les points de leur corps ont sans doute 
en eux-mêmes cette modification de la faculté de sentir, qui constitue l’irritabilité.” Ibid, 358. 
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The evolutionary perspective thus became the foundational one, and thus, the 
perspective through which one classified both vertebrates and invertebrates, and 
distinguished between flora and fauna. The predominant function that served as a 
tool of that classification was the presence or absence of nervous activity, signalled 
by the presence or absence of any form of a specialized system of nerves:
 “irritability in all or in some parts, is the most general characteristic of animals: it is 
even more so than the faculty of voluntary movement and than the faculty of sensing” “…
irritability, a faculty which pertains generally and exclusively to animals….” 29 
 It is remarkable that already in the appendix to the  Recherches (1802) Lamarck 
used the same explanatory mechanism for feelings, which is then repeated and 
developed in detail in his  Philosophie Zoologique . In contradistinction to Cabanis 
in his  Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (both series of the  Rapports 30 ) 
and in line with the functioning of passivity, 31 the basic tenet of sensationalism, for 
Lamarck the active agent in sensations, in feelings and in volition is not the nervous 
system nor any part of it – they are the loci of the events and processes! – but a 
particular fluid: “le fluide nerveux.” The presence or absence of a bodily system 
which enables the activity of the various body fluids, such as blood, was considered 
a distinguishing feature, marking the whole order of invertebrates, and used later on 
for internal classification within that order. In the general eighteenth century debate 
on the choice of bodily structures and mechanisms to explain sensations, feelings 
etc., there was quite a broad choice of models. Lamarck, in line with his geological 
and physical views, chose a hydraulic model, i.e. of various active fluids 32 as 
transferring agents and body structures that would go with it – pipes, tubes, canals, 
and other equivalent spaces. These structures functioned as linkages between inside 
and outside, as well as connections between various parts of the inside. More 
generally, they enabled the  rapports between the environment and the body, 
since for Lamarck the organism  interacted , within certain limits and constraints, 
with the environment, and was not just acted upon by it. It is within specific parts 
of these structures that the transformation into “information” of inner and outer 
cues was being carried out; this occurred by being translated into “behaviour” 
i.e. modes of experiencing and acting – feelings, movement, acting with the various 
capacities which Lamarck subsumed under intelligence. Lamarck’s use of ‘fluids’ 
provided him with an occasion to elaborate on the proper and improper modes of 
using what would be termed in the 1930s ‘theoretical entities’ within an empiricist 
 
29 
 “l’irritabilité dans toutes ou dans certaines parties, est le caractère le plus général des animaux; 
elle l’est même plus que la faculté des mouvemens volontaires, et que la faculté de sentir” 
(Lamarck 1806, 126). “… l’irritabilité, faculté qui appartient généralement et exclusivement aux 
animaux …” (ibid. 127). 
 
30 
 Cabanis  1805 ; see also Staum  1980,  1996 . 
 
31 
 See Condillac  1746,  1755 . 
 
32 
 Not only Haller, much earlier, but other naturalists as well, particularly in the 1780s and 1790s 
used ‘fluids’, endowing them with a variety of qualities and powers. For Lamarck the power of 
life is expressed by the movement of fluids in the living body, whether through special systems or 
without them, as was the case in the most elementary organisms; see also Smith  1976 . 
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framework (i.e. entities that could not be directly experienced or observed, but that 
formed part of the structure of a scientific theory).With him too such use was 
justified by inferring from visible effects to – temporarily – invisible causes. 
 Even before the detailed discussion found in the  Philosophie Zoologique 
Lamarck had established a gauge for the level of complexity of an organism. Its 
attribution to the organism was to be determined by the number and complexity of 
specialized sub systems of the organism, the extent and diversity of its functioning, 
its “behaviour,” and the spectrum of its experiencing and acting, i.e. its’ “faculties” 
and their range. In Lamarck’s work the correlations of these attributes established 
a continuity between what earlier had been deemed the Cartesian influenced, 
divided realms of the mental and the physical, a continuity that seemed self-evident 
within the contemporaneous idéologue-sensationalist framework. 
 Lamarck’s position on the nature of physico-mental/psycho-physical events 
becomes clearer in the writings from 1809 to 1820. Taking into account repetitions, 
similarities and differences, it is nonetheless striking how important the charac-
terization of model ‘basic units’ (sensations/sentiments) became: they came to be 
considered individualized rather than generic. They were explicated in physiological 
(in Lamarck, ‘physical’) terms and presented as events and processes of the material 
organism, yet were understood as the discursive equivalents of the traditionally 
mental, all the more so for taking place solely inside the body. Thus I contend that the 
“basic units” were neither solely physiological nor solely mental or psychological 
(and the same applied to any process that recombined them – it was a hybrid one 
too). Lamarck intentionally resorted to the method of analysis characteristic of the 
empiricist-sensational associationist schools, namely,  to choose basic units which 
were assumed to be the most elementary, primitive, while all other elements were 
regarded as combinations and compoundings of such units. In contradistinction 
to his predecessors, the evolutionary mechanism he had adopted operated on 
these basic units. This allowed him to point to a near zero point, and to adumbrate 
a gradual compounding across the ascending scale of organisms, and to exemplify 
an increasing  complexification . Furthermore, because organisms, as well as their 
subsystems, were in constant interaction with their specific environment, the 
feelings-events in the body, through the processes of the body, and as integral 
components of the body, bore the specificities of this or that particular body, and 
thus were embodied in this double sense. 
 This is the gist of my argument. 
 As indicated above, during the period from 1800 to1806 there was in Lamarck a 
sharpening of the distinction between the Hallerian sensibility and irritability, and 
the adoption of a hydraulic model of the nervous system and of nervous fluids. In the 
years that followed, up to 1820, Lamarck’s similarity to and distinction from some of 
his contemporaries, most conspicuously Cabanis, turned on the explanations proffered 
for sensations and feelings, instinct and inner-feeling or  sentiment intérieur . 
 There has been a subdued but continuous disagreement on where to locate him 
in the naturalist-medical field of his generation. For Richards  (1979 , 1987 ), 
Lamarck and Cabanis were in the same general camp. Corsi  (1988) , in his masterful 
reconstruction of the contemporaneous scientific field tends to disagree, but points 
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to actual and possible allies and missed opportunities for cooperation and support. 
By contrast, Rey  (2000) , who looked upon the period from the point of view of 
medical traditions and vitalist positions, had no place at all for Lamarck in her 
account. Vidal  (2006) and Hatfield  (1995) took part in this debate by asking 
whether psychology was newly constituted in that period, and agreed that it was in 
fact re-constituted, shunning its former dualist ancestry. 
 The  Philosophie Zoologique was Lamarck’s comprehensive undertaking to 
present an extremely detailed theory of the animal world, and his endeavour to tie 
together evolution, generation and development, genealogical/heredity, systematics 
and the (non-human and human) psychophysical field. Because of space limitations, 
I shall only attempt a brief analysis of the main arguments advanced and of the 
mechanisms posited in the  Philosophie Zoologique regarding some of these matters. 
Two main issues are of relevance to my discussion here: feelings,  sentiment 
intérieur . The principal components of Lamarck’s explanatory model of the ‘basic 
units’ and their compoundings were the nervous system at large, certain specific 
spaces within it –  centres, ‘foyers’ – particularly the brain, and the (hydraulic model 
of) nervous fluids. Based on the kinds of experiencing and movement available to 
groups of animals, 33 experiencing and movement that were found or were absent in 
the various organisms along the evolutionary scale, the animal realm was divided 
into four groups in Lamarck’s writings up to 1810 (e.g. Lamarck  1809 , 48); and into 
three groups from 1812 on (e.g. Lamarck  1815 –1822, 267–269). 34  Given that the 
nervous fluids were the active agent in the explanatory model, in the 1809 writings 35 
there were also two degrees of their mode of activity which mapped unto two 
modes of growing complexity and sophistication of the physico-mental apparatus. 
Furthermore, humans were distinguished by highly specialized activities. Though 
these could theoretically be found in organisms of lower complexity they stood out 
in humans: attention, imagination, understanding, thinking and recalling (memory). 
More than before, in the  Philosophie Zoologique the evolutionary perspective was 
conspicuous, as the question of animal–human continuity was brought up directly 
and indirectly in almost every issue discussed. Two causes of change in organisms 
were available in the explanatory model of the earlier writings: through direct impact 
of the ‘environment-circumstances’ on organisms and their action–interaction with it, 
and through the inner tendency to complexification. In the  Philosophie Zoologique 
the order of importance between these two was reversed, so that the tendency to 
complexification or the “life force” came to be seen as the predominant mechanism 
 
33  
 Which in turn depended on the degree of sophistication of their nervous system and its parts. 
 
34 
 Burkhardt  1995a argues that although Lamarck’s theoretical position was that structures were 
dependent on functions, yet in actual practice he derived function from structure. His work was 
less like that of a contemporaneous ethologist and more like that of a comparative (animal behav-
iour). Lamarck himself, though, viewed his practice differently. In his later writings he empha-
sized the insights culled by any zoologist who could observe the functioning of organs, and who 
presumably would also infer from it within the faculties discourse in a way which was not open 
to an anatomist . Lamarck 1816,  1972 , 41–42. 
 
35 
 Philosophie Zoologique and opening lecture for the 1809 course, Lamarck  1972 , 201–214, or in 
his text  l’avancement de la zoologie from 1808 to 1810. Ibid, 215–226. 
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for progress in the organic world, 36 while ‘circumstances’ were counted as secondary 
to it. Circumstances impacted on organisms indirectly via the mechanism of use 
and disuse, with the formation of habits inherited inter-generationally. As Lamarck 
assumed that functions determined structures, it meant that change of habit 
could bring about new organic forms. The circle of causality actually ran from 
circumstances or environment to needs and pressure for adaptation, to exercise of 
faculties, formation of habits which were instrumental in the rise of new structures 
through intergenerational transfer. Thus some version of a middle way position was 
forged in the debate on innate versus external capacities, so central in the eighteenth 
century, both between Cartesians, Leibnizians and sensualists on the one hand, 
and in the wide range of sensationalist-associationist field, on the other. In the 
 Philosophie Zoologique Lamarck delineated multi-levelled system for the conveyance, 
transfer and maintenance of external and internal data, transformed into various 
embodied informational modes which had specific ways of activation attached 
to them. The basic contemporary distinction between within/outside the body 
was somewhat blunted by the very fact that everything could be processed, could 
become an event only inside the body. Thus excitation, perception, sensation, feeling, 
(and some muscular movement) would be one ‘organic’ mode termed sensibility; 
excitation, contraction would be another ‘organic’ mode termed irritability. These two 
modes were considered separate, differing, as mentioned earlier, in their extension 
over the animal world and independent of one another. Only the first was looked 
upon as depending on any specialized organic sub system, the nervous system. 
But in both modes it was the movement of various fluids within the body which 
indicated its being a living organism. 
 Lamarck provided a different view by virtue of his evolutionizing perspective. 
There is a persistent effort by Lamarck throughout the  Philosophie Zoologique to 
distinguish his positions from those of numerous naturalists, even though these 
were rarely mentioned by name. Thus the book can be read as a series of exercises 
in ‘dialogues manqués’. I shall not take this path here, because the focus of my 
paper lies elsewhere, but note that only two of his interlocutors – Cabanis 
and his disciple Richerand – were explicitly mentioned by name time and again. 
Their positions, particularly those of Cabanis, were perceived by Lamarck, and 
perhaps by some contemporaries, to be close enough to his own so as to call for 
explicit criticism. 37 Here Lamarck’s effort to differentiate himself and disconnect 
himself from their positions had been both more difficult and more nuanced. This 
is directly related to my claim that Lamarck’s original contribution lies in his new 
perspective. In numerous places in the  Philosophie Zoologique Lamarck argued 
that method-wise and content-wise his perspective would be more generative, with 
higher explanatory power than Cabanis’. For example: in the introduction to Part II 
of the  Philosophie Zoologique , after a laudatory introduction on Cabanis’s findings 
concerning Man, he chided him, stating:
 
36  
 e.g in  Philosophie Zoologique II/vi: “Life … tends incessantly by its very nature to a higher 
organisation, to the creation of special organs, to the isolation of these organs and their functions, 
and to the division and multiplications of its own centres of activity” (Lamarck  1984 (1809), 239). 
 
37  
 For example, Corsi  1988 , particularly 122 and ch. 6; Staum  1980 , particularly 182–189. 
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 “We must not confine ourselves to seeking the proofs of it by an examination of the highly 
complicated organisation of man and the more perfect animals. Proof will be obtained 
more easily by studying the diverse progress of complexity of organisation from the most 
imperfect animals up to those whose organisation is most complex … it is the simplest of 
all organisations that we should open our inquiry” … And “(examining complex organs of 
higher animals tends to ignore the fact that) … it does not follow that these same organs 
are essential to the existence of life in all living bodies whatsoever”. 38 
 Here and elsewhere Lamarck differentiated between the order imposed by instruc-
tion 39 and the order of nature. The order of the investigation ought to follow that of 
nature, rather than the ploys that make it more accessible to encumbered human 
understanding. 40 It is only by adopting the elementary forms as the object of 
description and analysis, that  general and more specific  features could be derived, 
 necessary and sufficient conditions for life established, and  real relationships 
such as between functions and structures, organism and circumstances, the 
various component parts of the organism determined, 41 and  causality attributed. 
These seemed to him to be the desired results characteristic of a scientific endeavour. 
Furthermore, implied in the injunction to start with the elementary forms was the 
impossibility of either universalizing any stage of the evolutionary progress, or 
making predictions from one stage to the next one. This in contrast to a “post factum” 
description. In that sense Lamarck’s injunction provided the possibility of regarding 
the evolutionary path as containing “emergent” offshoots, and particularly so for 
feelings and for intelligence. 
 According to Lamarck the feasibility of ascribing ‘feelings’ to individuals in the 
animal world was rather limited. 42 Among the invertebrates – Lamarck’s area of 
specialization at the MHN – the lower taxa were considered not to have even the 
rudimentary organic structure deemed a necessary condition for the expression of 
“feelings.” The latter require as a minimum a primitive, undeveloped, rudimentary 
nervous system as “The nervous system constitutes the special organ of feeling 
when it is composed of a single center of communication and of nerves terminating 
it.” 43 As Lamarck started his analysis from the elementary forms of living 
organisms, the addition of further functions – whose extension were more 
 
38  
 Lamarck  1809 , 185. 
 
39  
 For example, Lamarck  1984 [1809], 8. 
 
40  
 In an unpublished text written perhaps between 1816 and 1817 this was expressed most 
concisely: “cet ordre est le seul que soit naturel, instructif pour nous, favourable à nos études de 
la nature: et qui puisse, en outre, nous faire connoître la marche de cette dernière, ces moyens et 
les lois qui régissent ses opérations à leur egard. Des rapports qui doivent être employés dans la 
distribution et la classification des animaux” (Lamarck  1972 , 248). He went on to emphasize that 
this order should be implemented by both the zoologists and the botanists. Ibid, 270. 
 
41 
 In one of the rare semi autobiographical paragraphs in an opening course lecture Lamarck 
stated (1816) that only gradually did he realize what a rare glimpse into the working of nature the 
investigation of invertebrates had offered him: “… il existoit réellement un ordre à reconnoitre, 
relativement à la composition de chaque sorte d’organisation animale …” Lamarck  1972 , 29. 
 
42  
 For some discussions of animal behaviour and evolution at that time see Burkhardt  1981,  1995b . 
 
43  
 Lamarck  1809 , 274. 
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bounded and constrained – and of structures – whose specialization became more 
sophisticated – turned his narrative into a kind of division of labour. The narrative 
could be characterized as being one of accumulation, and at the same time one of 
complexification. “Feeling” could be defined from the point of view of the discourse 
on organic functions, and also from that on faculties. Lamarck was clearly juggling 
to make the two overlap so as to constitute “feelings” as a basic physico-mental 
unit. “Feeling, or the capacity for experiencing sensations” 44 ;
 Feeling is not a faculty … feeling is only an effect; that is to say the result of an organic 
act and not a faculty inherent in any of the substances, which enter into the composition of 
a body that can experience it …. none of our humours and none of our organs, not even our 
nerves, have the faculty of feeling. It is only by an illusion that we attribute the singular 
effect which we call sensation or feeling to a definite part of our body … But the very 
remarkable effect called sensation, or, when more intense, pain, is the product of the 
function of a very special system of organs, the activity of which is dependent on the 
circumstances which provoke it. 45 
 In those parts of the  Philosophie Zoologique , where feelings were discussed, Lamarck 
elaborated on the above trying to differentiate his position from those of Cabanis and 
of the phrenologist Gall: 46 “… it is our entire being that feels or rather undergoes a 
general effect … it is a commotion throughout the entire sensitive system … 47 
 In the third part of the  Philosophie Zoologique Lamarck presented a detailed 
descri ption of the general and specific movements and paths of fluids through 
variously differentiated nervous systems and their specialized sub parts and 
spaces. He repeatedly dissociated these processes from any assumption about 
non-physiological substrates. Thus the conventionally ‘mental events’ of empiricism – 
subsumed under the experiencing of feelings – were presented as direct consequences 
of physiological processes, with Lamarck refusing to give in to the demands of 
accounting for their being otherwise perceived (“an illusion,” “une hallucination” etc.). 
It seems to me that he was aware of the fact that the shift he was asking his students 
and readers to perform was neither quantitative nor obvious. Furthermore, it was one 
which, in a serious sense, could not be justified within the sensationalist framework. 
He was using the evolutionary mechanism both rhetorically and substantially as the 
lever which would perform that transition. If the capacity of experiencing was 
dependent on emerging bodily structures which did not develop by simple quantitative 
steps, then the resulting experiencing, the resulting feelings, were also an emergent 
category, embodied yet endowed with a qualitative surplus which pointed beyond. 48 
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 Lamarck  1809 , II ix, 266. 
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 Ibid., II, ix and 273. 
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 See also  Gall’s system in Lamarck  1933 . 
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 Lamarck  1809 , III, 321. 
 
48 
 A note is in order here to point out that Lamarck’s conception of ‘material’ was not a reductionist 
one in the nineteenth century sense. One has simply to recall that he did not subscribe to the ’new 
science’ at large, and specifically to Lavoisier’s chemistry. See also footnote 4. Note, though, that 
his later writings were much more zoological both in the explication of mechanisms and in the 
examples used. On a somewhat analogous problem see Kaitaro  2008 . 
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 Between 1809 and until his last book in 1820, the  Système analytique des 
connaissances positives de l’homme , Lamarck published one major work, the 
 Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (1815), as well as numerous entries 
in a natural history dictionary (1817) 49 which were later incorporated, together with 
other materials, into the  Système analytique, written when he was becoming 
completely blind. There were also many lecture notes, introductory lectures to 
the courses he had taught, and other articles and materials that had remained 
unpublished. There are certain interesting differences in the explication of some 
major notions between the  Philosophie Zoologique and these later works. There was 
also a sharpening of Lamarck’s insistence on the correctness of certain methodological 
approaches; for example, those concerning the proper order of investigation and 
exposition and those relating to norms of classification. I shall here only relate 
certain aspects of Lamarck’s description and analysis of feelings, namely, those that 
may further clarify his unique perspective as compared with his contemporaries. 
In most of the shorter later writings Lamarck did not go directly from a discussion of 
irritability to a general discussion of feelings, but instead he interposed a discussion 
of a specific feeling variously named “an obscure feeling,” “an intimate feeling,” 
“a feeling of existence,” and an “inner feeling.” Thus in the text also called 
 The Harvard MS (1810–1814) where a program for writing on human knowledge was 
being laid out, the order of exposition was such that irritability came first, then feeling 
with interior feeling as one of its sub sections, then ideas etc. In the subsequent 
editing of this work by Lamarck, the arrangement of the intended exposition was 
changed to irritability, and within the feelings section the only subsection to appear 
dealt with interior feeling. In another version only a discussion of the interior feeling 
remained. The emphasis in the later writings was on the “progressive development” 
of the nervous system whose complexified aspect I suggest was to be looked 
upon as organic emergence. Its ‘effects’ were observable on the ascending scale 
of organisms, and in particular, in the capacities for feeling in the more “complex” 
organisms, in which, incidentally, “feeling” would not be manifested when the 
supporting sub system was damaged. 50 This is almost self evident once we recall 
that the  Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (1815) was considered at the 
time a highly significant contribution to systematics. It seems to me that Lamarck 
had endeavoured to turn it into an exposition of “evolutionary systematics” – with 
a heavy emphasis on “evolutionary” – because he probably realized that the book 
would be of interest to a much wider audience than his  Philosophie Zoologique . 
Indeed, numerous unsold copies of the latter were found on the auction list of his 
library after his death. 51 The same applied, and all the more so, to the items Lamarck 
prepared for the Deterville new dictionary. There all the non specialist items written 
 
49 
 Nouveau Dictionnaire d’histoire naturelle …, Deterville, Paris, 1817–1819, Lamarck’s articles 
are from 1817. Numerous dictionaries were published in those years, reflecting the changing state 
of the respective fields. 
 
50 
 For example, see  Discours d’ouverture 1816 in Lamarck  1972 , 40–41; such quasi incidental 
comments indicate the extent to which Lamarck was well versed in the medical debates of his time. 
 
51 
 Lamarck  1830 . 
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by Lamarck (i.e. not the ones on conchology and on meteorology) were followed by 
parallel entries by Virey. 52 
 The manner in which evolutionary matters were dealt within the 1815 primarily 
classificatory work and in the subsequent publications from 1815 till 1822 is of 
interest. The principal thrust of the general part of the 1815 work was presented in 
the form of “first principles” in which Lamarck tried to tie together method, model, 
and a rhetoric adequate to the task, so as to distinguish his position clearly from 
those of vitalists, idéologues, phrenologists, 53 proponents of the ”new science” and 
the new comparative anatomy. And with respect to “feelings” – first and foremost 
a re-affirmation of a material-organic interpretation of ‘feelings’ and this within his 
framework of relations between functions and structures. 54 
 Lamarck summarized his position in a short, condensed manner stating that 
the faculties were separate in their organic structures, but cohered, and were part 
of an ascending, interrelated, tangled web of relationships within the same 
organism. The fundamental relationship was that of functions to specialized 
organs. The novelty here was the emphasis on the fact that this framework 
worked adequately, fittingly, all along the evolutionary path. Thus for a lower animal, 
devoid for example of ‘feeling’ (advanced faculties such as intelligence and 
judgement) “will be for them superfluous faculties, of which they have no use” 
– having them would probably be “damaging/dangerous for animals so delicate”. 55 
 
52 
 See Virey  1817 –1822, Corsi  1987 , Benichou and Blanckaert 1992, Blanckaert  2002 . 
 
53 
 See Destutt de Tracy  1817 –1818,  La Décade  1794 –1804, Goetz  1986,  1993 , Moravia  1980 , and 
Young  1970 . 
 
54 
 The meaning of this discussion is enhanced by putting it side by side with the list of “zoological 
questions” found in the  Harvard MS , which is believed to have been written around the same time. 
These two writings seem, indeed, to be carrying a question-answer relationship, particularly on 
the matters mentioned above. Lamarck  1933 , 185–189. 
 
55  
 Lamarck  1815 –1822, Introduction, 23–24. “seraient pour eux des facultés superflues, et dont ils ne 
feraient aucun usage,” “nuisible à des animaux si délicats” (on the division of invertebrates). In his 
later writings Lamarck found some difficulties with his former presentation of the division of inver-
tebrates, because according to it one of the two lowest classes by the criteria of the nervous system, 
namely ‘worms’, was found to be higher up by the criteria of the stage of development of other 
systems, creating an unexplained “jump” in an otherwise continuously and gradually ascending 
series. Thus in a late writing, he decided to divide the invertebrates into two branches rather than his 
usual unilinear ascending one, as e.g. in ‘Des rapports’ 1816–1817 ( Lamarck  1972 , 276–281). S. J. 
Gould argued that it was a later reflection on an earlier comment by Cuvier on the division of that 
realm (Gould  1999a,  b) . Note, this is contrary to Darwin’s branching tree of descent with a single 
trunk. Lamarck’s conceptual picture of the series was, indeed, similar and he had uniform ordering 
rules which applied to all living organisms (Daudin 1926). But in order to account for transformation 
and non-extinction of species he had added spontaneous generation of most elementary living enti-
ties. These would then, by a slow process stretching over long chunks of time, become ‘more per-
fected’ organisms, in the various animal realms. But it was primarily the various deviations caused 
by ’circumstances’ that added branches to the earlier picture of the evolutionary tree, thus undermin-
ing the simple coherence of the ‘echelle’ image. In  Histoire des animaux sans vertèbres one finds a 
marked emphasis on the adequate fit between organisms and their subsystems and faculties and their 
‘needs’. Yet in the supplement to that work, Lamarck admitted that the actual order, or ‘the order of 
productions’, as he named it, was differently constructed. 
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Or in a long elaboration to prove that this fit in all its details on various levels, and 
in relation to differing “faculties” supported by the nervous systems: “… there is 
always a perfect relationship between the needs, the faculties which satisfy them, 
and the organs that supply these faculties.” 56 In these later writings there was a 
renewed emphasis on the relationship between individuality and life, which had 
been a feature mainly of Lamarck’s earlier writings. The progressive development 
of more complex organic sub systems which supported more advanced functions 
was meticulously presented in the  Histoire as a result of interactive adaptations to 
ever newly posited needs, thus attenuating the role of ‘inner inclination’ to perfection 
when compared to its exposition in the  Philosophie Zoologique . This is most 
conspicuous in analyzing the progressive development and diversification of the 
nervous system. Given the different context in which this work was composed, 
Lamarck did not try to distinguish himself from either Cabanis or Richerand. 57 And 
when discussing the need, already well articulated in the  Philosophie Zoologique , to 
separate irritability and sensibility, and to distinguish between muscular movement 
based on a nervous system and muscular irritability, he criticized Haller in a direct 
manner that had been absent in the  Philosophie Zoologique . In general, one can 
say that critical comments were much more frequent and direct in  Histoire , and 
the former tortuously detailed formulation of correlative relationships tended to be 
collapsed into shorter ones e.g. “Surely, there are none but nerves which would 
be the true organs of sentiment/feeling.” 58 
 In his last work, the  Système analytique, Lamarck followed the same pattern as 
in all the other major ones: the first chapters dealt with the world at large, including 
the non living, concept of nature etc. The marked difference in this last work was the 
perspective from which these were discussed, namely: “What were the sources of 
knowledge available to humans? Under what constraints were these sources?, and 
“Were these compatible with his (Lamarck) view of the mechanisms of perceiving 
and thinking available to human beings?” There is hardly any difference in content 
or theoretical devices between the other late writings and the  Système , as far as the 
explication of ‘feelings’ was concerned. Both analysis and description were much 
more succinct and tended to deal only with superior evolutionary forms – i.e. 
 
56  
 “ … Qu’il y a toujours partout un rapport parfait entre les besoins, les facultés d’y satisfaire, et 
les organes qui donnent ces facultés” (ibid, 252). This had an underlining pointing at Cuvier’s 
conception of ‘nature’, as the rhetorical thrust of the introduction was intended to undermine the 
latter’s definition for ’animal’. Lamarck’s own exposition of the characteristics of a ‘living body’ 
harked back to the project “Biologie” he delineated in 1802 but never carried out. Barsanti  1995, 
 1997a , Corsi  2006 , and from a very different angle, Rey  1994 . Corsi argued that it happened for 
socio-political reasons. In accordance with the ‘adequate and fit’ framework Lamarck offered 
detailed and elaborate explications for the appearance of novel forms of organic adaptation in the 
lower invertebrates without the need for an explanatory mechanism involving ‘feelings’. 
 
57  Cabanis’s work mentioned earlier and see Richerand, 1804. 
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 “Assurément, il n’ya que des nerfs qui soient les vrais organes du sentiment …” (Lamarck 
 1815 –1822, I, 240). 
228 S. Gissis
humans. Those that were taken from the dictionary items formed in some ways an 
interconnected chain within the book. 59 
 3  “Sentiment  Intérieur” 
 I shall now attempt to analyze a special form of feelings in which, once again, the 
evolutionary perspective was posited as innovative, even when somewhat similar 
notions appeared elsewhere. I shall discuss the notion of  sentiment intérieur – 
“inner feeling” which Lamarck characterized thus:
 every sensing being, i.e. a being which is endowed with the faculty of sensing, and nowhere 
else but the animal-realm that beings of that sort exist, possesses a sentiment intérieur, 
which it enjoys without discerning it, that gives it (the being) a very obscure notion of its 
existence, or put differently, constitutes in it the feeling of its being, and in this way allows 
[donne lieu] for that “I” so familiar to us, because we have the capacity to pay attention to 
it. This intimate feeling of existence, in one word this particular ‘I’ [ ‘moi’] has been well 
known to us, as I have said.; but it seems to me that the sentiment intérieur that allows for 
it [the ‘moi’], constituting a power which on the one hand is susceptible to being moved by 
[i.e. responsive to] any felt need, and on the other hand is capable of immediately causing 
action, has not been recognized by anyone before me. 60 
 This short paragraph encapsulates what I consider one of Lamarck’s most original 
ways of applying the evolutionary grid to contemporaneous naturalist, philosophical 
and cultural issues. 
 The  sentiment intérieur was, on the one hand, a feeling i.e. falls under the 
explanatory mechanisms of feelings, and was emergent in the same sense that feelings 
within Lamarck’s theory were. Yet on the other hand, it differed in remarkable ways 
from them, which tended to put into question it being ‘a feeling’. 
 In the earlier period i.e. from 1800–1806 this  sentiment, in the form of  sentiment 
d’existence , is mentioned only once, as a component of the events that ‘happen’ in 
that part of the nervous system related to feelings “… In the feeling of existence of 
an individual organism, and in the need which the organism experiences instanta-
neously when it thinks.”  61 I believe that it indicates that Lamarck was aware of the 
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 Direct and indirect criticism of these can be found in some related and parallel items by Virey 
 1817 –1822 see also Corsi  1987 . 
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 Lamarck  1817 , “Instinct,” 332, original emphases. “Tout être sensible, c’est-à-dire, doué de la 
faculté de sentir, et ce n’est que dans le règne animal qu’il en existe de cette sorte, possède un 
sentiment intérieur, dont il jouit sans le discerner, qui lui donne une notion très-obscure de son 
existence, ou autrement, qui constitue en lui le sentiment de son être, et qui y donne lieu à ce moi 
si connu de nous, parce que nous avons le pouvoir d’y donner de l’attention. Ce sentiment intime 
d’existence, en un mot, ce moi en question nous étoit bien connu, comme je viens de le dire; mais 
le sentiment intérieur qui y donne lieu, constituant une puissance, d’une part, susceptible d’être 
émue par tout besoin senti, et de l’autre, capable de faire agir immédiatement, ne me paroît avoir 
été reconnu par personne avant moi.” 
 
61  
 Lamarck  1802 , 168. “… dans le sentiment d’existence de l’individu, et dans le besoin qu’il 
éprouve dans l’instant où il pense.” 
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possible criticism of the rudimentary theory of feelings he was constructing at 
the time, but was vaguely indicating that whatever solution that would be found had 
to remain within the bounds of the conceptual scheme delineated. 
 Let me draw a very rough sketch of the thorny field concerning ‘self’ and ‘feelings’: 
During the eighteenth century at least three major traditions of dealing with the 
enduring self identity of individuals and with the explanatory mechanisms for 
perception and intellection, battled, with discrete components of each getting 
intertwined with others in a wide array of variations, none of which I shall attempt 
to trace here. 62 These were the theological seventeenth century positions on the soul, 
either Catholic or Protestant, the Cartesian two substances varieties and the 
sensualist range of solutions – or rather non-solutions – within their epistemological 
grid. Beside these one should mention the Spinozist influence, which according 
to some scholars colored debates at least until the mid-eighteenth century. 63 
A plethora of programs and disciplinary frameworks had developed in the 
spaces between these three. By the end of that century sensualist-empiricist 
approach seemed to be predominant, particularly in the fields of medical physiology 
and (empirical) natural history. Naturalists as well as physiologists struggled 
with the various ways of reading Newton, and of applying mechanistic models 
to what was gradually perceived as complex time-dependent processes in 
nature (and in society).These seemed to them to resist mathematization and 
quantification. How to achieve a fit under these terms between on the one hand the 
(macro) phenomena perceived as those that demanded an explanation – e.g. life, 
generation-heredity-development, perception and intellection, cohesive unity and 
functional diversity in the organism – and the micro mechanisms proffered for that 
purpose, on the other, became a difficult task. 
 The positions that resonated with Lamarck, as far as one can judge from his 
muted interlocutors, were probably the physician-vitalist one, the more severe 
monist materialism such as d’Holbach’s, and the mixed options delineated 
by some members of the Idéologues group and by Diderot. They had in 
common the shunning of introspection as a privileged venue to the ‘self’, and the 
attempt to construct physical–physiological explanatory mechanisms, preferably 
non-reductive ones. 
 Concurrently, this was a period of profound economic, social and cultural 
changes, which some historians view as the period of the emergence of the “self” 
both in high and low culture and as a scientific object. 64 Most thinkers during 
 
62 
 I have intentionally tried to avoid using general terms such as materialism, vitalism, or mechanism 
in my analysis, because I think that within the context of the passage from the eighteenth to 
nineteenth century they are not helpful in trying to understand the particular case I discuss. One 
obvious reason for that may be that their meaning was changing. But see e.g. somewhat indirectly 
Blanckaert  2002 , and more directly Bourdier  1971 , Corsi  1982 , Dixon  1988 , Hagner  1992 , Sloan 
 1990 , Smith  1995 , Thomson  2001 . 
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 See Israel  2001,  2006 , and the debates these volumes sparked. 
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 Goldstein 2000,  2005 , Wahrman  2004 ; Habermas vs. Koselleck and the debate on the public 
sphere in the eighteenth century. See also Staum  1996 , Stedman and Gareth  2002 . 
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the second half of the eighteenth century, particularly in France, looked upon the 
individual as the basic unit of description and analysis. 65 Thus the ‘self’ was 
problematized in both the ’social’ and the ’natural’ discourses of the time. When 
Lamarck called the ‘self’ a feeling, he was using an option already there in the 
repertoire of models of enduring cohesive identity; once again his innovativeness 
lay in the evolutionary grid applied to this notion. Let me elaborate and illustrate. 
Lamarck discussed that notion in the  Philosophie Zoologique and in fact this was 
the most detailed working out of its meaning in use. Even though Lamarck used 
both names –  sentiment intérieur and  sentiment d’existence, 66 the former was much 
more frequent, and when using the latter it was often accompanied by further 
adjectives such as – the intimate sense of … the obscure sense of … the obscure 
notion of …, and from 1817 on also ‘ conscience de ’ which appeared in a couple of 
items of the dictionary. In these cases the distinction between conscious and 
non conscious animals was significant to his argument, and the same goes for 
the distinction between humans and animals in the  Système .  Sentiment intérieur 
appeared already in the preface which summarized the  Philosophie Zoologique . 
It was defined as a feeling ‘aroused by needs’ and a causal agent in both movements 
and actions related to needs. The assumption of special organs for specialized 
functions meant that there was a particular space within Lamarck’s construction of 
the nervous system, where took place the processes of a need being felt through 
‘emotion’, 67 and the processes resulting in the formation of an action and/or a 
reaction. Being activated by a need meant, within the Lamarckian explanation, that 
the  sentiment intérieur played an important role in the formation of habits, which, 
when becoming an acquired trait, were passed on inter-generationally. This ‘feeling’ 
of one’s existence was there continually. This “feeling” pervaded the whole organism 
as it gathered feelings produced by the very activities of living and was thus based 
on the interconnectedness of the nervous system. This interconnectedness served to 
bind together processes. It replaced what earlier in the century had been considered 
two substances, or alternatively, a bodily substance and some non-bodily substance 
ruling and activating it. Thus Lamarck provided a substitute to a substantive substrate 
of the functional unity of the organism, i.e. for him the organism functioned reactively 
and efficaciously. It meant a stable system which was both self referring and a referral 
system, referring to the ever present needs of the living organism as a cohesive whole 
in relation to its inner working and in its distributed functioning. This was in relation 
 
65 
 Note, though, that some (e.g. Ferguson and even Condorcet in his late writings) argued that one 
could not imagine, hypothesize, describe or analyze discrete individuals in isolation: they had to 
be considered already as socialized, already within the context of some society. They all thought 
that an explanation for the fact that sociability was a universal human trait had to be provided. 
From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards the dynamic character of being human 
became emphasized as the foremost feature at both the individual and the collective level, and 
became a key notion in eighteenth century writings on the mechanism for culture or for civility to 
evolve. 
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 See Jordanova  1981 . 
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 For Lamarck ‘emotion’ had to do with having a power to affect movement. 
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to needs, particularly survival and adaptational needs, arising in its interaction with 
the environment, as embodied in this generalized continuous state. Lamarck looked 
upon the nervous system as having distinct and separate parts for sensing and for 
movement. The uniqueness of the  sentiment intérieur was, for him, its ability to be 
both a transmitter, as indicated above, and an initiator of movement. 
 Viewing the  sentiment intérieur through the evolutionary grid meant that it was 
emergent, absent in very low invertebrates and appearing in crude form in invertebrates 
from insects up. Being ‘a feeling’ it could not exist without a nervous system plus 
the fluids mechanism which would support it, and both its degree of sophistication 
and efficacy in bodily movement – i.e. of constraint, compulsion, control and 
choice – depended on the complexity of this supportive system. It meant that verte-
brates in general, mammals and humans in particular, had a more privileged position 
in relation to it. The assumption of an emergent, gradual  sentiment intérieur was 
intended to resolve the empiricist cul-de-sac of identity-and-continuity of the self 68 on 
many levels. The  sentiment intérieur provided the organism with a coherence arising 
from discrete components, encompassing the whole organized living-body-system, 
endowing it with an ever newly constituted unity-in diversity, completely embodied 
and yet accounting for the transition to emergent graduated experiencing, which 
already at its elementary level was regulating and monitoring. 69 Moreover, because 
the  sentiment intérieur was constituted as both receptor and initiator it was 
constituted as a necessary condition for higher functioning such as a variety of 
modes of thought of which volitional acts were a derivation. 
 Lamarck discussed some of the enabling conditions for the higher mental 
functions in the  Philosophie Zoologique , in the  Histoire , in the dictionary items, in 
the  Système analytique based on them, as well as a couple of writings from 
the second decade of the nineteenth century. 70 Let me briefly mention one such 
condition – ‘attention’ – which illustrated the growing complexity of the nervous 
system. Whereas the  sentiment intérieur was wide ranging, ‘ attention ’ was posited 
as a narrow and specialized function closely and directly related to it. ‘ Attention ’ 71 
was a term which acquired, besides its more generalized use during that period, also 
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 Which Goldstein  2005 calls horizontal fragmentation of the self. 
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 Another important facet of the  sentiment intérieur comes through Lamarck’s discussion of 
instinct and Lamarck’s position within the contemporaneous controversy on that, but this is 
beyond the present paper. 
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 For example, Discours d’ouverture de 1816, Apperçu analytique des connaissances humaines. 
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 As he says in the  Philosophie Zoologique : “Ainsi, pour que les traits ou l’ image de l’ objet qui 
a causé la sensation puissent parvenir dans l’ organe de l’ entendement et être imprimés sur 
quelque partie de cet organe, il faut, premièrement, que l’ acte qu’ on nomme attention, prépare l’ 
organe à en recevoir l’impression, ou que ce même acte ouvre la voie qui peut faire arriver le 
produit de cette sensation à l’ organe sur lequel peuvent s’imprimer les traits de l’ objet qui y a 
donné lieu:  et pour qu’ une idée quelconque puisse parvenir ou être rappelée à la conscience, il 
faut, à l’ aide encore de l’ attention, que le fluide nerveux en rapporte les traits au sentiment 
intérieur de l’individu, ce qui alors lui rend cette idée présente ou sensible … ” (Lamarck  1809 , 
375–376, my emphasis). Or in ‘Idée’ ( Nouveau Dictionnaire ) : “Cet acte … qui seul … donne le 
pouvoir d’exécuter toute autre opération de l’intelligence.” Lamarck  1817 , 83. 
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a specialized signification related to the practice of naturalists during the eighteenth 
century, namely, a willed selection of observation as well as that of rapt concentration 
and absorption with a corresponding physiological mechanism to enable ‘the soul’ 
to do that. 72 Lamarck lifted ‘ attention ’ from its more accepted use, and from its use 
among the Idéologues and particularly Cabanis, in order to deploy it for a differing 
purpose. Contrary to Cabanis, he assumed a unitary organic individual, and 
denied the possibility of a scattered or divided ‘moi’. 73 As mentioned earlier, the 
rudimentary sense of existence did not entail in any way either thinking or judging, 
capacities ordinarily characterizing human singularity at that time. ‘ Attention ’ was 
explicated as one of the necessary preconditions for enabling the physiological 
arrangements which catered for the formation of ideas out of impressions, 
and thereby also for memorization. 74 One could view it as a mechanism for fixing 
the object of sensation, prolonging its duration in the relevant receptor parts 
of the nervous system, thereby allowing for a focusing pause. That activity of 
making the pause possible could be seen as a time-component in the spatial-
physiological description of thinking, of the formation of ideas. It allowed for 
gathering-and-enhancing in order to enable a move from one order of mental 
functioning to the next-qualitatively higher, i.e. more complex one, possible only in 
specific spaces within the nervous system, such as available only to the ‘highest’ 
among the four groups of organisms endowed with  sentiment intérieur. 
 To sum up: Lamarck started from a third person description in order to convey 
the meaning of a first person experience. 75 Damasio’s table of self 76 delineates an 
evolutionary path from proto self to a core self (with consciousness), which can 
help in grasping what Lamarck was attempting to do. There were naturalists who 
suggested inner feelings before Lamarck, most conspicuously Buffon and Cabanis 77 
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 Daston  2004 , 117,  2007 , 240–41. 
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 Cabanis discussed the possibility of partial, plural, ‘moi’, related to differing nervous centers, 
but he declared that one could say very little about them “puisque toutes nos sensations de moi 
rapportent exclusivement au centre général et que nos moyens d’acquérir des notions exactes” 
depend on grasping the circumstances “dans leur enchaînement”, ibid, 503. 
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 This is where Cabanis’ and Lamarck’s positions are similar: Cabanis dealt only with humans, and 
wrote profusely on ‘pain’ and its important role in medicine. Thus  ‘attention’ was posited as a neces-
sary condition not only for the very reception and transmission of an impression, but also for the 
production of pain. These matters are discussed in the first three memoirs and in the tenth as well . 
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 Taylor  1989 . 
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 Damasio  1999 , 199, Damasio and Damasio  2006 ; see also Edelman  2006 . 
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 But note that though the term was used by numerous authors in France, particularly in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, it was rather polysemic. Its varying meanings, though non overlap-
ping, related primarily to humans, e.g. to the moral, to that which is beyond reason etc. and when 
related to animals (e.g. Buffon  1749 –1788, 15 cxxix, see http://www.buffon.cnrs.fr.) the compari-
son emphasized the gap, the conspicuous difference between the two. Cabanis used only ‘sentiment 
d’existence’, and related it to issues of the will, for example being a physician, when he discussed 
the changes brought about by different living regimes, particularly nutrition, that could ”en un mot, 
à donner un plus grand sentiment d’existence” Cabanis  1805 , 386. Or when he discussed sympathy, 
sentiment of self and will. (ibid, 541). For Cabanis “le moi réside exclusivement dans la volonté,” 
and even the foetus has a sense of that (ibid, 31). 
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(who restricted it to an inner feeling in humans only), but it was Lamarck’s 
evolutionary perspective on ‘feelings’ in general and on ‘inner feeling’ in particular 
which made his suggestion a generative one for psychologists in the nineteenth 
century. Yet, when looking at the notion within his scheme, it is clear that  sentiment 
intérieur did not fulfil the role of a feeling, this in Lamarck’s own view, and 
belonged much more in his ‘faculty discourse’. 
 The assumption of  sentiment intérieur/sentiment d’existence first elaborated 
in the  Philosophie Zoologique was reworked again in the  Histoire , but these 
presentations differed primarily in their emphasis. 
 The source and cause of movement of lower organisms were outside pressures. 
They had tropism-like movements, and the reason for it, mentioned in the 
 Philosophie Zoologique and elaborated upon in much more detail in Lamarck’s 
 Système , was the inability to have feelings, and thus to enjoy the concerted bodily 
movements related to  sentiment intérieur : “Now, the very imperfect animals under 
consideration since they do not in anyway possess the  sentiment intérieur in 
question, would not know having or have means of eliciting in them the instigating 
cause of their movements. Obviously, it comes to them from the outside, and 
certainly it is not at their disposal; also, none of their needs necessitate it being 
there; that is what I have already shown. All that they need is found within their 
reach; they are animals only by virtue of being irritable.” 78 
 Already in the  Philosophie Zoologique , but much more so in his  Histoire 79 and 
in his  Système , Lamarck tried to stretch the epistemological and cultural (“moral”) 
work that the  sentiment intérieur could do within his system, and indeed turn it 
into a full blown social-cultural self, including morals, 80 e.g. to point to a diversity 
and wide range of needs characteristic of humans which would be amplified by 
civilization. 81 In addition, Lamarck also tried to relate it to memory, imagination, 
and intelligence, and its mode of functioning as initiating and bringing about 
human proclivities – above all that of tending to preserve oneself. In fact, in higher 
mammals and in humans a wide range of social behaviours could be derived from 
the latter. Thus, as far as humans were concerned, Lamarck posited within the 
sensualist framework a feeling of an active “self,” which, being a necessary result 
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 Lamarck  1801 , 251. ”Or, les animaux très-imparfaits dont il s’agit, ne possédant nullement le 
sentiment intérieur en question, ne sauraient avoir ou faire naître en eux la cause excitatrice de 
leurs mouvemens. Elle leur vient donc évidemment du dehors, et dès lors elle n’est assurément 
pas à leur disposition; aussi aucun de leurs besoins n’exige qu’elle le soit; ce que j’ai déjà fait 
voir. Tout ce qu’il leur faut se trouve à leur portée; ce ne sont des animaux que parce qu’ils 
sont irritables.” 
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 As well as in the articles written for the Deterville dictionary. 
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 “Maintenant, il est indispensable de montrer que les penchans des animaux sensibles, que ceux 
même de l’homme, ainsi que ses passions, sont encore des phénomènes de l’organisation, des 
produits naturels et nécessaires du sentiment intérieur de ces êtres.” Lamarck  1801 , 258. 
 
81 
 Given that for Lamarck there was an evolutionary fit between possible needs, the specific 
faculties which would satisfy them and their supporting organs, the absence of  sentiment intérieur 
was indicative of the narrow range of the organism’s needs, and vice versa, and of the place of its 
series (a term often used, and much less loaded for him than species). See Daudin 1926. 
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of organic structures was in that sense, moreover, “innate.” However, this feeling of 
an active “self” was meaningless within human culture without “experiencing” 
within a specific environment (in that sense a Piaget-like structure) e.g. “No doubt, 
man is born without ideas, without enlightenment, in possession of nothing 
but a  sentiment intérieur and general proclivities which tend to exert themselves 
mechanically. It is only with time and through education, experience and the 
circumstances which he encounters that he acquires ideas and knowledge.” 82 
 In conceiving the  sentiment intérieur Lamarck was answering questions at the 
focus of eighteenth century, particularly late eighteenth century, debates, and using 
eighteenth century means – e.g. materialization of the mental. However, his evolu-
tionary perspective, which assumed both growing complexification and openness to 
the environment, compelled him to look for a unifying cohering foundation for the 
individualized entities which populated his theory. This foundation had to cater to 
the demands of “science’ 83 as well as those of ’experience’, and thus he produced 
the first version of an evolutionary ‘self’, and a new conception of ’internality’. 
 I shall end with a brief remark: When Lamarck had reached the limits of the then 
prevalent modes and models of explanation of living nature, he gradually constructed 
a model which by virtue of combining time, genealogy and causality could provide 
a better description and analysis of processes of emergence – of the emergence of 
complexity and of complex self organization – which Lamarck came to see as the 
principal features of the living entities. This model was at the core of Lamarck’s 
innovations – explicating the ‘feelings’ and the ‘experiencing self’ that I have 
discussed in this paper. It aimed to encompass all the known functioning of the 
human mind and of the human psyche, and it did so by situating humanity as a 
component of a natural continuity. The basic analytical units, the mechanisms, the 
generalizations, the laws, all would have to apply to living organisms at large in 
order to apply to humans. It “naturalized” human behaviour by putting it on a par 
with the behaviour of any living organism. The patterns and mechanisms that would 
apply to living nature would apply to human perception and consciousness, as well 
as to unconscious, purposeful, planned and spontaneous human activities; to 
thought, feelings, desires, and in fact to both individual and social behaviour. 
The problématiques that Lamarck dealt with were certainly those of the natural 
history and of the physicians-physiologists communities of the time, and were 
conceived within the broadly defined framework of sensualism–associationism. 
His questions were defined within this conceptual framework, but the variety of 
answers given within this framework must have been deeply unsatisfactory to him. 
His innovative stance, which answered the questions by freeing himself from 
 
82 
 “Sans doute, l’homme naît sans idées, sans lumières, ne possédant alors qu’un sentiment intérieur 
et des penchans généraux qui tendent machinalement à s’exercer. Ce n’est qu’avec le temps et par 
l’éducation, l’expérience, et les circonstances dans lesquelles il se rencontre, qu’il acquiert des 
idées et des connaissances” (Lamarck  1817 , 279). 
 
83  
 The  idéologues as well as Lamarck certainly worked under the constraint of the evolving 
conception of science as produced in the 1st class of the  Institut which Lamarck regularly attended 
and of which he was an active member until he became totally blind. Without the theological self, the 
social understanding of man’s place in nature also became a matter of scientific knowledge. 
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that framework embodied a systematic and thoroughgoing application of an 
evolutionary perspective on the living world. With that he laid a possible foundation 
for a novel, generative framework. 
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Part III
Embodied Minds
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 Abstract  Associated ideas, complained Locke, follow one another “without any 
care or attention.” In a brilliant inversion of Locke’s nervous worries about the perils 
of misassociation, Hume resolved the sceptical despair brought on by philosophical 
reasoning only by returning to mindlessness: “carelessness and in-attention alone 
can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely on them” ( Treatise , I.4.2). 
How did British natural and moral philosophers in the early eighteenth century 
think about what happens when the mind is elsewhere? How did they theorize the 
processes by which thoughts, fancies, memories, daydreams, and feelings come to 
mind without prompting either by reason or reality, by the will or by the world? 
Examining works by Mead, Harris, Gibbs, and Branch, I detail the role of bodily 
fluids and nervous spirits in “conveying the mischief” by which imagination tends 
to ruffle our calm. Minds are often surprised by their own habits, and various 
forms of regimen were recommended in these works of medical psychology 
and moral physiology to ‘pinion’ the imagination and still the roving thoughts. 
I anchor these local discussions within a broader enquiry into mind-wandering and 
‘stimulus-independent thought’, and sketch a rich neurophilosophical background 
to Hume’s views on the bodily bases of custom and habit. 
 1  The Restless Mind 1 
 Like us, early modern philosophers, both natural and moral, didn’t always under-
stand the springs of their own actions. They didn’t want to feel everything they felt, 
and couldn’t trace the sources of all their thoughts and imaginings. Events from 
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and the Physiology of Fantasy from Locke 
to Hume 
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 The original research on which this paper is based was conducted at the Wellcome Institute way 
back in February 1999, and I presented initial talks in 1999 to audiences in Sydney and Edinburgh, 
and at the annual conference of the International Society for the History of the Neurosciences in 
Lausanne. My work then on early eighteenth-century English medico-psychological writers like 
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past experience come to mind again unwilled: abstract thought is interrupted by 
fantastical images, like the “winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants” 
by which Hume exemplified “the liberty of the imagination.” 2 Then, as now, a failure 
to keep a train of thought on track could be blamed for both personal and social ills, 
for wasted lives and erratic policies. The ongoing struggle to distinguish the 
deliverances of reason from what Hume called ‘the loose and indolent reveries of 
a castle-builder” 3 thus required scrutiny of daydream and fancy as much as belief 
and knowledge. 4 The mind’s tendencies to float and to roam were of great interest 
to early modern philosophers as well as to others concerned with medicine, mental 
health, morals, education, and taste. This paper sketches one local line of thinking 
and theorizing about ‘mind-wandering’ and its bodily causes in British philosophy 
over the first decades of the eighteenth century, as a small exemplar of a form of 
cognitive history intended to illuminate independent historical and contemporary 
concerns about our understanding of mental life. The dual aim is to see problems 
in our historical material that we might otherwise miss, and to use history to explore 
phenomena more or less marginalized by modern psychology. 5 
 Historians of philosophy often interpret early modern thinkers, in differing 
traditions and for differing reasons, as tempted by the view that mind requires 
awareness. Notable exceptions may be acknowledged: this is one reason Hume’s 
claim that experience may produce belief and judgement “by a secret operation, 
and without once being thought of” was dramatic and puzzling. 6 But awareness 
and control together are taken to have formed a standing ideal or paradigm for 
mental life: the ordered mind, at least, would exhibit complete and undivided 
Mead, Harris, Gibbs, and Branch was intended to pick up loose threads from my book  Philosophy 
and Memory Traces (Sutton  1998) , uneasy with my own carping at historical thinkers’ resistance 
to confusion, their struggles with internal division, their desperate attempts to clean out the mind. 
The Embodied Empiricism project affords a new context for a more constructive line through this 
material, and I’m most grateful to Charles Wolfe for the encouragement to do so and for his general 
support. My thanks for help in that earlier phase to Catalin Avramescu, Stephen Gaukroger, L.S. 
Jacyna, Peter Jones, Jamie Kassler, Doris McIlwain, Gail Kern Paster, Udo Thiel, and Richard 
Yeo. For thinking through issues about ‘mindlessness’ and applying intelligence to the reflexes 
with me in other contexts more recently, I’m grateful to Wayne Christensen, Ed Cooke, Andrew 
Geeves, Doris McIlwain, Meta Regis, and Evelyn Tribble. Lisa Shapiro’s excellent commentary 
at the Embodied Empiricism meeting in February 2009 was particularly helpful, as were questions 
from Dominic Murphy and Richard Yeo. This is also an opportunity to acknowledge the enormous 
influence of the boundary-spanning work of G.S. Rousseau on imagination and ‘discourses of the 
nerve’. If I engage explicitly with his writings less here than on some previous occasions, it’s only 
because this is, in a sense, so thoroughly his topic, and I can only point readers to the essays 
now helpfully collected in Rousseau  2004 , and especially to his remarkable recent essay on 
eighteenth-century ‘brainomania’ (Rousseau  2008) . 
 
2  
 Hume  1739 /1978, I.1.3, at p. 8. 
 
3 
 Hume  1739 /1978, 624. 
 
4 
 See also Tierney-Hynes  2007 on the ‘castle-builder’. 
 
5 
 On cognitive history compare Richardson  2001 ; Lloyd  2007 ; Smail  2008 ; Sutton  2000,  2002, 
 2007a ; Tribble  2005 . We hope that the risks taken in work like this of catching ‘the virus of the 
precursor’ are outweighed by the benefits. 
 
6 
 1739/1978, 104; Traiger  1994 . 
245Carelessness and Inattention
mindfulness, and be regulated by the agent’s will in harmony with reason. 
The prevalence of these default assumptions created trouble, firstly, for philosophers 
and moralists who wanted to construe the old conflict between reason and the 
passions as occurring  within the mind, rather than between the self and entirely 
alien forces. 7 Further, it was hard to find theoretical room for the occurrence of any 
ideas, memories, decisions, or feelings with no or diminished awareness (“without 
once being thought of”), or in the absence of voluntary regulation and direction. 
Ordinary mind-wandering, daydreaming, and fancy remained mysterious and 
poorly-theorized: it was difficult to identify the distinct dimensions on which these 
nebulous psychological phenomena need to be studied. Yet we can still identify many 
distinctive historical attitudes, in both theory and practice, to the relations – conflictual 
or interactive, in competition or in coordination – between what we might think 
of as the attentive mind and the floating mind. Perhaps the dominant strains of 
Western moral psychology have privileged reflection and control, encouraging us 
to be suspicious of and to minimise the influence of unguided thinking: but there 
have also often been alternative views, both mystical and naturalistic, which value 
both mind-wandering and habitual flow. 
 In the twentieth century’s quite different intellectual context, brave alliances 
between psychodynamic and cognitive approaches to the unconscious were needed 
gradually to initiate the scientific study of unguided thought flow, zoning-out, and 
mind-wandering. 8 Anti-dualist consensus notwithstanding, executive control (over 
thought and action alike) is still often seen as requiring both awareness and intent: 
this has rightly been blamed for the prevalent psychological neglect of daydreaming 
and fantasy. 9 Such processes are often precisely driven by the agent’s current concerns, 
by ongoing or unfinished goals 10 , yet are initiated and maintained without explicit 
intention and (sometimes) without ongoing awareness. So official theories which 
yoked agency to intention or awareness rendered such phenomena barely visible. 
 Again, of course, there are strong counter-movements, reaching well beyond 
psychoanalytic theory, which do encourage the incorporation of the tacit realm 
 within our psychology. But, despite helpfully attending to inattention, in some cases 
these alternative lines of thought reinforce key dichotomies from their rationalist 
targets. Philosophers of various persuasions argue against over-reliance (in theory and 
in practice) on attention and top-down control, suggesting that “mindedness is the 
enemy of embodied coping,” 11 or that a wandering mind “is conducive to effective 
action because of its responsiveness to the objective demands of one’s materials and 
circumstances;” 12 while both philosophers and cognitive psychologists underline 
the pervasiveness of automaticity in everyday life, 13 and the ironic or self-refuting 
 
7 
 James  1999 ; Schmitter  2006 . 
 
8 
 Singer  1966 ; Antrobus et al  1970 ; Berntsen  2009 . 
 
9 
 Smallwood and Schooler  2006 ; Schupak and Rosenthal  2009 . 
 
10 
 Klinger  2008 . 
 
11 
 Dreyfus  2007 , 353. 
 
12 
 Velleman  2007 , 184. 
 
13 
 Gendler  2008 ; Bargh  1997 . 
246 J. Sutton
tendencies of attempts at mental control. 14 But even when nonconscious thoughts 
and feelings are no longer seen as entirely outside the cognitive realm, they are too 
often still construed, as in early modern discussions, as lacking in both knowledge 
and control. These twin pillars of the mind were and are often yoked together: then 
described as reason and will, now as (say) declarative knowledge and executive 
control. Habitual or grooved thoughts and actions operate in the main, the idea 
goes, without access to explicit background beliefs or factual memory, and often 
without in turn leaving any explicit trace in memory; and they characteristically 
operate ‘automatically’, without the need for deliberate initiation or conscious 
online guidance. These views are buttressed by some neuroscientific work, 
which sees sequence memory as crystallized and inflexible once learned, with the 
components of kinaesthetic sequences chunked as single entities in memory, hard 
to uncouple and selective redeploy, and habit memory entirely “controlled by 
antecedent stimuli,” evacuated of awareness so that we act on its basis “without 
anticipating the consequences.” 15 
 Studying the diverse phenomena of mind-wandering – of carelessness and 
inattention – can, I suggest, help us undermine these dichotomies between 
goal-directed and automatic action, and between controlled and habitual thinking. 
Between the basic reflex and fully reflective, deliberate, self-aware action lie 
extraordinarily diverse arrays of distinct psychological phenomena, which vary on 
many different dimensions. 16 Neither awareness nor control, neither knowledge nor 
intention, neither reason nor will, need be seen in an all-or-nothing manner. 
 This historical study is thus intended to complement a more promising recent 
wave of empirical research on “the restless mind” and on daydreaming, unguided 
thought flow, zoning out, fantasy and mind-wandering, phenomena which are 
“ubiquitous in mental life” 17 and of considerable theoretical, personal, and moral 
interest. How often do we fail to notice our minds wandering? When and how do 
we sometimes maintain performance on mundane tasks, even quite tricky ones like 
driving, when our minds are off and away? How do we catch ourselves in the act 
of fantasy, and what changes when we do? Can unguided imaginative wandering 
help in solving problems? What happens when we entrust key actions or decisions 
to such mere habits of mind? Two questions about mind-wandering above all 
interest us, as they did the early modern writers I discuss here, with their different 
frameworks and terminologies and explanatory options. What causes such unguided 
shifts in the flow or thread or sequence of thoughts and feelings, which seem to be 
internally-generated yet apparently involuntary? And, secondly, how (both in 
general and in specific instances) can we better direct, fully inhabit, or align 
ourselves with our roaming minds? 
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 At least four distinct dimensions are at issue in this recent literature: 18 feelings 
and thoughts may be more or less fanciful and wishful (as opposed to realistic), 
more or less cut off from the current environment in forms of ‘task-unrelated’ 
and ‘stimulus-independent’ thought, 19 unintended or spontaneous (rather than 
deliberate) in their initiation and direction, and either accessible in awareness or not 
(I can be surprised to find that I’ve been thinking about something else for some 
time, while on other occasions I’m perfectly well aware of my ongoing meandering 
stream of thought). 
 These topics might seem remote from the official concerns of a historical 
investigation into a tradition of ‘embodied empiricism’, concerned as it is with 
the life sciences and medicine, with anatomy, fevers, and hysteria. But the kind 
of mind in question here, in early eighteenth-century phenomenological and 
psychosomatic inquiries into wandering thoughts and stray feelings, is of course 
entirely different from the a-historical, disembodied, isolated mind sometimes 
said to have been set at the heart of an official theory called ‘empiricism’. Most 
generally, the writers I’ll discuss, between Locke and Hume, are always treating the 
dynamics of body and mind together: even if they do not assume the psychophysical 
identities of earlier humoral materialisms, they still illustrate, worry at, and 
offer prescriptions to work with the intimately interactive relations of nerves 
and thoughts, passions and pores. More specifically, although these early 
eighteenth-century texts are mostly under the influence of what historians label 
‘iatromechanism’, they do not exhibit some of its textbook characteristics. 
The body-machine is no more a rigid, inflexible clock, always responding in the 
same way to the same stimulus, than it was for Descartes. 20 Whether the activity 
was attributed more to the body’s liquors and fluids and juices, or (with the advance 
of solidism) to the elastic and restorative powers of the fibres and tubes and pipes 
through which such spirits flowed, physiological processes were seen as exhibiting 
their own dynamics, both intrinsic and involuntary. 21 These inner elasticities and 
vibrations could be precisely the source of undirected psychological activity: 
if either medicine or philosophy was ever successfully to calm the mind or society, 
then the task of psychosomatic regimen was to improve the bodily conditions for 
their optimal exercise. 22 
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 2  Carelessness  and In-Attention 
 We start with an under-noticed aspect of the chapter on association which Locke 
added to the 4th edition of his  Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1700. 
The mind makes strong combinations of ideas in itself, says Locke, “either voluntarily 
or by chance , and hence it comes in different Men to be very different.” 23 Such 
individual differences arise, in other words, because while some couplings of 
ideas are due to reflection, others are “wholly owing to Chance or Custom.” 24 
This explains both particular errors, and the more general “degree of madness” in 
most of us. 25 Ideas which ought to be “loose and independent one of another” connect 
wrongly, under the rowdy influences of “Education, Custom, and the constant din 
of their Party,” and so “set us Awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural.” 26 
These unfortunate outcomes occur even “in very sober and rational Minds,” says 
Locke in striking terms, just because ideas once associated will “follow one another 
… without any care or attention.” 27 
 In this scheme, then, Locke links volition and reflection with care and attention 
as labels for the  appropriate forms of internal guidance of our sequences of 
ideas, as the opposite of misassociation. This concept of ‘attention’ was relatively 
novel. In seventeenth-century English, you are attending when you notice, 
take heed of, or direct the mind towards objects or events in the external world. 
But in Locke, attention operates (or fails to) on the  inner world: “when the  Ideas 
that offer themselves … are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the 
Memory, it is  Attention .” 28 
 Note also the physiological grounding of Locke’s detailed picture of the 
processes of remembering and associating ideas, a far cry from his official neutrality 
about the physical operation of the mind. 29 In the absence of ‘care and attention’, 
the grooved sequences of associated ideas are based in (or even just are) grooved 
sequences of patterned motions of nervous fluids:
 Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in the 
Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motions in the 
Animal Spirits, which once set a-going continue on in the same steps they have been used 
to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy 
and as it were Natural. 30 
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 Such psychophysical pairings – in remembering, imagining, and thinking alike – are 
symptoms of our deepest cognitive failings, eliciting Locke’s sad realism about 
the cognitive effects of the Fall. As angels need no memory, they are free of the need 
to encode and retrieve. For us, in contrast, memory often goes astray either through 
“the temper of the Body” as “the Imagery moulders away” 31 , or because of failures of 
attention: we don’t register things, notes Locke, which “have been little taken notice 
of; the Mind, either heedless, as in Children, or otherwise employ’d, as in Men.” 32 
 The concern here is with what happens when the mind’s away, when – through 
incapacity or overload – ideas turn over without control or even care. Descartes had 
argued that although animals do see and feel, they “do so not as we do when we are 
aware that we see, but only as we do when our minds are elsewhere.” 33 This is just 
what’s happening, for Locke, in misassociation, and why it is dangerous: without 
heed or care, when ‘otherwise employ’d’ or else driven by custom, history, and 
ingrained embodied tendencies, the mind is barely present at all, its influence on 
our actions severely eroded. It’s just this nervous worry that Hume echoes and 
brilliantly inverts in his  Treatise of Human Nature. 
 Through book 1, Hume elicits our sceptical doubts about both reason and the 
senses. He suggests that such doubt “can never be radically cur’d, but must return 
upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem 
entirely free from it.” 34 It is not only in the notorious conclusion to Book 1 that 
Hume evokes the ‘forelorn’ and ‘disconsolate’ mood brought on by intense 
reflections. 35  He was not many years off an unsuccessful course of “Anti-hysteric 
Pills,” described in a 1734 letter which compared Hume’s history of nervous disor-
ders, due to his “profound reflections” with their “warmth or Enthusiasm,” to reli-
gious fanatics and “French Mysticks” whose “rapturous Admirations might 
discompose the Fabric of the Nerves & Brain.” 36 But although neither drugs nor 
backgammon can enhance the overzealous philosopher’s mood, there is an unex-
pected solution to the perils of thinking: “Carelessness and in-attention alone 
can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely on them.” 37 By allowing 
heedlessness, encouraging the mind to be elsewhere or otherwise employed, Hume 
finds temporary respite from reflection. In thus embracing carelessness and 
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 inattention, Hume recommends trust in both instinct and experience, accepting the 
effects of education and custom, everything which is “independent of all the 
laboured deductions of the understanding.” 38 
 The verbal echo is a neat new way to catch the difference between Locke’s restricted 
use of association to explain error, and Hume’s radical extension of the principles of 
association. Hume exhibits and recommends trust in the tacit realm, in the deliverances 
of custom and habit, in light of his retreat from care and attention. But there’s also a 
richer local history to spy into here, a history of mind-wandering, medicine, and moral 
physiology, of habit and body and brain, of embodied empiricism between Locke and 
Hume. Through the early years of the eighteenth century, how did other British natural 
and moral philosophers think of these processes by which thoughts, fancies, memories, 
daydreams, and feelings come to mind without being prompted either by the world or 
by the will, by reason or by reality? Without denying the novelty of Hume’s case that 
reason itself is, or is the product of, natural habitual and affective processes, we can 
identify a discourse that was more broadly shared by natural and moral philosophers in 
the years before the  Treatise. The consensus lay in ways of talking about, and in many 
cases theorizing, the many ways in which the causes, contents, and course of mental life 
are out of our control: many writers sought a way to think about a multiplicity of causes 
of thought and feeling, among which reason and will would have to struggle for influ-
ence. For the odd historical reason that both Locke and Hume sought to distance their 
epistemological work from the contemporary natural-philosophical and medical frame-
works with which they were familiar, it’s too easy for us to lose the sense that they were 
fully aware of the embodied roots of mind-wandering. 39 
 3  Pinnioning the Imagination 
 The late twentieth-century study of mind-wandering and daydreaming arose 
in part from work on (night-time) dreaming, with similar ambitions to unify 
depth-psychological and cognitive perspectives, 40 and it continues alongside the 
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equally challenging and speculative multidisciplinary sciences of dreams. 41 
One highly contested ongoing debate concerns just how bizarre and fantastical 
dreams are. The dominant view is that dream narratives are intrinsically implausible, 
utterly unrealistic delusions or psychoses resulting from “a mental readout of the 
chaotic brainstem activity of REM sleep.” 42 But among a number of challenges to 
this mainstream theory are results from systematic content analyses of dreams, 
which compare them not to objective real-life events or actions but to waking 
 mental life: G. William Domhoff suggests, for example, that “there is far more 
discontinuity, drift, and inattention in waking thought than is implied by the claim 
that changes in dream scenes or settings are inherently bizarre.” 43 Again, we can 
use this contemporary debate as a historical clue: in asking what pictures of the 
inattentive waking mind were available to our early eighteenth-century thinkers, 
we can use their views about the similarities and differences between waking and 
dreaming thoughts and feelings. 
 This quest takes us to an appropriately obscure exemplar, after our two canonical 
texts on carelessness and inattention. Thomas Branch, a writer of whom we know 
next to nothing, responded eloquently in his  Thoughts on Dreaming (1738) to views 
defended in Andrew Baxter’s 1733  Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul . 44 
Baxter had argued that dreams derive from supernatural agents: Branch responds 
that what might appear to be supernatural is in fact inside us. 45 In doing so, he 
expresses forcefully the view that ordinary waking mental life is more confused 
than regular, anchored more in a fantastical than an objective realm. 
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 Baxter had argued that the bizarre content of dreams means that they cannot be 
accounted for by natural causes, there being insufficient material in “the Business and 
Thoughts of the Day” to furnish our dreams. Branch’s strategy in reply is to challenge 
the distance between mental life in waking and dreaming. Like Domhoff in the 
modern debate, he asks us to consider that many daytime thoughts of internal origin, 
driven neither by perception of the world, nor by reason, are just as wayward. 
 “Consider,” Branch requests, “with what great Difficulty it is that we fix it 
[the Mind] long, whilst awake, on one Subject; and that in Opposition to our best 
Endeavours.” When awake, we can fixate ourselves by using external props – objects, 
activities, or other people – as scaffolding for our thought: in reading books, 
conversing, or putting our views on paper we use prostheses to support our 
attention. But, Branch laments, the mind is “ever and anon flying off, and will hardly 
be held in.” So when such external supplements to thought are absent, as in sleep, “it 
is far from being strange, that the Mind, naturally a Wanderer, should rove at large.” 46 
 The vast and complex landscapes of our dreams are parallel to the fiery productions 
of imagination. Our thoughts can indeed  seem to be of alien origin: every man each 
day has “Imaginary Forms brought before him, which he knows not of going in 
search after, and even wonders how they were introduced”. 47  But their origin is in 
fact internal, produced by the compounding and mixing of ideas, the continuing 
business of imagination. 
 Branch draws a sharp distinction between voluntary invention and involuntary 
imagining. The soul  can deliberately ‘confine’ and ‘rectify’ imagination for a particular 
purpose, or select the Forms it brings, by judgement, in an act of creation. But this is 
not easy, and “is certainly,” admits Branch, “a work of fatigue.” When, on the contrary, 
“we control not the imagination, but let it fly at all, and pursue its own Game, this 
costs us no Pains; many Persons find much more in pinnioning it.” 48 
 So in the course of arguing against the attribution of dreams to “foreign agents” 49 or 
other alien sources, Branch underlines the complexity and heterogeneity of the internal 
origins of our mental life. He depicts mind-wandering as our default  psychological 
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mode, vigilance against which comes at some cognitive cost. 50  It is natural for the mind 
to be off on a frolic of its own. In dreaming, lacking direction from both reality and 
rationality, we are entirely unable to pinion the imagination. On the picture of waking 
life which thus emerges in parallel, executive control – the exercise of due care and 
attention, or effort and inhibition – is not impossible, but it is rare and costly. 
 4  Conveying the Mischief: Body Fluids and Openness 
to Influence 
 The idea that many of the sources of disorder are within was also backed by 
prevailing psychophysiological theory, which I sketch here using works written 
early in the eighteenth century by the Newtonian Richard Mead, the encyclopedist 
John Harris, and the Cornish physician James Gibbs. 51 Although Mead, in his 1702 
work  A Mechanical Account of Poisons, officially characterises ‘mathematical 
learning’ as the distinguishing mark of a genuine physician, he offers in fact only 
richly verbal and irredeemably qualitative accounts of the paths of transmission 
within body and nervous system. Mental life is not protected or insulated from any 
trouble and taint in the “small Tubes all over the Body,” Mead notes, for the fluid 
of the nerves, “Undulating continually towards the Brain, and being the chief 
Instrument of Motion and Action, may sometimes more immediately convey the 
Mischief.” 52 In this section, I briefly rehearse the widely shared picture of the array 
of interconnected body fluids and vessels along which mischief of various kinds 
is conveyed. If pathologies could be physical and psychological at once, then 
philosophers, moralists, and physicians needed to map and inhabit all these richly 
interconnected psychosomatic phenomena. 
 There were increasing doubts about the ontology of certain physiological fluids, 
notably nervous or animal spirits, invisible and “immechanical” agents that “elude 
all art,” as the corpuscularian physician Thomas Morgan complained. 53 But the 
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solid parts could be the subject of just as many and as complex psychologized 
properties and variables, as the strength and vigour and harmony of the composition 
of the nerve had to be maintained. 54 And even for solidists, the condition of 
interconnected body fluids – blood, bile or gall, chyle, lymph, spittle, pancreatic 
juice, semen, as well as any “peculiar Juice in the nerves” – remained vital in 
distending or altering the body’s elastic fibres, so that “flow and obstruction” 
remained at the heart of the “economy of circular physiology.” 55 As Mead put it, “the 
Vessels are rarely obstructed, unless it be from the fault of the Liquid they carry.” 56 
So despite differences across physiological schools, which in other contexts we’d 
want to investigate closely, here we can focus on the existence of unified schemes 
and language for thinking about mood and emotion, involuntary thoughts and 
memories, imaginings and fantasy, alongside disease and health. Linking the 
innards both to practices and exercise and regimen, and to mental life, this language 
of quick and nimble, fleeting spirits and fluids, which could be low, sunk, broken, 
oppressed, dejected, petulant, harassed, “ruffled beyond description,” hurried, or 
roused was used to think through psychological confusion and distress, and in 
explaining every disorder of the animal machine. 
 We can trace the possible paths of influence which transmitted mischief or 
disorder in its various forms. Mead’s mechanical account of poisons exemplifies 
the operation of external sources. After reading new Italian theories of vipers, and 
Tyson on the rattle-snake, Mead wanted “to hint something concerning the Nature 
of Fluids in General.” 57 The salts of venom irritate and fret the sensile membranes, 
creating an excess of animal juices. This ‘disjoins’ parts of the blood, altering its 
mixture. Poison changes mainly the arterial blood, but the fluid of the nerves may 
be considerably changed as well. Most generally, we can expect to explain all 
disorder in the body through “the doctrine of the Mixture of Heterogene Fluids, and 
their Separation.” 58 We are working with a diverse array of continuous variables. 
For Mead, there can be “a vast  variety … in the Fermentations even of one and the 
same Fluid,” because these are simply “ Changes made in the  Cohaesion of the 
compounding Particles,” and are thus “capable of as many Alterations as  Motion in 
its  Degrees and  Directions can admit of, which are really infinite.” 59 
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 Likewise, there were puzzlingly interconnected effects of purely internal processes 
of fermentation or ebullition. Across the many entries on the interconnections of 
body fluids in his  Lexicon Technicum , Harris draws on diverse recent writers to 
update and mechanize earlier accounts of the stages of purification of bodily spirits. 
Food affects the blood, for example, in many ways such as in “Chylification,” 
which depends first the existing state of the stomach and the guts, and then the 
“various Mixtures and Preparations of Chyle” as it is dissolved and fermented from 
food: in “Sanguification,” then, as blood and chyle mix, it is easy for particles of 
blood to be “intangled and detained from flight,” or for the heat of ebullition to 
become so great that “it often endangers the Vessels they are contained in.” Harris too 
is attracted in principle by the ideal of geometrizing the influence of airs, waters, and 
places on body fluids: the nature of secretions in general depends on the diameter 
of the orifice of the secreting duct, on the angle of incidence of the duct with the 
vessel, and on the different velocities at which fluids arrive at the orifices. 
 Advertising his mixtures for the cure of scrofulous distempers, James Gibbs 
tells of a girl from Truro who in 1706 when 16 years old had “an hysteric disorder 
of her spirits at 8 p.m., plus loss of appetite.” 60 Gibbs identifies two possible 
causes. Sometimes “the Passages of the Spirits are so obstructed in the Nerves, as 
to produce Paralytic Impediments,” while “at other times the Spirits are irritated 
into Convulsive Ferments.” Fortunately his preparation attacks the common causes of 
both. All nervous diseases are caused by “the Depravations of the  Nervous Juice ” 
– humours are often “frothed up” as they leave the glands which secrete them, and 
animal spirits are stagnated or paralysed, preventing the natural office of the fluids, 
which is “chiefly to  lubricate and fill the Interstices of the Fibres of the Nerves.” 61 
The spirits can be affected or ‘diminished’ equally by acids and by sadness. 
 In these writers, we see mechanized versions of older cosmobiologies. 
The Newtonians identify the mechanics of cosmic and of bodily fluids. For Mead, 
the same principles of action operate in the Universe and “in the most minute and 
finest Corpuscles” of any internal vessel with its “very subtile and elastic Fluid.” 62 
Whatever the precise ontological commitment (to fluids or vibrating ethers, for 
example), there are not just analogies but identities across the whole realm of subtle 
substances. As well as advice on musical and other exercises, this drives ideas 
about cosmic influence in the ‘lunar medicine’ of this early eighteenth-century 
period. 63 Gibbs explains how ‘the moon has a considerable influence on the 
constitutions of some persons’: disorders of the eye, for instance, increase after 
every full moon because the spirits of the optic nerve are ‘dispos’d directly to 
receive’ particles of the aetherial fluid which may compress and restrain their 
turgescence. 64 In discussing effluvia and influences, these writers cite Boyle who, 
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according to Harris, ‘is inclined to believe that the Planets may have some Physical 
Influence or Operation on Bodies of our Globe,” so that (for example) thin air, 
when “altered by these planetary virtues, must needs variously impress, move, 
agitate and infect the Spirits or Subtiler parts of all Bodies within its Reach,” giving 
rise to sudden cramps, convulsions, blights, colds, or pestilential invasions which 
“often, as it were in an instant,” seize on our Bodies.” 65 
 The forms of cosmobiological holism in play in these iatrophysical works, with 
all their claims to novelty, are just as extensive and as concrete as in earlier eclectic 
medico-physiological syntheses, and just as easily turned towards a range of practical 
interventions. Because of the multiplicity of relevant parameters behind bodily 
changes, all changing at different rates, there were many ways to try to change or 
influence these interconnected processes between world and body, and within the 
body. We can now underline the point that these explanatory schemes also and 
inevitably included psychological disorders and diversions. No matter how much 
mechanical or Newtonian physiologists wished to discuss the operations of body, 
brain, and nerves in purely quantitative terms, those who strayed into the morally 
and commercially intriguing domains of medical psychology – the chancy operations 
of feeling, remembering, imagining, reasoning, and even perceiving – could not 
avoid richer boundary-spanning language and theorizing. 
 5  Surpriz’d by Habit: Control and Error in Moral Physiology 
 In turn, composed or depraved fluids affect the mind. This returns us to mind-
wandering. When unguided and undirected, thoughts and feelings are driven by our 
embodied habits, by the grooved tendencies embodied in our internal vessels and 
the fluids they conceal. What’s appropriate and objective differs from what’s 
improper or corrupt only in its distal causes: the immediate neural precursors of any 
thoughts are the same in both cases. 
 In normal operation, mental processes and the actions which they cause are 
guided by the twin supports of perception and reason. These offer external and 
internal sources of direction for thought and action. Objectivity is provided on the 
one hand by the external world, as our senses give us fallible but mostly trustworthy 
knowledge of reality. And on the other hand, the inner foundation offered by reason 
delivers clear judgements which, which combined with the impetus of the will, can 
guide us in practical action. 
 But these twin sources of direction provided by reality and reason, by the world 
and the will, do not exhaust the possibilities. After the Fall at least, our own cognitive 
capacities include a range of mechanisms of distortion. Remembering, imagining, 
and dreaming, as well as psychological processes directly caused by specific 
bodily disturbances, all open up the possibility that the ideal transparency of 
our attunement to the world can be subverted from within. Again, this theme in 
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our ‘empiricists’ is clearly present in Descartes too: in  L’homme , the ordinary 
mechanisms of corporeal memory are depicted as intrinsically giving rise to fantasy. 
It “usually happens,” notes Descartes, that in the flow of animal spirits over time 
through the pores of the brain, “several different figures are traced in this same 
region of the brain almost equally perfectly.” This means that
 the spirits will acquire a combined impression of them all … It is thus that chimeras and 
hypogryphs are formed in the imaginations of those who daydream, that is to say who let 
their fancy wander listlessly here and there without external objects diverting it and without 
the fancy’s being directed by reason. 66 
 In addition to these importunities of imagination, the same processes explain the 
intrusions of old unwanted memories into present mental life: “it is thus that past 
things sometimes return to thought as if by chance [ comme par hazard ] and without 
the memory of them being excited by any object impinging on the senses.” 67 
 Noting again, in passing, that this doesn’t sound at all like the kind of storage 
system which might be used by the kind of ‘Cartesian automaton’ described in 
textbook accounts of mechanism (see also Sutton  2000) , we can move on to examine 
a standard account, shared by so-called Cartesian and Newtonian physiological 
psychologists, of the relations between perception, inner processes, volition, and 
action. Mead describes the normal operation of the process:
 upon this Representation [of outward Objects to the Common Sensory], at the Command and 
Pleasure of the Soul, part of the same [nervous] Fluid is determin’d into the Muscles, and mix-
ing with the Arterial Blood there, performs all the Variety of voluntary Motions and Actions. 68 
 When developed appropriately over time, this process  can operate successfully 
even without the active online involvement of reason. Because of “the Constancy 
of this Order in us,” without reason the representations made to the mind can still 
“immediately and necessarily produce suitable Motions in the Bodily Organs.” 
Mead is envisaging something very like Locke’s association, though in a distinctive 
iatrophysical language. Like Locke he realizes that we are opened up to the possibility 
of error by this otherwise useful tendency of habitual processes to continue on 
without conscious intervention. Patterns of both action and thought which have 
come to be linked together, if prompted or triggered by causes other than perception 
or reason, bring disorder and, in the extreme, delirium, which he describes as
 the Representation and Various Composition of several Species to the Mind, without any 
Order or Coherence; together, at least most commonly, with irregular, or, as it were, undesigned 
Motion of the Body; that is, such a wandering and irregular Motion of the Nervous Fluid, 
whereby several Objects are represented to the Mind, and upon this Representation divers 
Operations performed by the Body, though those Objects are not Impressed upon the 
Organs, nor those Operations or Motions deliberately Commanded by the Soul. 69 
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 This ‘wandering’ is internally generated. In theory, “the Mind is the first Principle 
of all Muscular Motion,” but here it appears that much of what goes on in us, in 
driving thought and action, is foreign to it:
 in such Cases as these, its Promptitude to Action or Habit being so great, it is in a manner 
surpriz’d, and cannot recover itself after the Spirits are with violent force determined 
pursuant to the Representations of the Species. 70 
 Surprised by its own habits, the mind is the victim of its own idiosyncratic history, 
roaming along with its delicate or delirious spirits. Mead offers detailed diagnoses 
of the distinctive ways in which “the Hurry and Confusion of the Spirits” can render 
the mind overly vulnerable to certain stimuli – colours, particular emotions, trivial 
entertainments, or obscene talk and actions. 71 Error takes many forms: insensitivity 
and oversensitivity to the world are equal risks which were increasingly theorized 
as part of the physiology of consumerism. Those with weak or slender nervous 
fibres are too easily acted on by external objects, George Cheyne for example being 
too “easily ruffled on a surprise.” 72 
 6  Remedies for Reveries 
 But just as an extraordinary variety of contextual factors could distract or capture 
the mind, opening it to the influences of habit and the body, so the plasticity of 
psychosomatic interplay still allowed for a wide array of remedies. These ranged 
from chemical preparations and anti-hypochondriack pills through musical 
cures and physical activity and baths and spas to the various forms of exercise 
recommended by these iatromechanist physicians. As Ishizuka argues, ‘exercise’ in 
this period could include anything which imitated or encouraged the internal 
motions of the fibres, taking drugs as much as riding, because the non-voluntary 
internal motions which ground both motor and cognitive habits could be exercised 
and altered in many different ways. 73 
 So there could be no distinction between physical and psychological cures: 
our writers focus on the general idea of gradually coming to know and indirectly 
influence your own habits by any means possible. They often employed stories 
about ingrained links between specific thoughts or actions and particular contexts. 
Apologizing for the “pleasant oddness” and “comical Circumstances” of the tale, 
Locke tells us of a man who learned to dance in a room where stood a remarkable 
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old trunk, and could not perform in any other place. 74 Descartes had offered his own 
recipes for training the brain. Until a man realizes that the reason he wants to cry 
at music which makes others want to dance is that he “has never heard a galliard 
without some affliction befalling him,” and that this is because “it evokes ideas in 
the memory,” he has no chance of altering this response. But with  industrie – effort, 
or psychological work – to identify and alter our idiosyncratic  habitudes, we can 
help ourselves deal with “all the contingencies of life.” 75 Likewise, Mead introduces 
his defence of musical cures, in which a “strong pulse” brings an “increased Influx 
of the Liquor of the Nerves into the Muscles,” by repeating a story which Boyle 
repeated from Scaliger about the knight of Gascony who had to piss whenever he 
heard the sound of bagpipes. 76 Modulating these psychophysical connections can 
be done just as effectively, argues Mead, by indirect means as by the power of the 
will, since both means have to operate through the same “shaking of the nerves.” 
 Although Locke saw association as primarily the root of trouble – aversion to 
foods, fear of darkness, unwarranted hatreds, dislike of books, ingrained political 
prejudices – he also saw a different side to custom and habit. Locke distinguishes 
motor-based associations from cognitive habits, though he then attributes them to 
the same cause in the trains of motion of the animal spirits. A musician finds a 
melody playing itself out in his understanding just “as regularly as his Fingers move 
orderly over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune he has begun, though his 
inattentive thoughts be elsewhere a wandering.” This case helps us to conceive, says 
Locke, of what he calls “Intellectual Habits, and of the tying together of Ideas.” 77 
 In turn, custom and habit then for Hume are labels for characteristics of the 
imaginative processes which produce belief. These are non-rational and non-reflec-
tive propensities or tendencies. Some, like our beliefs in causation and in the 
continuing existence of the external world, are probably permanent and irresistible 
natural fictions. Others are changeable, more or less weak and irregular, offering 
opportunities for cognitive and practical reform by way of a change of habits, the 
implanting of different inclinations by changing our habits of belief. The value of 
philosophy is that, properly undertaken, “it insensibly refines the temper, and it 
points out to us those dispositions that we should endeavour to attain, by a constant 
bent of mind, and by repeated habit.” On naturalizing interpretations of Hume, at 
least, the authority of custom and habit is proper. Beliefs are not formed by reasoning, 
but in the main by the history-dependent and body-dependent mechanisms of the 
restless mind. 
 Further rereading of Hume in light of our consideration of mind-wandering is 
just one of the threads left open for further research: having identified residues in 
his work of these discourses of moral physiology and medical psychology, it is 
tempting to think, with Frasca-Spada  (2003) , that “the avoidance of physiological 
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accounts in his pages is an oddity calling for an explanation.” Likewise, we need to 
incorporate the many practical and commercial ways in which the multicausal 
psychosomatic frameworks discussed here still influenced what and how much 
early eighteenth-century people ate and drank, how and when they slept, took 
holidays, conversed, what recipes and medicines they took. What I have done here 
barely scratches the wonderful material in these medico-moral ‘mixed discourses’ 
of spirits, body, and self, or of brain, mind, and soul. 78 But by identifying 
mind-wandering, fantasy, and inattention as a specific domain of enquiry and 
debate for these historical actors, I hope to have brought to clearer visibility a wide 
and intriguing range of phenomena which are neither wholly conscious and 
controlled, nor entirely brute and automatic. 
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 Abstract  This paper aims to draw out two distinct strands in Locke’s account of our 
simple ideas of experience: an instrumental and an immersed model of experience. 
The place of pleasure and pain in sensation is key to the distinction between these 
two models. After showing this equivocation in Locke’s account, I consider its 
implications for his account of object perception, or our ideas of particular 
substances, and suggest that considering these issues in Locke might afford insight 
into contemporary discussions of the Binding Problem. I conclude by showing how 
Berkeley and Condillac resolve this equivocation in Locke and considering why 
Locke himself might have failed to do so. 
 1  Introduction 
 In this paper I aim to problematize a pervasive yet unstated assumption about 
Locke’s account of, at least, our simple experience. Most readers take Locke to 
conceive of simple experience as simply conveying information about the properties 
objects in the world are meant to have independently of human efforts to engage 
with that world. It is as if our sense organs are like instruments designed to 
detect the properties of objects, and our experience of the world might as well be 
disembodied. While this line of thought is to be found in Locke’s  Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, 1 I aim to show that Locke’s view wavers between this 
disembodied or instrumental conception of our experience and one that takes us to 
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be essentially immersed in the world and our experience to be essentially affective. 
Once I establish the points of tension in Locke’s account of our simple experience, 
I explore one implication of this tension: Locke’s account of how we come to 
perceive objects, or what he terms particular substances, from our simple ideas. 
Contemporary cognitive psychologists refer to this issue as the Binding Problem 
– that of how information from different sense modalities gets bound together – and 
understanding the challenges of Locke’s account might afford insight into 
contemporary discussion of similar issues. Just as we can ask what contemporary 
import attention to this tension in Locke has, so too can we ask why Locke himself 
did not resolve this tension, especially since several Lockeans adopt a model of 
immersed experience. I present some thoughts on this matter as well. However, my 
focus is to elucidate the tension in Locke’s account of experience between an 
instrumental and an immersed conception of embodiment. 
 In  Section 2 , I clarify the sense in which Locke’s conception of simple experience 
might as well be disembodied by considering what Locke might mean by asserting 
that our senses are ‘fitted’ to the world around us. On one reading, while our simple 
ideas might well depend on the body we have, our embodied condition does not 
affect the information those simple ideas provide us with – their content – and in it 
is in this sense that our experience might as well be disembodied. There is a second 
possible reading of Locke’s notion of ‘fittedness’, one which is aligned with an 
alternative immersed conception of simple experience that was prevalent in the 
early modern period in thinkers such as Descartes, Spinoza, as well as in canonical 
empiricists such as Berkeley and Condillac. On this alternative account, sensory 
experience also conveys information about the world, but that information incorpo-
rates the way things affect our well-being; pleasure and pain are integral to our 
sensory ideas. On this line, our embodied condition does affect the content of 
our sensory ideas. With this distinction in mind, I turn in  Section 3 to consider 
Locke’s account of our ideas of pleasure and pain, and Identify some tensions and 
equivocations in that account. In  Section 4 , I argue further that these issues infect 
Locke’s account of our perceptions of objects. In this section I also consider how 
contemporary cognitive scientists might gain insight from this point. In  Section 5 , 
I briefly note how some empiricists who self-consciously follow Locke resolve his 
equivocation regarding our ideas of pleasure and pain. They seem to adopt the 
model of immersed experience. Finally, in  Section 6 I speculate about the reasons 
Locke himself might not have resolved the tension between instrumental and 
immersed experience in his work. 
 2  Locke’s Account of Sensation as Fitted to our Surroundings 
 I have claimed that insofar as Locke models sensation as importing information 
about properties of objects instrumentally, he might as well take sense perception 
to be disembodied. This claim demands an obvious qualification. It has been widely 
remarked that Locke is deeply engaged with the scientific developments of the 
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latter half of the seventeenth century. 2 This engagement with the contemporary 
scientific landscape also impacts his discussion of sensation. Not only does Locke 
admit that we might have had different sorts of simple ideas had we different 
sensory organs than we do have, 3 he also considers the impact of the constitution 
of the sensory organs we do have on the content of the sorts of simple ideas humans 
have. He writes:
 Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies and the real constitution 
on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different 
ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow colour of Gold would then disappear, and 
instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size and figure… 
(ECHU 2.23.8) 4 
 Locke, here, is explicitly concerned to make sense of the microscope and the ways 
in which that piece of technology changes our perceptions, but the general point is 
nonetheless instructive. Locke seems to acknowledge that we perceive the qualities 
of things we do because we have the sense organs we have. In this way, Locke 
does suggest that the content of our sensations is importantly tied to the bodies 
we have. 
 This simple sense in which we can understand our bodies as figuring in sensation 
is, not, however, opposed to an instrumental conception of embodiment. To clarify 
the distinction between what I am calling instrumental and immersed embodiment 
and experience, let me consider in more detail the context of the passage quoted 
above. There Locke asserts that our senses “are fitted … for the neighborhood of 
the bodies that surround us, and we have do with” (ECHU 2.23.13). We can eluci-
date the distinction at issue here by fleshing out this notion of ‘fittedness’. 
 It is clear that, for Locke, our senses are ‘fitted’ to our surroundings insofar as 
they serve our purposes. As Locke puts it: “We are able, by our senses, to know, 
and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our uses, 
and several ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life” (ECHU 2.23.12). 
But we can distinguish two distinct ways in which our sensory experiences can 
 
2
 This engagement is announced in the  Epistle to the Reader of the  Essay, with Locke’s self-
description as “an under-labourer in clearing ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish 
that lies in the way to knowledge” of the sort that Boyle, Sydenham, Huygens, and ‘the incompa-
rable Mr. Newton’ were pursuing, and is evident in his appropriation of Boyle’s brand of the 
mechanical philosophy in detailing the inner workings of bodies. In recent years, Locke’s scien-
tific interests have been well-discussed. Relatively early discussions include: Sanchez-Gonzalez 
1990. Wilson  1995 , Stein  1990 , and Downing  1997,  1998 . For more recent discussion see: Anstey 
and Harris  2006 , Jones  2007 , Keating  2002 , Meynell  2003 , Milton 2001 and  Walmsley 2009 . 
 
3
 See for instance ECHU 2.2.3: “This is the reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible 
to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the 
notice of Corporeal things, than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to 
man. Yet I think it is not possible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, however 
constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides, sounds, tastes, smells, visible and 
tangible qualities.” 
 
4
 See also ECHU 2.1.23–24 and 2.23.13. 
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serve our purposes. On the one hand, our senses can be said to serve our purposes 
insofar as they provide us with information that we can go on to use to achieve our 
ends. On this view, there is no essential connection between the sensory information 
we receive and the purposes we have. It just happily turns out that the two fit 
together. Our sense organs are instruments that are capable of detecting certain 
properties, or qualities, in the world. While these instruments might be designed so 
as to detect the properties they do, and so ‘be fitted to our surroundings’, nothing 
in that design requires us to  use that information. My eyes might be fitted to convey 
information about the numbers of hairs on each person’s head, but that information 
need not serve any purpose. If I decide, quite independently, that I want to be a 
hairdresser, then maybe I can put that information to good use. It is central to this 
 instrumental way of understanding the way our bodies figure in sensation that the 
sensory content, the information we receive, is not in principle tied to the purposes 
to which we might put that information. In the first instance, the information we get 
is not dependent on any purposes we might have, nor need our purposes derive from 
the information we gain through sensory experience. 
 This model of fittedness does seem to be what Locke intends in the passages 
I have pointed to. Indeed, the most familiar parts of Locke’s account of sensation 
accord well with this conception of our sensory experience. Locke characterizes the 
origin of our simple ideas as a matter of the senses ‘conveying into the Mind’ 
those perceptions proper to the way sensible objects affect our sense modalities 
(ECHU 2.1.3), thereby suggesting that sense perception amounts to the input of 
information about objects, information which is meant to be true of them irrespective 
of the receiver of that information, and his, her or its purposes. This same line of 
thought would seem to permeate Locke’s discussion of the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities and our ideas of them. Qualities, for him, are simply 
powers to produce simple ideas in us; we get information about the properties of 
bodies straightforwardly in our ideas of primary qualities in virtue of the resemblance 
between those ideas and the qualities themselves. This resemblance relation has 
nothing to do with the uses to which we might put the information about the primary 
qualities of bodies. Moreover, it seems that Locke takes our ideas of secondary 
qualities to provide us with some information about properties of bodies even though 
those ideas do not resemble their causes. After all, our ideas of secondary qualities 
are still produced in us by some complicated array of primary qualities, and so they 
would seem to encode some information about those primary qualities. We might 
have to crack that code, but the information that is conveyed, again, makes no 
reference to the uses to which that information might be put. 5 
 
5
 There is no doubt much more to say here. Understanding the relation between our ideas of 
primary and secondary qualities for Locke is a vexed topic. As I note below, sometimes Locke 
does suggest that secondary qualities are analogous to pleasures and pains, and so do potentially 
give us some information bearing on our welfare. I say ‘potentially’ here because not only will 
this depend on the dimensions of analogy but also on the conception of pleasure and pain in play, 
as will become clear in the next section. 
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 There is, however, a second way in which we might take our sensory experiences 
to be fitted to our surroundings. On this view, the very content of our simple sense 
perceptions  is tied to our purposes, and in particular, to our end of self-preservation. 
Immediately prior to Locke, this sort of account of sensory experience is seen most 
clearly in Descartes, though it is also found in Spinoza, and arguably Hobbes, as 
well. 6 In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes maintains that
 the proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform the 
mind of what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part; and to 
this extent they are sufficiently clear and distinct. But I misuse them by treating them as 
reliable touchstones for immediate judgements about the essential nature of the bodies 
located outside us. (7:83; 2:57–8) 7 
 Rather than informing us about properties of things in the world, for Descartes, our 
sensations inform us about how things are  in relation to us , how they benefit 
and harm us, and in general how they affect our well-being. 8 Though Descartes 
recognizes we can be mistaken about the benefits and harms things offer us – for 
instance, we can feel thirsty when we ought not to take in more fluids – for him, we 
still experience the sensations we do in accord with the system which “is most 
especially and most frequently conducive to the preservation of the healthy man” 
(7:88; 2:60). 
 One might well ask how, on this view, our sensations give us this kind of infor-
mation. Does the input into one sense modality or another contain information 
about the way things in the world impact us? Some medieval thinkers seem to have 
espoused a model somewhat like this. According to Aquinas, for instance, all 
animals were able to register the way things in the world stood to affect their very 
existence through a separate sensory faculty, the  vis estimativa . Famously, through 
this faculty, a sheep is able to perceive a wolf as dangerous – that is, as capable of 
causing that sheep harm. 9 Similarly, through this faculty we able to perceive various 
threats in our environment, as well as those things that stand to benefit us. 
 Descartes, however, does not want to go the route of this simple sort of sensory 
model. Rather, for him, two aspects of our sensory experience serve to provide us 
with information. First, the  variation in sensory input conveys information about 
the ways things benefit and harm us as unions of mind and body. He writes:
 
6
 It is hard to know just what Spinoza’s account of sensation is – he himself does not use the term – but 
Spinoza is clear that “the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own 
body more than the nature of the external bodies” ( Ethics IIP16Cor2 in Spinoza 1985). At the basis 
of this claim is Spinoza’s claim that our conatus is our essence (EIIIP7). Like it is for Spinoza,  conatus 
is at the centre of Hobbes’s philosophy, and one might well argue that our drive to persevere shapes 
the content of our sensory experiences had through the working of the machine of our body. 
 
7
 Citations of Descartes’s works follow this format: (Volume: page of AT; Volume: page of 
CSM/K). ‘AT’ refers to Descartes  (1996 /1908). ‘CSM’ and ‘CSMK’ refer respectively to Vols 1–2 
and to Vol 3 of Descartes  (1985 –1991). 
 
8
 Simmons  1999 makes a similar point. 
 
9
 See, for instance,  Summa Theologiae I, q.78, art.4. (Aquinas 2002). 
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 And from the fact that I perceive by my senses a great  variety of colours, sounds, smells 
and tastes, as well as differences in heat, hardness and the like, I am correct in inferring 
that the bodies which are the source of these various sensory perceptions possess differences 
corresponding to them, though perhaps not resembling them. Also, the fact that  some of the 
perceptions are agreeable to me while others are disagreeable make it quite certain that my 
body or rather my whole self, in so far as I am a combination of body and mind, can be 
affected by the various beneficial or harmful bodies which surround it. (7:81; 2:56; 
emphasis added) 
 Thus, our sensations of colour all on its own does not tell us anything about the 
world, let alone about any real colours in the world. Rather, variations in our 
sensations of colour convey information about real variations in the world. Second, 
in this passage Descartes suggests that these sensations themselves are either 
agreeable or disagreeable, and through this aspect of our sensations we are steered 
towards what is beneficial and away from what is harmful to us. For Descartes, 
sensations seem  intrinsically to involve pleasure and pain. It is thus no accident that 
in the Sixth Meditation, the paradigm sensations are hunger and thirst, two sensations 
that do seem to involve some kind of pain. Insofar as Descartes does take our sensory 
experiences to have this intrinsic affective aspect he builds a certain sort of teleology 
into our sense perception. For we feel pleasure and pain as is most conducive to our 
preservation. That is, for Descartes, the content of our sensations  contains an end 
of self-preservation. In this important way our experiences contain our purposes, or 
at least one central purpose. On this model, our cognitive contact with the world 
comes as we are immersed in a world, situated with respect to things that impact 
on our well-being; our senses are fitted to our surroundings insofar as they are 
geared to enabling us to achieve our end of self-preservation. 
 From the perspective of this second way of understanding our senses as fitted to 
our surroundings, one thing is quite notable in Locke’s account of our simple ideas 
of sensation, at least as I have presented it so far: Locke makes no mention of pleasure 
and pain in his discussion of the ideas we receive through the five canonical sense 
modalities. Insofar as Locke would seem to think that our sensory ideas, in and of 
themselves, do not involve pleasure and pain, he would also take it that our sensory 
ideas contain no information about how things in the world impact on our welfare, 
and in general our ability to preserve ourselves. 
 3  Pleasure and Pain in Locke’s Account of Our Simple 
Ideas of Sensation 
 Of course, Locke does not ignore the fact that we have sensations of pleasure and 
pain. Indeed, Locke counts pleasure and pain as those simple ideas that we can have 
either through sensation and reflection. Locke’s discussion, however, is far from 
systematic. In this section, I identify two equivocations in Locke’s account. 
 First, it is unclear whether Locke takes pain and pleasure to contain intrinsically 
information about our well being. On the one hand, when Locke first introduces the 
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simple ideas of pain and pleasure, he seems to tie those perceptions to our welfare. 
The fact that we often feel both pleasure and pain towards the same object
 gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker: Who, designing 
the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our 
bodies,  to warn us of the harm that they will do , and as advices to withdraw from them. 
(ECHU 2.7.4, emphasis added) 
 Pleasure and pain thus seem to carry with them information about the ways things 
can benefit and harm us. Yet Locke defines good and evil with reference to pain and 
pleasure.
 That we call  good , which  is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or 
else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. … 
[W]e name that  evil , which  is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure 
in us; or us to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. (ECHU 2.2.2) 
 It seems here that Locke is taking pleasure and pain as primitive feelings which 
themselves cannot be explained. Pleasure and pain, on this line, are not indicators 
of any objective benefit or harm that might visit us. Rather benefits and harms, or 
good and evil, are defined in virtue of what we happen to feel. If putting a hand 
in a roaring fire brings pleasure, then it is by definition good. Yet in the very next 
paragraph Locke seems to switch tacks to assert that good and evil  cause pleasure 
and pain, as if there were facts of the matter about what was good and bad, and our 
feelings of pleasure and pain indicate those matters of fact to us (ECHU 2.20.3). 
This claim, however, does not sit well with the definitions of the various passions 
that follow. In those definitions it seems that these species of pleasure and pain are 
a matter of mere subjective feeling, which then by accident shape our ascriptions 
of good and evil. For instance, we love grapes simply because their taste brings 
delight. Without that feeling of delight, the grapes cease to be good, and we no 
longer love them (ECHU 2.20.4). It seems then that we are supposed to read the 
first half of the first sentence of ECHU 2.20.3 as concerning what we  call good and 
evil rather than any real relation of benefit or harm. 10 
 A similar tension appears in Locke’s remarks concerning skepticism about the 
existence of the external world. In Book IV, when Locke firsts considers our knowl-
edge of ‘real existence’, he challenges anyone who experiences the pain of being in a 
fire to assert that he is dreaming. His point here is that some ideas, simply in their 
phenomenology, give us sufficient information to conclude that a world exists beyond 
our ideas. However, he does not maintain that in learning that something exists which 
also causes us (in this case) pain we also learn something about the way that something 
might benefit or harm us. 11 Yet when Locke turns to consider our ‘knowledge of the 
existence of other things’ in more detail in ECHU 4.11, he seems to admit that plea-
sures and pains  do tell us about various benefits and harms in the world. He writes:
 
10
 ECHU 2.21.42 supports this reading. There Locke asserts that “whatever has an aptness to 
produce pleasure in us, is that we call  Good , and what is apt to produce Pain in us, we cal  Evil , 
for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us.” 
 
11
 See for instance ECHU 4.2.14. 
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 That  the certainty of things existing  in rerum Natura , when we have the testimony of our 
senses for it, is not only  as great as our frame can attain to, but  as our condition needs . 
(ECHU 4.11.8; original emphasis) 
 And as he fleshes this out, it is clear that the ‘condition’ he refers to is that of our 
general well-being.
 For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting 
his finger in it, will little doubt that this something existing without him,  which does him 
great harm, and puts him to great pain : which is assurance enough, when no man requires 
greater certainty to govern his actions by that what is as certain as his actions themselves. 
(ECHU 4.11.8, emphasis added) 
 Locke thus seems in the end to allow that pleasures and pains do, for the purposes 
of action at least, inform us about the ways things in the world can benefit or harm us. 
Insofar as he does, Locke might well conceive of our bodies not as mere instruments 
with which to detect properties in the world but rather as immersed in it. At least 
our sensations of pleasure and pain inform us of how other bodies stand in relations 
to us and our purpose of self-preservation. 
 Even if we do allow that Locke takes our sensations of pleasure and pain to 
contain information about the way things benefit and harm us, 12 there is a second 
 
12
 There might well be a third alternative to consider here. Our ideas of pleasure and pain might 
give us information about the world, just not about the way things benefit and harm us. On this 
line, ideas of pleasure and pain would be akin to our ideas of secondary qualities. Though these 
ideas do not represent (by resemblance) qualities of objects, we can gain some information about 
the world if we could adduce the causal relation between primary qualities and our ideas of 
secondary qualities. Similarly, this line would go, if we properly understood the causes of our 
pains and pleasures, those ideas could give us information about primary qualities. Locke seems 
to be suggesting this in a comparison he draws between ideas of secondary qualities and our ideas 
of pain in ECHU 2.8.16 and ECHU 2.8.18: 
 And yet he that will consider that the same fire, that at one distance produces in us the 
sensation of warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different sensation of 
pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say, that his idea of warmth, which was 
produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and  his idea of pain, which the same fire 
produced in him the same way, is not in the fire . Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, 
and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by 
the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts? (ECHU 2.8.16, emphasis mine). 
 Besides, manna, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, has a power to produce 
the sensations of sickness, and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us.  That these ideas of 
sickness and pain are not in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are nowhere when 
we feel them not ; this also every one readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to 
think, that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna; which are but the effects of the 
operations of manna by the motion, size, and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate; as 
the pain and sickness caused by manna are confessedly nothing but the effects of its opera-
tions on the stomach and guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts (for by 
nothing else can a body operate, as has been proved). (ECHU 2.8.18, emphasis added). 
 These passages, interestingly, raise a question about how we are to distinguish between our 
ideas of secondary qualities and pleasures and pains. Hume, in his  Treatise on Human Nature, 
raises just such a question in his discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses (THN 1.4.2.12), 
a section I take to be largely about the empiricist prospects for an account of object perception. 
This would seem to bear on my discussion later in this paper. 
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point of equivocation in Locke’s account of our simple ideas of pleasure and pain, 
one that bears on whether Locke can be taken to have a conception of immersed 
experience. For Locke, each of our simple ideas, whether they be of sensation or 
reflection, are conveyed into the mind independently of one another, and it is cen-
tral to his account that these simple ideas be unanalyzable. Given this assumption 
it certainly seems as if our ideas of pleasure and pain ought to be distinct from our 
other simple ideas. And often Locke’s discussion of pleasure and pain does take this 
line. In ECHU 2.7.2 Locke writes,
 Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas, both 
of sensation and reflection: And there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, 
any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or 
pain. By pleasure and pain I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights or 
molests us … 
 Locke here makes two distinct claims. First, he notes that almost all of our ideas 
are joined to an idea of pleasure and pain, and in doing so he certainly suggests 
that each of the ideas that are joined together are distinct from one another. 
Second, he suggests that our ideas of pleasure and pain are  caused by other ideas. 
While this second claim also presupposes that ideas of pleasure and pain are 
distinct ideas, it is puzzling with respect to ideas of sensation. Presumably, our 
sensory ideas of pleasure and pain derive directly from the workings of the world 
on our bodies, and not from the workings of our mind on itself. But in any case, it 
seems clear that Locke takes our ideas of pleasure and pain to be distinct from 
our other ideas. 
 This clear distinction, however, becomes somewhat murky in the very next 
paragraph. There Locke maintains that our creator,
 having also given a power to our minds in several instances, to choose, amongst its ideas, 
which it will think on, and to pursue the enquiry of this or that subject with consideration 
and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of; 
has been pleased  to join to several thoughts, and several sensations, a perception of delight. 
If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we 
should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention, 
or motion to rest …. It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to  annex to several objects , 
and the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant 
pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees; that those faculties which he had 
endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us. (ECHU 2.7.3, 
emphasis added) 
 While in this passage Locke still talks of pleasure and pain as joined to our 
thoughts, in almost the same breath he denies that pleasures and pains are 
‘wholly separated’ from our sensations and reflections. Along the same lines, it 
is hard to know what Locke means when he claims that pleasures and pains are 
‘annexed’ to our ideas of objects. Does he take the annexation to result in a 
simple idea, with aspects only distinguishable by reason? Or does the annexa-
tion amount to forming a complex idea? It is hard to say. In ECHU 2.7.5 he 
maintains that pleasure and pain are “blended … together in almost all that our 
thoughts and senses have to do with.” Again we can ask how we are to under-
stand this ‘blending’. 
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 It seems important to Locke to maintain that pain and pleasure  are distinct ideas; 
he seems to be bending over backwards to preserve their distinctness. Yet he realizes 
that this position faces some explanatory challenges. Pleasures and pains, for him, 
seem to function as the vehicles through which our attention is directed to one idea 
or another. But, of course, they cannot serve this function if there is no explanation 
of how the two come be joined together. It is for this reason Locke seems to want 
to qualify the distinctness of  all our simple ideas from one another and to deny that 
pleasure and pain are wholly separate. 
 While Locke says relatively little about pleasure and pain, what he does say is 
fraught with equivocations. Sometimes he takes pain and pleasure to be essentially 
contentless, simply feelings of delight or uneasiness, which, while they ground our 
evaluations and move us to action, tell us nothing about the world. At other times, 
Locke takes pleasure and pain to indicate the ways things benefit and harm us, or 
otherwise impact on our well-being. Insofar as Locke does sometimes suggest the 
latter view, his account of experience might not be as instrumentally embodied as it 
initially seems. However, Locke is far from taking our experience to be essentially 
immersed insofar as he takes pleasures and pains to be distinct from our other simple 
ideas. Insofar as we can separate the sensory contents from pains and pleasures, 
Locke must take it that sensory information is gained  independently of any informa-
tion afforded by pleasure and pain, that is, independently of concern with self-preser-
vation. This separability of sensory experience from any ends we might have is at the 
heart of the account of experience that takes our bodies as detecting instruments. 
 4  Pleasure and Pain and Our Ideas of Particular Substances 
 It might be tempting to note these equivocations in Locke’s account of pleasure and 
pain but to discount them as on the whole unimportant. However, Locke’s equivo-
cation regarding the place of pleasure and pain in our  cognitive economy does 
extend to other aspects of his account that philosophers have taken to be central. 
In this section, I focus on the implications of Locke’s mixed mind regarding pleasure 
and pain, and so instrumental and immersed models of experience, on his account 
of particular substances. 13 
 According to Locke, we form our ideas of objects, or what he terms particular 
substances, 14 in virtue of our noticing that “a certain number of these simple ideas 
 
13
 In an extended treatment of this problematic, I would also want to consider in more detail 
Locke’s epistemology, for it seems to me that we can think about the importance of the distinction 
there between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, on the one hand, and sensitive knowledge 
on the other, as importantly dependant on the separability of pleasure and pain from our other 
simple ideas, and so dependent on an instrumentalist conception of embodiment. 
 
14
 It might well be that for Locke our ideas of particular substances are ideas of  kinds of objects, 
rather than of individual objects. Nonetheless, those ideas would presuppose, for him, ideas of 
individuals, and Locke owes his readers an account of our perceptions of objects. I don’t see that 
that account of our ideas of individuals would be very different from his story about our ideas of 
particular substances. 
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go constantly together” (ECHU 2.23.1). We receive an ever changing set of simple 
ideas in the course of our experience, and, so the story goes, we notice that some 
of those simple ideas always seem to come into our mind together. We “collect … 
such combinations of simple ideas” together and form a complex idea. Locke takes 
it to be natural to seek an explanation of why those simple ideas do come into the 
mind together, and he posits that the qualities which cause those simple ideas all 
inhere in one underlying “something, I know not what” or pure substance in general. 
While readers usually focus on Locke’s entitlement to this supposition, or how best 
to understand pure substance in general, or if Locke’s account allows for particular 
substances to have real essences, these lines of inquiry take for granted that 
Locke can make sense of our ability to notice that some simple ideas come together 
in experience. 
 But how is that supposed to happen on Locke’s view? As William James puts it, 
albeit two centuries after Locke, our first experience of the world is as of “one great 
blooming, buzzing confusion.” 15 James is far from being the first to conceive of 
our experience in this way. We have already seen the shades of a similar position 
articulated in Descartes’s Sixth Meditation, where Descartes presents us as 
perceiving various colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and so on, that must be organized 
in some way. 16 It would seem that Locke conceives of our experience in a similar 
way, at least at the beginning of his account. Locke makes no mention of any filter 
to control the conveyance of ideas into the mind, and a simple introspection reveals 
that the simple ideas I do sometimes collect together to form an idea of an object 
not only are not always joined together but also are sometimes joined with other ideas. 
Indeed, this seems to be part of the point of Descartes’s meditator’s consideration 
of the piece of wax. We cannot, according to this account, know by sensation the 
piece of wax – or, one might say, take there to be a single piece of wax, an object, 
before us – because the sensible qualities we perceive are constantly changing, and 
we cannot imagine the uncountable changes it might further undergo. The meditator 
requires and does not find within sensation itself a principle for grouping sensible 
qualities together into an object. The problem is not simply one of building 
up a complex idea from simple ideas of sensation, but also one of breaking 
down the manifold of our experience into objects. In peering into my dining area, 
I not only see my kitchen table, I also see the table cloth covering it, the light 
 
15
 James  1950 /1918, 462. 
 
16
 Descartes’s account of the three grades of sensation in his  Replies to the Sixth Objections fits 
this reading well. On that account, the first grade of sensation consists simply in the physiological 
changes in our sense organs. The second and third grades both concern our sense perceptions, that 
is, sensations as mental states. The second grade of sensation consists of ideas of the various 
sensible qualities that are available to us. These sense perceptions do not yet allow us to form ideas 
of object, though there may be patterns to our perceptions. Descartes describes the third grade of 
sensation as our judgements of something before us – that we see a bent stick in water, for 
instance. (See 7:436ff; 2:294ff) It is hard to know how to read ‘judgement’ here. It seems clear 
that Descartes does not intend the sort of judgement that is the focus of the Fourth Meditation. I am 
inclined to read him as accounting for the way we reify the patterns we perceive into objects. 
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streaming through the window, the chairs around it, the floor it sits on, and so on, 
and one might say similar things about my tactile and auditory experiences of the 
table as well. One wants an account of how the simple ideas I receive all at once 
get grouped together into an array of complex ideas that constitute my idea of 
objects. To my knowledge, Locke does not explicitly offer any such account. 
 Descartes does not explicitly offer such an account either, but his remarks in the 
Sixth Meditation are suggestive. Recall there were two aspects to Descartes’s 
account of sense perception. First, variations in our sense perceptions were taken 
to indicate real variation in the world, and second, our sense perceptions them-
selves were taken to be intrinsically agreeable or disagreeable, that is, pleasant or 
painful. While I cannot fully argue for it here, I want to suggest that these two 
aspects work together to afford us perceptions of objects. That our perceptions 
admit of variation in and of itself is insufficient to get us an idea of an object. 
Someone with poor vision need only take off her glasses to get this point: perceiv-
ing sensible qualities, even if we can perceive variations in those qualities is not 
the same thing as having an idea of an object. Rather we delimit objects in the 
varied landscape of our sensory experience by the pleasures and pains we experi-
ence. These pleasures and pains, for Descartes unequivocally, indicate the way 
things benefit and harm us and with this information we can, through a kind of 
judgement, form an idea of a well-delimited object. 17 
 It is particularly noteworthy that Locke mentions nothing about pleasure and 
pain in his discussion about particular substances. Locke’s equivocations regarding 
pain and pleasure preclude his telling a Cartesian story about how we manage to 
collect our simple ideas together in the first place, so as to form ideas of particular 
substances. If Locke takes ideas of pain and pleasure to be primitive simple ideas, 
providing no information about benefit and harm, they are just like any other of our 
many ideas of experience that need to be organized in some way. And insofar as 
they are not information bearing it is not clear what sort of role they could possibly 
play in any account of our complex ideas of objects. If he takes our pains and 
pleasures to provide us with information about benefits and harms, Locke might 
have a resource to draw on in providing an explanation of how we form ideas of 
objects similar to that of Descartes. Indeed, Locke’s account of the role pleasure 
and pain play in focusing our mind’s attention on one idea or another would seem 
to provide the beginning of such an account. However, this path is only open to 
him if he takes our sensations to be intrinsically pleasant or painful, that is, so 
long as he takes our bodies to be immersed in the world. If he takes our bodies 
instrumentally, that is, if he maintains that pleasure and pain are distinct and 
separable simple ideas, he cannot appeal to any information regarding benefit and 
harm as attention-focusing until he accounts for how those pleasures and pains 
come to be joined with our other simple ideas. But of course this is the problem for 
which we are seeking a solution in the first place. 
 
17
 Again, the sense of judgement in play here cannot be that of the Fourth Meditation. (See n.16 
above.) 
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 Locke himself, even if he does explicitly mark a problem here, does recognize 
he must say something about how we form ideas of particular substances from 
simple ideas. In ECHU 3.6.28, he claims that
 the Mind, in making its complex  Ideas of Substances, only follows Nature; and puts none 
together, which are not supposed to have a union in Nature. No body joins the Voice of a 
Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixedness 
of Gold, to be the complex  Ideas of any real Substances; unless he has a mind to fill his 
Head with  Chimeras . 
 Here Locke simply asserts that our simple ideas are packaged into complex ideas 
in the mind in a way that conforms to the way the properties they represent are 
packaged in nature. While if this were so, it would solve the problem facing his 
account of particular substances, it is not clear how he is entitled to the claim. Even 
if we concede that our ideas of primary qualities do resemble the actual primary 
qualities of bodies, our holding these qualities in mind does not entail that we also 
hold the relations between them. Indeed, Locke’s atomism about simple ideas 
suggests that they do  not contain this relational content that is crucial to the story 
Locke is trying to tell here. Locke’s professed realism here might well solve his 
problems but it is far from clear whether this strong a realist claim conforms to his 
empiricist methodological commitments. 
 It is intriguing that the problem of object perception in Locke seems analogous 
to what contemporary cognitive scientists call the Binding Problem. Consideration 
of Locke’s mixed mind about the place of pleasure and pain in sense perceptions on 
his account of object perception can perhaps lend some insight to current discussion. 
The Binding Problem at its most basic level is the problem of how to understand 
our ability to represent a thing as having certain properties. As such, any solution 
to this problem must explain both how we come to represent a particular thing 
(i.e., have an idea of a particular substance, in Locke’s parlance) and how we take 
that thing to be possessed of certain properties. 18 Clearly, different answers will turn 
on whether one takes representation to involve conscious awareness, how one 
models the ways in which properties can come to be ‘bound’ with one another, and 
more generally, the models of information processing available, as well as other 
factors. 19 Interestingly, standard answers to the Binding Problem, like Locke, ignore 
any affective dimension to our experience. Now there might well be pragmatic 
reasons for this. Models of neuroprocessing are still very much in development, 
and so merely meant to approximate the way our minds do work. Nonetheless, 
cognitive scientists might well want to evaluate the assumptions they tacitly make 
about the character of the information being processed. They seem to assume a kind 
of instrumental conception of experience, in a way similar to the reading of Locke 
I have been problematizing here. However, as I have shown, Locke himself 
 
18
 For a helpful overview of this problem see Plate  2007 . Other recent philosophically informed 
work includes Pylyshyn  2007 and Bermùdez  2007 . 
 
19
 Of course, if one does not begin from a Lockean perspective, assuming that sensory information 
is simply brought into the mind to be processed, one might reject the Binding Problem as a genuine 
problem. See for instance, O’Reagan and Noë  2001 . 
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seems to have wavered between conceiving of our experience as instrumental and 
immersed in the world. Contemporary investigations of human understanding 
might well benefit from rethinking the models of sensory input, so that they include 
the affective dimension proper to an immersed conception of experience. Doing so 
might well lead to progress in solving the Binding Problem. 
 5  Resolving the Tensions in Locke: a Brief Overview 
of Empiricist Responses 
 Interestingly, at least some central figures in eighteenth century empiricist thought 
do seem to take our experience to be essentially immersed in the world. That is, 
they resolve the equivocations that I have pointed to in Locke’s account of pleasure 
and pain in a particular way: they take our sensory experience to contain essentially 
an affective dimension. I here focus on Berkeley and Condillac to illustrate this 
point, but other figures to consider include Hutcheson, Diderot and Rousseau. 
 5.1  Berkeley 
 Berkeley’s  A New Theory of Vision is principally concerned with arguing against a 
geometrical, so rationalist, account of visual perception of distant objects and 
proposing an empiricist alternative, and in it he says very little about pleasure 
and pain. Nonetheless there we can see the beginnings of a view that would, unlike 
Locke, take at least some of our sense perceptions to involve some sense of benefit 
or harm. In a.59, in beginning to lay out the relation between ideas of sight and 
those of touch, he writes:
 We regard the objects that environ us in proportion as they are adapted to benefit or injure 
our own bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensation of pleasure or pain. Now 
bodies operating on our organs, by an immediate application, and the hurt or advantage 
arising therefrom, depending altogether on the tangible, and not at all on the visible, qualities 
of any object… (NTV, a.59) 
 Here Berkeley maintains that through our sense of touch we are able to sense the 
various benefits and harms the world might afford us. We do not, he here maintains, 
gain similar information directly through vision, though from past correlations 
between visual sensations and tactile ones, we can use our sense of sight to anticipate 
things we come across benefiting or harming us. 20 
 
20
 It is important to note that the distinction between touch and vision does not correspond to a 
distinction between ideas of secondary and primary qualities. This is certainly the case for 
Berkeley who rejects the distinction, but it is also the case for Locke. Touch, after all, allows us 
to have ideas of shape just as well as vision, not to mention solidity. 
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 In the  Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous , however, Berkeley seems to 
extend his position on touch to  all our sensory ideas. In reading the  Dialogues , 
commentators have typically focused on Berkeley’s criticisms there of Locke’s 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and on his argument following 
from the premise of both that criticism and Locke’s own methodology – that what 
we immediately perceive are ideas – against the inference to the existence of any 
extra-mental cause of our ideas. However, with Locke’s equivocation regarding the 
place of pleasure and pain in sensation at the fore, Berkeley’s commitment to a 
central tenet of an immersed conception of experience comes out clearly. It begins 
to emerge as Berkeley’s alter-ego Philonous prompts Hylas to recognize that all 
sensations of great heat or cold are “nothing distinct” from a “sensible pain”:
 Phil.  Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire 
affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same 
simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and, 
consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a 
particular sort of pain. 
 Hyl. It seems so. 
 Phil.  Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation 
to be without pain or pleasure. 
 Hyl. I cannot. 
 Phil.  Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, 
abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c. 
 Hyl. I do not find that I can. 
 Phil.  Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensa-
tions or ideas, in an intense degree? 
 Hyl.  It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a very great heat cannot 
exist but in a mind perceiving it. ( Dialogues , 12–13) 
 Note that Berkeley here makes a point of treating our sensation of heat as a 
simple idea, and from there concludes that the heat must be a kind of pain. As the 
discussion continues it becomes clear that Berkeley applies the same line of reasoning 
to all our sensations: they are all species of pleasure and pain. Here Hylas tries to 
recoil from that conclusion, but to no avail:
 Hyl.  Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this time. You asked whether 
heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which 
I answered simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished: – 
those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains but not as existing in the 
external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in 
the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by 
us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to this? 
 Phil.  I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concern-
ing sensible things, which you defined to be, the things we immediately perceive by 
our senses. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, 
I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You 
may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, 
and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be 
made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once 
more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning 
those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind? 
( Dialogues , 16) 
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 Philonous insists that the only way of escaping that conclusion that our sensa-
tions are all species of pain and pleasure is to claim that something exists other 
than what we perceive immediately, a claim that Philonous thinks is wholly without 
warrant. 
 In the passages I have pointed to thus far, Berkeley adverts only to the so-called 
secondary qualities, and so can be seen as playing up Locke’s willingness to draw 
an analogy between those qualities and pain and pleasure. 21 However, Berkeley 
does go on to suggest that even our ideas of extension, figure and motion are also 
pleasures and pains, albeit less vivid ones:
 Phil.  It is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers. But, among 
other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and 
pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, 
tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the 
ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly 
absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are 
more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than 
the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recol-
lect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of 
heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after 
all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensa-
tion is as truly a sensation as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently 
should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject. 
( Dialogues , 27) 
 Berkeley thus resolves the equivocations in Locke in two ways. First, he admits 
that our sensations of pain and pleasure inform us about benefits and harms; they 
are information bearing states. Second, he denies that pleasure and pain are distinct 
simple ideas. Rather, all our simple ideas of sensation are pleasant or painful in 
themselves. In taking on these two positions, Berkeley clearly situates us as perceivers 
immersed in the world. 
 5.2  Condillac 
 Condillac was just as astute a reader of Locke as was Berkeley; his  Essay on the 
Origin of Human Knowledge is a reworking of Locke’s  Essay. For my purposes 
here, however, I am interested in his  Treatise on Sensations . Interestingly, there 
Condillac starts from the assumption that all our sensations essentially involve 
pleasure and pain. His self-described aim is to explain how all our cognitive functions 
can be explained from this starting point:
 Nature has given us our sense organs to alert us to what we have to seek out by pleasure, 
and to what we have to flee by pain. But our nature stops there. Experience has the job of 
giving us habits and completing the job that nature started. This object is new, and shows 
 
21
 See n.13 above. 
281Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke
all the simplicity of the ways of the author of nature. Cannot one but wonder that to give 
birth to ideas, desires, habits, and all kinds of talents, it is only necessary to make human 
being sensible to pain and pleasure? ( Dessein; Condillac  1754 /1984 , 12) 
 In many ways, then, Condillac’s project is identical to Locke’s: to explain human 
understanding without appeal to innate ideas and with only the resources of expe-
rience. However, there is one crucial difference. Whereas Locke is equivocal 
regarding whether pleasures and pains are distinct simple ideas, Condillac is clear 
they are not. For Condillac, they are integral aspects of our sensations. Moreover, 
that this is so is critical to the empiricist psychology Condillac wants to go on 
to develop. 
 Condillac proposes to defend his hypothesis that all our cognitive functions 
derive from our sensations through a thought experiment. Indeed, the whole of the 
work consists in just this exercise. Condillac asks us to consider a statue that is 
given one sense modality at a time and to determine when she comes to have a 
consciousness like our own. What Condillac seems to mean by consciousness here 
is simply the ability to perceive and identify objects as distinct from ourselves in 
the way we do. This work thus aims to provide a direct solution to the challenge 
Locke faces in explaining object perception in empiricist terms. 
 While I cannot give a full accounting of Condillac’s argument here, it is useful 
to recognize just how the fact that our sensations are pleasant and painful figures 
into the account. As the statue is given one sense modality at a time, she finds her 
awareness completely consisting in the sensory quality of that mode she is expe-
riencing. She first identifies herself with the smell she is experiencing, of a rose; 
there is nothing in her awareness but that smell. Then she identifies herself simi-
larly with the color she experiences, the red of the rose; again she is not aware of 
anything but that color. Insofar as the sensory qualities each constitute her aware-
ness, she has no consciousness of anything else. While in these cases, Condillac 
is clear that the experience of rose smell and of rose colour are pleasant, it is not 
clear what function this pleasure is to play in our cognitive life, other than to 
induce us to want to continue in having that pleasant experience. 
 It is not until that the statue acquires a sense of touch that she is able to form an 
idea of an object distinct from a perceiving subject. At its most fundamental level, 
touch, for Condillac, seems to be equivalent to proprioception, and it is this funda-
mental feeling, as Condillac calls it, through which we get a sense of ourselves. 22 
Equally, we are only able to learn that there is something existing outside of us 
through the sense of touch. Pleasure and pain are essential to the statue’s coming to 
understand that there are other things existing distinct from it. For with the sense of 
touch, understood first as a fundamental feeling of one’s body, and so of oneself, 
pain and pleasure are what lead us to move our limbs:
 In accord with its organization, therefore, pleasure and pain, or the passage from one to the 
other, cause it to have movements; it cannot then but happen that among these movements 
 
22
 TS II.1.3; Condillac  1754 /1984, 158. 
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some will cut off or suspend a sensation which is hurtful, and others will procure it a 
sensation which is pleasurable. ( TS II.5.2; Condillac  1754 /1984, 101–2) 23 
 Through these motions, motions prompted by feelings of pain and pleasure, the 
statue comes to discover that it has a body distinct from other bodies. In moving its 
limbs along itself and around in the world, it comes to distinguish when it feels 
itself, and when it does not:
 Placing its hands on itself it will discover that it has a body, but only when it has 
distinguished the different parts of it and recognized in each the same sentient being. It will 
discover there are other bodies when it touches things in which it does not find itself. 
(TS II.5.2; Condillac  1754 /1984, 102) 
 Through touch, then, we begin to form ideas of objects. We are able to locate our-
selves in a world populated by other things existing apart from us. 
 With an idea of an object existing distinctly in place, Condillac’s next task is to 
explain how we are able to collect together our other simple ideas, ideas of color, 
smell, taste and so on, and attribute them to the objects our sense of touch has 
identified. Doing this, for Condillac, once again involves motion. 
 Placing its hands by chance upon the objects it meets, it grasps a flower and holds it in its 
hand. Its arm moving aimlessly, is brought now towards its face, now away from it; it is 
conscious with more or less vividness of a particular mode of being. Surprised, it now 
repeats the experiment designedly. It lifts the flower and lets it fall several times, and it 
comes to think that it exists or ceases to exist in a certain manner according as the flower 
is near or distant. Finally, it begins to suspect that it owes to the flower the feeling which 
is a modification of its own being. (TS III.1.4; Condillac  1754 /1984, 158) 
 We combine smell with touch, for instance, by first having two discrete sensa-
tions, and then noticing that there is correlation between the changes in the one 
(smell) while we move the other. Touch provides us with a fixed point through 
which we can measure changes in the other sensations we have, and in particular 
changes in pleasures and pains. In correlating those changes with our own 
motions, we come to attribute various sensory qualities to the objects defined 
through touch. 
 Condillac, thus, would seem to resolve the equivocations from Locke in a way 
similar to Berkeley. For both, pleasure and pain are an intrinsic aspect of all our 
sensations, and in particular those of touch. For both, pleasure and pain contain 
information about benefits and harms. Condillac ingeniously argues that with this 
conception of immersed experience, an empiricist has all the resources that are 
needed to resolve a problem facing Locke – the problem of explaining our ability to 
perceive objects. 24 
 
23
 See also TS II.8.1: “Without pleasure our statue would never have the wish to move: without 
pain it would move with confidence and infallibly perish. It must then always be exposed to pleas-
ant and unpleasant sensations” (Condillac  1754 /1984, 119). 
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 Condillac’s account of how we come to perceive objects should be of particular relevance to 
cognitive scientists interested in the Binding Problem. 
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 6  Locke’s Mixed Mind: Possible Explanations 
 It is particularly interesting that two empiricists as committed as Berkeley and 
Condillac adopt the model of immersed experience, taking our sensations to be 
essentially affective, even though the model does seem to find its roots in the early 
modern period with canonical rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza. Thus, while 
it might perhaps be tempting to explain Locke’s equivocations by claiming that 
immersed experience is somehow at odds with empiricist principles, this cannot be 
correct. So then why did Locke himself not resolve the equivocations in his 
account? Of course, one might well claim that he prioritized other issues, but 
for the sake of argument let me conclude by offering two other less pragmatic 
and more philosophical answers. 
 First, consider the status of animals in the early modern period. It was certainly 
highly contentious whether animals were capable of either pleasure or pain, 25 and 
if animals were taken to be incapable of these basic affective responses, this would 
certainly preclude their having immersed experience as such. But surely no one 
would want to deny that animals share a world with us, a world populated by 
objects with properties. If animals are incapable of feeling pleasure and pain, then 
their sensory perception must not involve this affective dimension. Are we then to 
understand humans and animals as experiencing the world in fundamentally different 
ways? A principle of simplicity would suggest that human and animal experience 
are not different in kind, but rather at different points on a spectrum. So long as 
animals are denied feelings of pain and pleasure, it would make sense then to adopt an 
instrumental conception of experience. We do share sense organs with animals, and 
so it does make sense that we would be able to take in similar bits of information. 
But equally, if we admit animals might feel pleasure and pain, then the possibility 
of a model of immersed experience opens. Locke’s mixed mind about human 
experience thus parallels mixed views about animal experience. 
 Second, it is worth noting that the conception of human embodiment was inti-
mately intertwined with theological issues, and in particular that of the immortality 
of the soul. The controversies around Locke’s accounts of substance and personal 
identity – in particular his exchange with Stillingfleet – demonstrate just how 
vexed a topic the immortality of the soul was, and Locke does take care in to affirm 
his belief in the Resurrection and the immortality of the soul, distinct from its 
immateriality in the  Essay . 26 In many ways, a model of immersed experienced is 
more threatening in this regard to Locke than it might be to someone like Descartes 
who was clearly committed to the view that the mind, or soul, was able to subsist 
without the body. For Descartes, whatever thoughts the soul might be able to have 
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 Descartes, for instance, initially denies animals are capable of pain and pleasure, just insofar as 
they are incapable of thought (see 3:85; 3:148 and 4:573; 3:302ff). Later, in correspondence with 
More, he backpedals a bit, simply suggesting that we cannot know whether animals experience 
pleasures and pains (5:276f; 3:365f). 
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in virtue of being united with a body, and so immersed in the world, the soul is still 
capable of independent existence and thereby persists after death; and so Descartes 
preserves the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Locke’s skepticism 
about pure substance in general, his lack of commitment to dualism, and his denial 
of innate ideas put pressure on the model of immersed experience in the face of 
concerns about the soul’s immortality. If all our ideas come from experience, and 
that experience is essentially situated in the world, what can possibly be retained 
once our body dies? Without our bodies, we would presumably lose the capacity to 
retrieve those ideas whose content depended on our having a body at all. And without 
its thoughts, what could the soul possibly be? Despite the advantages of a model of 
immersed experience, these kinds of considerations might well have moved Locke 
towards a more instrumental conception of our experience. If the content of our 
ideas does not depend on the body in which we find ourselves, then the mind can 
at least in principle retain those thoughts after the body dies, and so preserve 
some semblance of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Easing of various 
political pressures around this issue might well have allowed later empiricists the 
liberty to fully adopt the model of immersed experience. Certainly, these sorts of 
considerations need not constrain contemporary cognitive scientists in their efforts 
to address the question of object perception. 
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 Abstract  Kant introduces empiricism as a deficient position that is unsuitable for 
the generation of scientific knowledge. The reason for this is that, according to him, 
empiricism fails to connect with the world by remaining trapped within the realm of 
appearances. If we follow Galen’s account of the debate ensuing among Hellenistic 
doctors in the third century B.C., empiricism presents itself in an entirely different 
light. It emerges as a position that criticises medical practitioners who stray away 
from the here and now by indulging in theory-driven a priori forms of reasoning. In 
so doing empiricism remains at all times committed to the world and its agents. In 
this paper Galen’s account of empiricism will serve me as a means to unravel the 
dynamics of a discussion that aims to reassess the standards of a dogmatic scientific 
practice. By looking at Bacon’s and Gassendi’s perception of the ancient medical 
tradition I will furthermore show that the understanding of what empiricism is cru-
cially depends on the understanding of what scepticism is. 
 1  Introduction 
 In the  Critique of Pure Reason Kant presents empiricism as a form of idealism. 
In the  Fourth Paralogism he writes:
 The term ‘ idealist ’ is not … to be understood as applying to those who deny the existence 
of external objects of the senses, but only to those, who do not admit that their existence is 
known through immediate perception, and who therefore conclude that we can never, by 
way of any possible experience, be completely certain as to their reality. 1 
 Kant thereby turns empiricism into a sceptical position that is sceptical for its 
admission of the claim “that, the existence of which can only be inferred as a cause 
of given perceptions, has a merely doubtful existence.” 2 These considerations are 
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part and parcel of his attack on the scepticism that Kant regards as a consequence 
of Berkeley’s and Hume’s attempt to deal with Cartesian dualism by accepting that 
the  representation of a physical object is genuinely different from the object  itself , 
the so-called Ding an sich. Kant’s announced strategy consists in tracing the limits 
of reason for the purpose of showing that knowledge is possible,  although objects 
independent of our experience indeed lie beyond our grasp. 3 
 In this paper I wish to show that the Kantian conception of empiricism is deeply 
mistaken. This conception suggest that thinkers before Kant were primarily 
concerned with the problem that real knowledge can be obtained only if precisely those 
causes are known that are taken to be unknowable. Kant thereby creates the wrong 
impression that early modern empiricism is a purely epistemological position that 
can but fail in its attempt to provide a genuine understanding of the world on the 
basis of appearances. I will oppose this Kantian conception of empiricism by 
examining the writings of Galen (129–216 A.D.) that provide us with an account 
of the debate between ancient empiricist and rationalist doctors, a debate that 
ensued among Hellenistic doctors in the third century B.C. and that was known to 
many early modern writers. I will argue that Galen’s writings present ancient 
empiricism as an essentially pragmatic position which is marked by its hostility 
towards any sort of speculative science. Ancient empiricism thereby challenges 
the very metaphysical model that Kant attributes to empiricism in general, that 
is, the model that assumes the existence of unknown hidden causes and that renders 
empiricism a hopeless epistemological position. To correct the Kantian picture of 
empiricism is crucial as it may help us to understand that those whom we today 
identify as the great classic empiricists, that is, early modern philosophers who 
promoted experimental methods, did not understand themselves as the losers of a 
game that reaches for hidden causes, but as the avant-garde of a new generation of 
(natural) philosophers who most enthusiastically assumed that they can discover 
things that render the world of our everyday lives more comprehensible. 
 I will begin by giving a brief outline of the particularities of the Kantian account 
of the relation between empiricism, science and epistemology. This will help us to 
understand why Kant casts empiricism in terms of a purely epistemological theory. 
I will then turn to Galen’s account of ancient empiricism in order to reveal the 
empiricist’s commitment to the world of the here and now and his rejection of 
metaphysical hidden causes. I will substantiate this claim by examining empiricism 
with respect to its fierce opposition to theory-laden forms of reasoning and thereby 
create a link to the ancient sceptical tradition of Pyrrhonism. The remainder of the 
essay will focus on the perception of ancient empiricism and scepticism by thinkers 
such as Bacon, Gassendi and Montaigne. I will examine the reasons why empiri-
cists became associated with that sort of scepticism that detaches appearances from 
the real things. I will conclude by suggesting that Galen’s account of empiricism is 
able to provide a cure for the Kantian tendency to epistemologize empiricism. 
 
3
 “Thus the critique of reason, in the end, necessarily leads to scientific knowledge; while its dog-
matic employment, on the other hand, lands us in dogmatic assertions to which other assertions, 
equally specious, can always be opposed – that is in  scepticism ” (Kant  1970 , 57/B 23). 
289Empiricism and Its Roots in the Ancient Medical Tradition
 2  The Kantian Turn 
 Kant has often been presented as the Copernicus of philosophy, that is, as the one 
who revolutionized the entire discipline. Apart from his followers, Kant himself 
even alludes to Copernicus in order to clarify his approach:
 We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary hypothesis. 
Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the 
supposition that they all revolve around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have 
better success if he made the spectator revolve and the stars to remain at rest. 4 
 According to Kant, Copernicus deserves merit because he understood that once 
a hypothesis fails to explain the phenomena, it needs to be replaced. The Kantian 
Kuno Fischer refers to Kant’s admiration for Copernicus in slightly different terms; 
he adds a twist which reinforces the picture that Kant  overcame the deficiencies of 
empiricism as much as Copernicus  overcame the “first perspective that derives from 
sense perception.” 5 The Copernican move is thus presented as a move away from the 
sensory level of experience toward a transcendental perspective. This apparently 
ignores Kant’s own description of Copernicus’ extraordinary achievement. For Kant, 
as pointed out above, it is one’s readiness to adjust one’s hypothesis if it fails to 
explain the observable data that deserves merit; it is not Copernicus’ insight into the 
deficiencies of a perspective based on sense perception. But although Fischer 
transforms Kant’s relation to Copernicus, it needs to be noted that he keeps in 
line with Kant’s general opinion that empiricism is a mistaken epistemological 
approach. Fischer does so by suggesting that true insight is possible only if one 
abandons the perspective inherent in sense perception, because sense perception is 
unable to transcend the realm of the appearances. 
 Fischer continues his interpretation of pre-Kantian philosophy with an analysis 
of the situation of philosophy in the wake of the scientific revolution. According to 
him, early modern philosophy was faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, the 
success of the experimental sciences pressured it to acknowledge the importance of 
experience and sense perception; on the other hand, philosophy needed to show that 
experience is insufficient for the acquisition of knowledge, unless it wanted to 
render itself entirely otiose. Fischer’s analysis thus proposes that philosophising is 
no more than a self-justificatory exercise: philosophers are those who need to show 
that analytic forms of reasoning are to rule any scientific enterprise. He writes: 
“If the empire of philosophy were not to die, it needed to regain a position that the 
empirical sciences respected and could not challenge.” 6 One of the consequences of 
this analysis is that empiricism once more appears to be altogether untenable as a 
philosophical position, not merely because it fails to perform the Copernican move 
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 Kant  1970 , 22/B xvii. 
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 “Gesichtspunkt der ersten, sinnlich nächsten Betrachtung” (Fischer  1909 , 8). 
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 “Wollte ihr Reich [das Reich der Philosophie] nicht zugrunde gehen, musste sie sich eine neue, 
stete, von Seiten der Erfahrungswissenschaften anerkannte und unbestreitbare Stellung erobern” 
(Fischer  1909 , 4). 
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and, therefore, remains trapped within the sphere of the senses. What’s more, 
according to Fischer, empiricism lacks respect for analytic reasoning, although it is 
precisely this form of reasoning which puts philosophy in a position to defend its 
status as a scientific discipline. 
 As pointed out before, Kant himself presents empiricism as a form of half-
hearted idealism that understands “all outer appearances” as being of “such a nature 
that their existence is not immediately perceived” but only inferred “as the cause of 
given perceptions.” 7 In characterising empiricism along these lines, he ascribes to 
it a form of Cartesian dualism. He implicitly takes it for granted that the empiricist 
is aware of the existence of causes different from those things that appear before 
his mind. Thus Kant tells us that the dualist is ready to “admit the existence of 
matter without going outside his mere self-consciousness,” 8 while the empiricist 
refrains from such judgement, because for him the causes of appearances have “a 
merely doubtful existence.” 9 Kant thereby suggests that the dualist  and the empiricist 
agree that there is a reality that duplicates the reality of appearances and that 
they only disagree on whether or not one is able to gain knowledge about it. 
One consequence of this interpretation is that the empiricist turns into a sceptic, 
who “after wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, 
must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses … finds, 
from this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to estab-
lish their reality.” 10 Hence, for Kant himself, empiricism fails to offer a scientific 
approach, not so much because it opposes a priori forms of reasoning, as Fischer 
claims; it fails to do so because it is unable to create insight into the true being of 
things that the empiricist allegedly locates in the hidden beyond. 
 Note that, according to Fischer and Kant, the questions of what science is, how 
philosophy can be pursued scientifically and how empiricism fits into all this 
relate to the question of whether philosophy is able to achieve knowledge. The 
rejection of empiricism as a philosophical position, and as a scientific approach, thus 
relates to its failure to provide a framework that enables the philosopher to achieve 
true insight into the being of things, while true insight is defined in terms of knowl-
edge of underlying causes. Kant himself proposes that knowledge is possible 
only if mind and world are not seen as separate from each other but as united by 
principles required for the possibility of experience. My aim in this paper is not to 
go into details about Kant’s approach and its purported ability to solve the outlined 
epistemological problem the empiricist encounters, for I am concerned with his 
conception of what empiricism is. At this point, I only wish to draw attention to 
the fact that on Kant’s account, he naturally turns out to be the genius who solved 
one of the major problems, if not  the problem of philosophy that has troubled 
thinkers since antiquity: that is the problem of how we can achieve knowledge. 
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As we will now see, Galen’s discussion of ancient empiricism has a very similar 
strategic aim. It establishes Galen as the genius who reunites the advantages of the 
medical schools of rationalism and empiricism. His account of the disputes between 
the two schools is interesting not so much because it shows that the talk about what 
empiricism is needs to be received with care and evaluated against the relevant 
historical background. The comparison between Kant and Galen is primarily 
interesting because Galen’s account reveals a dimension of empiricism that Kant 
entirely ignores. Galen presents empiricism as a position that challenges a 
hopelessly dogmatic and theoretical scientific practice. He thereby relates 
empiricism to a context that negotiated the aims and goals of science, without 
prioritising the question of whether and how knowledge is possible. 
 3  Empiricism à la Galen 
 In the Essay  On the Sects for Beginners Galen introduces the concept of empiricism 
by its opposition to rationalism:
 Some say that experience alone suffices for the art [of medicine], whereas others think that 
reason, too, has an important contribution to make. Those who rely on experience 
[ empeiria ] alone are accordingly called empiricists. Similarly, those who rely on reason are 
called rationalists. And these are the two primary sects in medicine. The one proceeds by 
means of experience to the discovery of medicine, the other by means of indication. 
And thus they have named their sects empiricist and rationalist. 11 
 In using the terms ‘empiricism’ and ‘rationalism’ Galen refers to the names that the 
medical sects gave themselves. 12 The standard objection that Kantians introduced 
the terms in order to refer to early modern philosophers who did not understand 
themselves in this way therefore does not hold. 13 And although it must be taken into 
account that Galen, similarly to Kant, provides us with a simplified story of 
empiricism that lets his own approach appear in a certain light – Nutton for instance 
emphasises that Hellenistic medicine was far more diverse than Galen tells us 14 – it 
is worthwhile going into details about some of the characteristics Galen attributes 
to the school of empiricism, because Galen’s discussion notably influenced 
the medieval and early modern perception of ancient medicine and thereby the 
pre-Kantian perception of what empiricism is. 
 Empiricists, as Galen puts it, aim for the knowledge of the right medicine by 
studying the symptoms; they make use of their memory in order to recall the different 
occasions and circumstances that obtained when a certain treatment succeeded 
or failed. In so doing the empiricist opts for inductive forms of reasoning: 
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 Galen  1985 , 3. 
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he generalizes upon his previous experiences and thereby commits himself to the 
so-called epilogism, a form of reasoning that is defined “solely in terms of what is 
apparent” and can be used for the “discovery of things which are not manifest 
 temporarily .” 15 The means by which the empiricist can gain knowledge here turn 
out to be rather limited. If he remains true to his own method, he cannot infer to 
something never seen or experienced before. Galen therefore rightly complains that 
the empiricist’s treatment is based on the trial and error of cures. Why the empiricist 
limits himself to this procedure – which is particularly worrisome for the one who 
serves as his guinea pig – becomes clear if we look at the various respects in which 
epilogism is considered a useful weapon:
 The epilogism also is useful, if one wants to refute those who dare to argue against what is 
manifest. It is also of use to point out that some phenomenon has been overlooked and to 
counter sophistical arguments. In reasoning this way, one never departs from what is clear 
but throughout stays within its limits. 16 
 It here seems that the empiricist understands the limits of his method as a 
virtue that he purposefully chooses in order to counterbalance the rationalist’s 
speculations and sophistical arguments. 
 One could perhaps be tempted to interpret the ancient empiricist’s commitment 
to the limits of reason in Kantian terms. That is, one could argue that the ancient 
empiricists were mainly interested in the epistemological question of how one can 
achieve knowledge. And one could point out that their answer is that one has to 
respect the limits of reason by restricting one’s reasoning to the systematisation of 
the previously experienced. Galen’s account of ancient empiricism would thus 
nicely tie in with the Kantian story that traces the battle between empiricists and 
rationalists back to Plato and Aristotle. 17 What this interpretation ignores, however, 
is that the context of the debate between ancient empiricists and rationalists was 
entirely different from the context to which Kant refers when developing his own 
critical philosophy as the long awaited solution to the problem of how knowledge 
is possible. Galen was a doctor and practitioner; and his discussion of the leading 
medical traditions pursues the aim of assessing the most promising way of treating 
diseases successfully. His discussion thus has a genuinely practical focus. In other 
words, the question is not that of how one can know, merely for the aim of knowing 
the truth, but that of how one can find a remedy that is efficient enough to cure the 
ill patient. Galen states in the opening line of  On the Sects for the Beginners : 
“The aim of the art of medicine is health, but its end is the possession of health.” 18 
 Of course, practicing medicine involves the knowledge “of what is healthy and 
what is not healthy” 19 ; and it is in this respect that empiricists object to rationalists 
 
15
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for relying on forms of reasoning unwarranted by experience, the so-called 
 analogism . Galen writes: “The analogism starts from what is apparent but then 
proceeds to matters which are entirely unclear and that is why it takes so many 
forms.” 20 The rationalist would thus turn observable phenomena into signs, 
namely, into indicative signs – a class of signs the ancient empiricist vehemently 
rejects 21 – because he takes phenomena to indicate things which are not accessible 
in themselves. In so doing the rationalist would not only rely on the unproven 
assumption that the observable is analogous to the unobservable, but also make 
use of unwarranted theories that inform the practitioner about the precise way in 
which the two relate to each other. 22 The problem with this approach would be, 
Galen continues his presentation of the empiricist’s attack on the rationalist, that 
the phenomena do not allow the rationalist to rule out that it is one cause rather 
than another that produces the observable effect:
 For, starting from the same phenomena, it arrives now at one and now at another unobvious 
conclusion. And, at this point, they [the empiricists] bring up the problem of the discord 
which cannot be settled and which they claim is a sign of the incomprehension of things. 
This is the language they use: ‘comprehension’ for true and certain knowledge, ‘incompre-
hension’ for the opposite of the first. And they say that the incomprehension is the 
cause for the discord which cannot be settled and that the discord, in turn, is a sign of 
the incomprehension. They point out that it is the disagreement concerning matters 
which are not manifest which cannot be settled, not the disagreement concerning 
matters which are manifest. For, in their case, everything once it is apparent what it is like, 
confirms those who are right about it. 23 
 Galen’s empiricist here mocks the rationalist for aspiring to “comprehension” if 
all he can achieve is “incomprehension” and “discord.” His more to general point 
seems to be that a medical practice that is built on as insecure a foundation as the 
knowledge of hidden causes is entirely unsatisfactory in its tendency to create noth-
ing but contradiction and speculation. 24 Jonathan Barnes characterises this prob-
lem as arising from the underdetermination of theory: “The symptoms of fever can 
be explained in many ways; yet the different doctors stick each to his own explana-
tion. In general there are many ways of explaining the fact that  q ; but most aetiolo-
gists cite just one of those ways.” 25 Barnes furthermore emphasises that this attack 
 
20
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 The empiricist, as much as the Pyrrhonist, only allows for commemorative or recollective signs 
which are used to draw inferences on previously observed causal chains. See  Barnes 1983 , 158f. 
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 Lolordo cites an Epicurean example to illustrate the nature of analogism: “The void must exist, 
because motion could not exist unless the void existed. Thus, motion is a sign of the void. How 
do we come to know that motion is impossible without an absolute void? Epicurus’ answer is that 
we know this by analogy with evident things. In ordinary cases, a (relatively) solid body cannot 
move somewhere unless that place is (relatively) empty” (Lolordo  2007 , 96). 
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on the search for hidden causes ( aiteologia ) lay at the heart of the empiricist’s 
concern. This is certainly true, for, as we have seen, Galen’s empiricist opposes the 
idea that we need to dig deep into the metaphysical realm in order to find successful 
cures and he recommends to base treatment on the experiences with the patients. 26 
The empiricist thereby seems to take it that phenomena have an explanatory value 
in themselves and do not merely function as signs for a truly explanatory cause, 
because for him the phenomena provide sufficient information for determining 
the right cure. 
 The empiricist’s commitment to a medical practice that results in an effective 
cure rather than unfounded speculation and contradiction seems to find Galen’s 
approval. This becomes clear three chapters later when Galen – after having given 
a short outline of a third group of practitioners beside those of the rationalists and 
empiricists, namely the group of the so-called methodists – sets out to specify 
the term ‘apparent’. According to him, this specification is necessary because the 
methodists would misinterpret ‘apparent’ in order to deny the need for theory and 
learning: “If you do say”, Galen objects to the methodist in the voice of the 
empiricist, “as I also have heard from you in the beginning, that all that is not 
manifest is useless and if you agree to follow what is obvious, then, perhaps, I can 
point out to you what it is that you are overlooking, reminding you of what is 
apparent.” 27 To illustrate his point Galen considers the case of two men who were 
bitten by a mad dog. Both men received medical treatment, the first by someone 
who considers solely what is apparent, in this case the open wound, the other by 
an empiricist doctor who also pays attention to background information, in this 
case the fact that the dog is mad. While the first man dies, the second survives. 
Galen finishes this story by asking: “Do you think that, in such cases, one 
inquires in vain into the antecedent cause and that the man died for any other 
reason than the negligence of the doctor, who failed to ask at all about the cause 
and to apply the treatment observed in this case?” 28 Note that the way Galen 
describes empiricism in this passage presents it as the recommended position, 
because the empirical doctor allows for the consideration of circumstances 
that previous experience has shown to be crucial to the success of the treatment 
(further circumstances that Galen names are for instance seasons, the location and 
age of the patient). Galen’s comparison between the empiricist and the methodist 
thus gives the characteristics of a desirable medical practice in terms of its success: 
it underlines that in order to secure the success of a certain treatment, it is 
necessary to consider not only the momentary apparent circumstances, but also 
the so-called antecedent causes, that is, causes that were once apparent. What 
does not seem to matter is which sort of reality – obvious or hidden causes – the 
practitioner is to know in order to achieve this success. 
 
26
 Experience comprises sources other than one’s own experience: history, reports and testimony of 
other practitioners can be consulted in order to identify the needed remedy. See Galen  1985 , 27. 
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 The comparison of empiricism with the school of the methodists shows how 
Galen gradually introduces new dimensions of empiricism that turn it into a more 
and more refined position. 29 In the same context Galen points out – again in the 
voice of the empiricist who keeps arguing against the methodist – that anatomy is 
essential to a successful medical practice: “That you do not even consider the parts 
of the body seems to me to be a rather strange thing for you to say and indeed quite 
absurd.” 30 Galen does not mention at this point what he explains on the opening 
page of  On the Sects for Beginners when opposing empiricism to rationalism, that is, 
that the empiricist rejects the use of theory for its tendency to lead the practitioner 
away from the realm of the experienceable to an underlying reality. Of course, if 
anatomy is understood as a theory that emerges as a result of the experimental study 
of corpses and living bodies, there is no conflict between Galen’s earlier and later 
account of empiricism, because the theory in question would be derived from the 
study of the observable. Unfortunately, Galen does not specify in which respect 
anatomy is to play a part within the empiricist’s practice. This suggests that he 
plainly understands it in the traditional sense as  phusiologia , that is, as a form of 
theory that reaches for principally unexperiencable causes. 31 
 Why does Galen present the empiricist as someone who is open to theory? It is 
clear that Galen himself held rather traditionally that science necessarily involves 
theory: for him the best doctor is a philosopher who is trained in logic, physical 
theory and ethics. In defence of Hippocrates and against the methodist he claims:
 They scold the man who has said that life is short and the art long. Quite the contrary, they 
say that the art is short and life is long. For, if one does away with all those things which 
have been wrongly taken to further the art and if we attend only to the communities, then 
medicine is neither long, nor difficult, but rather is easy and clear and can be learned as a 
whole in a matter of six months. (Sects, 11) 
 Galen’s point in this passage is that the methodists would deprive the ‘art of 
medicine’ of its status as a science. They would do so by introducing the simplistic 
model of communities or generalities, which describe diseases in terms of manifest 
states of constriction, dilation, or a combination of both. 32 In raising this point 
Galen clearly reveals the traditional view that “a true … science has to be based on 
truly general knowledge, which only reason not experience can provide us with” 33 ; 
and he subscribes to the orthodox claim that experience does not give us any 
explanations but only facts. 34 Despite his conservatism, it needs to be noted, 
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however, that Galen often sympathises with the empiricist, for instance, when 
claiming that experience is the most reliable criterion 35 for truth and that empirically 
unwarranted theories need to be abandoned. 36 
 If we combine these characteristics of Galen’s own position with his interpreta-
tion of empiricism as a position that assimilates theory in form of  phusiologia , it 
seems that Galen uses his discussion of the school of empiricism for a specific 
purpose. By discussing the methodists in opposition to the empiricists, he 
emphasises that theory is needed if medicine is to qualify as science. Thus, Galen 
is convinced that some persons can acquire the “art of medicine” by experience 
alone, 37 although he insinuates that this art is limited in its scope and fails to qualify 
as a true science. 38  Conversely, by discussing the empiricist’s criticism of the 
rationalist Galen draws attention to the problem of overemphasising theory and 
alerts his readers to the problem that theory easily leads to useless speculations 
about entities about which nothing definite can be said. He thereby reveals the need 
for new scientific methods, namely, methods that are more reliable and useful and 
less speculative which can be achieved through a robust commitment to experience. 
Galen’s purpose of presenting us with the methods and beliefs of the empiricist 
school of medicine in opposition to other schools thus turns out to consist in arguing 
for an experience-sensitive medical science that relies on theories that enable the 
practitioner to treat his patient successfully. 39 
 It might here strike us as a parallel between Kant and Galen that both discuss 
empiricism in order to show which standards a truly scientific discipline needs to 
respect. Kant wants to lead philosophy on the highway of science; and his disciple 
Fischer points out that the scientific status of philosophy can be preserved only if it 
succeeds in showing the need for analytic forms of reasoning. Galen surely takes a 
different stance. For him it is clear that philosophy is science, because science just is 
logical reasoning. Hence, for him the question is not so much that of how philosophy 
can preserve its status as a science, but that of how a medical practice that pays 
due respect to experience can qualify as scientific. A further difference between 
Kant’s and Galen’s discussion of empiricism is that the latter seems to use this 
discussion to advocate some sort of practically-oriented conception of science that 
opposes speculation and contradiction and thereby ensures the success of the treatment. 
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If so, Galen’s discussion of the various medical schools is to be read as an attempt 
to transform established science by bringing into play considerations about the 
practical value of scientific enquiry. Kant and Fischer certainly do not share this 
conception of science: their enterprise is driven by the quest for knowledge, while 
practical considerations play no role. But this is not all that distinguishes Galen’s 
conception of empiricism from the Kantian conception: as Galen’s discussion of the 
various medical traditions has shown, ancient empiricism is a position that attacks 
the model of a twofold reality and abandons the idea that unreachable causes need 
to be known in order to provide an appropriate understanding of the world. Galen’s 
discussion is thereby able to challenge the Kantian concept of empiricism as a form 
of Cartesian dualism. It can do so because it shows that the ancient empiricist 
does not construe reality as something which is detached from the world of the 
appearances. He takes reality to be the reality of the experienceable world and 
opposes all attempts to search for a deeper level. 
 4  Empiricism cum Scepticism 
 I will now try to answer the question of why empiricism is usually associated with 
the twofold metaphysical model that construes reality as something which lies hidden 
beyond the appearances and that we cannot access. One obvious answer to this question 
is that empiricism puts forward a weak concept of knowledge, that is, a concept that 
is weak, one could think, precisely because it is based on experiences, rather than 
the things that cause our experiences. The conclusion that seems to follow from this 
is that empiricism can merely offer suggestions about what is most likely to happen, 
but not about what needs to take place given that certain causes are inevitably at 
work. Although it is true that empiricism is a position that admits that it cannot 
predict the course of nature infallibly, it is not true that empiricism needs to be 
committed to the view that there is a realm of reality that, if it were accessible, 
would allow us to make such infallible claims. To render this point more evident let 
us take a closer look at the relation between ancient empiricism and scepticism 
(I will focus on Pyrrhonism and leave Academic Scepticism unconsidered). 
 Galen draws a direct comparison between the empiricist and the sceptic Pyrrho:
 The empiricist will not be a man of many words or of long speeches but will talk little and 
rarely, just like Pyrrho the Sceptic. Pyrrho had looked for the truth and, not finding it, was 
in doubt about all things nonevident, but in his daily activities he followed what is evident, 
whereas in everything else he remained in doubt. The empiricist’s attitude towards medical 
matters is like the sceptic’s attitude towards the whole of life. He does not lack in reputa-
tion, but he also is not arrogant; he is unassuming and not boastful, just as Timon claimed 
Pyrrho to have been. 40 
 If we follow this characterisation, empiricism needs to be understood as a specialised 
form of Pyrrhonism: while the latter marks an attitude which is relevant to  all areas 
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of life, the former describes an attitude that is relevant with respect to a  certain 
medical practice . Ancient scepticism and empiricism thus turn out to be similar 
in spirit: they are both marked by a readiness to overthrow previously formed 
opinions. Although this understanding of scepticism is Galen’s and not Sextus 
Empiricus’, 41 it seems advisable to take the link between empiricism and scepticism 
seriously. Barnes for instance emphasises that “it was the doctors, not the 
philosophers, who began the debate about causation and who first turned the 
weapon of skepticism against  aitiologia . Some of the arguments which Sextus 
directs against causation can still be traced back to Herophilus and to 
Erasistratus, and it is scarcely to be doubted that many more of the arguments 
had a medical origin.” 42 
 One point that is remarkable about Galen’s interpretation of the nature of Pyrrho’s 
scepticism is that it opposes the standard view that Pyrrhonism is a position that 
rejects belief  tout court . According to Galen, both empiricism  and scepticism admit 
of beliefs that are based on the evident. Thus he points out that Pyrrho naturally held 
beliefs while interacting with the world and other people in his ordinary life. Michale 
Frede has defended Galen’s interpretation of Pyrrhonism as a position that involves 
beliefs by drawing attention to Sextus Empiricus’ own words:
 In P.H. I 13 ff, Sextus explains in what sense the skeptic is not dogmatic. What is not in 
question, at least if we follow Sextus, whether the skeptic has no dogmas, no beliefs at 
all but whether he has no beliefs of a certain sort. Sextus distinguishes between a wider 
(koinoteron) and a narrower sense of ‘belief’; and only beliefs in a narrower sense count 
as dogmatic. Hence, there can be no doubt whatsoever that, according to Sextus, a serious 
Pyrrhonean skeptic can have beliefs. 43 
 According to Frede’s interpretation of Sextus, the Pyrrhonist merely rejects 
beliefs resulting from theoretical reasoning, but not beliefs that he comes to hold 
naturally and which are necessary for the mastery of everyday life. The reason for 
this is not so much that theoretical reasoning is taken to be suspicious in itself; 
rather it is because the Pyrrhonist understands that reason, once set into action, is able 
to undermine any one of its previously formed claims by presenting equipollent 
arguments on both sides of the issue. 
 Galen draws a similar distinction when reflecting on the status of medicine. 
He distinguishes between beliefs resulting from a natural process of reasoning and those 
that require reflection and theoretical reasoning. Thus he declares that there is a form 
of reason that “men have by nature” 44 and that it is this form that provides us with 
insight into necessary truths. Of course, Galen here clearly distances himself from the 
sceptic, for he claims that natural reason can reveal things that are necessarily 
true, while the sceptic may accept beliefs for their naturalness but not for their truth. 
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At the same time, however, Galen agrees with the sceptic (and the empiricist) that 
natural and theory-driven belief-forming processes form two separate categories of 
belief. If regarded against the background of Galen’s characterisation of empiricism 
as a position that rejects theory-dependent beliefs, that is, beliefs that Galen also 
criticises if unwarranted by experience, it becomes clear that the issue at stake is not 
so much the question of what is required in order to have true belief, but that of  how 
much theory is needed for a scientific approach to the world. 45 This issue is certainly 
one of importance, especially for those who challenge established orthodoxies, such 
as the sceptics, empiricists and, to a certain extent, even Galen. After all, theories are 
man-made and often enough infested by dogma. 
 One way of opposing dogma certainly consists in raising doubts about the 
appropriateness of established positions, another in abstaining from the mode 
of judgement that establishes dogma. I will now show in which way ancient 
Pyrrhonists made use of the second strategy. Pyrrhonists are famous for their 
practice of suspending judgement: that is for the practice of claiming that things 
appear to them in this or that way, while abstaining from claims to knowledge. 
Barnes distinguishes four senses of “to appear”:
 A proposition is of  type (A) if it contains a term purporting to refer to something “by 
nature nonevident”; for example: (1) The tower is composed of atoms – where atoms are 
those nonevident corpuscles hypothesized by some schools of belief. Propositions of 
 type (B) refer to evident objects and describe their evident characteristics; for example: 
(2) The tower is square. Propositions of  type (C) again refer to evident objects, but report 
on how they seem (how they look, feel, etc.); for example: the tower looks round. Finally 
propositions of  type (D) make no reference to any object, but merely state how things seem 
to be; for example: (4) It looks as though there’s a round tower. 46 
 In short, by saying that something appears in a certain way one can either form 
claims about things which are non-evident as in case (A), about things which are 
evident as in case (B) and (C) or about no things at all. Furthermore, it seems that 
only case (A) can be interpreted as a sense of “to appear” in which phenomena are 
taken to indicate a hidden reality, because in cases (B) and (C) the things to which 
we refer are evident, while in case (D) the appearance is not taken to refer to an 
object at all. Barnes ends this passage by suggesting that the “Sober Skeptic” has 
a problem only with propositions of type (A), because these alone would refer to 
principally nonevident objects: “Faced with an example of type (A), the appropriate 
answer is a sceptical shrug. As with (B), (C) and (D), the Sober Skeptic will make 
room for them all.” 47 More generally speaking, one could say that (sober) sceptics 
are those who form statements that remain concerned with the observable reality 
without reaching for non-evident objects. Note that this conclusion sits particularly 
well with the above-developed account of empiricism as a position that does 
not admit of a second layer of reality. If it holds that empiricists are specialised 
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sceptics, and if sceptics are permissive towards claims about the evident, while 
merely rejecting claims about the non-evident, the interpretation of empiricism as 
a position that concentrates on the world of the experiencable as the  only world 
finds confirmation. 48 
 The close link between ancient empiricism and scepticism now allows us to 
redefine our understanding of the empiricist’s fallibilism. As we have seen, ancient 
scepticism and empiricism are describable in terms of an attitude that challenges a 
worldview based on theory and pure reason. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that ancient empiricists as well as ancient sceptics happily accept beliefs that are 
useful and necessary for the conduct of our lives if these beliefs are based on 
the evident. Both, ancient sceptics and empiricists thus remain bound to the world 
that is precisely the world we experience when acting in our everyday lives. 49 If we 
take this into consideration, it becomes clear that the empiricist’s motivation for 
operating with a fallibilist concept of knowledge does not seem to derive from the 
disappointing news that the mind is unable to reach the real being of things; it derives 
from the empiricist’s commitment to the reality of our everyday lives that all too 
often teaches us that we were wrong. What we gain here is a concept of empiricism 
that is characterisable by a general openness to revision and the replacement of 
beliefs. Empiricism thus-understood is sceptical, if by sceptical we understand a 
general unwillingness to formulate incorrigible and dogmatic claims to the truth 
and falsehood of things; however, it is non-sceptical, if scepticism is taken to result 
from the inability to reach causes that would need to be known in order to predict 
things infallibly. 
 5  Perception of Empiricism and Scepticism 
 At this point one could ask which developments needed to take place in order to 
create the impression that empiricism is genuinely sceptical in its adherence to a 
twofold metaphysical model that both ancient empiricism and scepticism originally 
ventured to attack. That is, the metaphysical model that treats appearances as things 
that stand in between mind and world and thereby block access to the true being of 
things. As we have seen, Kant takes it for granted that empiricism operates with this 
metaphysical model. He characterises empiricism as a form of idealism or Cartesian 
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metaphysical dualism that separates appearances from their underlying real causes. 
In characterising empiricism along these lines he suggests that the understanding of 
what empiricism is must have changed with Descartes. Let us now have a look at 
Bacon and Gassendi in order to find out whether this impression is correct. 
 In the  New Organon (1620) Bacon writes:
 Those who have treated of the sciences have been either empiricists or dogmatists. 
Empiricists, like ants, simply accumulate and use; Rationalists like spiders, spin webs from 
themselves; the way of the bee is in between: it takes materials from the flower and of the 
garden and the field; but it has the ability to convert and digest them. 50 
 Bacon furthermore advocates “a closer and more binding alliance (which has 
never been made) between these faculties (the experimental and the rational)” 51 for 
the purpose of improving the established scientific practice. 
 This passage once again gives a good example of how empiricism and rationalism 
have been repeatedly presented as one-sided in order to introduce one’s own more 
sophisticated position as a combination of the best of the two. Bacon first explains 
that empiricism is a position that prioritises experience and fails to integrate the 
use of reason, before suggesting that a mix of both, experience and reason, is the 
solution to all problems. He thus proposes what Galen has offered before him and 
Kant would repeat one and a half centuries later. 52 Despite these broad similarities, 
however, it becomes clear that all in all Bacon’s discussion of empiricism stands 
closer to Galen’s than to Kant’s: Bacon neither introduces the epistemological 
twist so characteristic for the Kantian analysis of empiricism, nor does he impose 
a metaphysical model that detaches the realm of appearances from the real world. 
Bacon raises the topic of empiricism within his general attack on Aristotelian 
science that he takes to rely on useless forms of argument. He thereby pays tribute 
to the pragmatic considerations of the ancient debate and resumes its anti-dogmatic 
spirit: “We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn 
of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice than Ortelius’ universal map 
is to direct the way between London and York.” 53 Bacon’s presentation of the 
opposition between the two schools thus exhibits the same function as Galen’s. 
It triggers reflections on method and urges a reassessment of the aims and goals 
of science. 54 Bacon thereby clearly transcends the realm of purely epistemological 
considerations. 
 We will now see that Gassendi, Descartes’ contemporary and opponent, introduces 
a perspective that somewhat alters the picture by offering a conception of appearances 
that detaches them from the real things. In the  Syntagma Gassendi writes that the 
“Academic Sceptics” are those who
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 say that the appearance of things, or what things appear to be on the outside, is one thing 
and the truth, or the inner nature of things, namely what the things are in themselves, is 
another matter, and that when they say that nothing can be known certainly and that there 
is no criterion, they are not speaking of what things appear to be and of what is revealed 
by the senses as if by some special criterion, but of what things are in themselves, which 
is so hidden that no criterion can disclose it. 55 
 Pyrrhonists would be those “who make a habitual distinction between  tê phantasia , 
“appearances”, or what things seem to be, and  tê alêtheia , “the truth”, or what 
things are, and as those “who swear that they will raise no quarrel concerning the 
appearance of things, but only concerning their truth.” 56 Gassendi finally adds that 
Pyrrhonists only “assent to appearances” and “engage in dispute with the dogmatists 
only over the claim they make to know not only how things appear but also what 
they are like in themselves” 57 Gassendi thus presents scepticism, i.e. Pyrrhonism 
and Academic scepticism, as a position that is committed to the view that there is 
an “inner nature of things” that cannot be known, neither by the senses nor by reason. 
He thereby provides us with an interpretation of scepticism that assumes precisely 
the metaphysical model Kant attributes to empiricism, for Gassendi clearly distin-
guishes the appearance of things not only from their unknown essence, but also 
from the things themselves. From what has been said so far, it is clear that the 
sceptic certainly does not rely on such a metaphysical model. If the sceptic opposes 
belief in everything non-evident, how can he base his scepticism on a metaphysical 
model of a hidden real? If considered from a sceptical point of view, Gassendi’s 
analysis therefore appears questionable and likely to provoke a shrug, at least if we 
follow Barnes, because a shrug is precisely the reaction the sober sceptic offers to 
statements that refer to principally non-evident objects. 
 In this context it is interesting to note that Antonia Lolordo claims that Gassendi 
is as much of a direct realist as Sextus Empiricus: “Gassendi understands Sextus as 
denying knowledge of essences or inherent qualities, but accepting knowledge of 
appearances, so that we can, for instance, assent to the claim ‘honey tastes sweet to 
me’ but not ‘honey is sweet in itself’. For Gassendi as for Sextus, appearances are 
not mental entities but ways external objects appear.” 58 This may be true about 
Sextus own account as it may be true about Gassendi’s more general account of 
perception. However, it can barely be denied that Gassendi’s theory of signs, and 
especially his admission of the notion of the indicative sign, conflicts with his 
alleged direct realism. Gassendi points out that if “the truth in question is hidden, 
lying concealed beneath appearances” we must inquire “whether it is still possible 
to know it through some sign and whether we have a criterion by which we may 
recognize the sign and judge what the thing truly is.” 59 These considerations show 
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that Gassendi, at least when it comes to the use of indicative signs, endorses the 
metaphysical model that he attributes to the ancient sceptics. He understands 
appearances as signs that provide information about an underlying reality. 
 If we go back to Montaigne and his perception of ancient scepticism in 
“An Apology for Raymond Sebond” we gain valuable hints about what may have 
influenced Gassendi to think of appearances as indicators of a deeper level of reality. 
Montaigne is commonly seen to be the first to provide an extensive discussion of 
ancient scepticism after the publication of Sextus Empiricus’ writings in Western 
Europe in the sixteenth century. 60 When discussing the deceitfulness of the senses 
Montaigne writes:
 Our mental faculty of perception directly in touch with the outside objects – which are 
perceived via the senses, and the senses do not embrace an outside object but only their own 
impressions of it; therefore the thought and the appearance are not properties of the object 
but only the impressions and feelings of the senses. Those impressions and the objects are 
different things. So whatever judges from the appearances judges from something quite 
different from the object itself. 61 
 This is clearly a statement about the difference between the thing and its 
appearance: Montaigne here distinguishes between the inner world of the perceiving 
subject, “the impressions and feelings of the senses” and the “outside object”; and he 
tells us that judgement based on sense perception is based on something “different 
from the object itself.” 
 Craig Brush draws our attention to the fact that in this passage Montaigne 
notably alters the original arguments of Sextus Empiricus by exclusively concen-
trating on “the separation that exists between the senses and the external reality” 62 
and by omitting the discussion of the criterion that attacks syllogism and inductive 
reasoning. As an explanation Brush offers that Montaigne “is simply not interested 
in being a logician” 63 but rather in the role of the judge, “for he is more concerned 
with the subjective of the question than with the objective.” 64 The overall conception 
of Montaigne’s work seems to endorse Brush’s claim. Again and again Montaigne 
discusses change and alteration, choice of perspective and the influence of non-
cognitive factors that influence processes of judgement. Even the above-cited 
passage in which Montaigne discusses the impossibility of reaching the outer 
reality ends with the words:
 There is no permanent existence either in our being or in that of objects. We ourselves, our 
faculty of judgement and all mortal things are flowing and rolling ceaselessly: nothing 
certain can be established about one from the other, since both judged and the judging are 
ever shifting and changing. 65 
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 But if it is change, perspective and subjectivity that cause problems for the 
generation of certain judgement, why, one could ask, does Montaigne introduce 
the inner-outer distinction and with it a model that supports the idea that appear-
ances are detached from the reality of things? 
 One answer to this question arises if we consider that Montaigne, similar to the 
ancient sceptics and empiricists, ventures to attack the established philosophical 
opinion of his time, in his case Aristotelian Scholasticism, and more specifically, 
Aristotle’s account of perceptual cognition. 66 This becomes particularly clear if we 
pay attention to the fact that in the discussion of the fallibility of perceptual judge-
ment, he challenges the Aristotelian view that in processes of perception the mind 
is able to perceive the external object by forming sensibles ( aistehon ), that is, 
mental entities that are taken to  resemble the external thing and which allow 
the perceiver to extract the “essence” or “form” of the perceived object. Montaigne 
questions this account by asking: “How can our rational soul make sure that they 
[sense-impressions] are resemblances, since it has no direct contact of its own with 
the outside objects?” 67 It here appears that the reason for which Montaigne casts 
processes of perception in terms of an inner-outer distinction is that he wants to 
show the flaws of this particular perceptual theory and the metaphysical model 
going along with it. Montaigne thus proceeds in a similar vein as the ancient 
empiricists: he attacks a position that detaches the realm of the appearances from 
the real being of things by questioning how we can be sure that appearances indeed 
tell us something about the things from which they are detached. Of course, this 
does not entail that Montaigne commits to the view that he criticises, that is, to the 
metaphysical model that detaches the apparent from the real. 68 
 Having clarified some of the background considerations that could have influ-
enced Montaignes’ decision to refer to appearances as something separate from the 
things themselves, let us now return to the question of why Gassendi holds on to the 
notion of indicative signs and the model of a twofold reality, although he openly 
sympathises with the sceptics who reject both. Gassendi proceeds in a very similar 
way to Montaigne when using sceptical arguments as a means to attack established 
Aristotelian metaphysics. Thus Gassendi claims that Aritotelian science is founded 
on the assumption that we can achieve a grasp of inner natures; and he argues that 
science pursued along these lines is a hopeless enterprise, because we are plainly 
incapable of grasping hidden essences. Gassendi exclaims: “Yes, Aristotle, dear 
Peripatetic! Yes indeed the fundamental elements of reality are matter, form and privation. 
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 This interpretation seems to be endorsed by the concluding paragraphs of the Apology where 
Montaigne suggests that reality itself is as changeable and unsteady as appearances: “There is 
nothing in Nature, either, which lasts or subsists; in her, all things are either born, being born, or 
dying.” Montaigne  2003 , 682. 
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All I ask is that, using these, you explain to me the essence of just one single thing.” 69 
But although Gassendi happily engages in sceptical arguments when attacking 
Aristotelian metaphysics, he opposes Sextus by citing the Epicurean claim that “the 
sign is a thing of the senses.” 70 If we believe in Gassendi’s frequently expressed 
enthusiasm for Epicurean thought, it here becomes clear that the purpose of using 
sceptical arguments is not so much that of downgrading our knowledge claims for the 
very reason that all we can reach are appearances, but not the things themselves or 
their essences. By defending the notion of the indicative sign he urges us to use 
appearances as signs that indicate an underlying reality. So Gassendi’s problem is 
obviously not the problem that appearances block access to the real being of thing. 71 
His – as well as Montaigne’s – problem seems to be that Aristotelianism offers 
an unacceptable approach towards the world, while he, similar to Montaigne, uses 
sceptical arguments to reveal this. 
 6  Kant’s Concept of Empiricism Revised 
 What does all this have to do with Kant’s interpretation of empiricism as a form of 
idealism or Cartesian metaphysical dualism? At first glance it seems that Gassendi’s 
and Montaigne’s interpretation of ancient scepticism reveals that Kant was not 
altogether mistaken in attributing the metaphysical model of a twofold reality to 
early modern empiricists and rationalists. It indeed looks as if in response to 
scholasticism and with the various interpretations of Sextus Empiricus’ scepticism 
a gap between the inner and the outer of the perceiving subject opened up and 
created epistemological problems with which philosophers subsequently tried to 
cope. If so, Kant’s story of empiricism that presents empiricism as an account of 
how to solve sceptical problems would be vindicated. It would be vindicated 
because empiricism turned out to be no more than a strategy by which the sceptical 
threat was to be brought under control. 
 This is surely a rather simplistic reading. As has been pointed out, Montaigne 
and Gassendi cite the model of a twofold reality in order to attack orthodox philo-
sophical positions; and it is in this context that they consider scepticism a useful 
weapon. From this it does not follow that both thinkers understood scepticism as a 
 
69
 Gassendi  1972 , 82–6. 
 
70
 Gassendi  1972 , 333. 
 
71
 This interpretation opposes Walker’s claims that Gassendi would have benefited from Kant’s 
insight that knowledge of the Ding-an-sich is impossible: “It would certainly be a bonus from 
Gassendi’s point of view if the result were such as to exclude the possibility of our knowing 
about things as they are in themselves. Kant, in fact, was to put forward a line of thought which 
at least in his own opinion met the relevant requirements, and which I cannot help thinking 
Gassendi would have found rather congenial” (Walker  1983 , 333). According to my reading, 
Gassendi was plainly not troubled by the Kantian question; for further discussion of this point 
see Waldow  2010 . 
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problem that rendered any intellectual and scientific activity entirely otiose. Both, 
after having exploited sceptical arguments in order to show the deficiency of the 
established opinions, provide positive accounts of what sort of knowledge one is to 
seek: Montaigne recommends the study of oneself, while Gassendi advocates an 
experience-based examination of the world. Whether these recommendations can 
be seen as an attempt to solve the sceptical problem is questionable. It seems that both 
plainly stop bothering with sceptical arguments, once the adversary philosophical 
position has been defeated. Gassendi repeatedly states that it is entirely absurd to 
believe that there is no world and that we are just dreaming when actually perceiving; 72 
and Montaigne does not seem to be overly troubled by the fact that even the 
knowledge of ourselves can never gain the status of objective knowledge, for it is 
the self that becomes the subjective judge of herself. 73 
 If we consider the spirit Galen’s discussion of empiricism exhibits, we can 
understand why scepticism need not necessarily involve the fear that nothing can 
be known. 74 Galen presents empiricism as a pragmatic position that employs 
sceptical arguments with the aim of scrutinising the theory-laden practice of the 
medical dogmatists. Empiricism thus-understood is a position that casts doubt on 
the very belief that it is legitimate to transcend the realm of the experienceable by 
inferring to underlying causes. It is not a position that can be characterised by its 
struggle with the idea that knowledge is impossible. In drawing our attention to 
this use of sceptical arguments, Galen enriches our understanding of empiricism 
 and scepticism at the same time. He explains that both positions reject the uncon-
strained quest for knowledge that fails to impact on our lives. Empiricism and 
scepticism here present themselves as positions which are deeply committed to the 
world and its agents, a commitment that goes beyond purely epistemological 
considerations. If we add that, according to Ian MacLean, “Galen’s  De optimo 
modo docendi as well as others of his texts” were “sources for sceptical and 
antisceptical thinking” 75 of the Renaissance, it becomes clear why for early modern 
thinkers, such as Gassendi and many others, it was natural to make use of sceptical 
arguments  and to believe in the possibility of gaining insight into the world. These 
thinkers were presumably well aware of the fact that sceptical arguments are perfect 
tools for replacing established orthodoxies and for advocating an experience-based 
and practically-oriented form of philosophical investigation, even if this some-
times entailed their adherence to a metaphysical model that ancient empiricists 
originally rejected. 
 To conclude it can be maintained that Kant may have a point – at least as it 
concerns early modern forms of empiricism – when claiming that empiricists are 
quasi-metaphysical Cartesian dualists who differ from them only in their denial 
that it is possible to know the causes of appearances. Thinkers such as Gassendi 
 
72
 See for instance Gassendi  1972 , 328 and Gassendi’s reply to Descartes in Descartes  2005 , 180. 
 
73
 Hartle defends a non-sceptical reading of Montaigne in Hartle  2005 . 
 
74
 Popkin  2003 . 
 
75
 MacLean  2006 , 253. 
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implicitly endorse the view that inferences based on appearances can lead us to an 
understanding of their non-apparent causes. However, Kant’s account of empiricism 
does not only fail to do justice to ancient empiricism which clearly rejects the 
twofold model of reality. What is more, Kant is impermissibly reductive in his 
attempt to present empiricism as a purely epistemological position. In so doing he 
clearly departs from the course of authors like Galen, Bacon and even Gassendi 
who all refer to ancient empiricism and scepticism in order to advocate new forms 
of useful, experience-based and non-dogmatic science. 
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 Abstract  In this paper, I focus on the relations between sensibility, organic fibres 
and the soul–body-interface in the second half of the eighteenth century in France. 
The process of the mediation and transformation of embodied stimuli in a “human 
statue” is the main theme of Etienne Condillac’s  Traité des sensations (1754) 
and Charles Bonnet’s  Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme (1760). Both call 
embodied stimuli “sensations” ( sensations ) and the faculty to receive sensations 
“sensibility” ( sensibilité ). Like in the writings of the Montpellier medical doctors 
Théophile Bordeu and Paul Joseph Barthez, the term “sensation” refers to a wide 
range of organic and reflexive phenomena beyond the Hallerian dualism of muscular 
“irritability” and nervous “sensitivity.” While Condillac is mainly interested in 
the transformation of sensations into “experiences” and “judgments” of the soul, 
Bonnet develops a detailed scheme of the fibre œconomy of sensitive agents that 
transform outer stimuli into “physical sensations” ( sensations physiques ). Bonnet 
thus compares the organic differentiations of physical sensations and the relation 
of “physical ideas” ( idées physiques ) to the “organization” of living “organized 
bodies” ( corps organisés ). 
 1  Introduction 
 In the second half of the eighteenth century, the process of the mediation and 
transformation of embodied stimuli in a “human statue” becomes the main theme of 
Etienne Condillac’s  Traité des sensations (1754) and Charles Bonnet’s  Essai analytique 
sur les facultés de l’âme (1760). Both call the embodied stimulus “sensation” ( sensation ) 
and the faculty to receive sensations “sensibility” ( sensibilité ). Like in the writings 
of the Montpellier medical doctors Théophile Bordeu, Jean-Joseph Menuret, Henri 
Fouquet and Paul-Joseph Barthez, the term “sensation” refers to a wide range of 
organic and reflexive phenomena beyond the Hallerian dualism of muscular 
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“irritability” and nervous “sensitivity.” 1 Bonnet and Condillac use the term 
“sensation” for mechanical processes of stimulation, muscular, vascular, glandular 
and nerve-related movements, feelings, perceptions, passions and memories. 
 The sensation discourse is closely related to discussions about fibre models and 
soul–body-interactions. From around 1750, the fibre becomes through its passive and 
active properties the main operative building block and at the same time the first 
unifying principle of function–structure-complexes and stimuli-reaction-schemes of 
organic bodies. 2 It occupies the role that the cell takes up in the cell œconomies of the 
second third of the nineteenth century. 3 After Giorgio Baglivi’s pathology of fibre 
types and before Xavier Bichat’s catalogue of tissue types, the bodies of plants, ani-
mals and humans are for Bonnet all constituted through fibres, 4 and their differences 
mainly rely on different fibre types, structures and properties – plants feed through 
fibres, animals move and sense through fibres, and humans think through fibres. 
 While Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Claude-Adrien Helvétius already outline 
the framework of a material anthropology in which reflexive faculties of humans 
belong to their physical organization, 5 Condillac and Bonnet still distinguish 
between the sensitive “faculties” of a thing called “soul” and a thing called “body.” 
However, Condillac and Bonnet have different interests. Condillac is mainly interested 
 
1
 In the fifteenth volume of the  Encyclopédie 1765, Henri Fouquet (who is like Bordeu a medical 
doctor at Montpellier) defines “sensibility” as a general organic property that comprises both 
“irritability” and “sentiment” ( Encyclopédie , vol. 15 1765, 50): “L’ irritabilité n’est autre chose que 
la  mobilité ou  contractilité dont il a été question au commencement de cet article, & que nous avons 
dit être une des deux actions comprises dans l’exercice de la  sensibilité ; c’est toujours l’expression 
du sentiment; mais une expression violente, attendu qu’elle est le produit de la  sensibilité violem-
ment irrité par des  stimulus ; aussi est-elle quelquefois désignée sous le nom même de  stimulus chez 
les Phisiologistes, ou sous celui de  fibre motrice , &c.” In the article ‘Spasme’ of the  Encyclopédie , 
Menuret refers to the human as a “machine” in which each part is sensible or irritable: “Qu’est-ce 
que l’homme? ou pour éviter toute équivoque, que la méchanceté & la mauvaise foi sont si promptes 
à faire valoir; qu’est-ce que la machine humaine? Elle paroît à la premiere vûe; un composé harmo-
nique de différens ressorts qui mûs chacun en particulier, concourent tous au movement général; 
une propriété générale particulierement restreinte aux composés organiques, connue sous les noms 
d’ irritabilité ou  sensibilité , se répand dans tous les ressorts, les anime, les vivifie & excite leurs 
mouvemens; mais modifiée dans chaque organe, elle en diversifie à l’infini l’action & les mouve-
mens; par elle les différens ressorts se bandent les uns contre les autres, se résistent, se pressent, 
agissent & influent mutuellement les uns contre les autres; cette commixture réciproque entretient 
les mouvemens,  nulle action sans réaction . De cet antagonisme continuel d’actions, résulte la vie & 
la santé” ( Encyclopédie , vol. 15 (1765), 435b; thanks to Charles Wolfe for this hint). 
 
2
 Cf. Le Camus  1769 , 8: “Toutes les substances créées sont organisées ou sans organisation. 
Les premières sont composées de fibres, jouissent de la vie, et sont connues sous les noms 
d’animaux et de végétaux. Les dernieres sont massives, n’ont que des particules appliquées les 
unes contre les autres et sont inertes. Elles constituent le regne minéral.” 
 
3
 Cf. Berg  1942 , 336. 
 
4
 Fibres can be themselves composed of smaller organic units, like Buffon’s organic molecules. 
 
5
 For the larger context of material anthropologies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
debates about sensibility, and the so-called ideologists, see Picavet  1891 ; Baruzzi  1968 ; Moravia 
 1978 ; Lawrence  1979 ; Baasner Baasner  1988 ; Mullan  1988 ; Henry  1989 ; Van  1993 ; Duchet  1995 ; 
Bourdin  1998 ; Wolfe  1999 ; Riskin  2002 ; Audidière et al.  2006 ; and Thomson  2008 . 
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in the transformation of sensations into “experiences” ( expériences ) and “judgments” 
( jugements ) of the soul, while Bonnet develops a detailed scheme of the fibre 
œconomy of sensitive agents that transform outer stimuli into “physical sensations” 
( sensations physiques ). Bonnet thus discusses the organic differentiations of physical 
sensations and the relation of “physical ideas” ( idées physiques ) to the “organization” 
of living “organized bodies” ( corps organisés ). I will refer to both “spheres” of 
“operation” of Bonnet’s model of a sensitive agent. 6 In the first part, I reconstruct 
Bonnet’s “œconomy of fibres” of organized bodies. In the second part, I focus on the 
relation between the œconomy of fibres and the soul–body-interface. 
 2  Bonnet’s Œconomy of Fibres of Organized Bodies 
 After his observations of the parthenogenesis of aphids and Abraham Trembley’s 
experiments on the complete regeneration of artificially detached parts of the fresh 
water polyp  Hydra in 1744, Bonnet worked on a germ-fibre-theory to explain the 
development of organic bodies. If pieces of something living can again grow to entire 
organic bodies with heads and arms or stems and branches, then, Bonnet argued, there 
have to be small organized units with reproductive potentials within the visible units. 
These small, point-like units are germs that extend their contracted fibre architecture 
like “mini-machines” ( machinules ) into the “organization” of adult bodies. 7 
 In the first decades of the eighteenth century, web-like representations of fibre 
architectures and canal systems were already a standard reference for anatomists of 
plant and animal bodies. In his manual  Corporis humani anatomia (1693), which 
was reedited at least thirteen times in Latin and German until 1739, Philip Verheyen 
portrays the human body as a complex system of different types, dispositions and 
combinations of fibres (Fig.  1 ) 8 : 
 Beside the representation of web-like canal systems and a great variety of cata-
logues of different geometrical shapes and dispositions of fibres from Vesalius to 
Verheyen, the problem of self-moving properties of organic units characterizes 
 
6
 Most of the secondary literature about Bonnet focuses either on his germ theory (within the 
framework of preformationist debates) or on his “psychology.” For a discussion of both aspects, 
see e.g. Marx  1976 ; Anderson  1982 ; Mazzolini et al.  1986 ; Cheung  2005a,  c . For Bonnet’s 
germ-fibre-theory, see also Rieppel  1988 ; Buscaglia  1994 ; Cheung  2004,  2005b . 
 
7
 Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/1, 360–361. In  De Motu 
Animalium (1680–1681), Giovanni Alfonso Borelli often referred to the Latin expression 
 machinulae to characterize mini-machines of fibre complexes in organic parts as muscles. 
 
8
 Cf. Berg  1942 , 390–392; Ishizuka  2006, 72–75; and Suy  2007 . Boerhaave combines the notion 
of a hollow “nerve fibre” as the basic building-block of all organic structures with Frederik 
Ruysch’s visualization of canal systems through various injection techniques. In Boerhaave’s 
hydraulic model of organic bodies, “canals” or “tubes” ( canales ) are differentiated into smaller 
tubes that “finally form, branched within themselves, the structure of a net ( retis structura ).” Cf. 
Boerhaave  1703 , 10: “… canalis est conicus, elasticus, inflexus, divisus in similes minores eodem 
trunco ortos, qui ultimo … retis structura in se mutuo patent.” 
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fibre debates from René Descartes, Francis Glisson and Thomas Willis to Giorgio 
Baglivi and Albrecht von Haller. Their explanatory patterns refer to mechanistic or 
chemical explanations of elasticity, contractility, and irritability and to so-called 
vital explanations of these properties through an inherent force. 9 
 In  Primae lineae  physiologiae (Haller  1747) , Haller clearly distinguished 
between three types and general functions of fibres that constitute all “tissues” ( tela ) 
and “membranes” ( membranae ) of human and animal bodies: the fibres of the “cel-
lular tissue” ( cellulosa tela ), the muscle fibres, and the nerve fibres. 10 Living beings 
are “cellular fibre fabrics” ( cellulosae fabricae fibris ). 11 The fibres of the cellular 
tissue serve as the basic stabilizing material for organic structures, irritable muscle 
fibres can contract themselves through a specific  vis insita , and nerve fibres trans-
mit sense data or instructions from a regulating, soul-like agent. 
 For Bonnet, the germ-fibre-unit of an individual organized body is first of all a 
preexisting system of parts with basic regulating and structural properties:
 … I understand in general by the word germ all these preordinations or preformations of 
parts that are themselves able to determine the existence of a Plant or an Animal ( de parties 
capables par elle-même de déterminer l’existence d’une Plante ou d’un Animal ). 12 
 Fig. 1  Fibre architecture of the human body. Verheyen  1712 –1713, vol. 1 (1712), 30, plate II 
 
9
 Cf. Temkin 1964; Jaynes  1970 ; and Ishizuka  2006 . 
 
10
 Cf. ibid., 11 (§ 23): “Summam dignitatem huius cellulosae telae adgnoscet, qui cogitabit, ab ea 
sola pendere omnium arteriam, nervorum, fibrarum muscularium, adeoque compositarum inde 
carnum viscerumque legitimam firmitatem, stabilitatem … Ea cum vasi, nervis, fibris muscularibus 
& tendinieis … omnia viscera, omnes musculos, glandulasque & ligamenta, & capsulas componit, 
ab ea sola, eiusque varia longitudine, tensione, copia, proportione, glandularum viscerumque 
diversitatem oriri, & ab ea denique longe maximam partem corporis ipsius effici certum est, si 
quidem non totum ex huiusmodi fillis cellulolis componitur.” 
 
11
 Cf. Haller  1747 , 7 (§ 17). 
 
12
 Bonnet,  Tableau des Considérations sur les corps organisés in Bonnet  2002 , 82. Cf. Bonnet 
 1985 , 63 (§ 83): “L’organisation primitive des germes détermine l’ arrangement que les atômes 
nourriciers doivent recevoir pour devenir parties du tout organique.” 
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 In  Considérations sur les corps organiques (1762), Bonnet introduces his model of 
a germ-fibre-unit as an automaton that is composed of indefinitely small fibres. These 
fibres interact as “mini-machines” ( machinules ) to “animate” the  tout organique :
 A fibre, as simple as it might appear, is nonetheless a  tout organique that feeds, growths 
and vegetates. 13 
 The  tout organique can differentiate into nine thresholds of organized units: the 
germ, the fibril, the fibre, the “mesh” ( maille ) or the “cell,” the “fascicle” or “fibre 
bundle” ( faisceau ), the tissue, the organ, the apparatus, and the entire organism. 
Each higher organized unit is composed of lower units. 
 The fibre that is “supposed to be simple is itself composed of a multitude of 
fibrils ( fibrilles ) that are, as for themselves, composed of a multitude of more or 
less homogeneous particles ( molécules ) as their first elements, while the fibrils 
are the second elements.” 14 Each fibre represents in general a basic fusion point 
of the external particles with the inner order of the organic body. It possesses 
assimilative properties:
 … the fibre determines through the Mechanics of its Structure the arrangement of its 
nutritive Atoms … 15 
 From this fusion result the characteristics of the “primordial layers” of higher 
organs in the form of specific “patterns” ( trames ). These patterns can appear as 
“meshes” ( mailles ) or “cells.” They belong again to various types of “fibre bundles” 
( faisceaux ) and “tissues.” 
 Lower units, as for example the parenchymatic or cellular tissue, 16 are less 
determined in their operative effects than higher units (organs or apparati). Cells, 
bundles of strings and tissues represent the structural or “solid” physiological basis 
of the organic “network” ( réseau ). The organs and the apparati operate through the 
co-existing and co-ordinated “meshes” of the “network”:
 … we learn from physiology that there is no organic part that is not covered externally and 
internally with a cellular or parenchymatic tissue. It is so universally extended that it 
enfolds the whole system of fibres. One could thus think of it as the principal instrument 
of growth. The diverse incrustations or incorporations that determine the consistence [of 
organic parts], the [process of] growth and the most essential modifications of each part are 
situated within its nearly infinitely varied meshes or pores. 17 
 The organic “network” thus is a “networking system” ( ouvrage à réseau ) 18 
of organized units on various levels, a system of a “nearly infinite” number of inter-
mediate “chain-links” ( chaînons ) that appear in certain subordinated levels of order. 
 
13
 Bonnet  2002 , 257. Bonnet sometimes also describes “fibrils” ( fibrilles ) as “mini-machines.” Cf. 
Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/2, 361; and Bonnet  2002 , 232 and 
262. 
 
14
 Ibid., 258. 
 
15
 Bonnet 1973 , 68 (§ 101). 
 
16
 Cf. Bonnet  2002 , 288. 
 
17
 Ibid., 296. 
 
18
 Bonnet 1973 , 65 (§ 97). 
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This networking system depends on the “enchained” microscopic structures of 
“bended,” “stretched” and “hooked” fibres or “threads” ( fils ) that form “meshes” and 
“tissues.” To describe the growth of the organic “network,” Bonnet often refers to 
the process of weaving and to the mechanism of looms. The folded skins of organs 
become thus different kinds of weaving patterns or “cloths” ( étoffes ):
 The organized bodies are more or less fine tissues, they are networks, kinds of cloths of 
which the chain forms itself the pattern of an art that we would have to admire even if it 
would be known to us …The bodies of plants and of animals are thus sorts of looms, more 
or less composed machines that convert the diverse materials that are used for the activities 
of their mechanisms ( ressorts ) and their fluids. 19 
 Bonnet’s loom analogy reflects the invention of new machines of spinning and 
weaving processes for the fast growing market of the weaving industry, especially 
in England and France. 20 It was not before 1785 that Edmond Cartwright patented 
the first fully mechanized loom. 21 However, the automatization of spinning 
machines and looms already begun in the first half of the eighteenth century. In 
1733, John Kay invented the so-called flying shuttle. 22 The weaver could move 
Kay’s shuttle, itself loaded with cotton, only with a flick of the wrist of one hand 
from one side of the loom to the other and change at the same time the pattern of 
the warp threads. 23 In 1745, Jacques Vaucanson developed a completely automated 
process of the production of woven patterns through punch cards. 24 But Vaucanson’s 
machine remained a prototype until 1805 when Joseph-Marie Jacquard combined 
Cartwright’s power loom with an automated punch card system. 
 In his  Lettres philosophiques (Bourguet  1729) , Louis Bourguet already com-
pared the mechanism of looms with the mechanism of organic bodies. However, 
Bourguet focused on the automated process of weaving itself and not on the fibre 
architecture of the product:
 The Mechanic Arts still reveal a couple of other good examples, and there is one among 
all the others that I have to mention because it seems to be truly accurate for a better 
understanding of the subject that we examine [i.e. organic bodies]. I would like to talk 
about the vertical loom 25 that is used to produce  Rubans ,  Galons , and all kinds of  Cloth s 
with gold, silver, silk, wool and linen. This work of art is such that a simple Worker, who 
understands nothing, can produce all theses nice Works in passing one or a couple of 
shuttles along the Chain and in putting the feet on a certain number of Pedals. 26 
 
19
 Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4, 359–360. Cf. Bonnet  1985 , 63 (§ 83): 
“Un solide non-organisé est un ouvrage de  marquetterie , ou de pièces de rapport. Un solide organisé 
est une étoffe formée de l’ entrelacement de différents fils. Les  fibres élémentaires avec leurs  mailles , 
sont la  chaîne de l’étoffe; les atomes nourriciers qui s’insinuent dans ces mailles, sont la  trame .” 
 
20
 Cf. Baum  1913 , 25–42. 
 
21
 Four years later, a steam engine powered the movements of the loom. 
 
22
 In the same year, John Wyatt invented an automated spinning machine. 
 
23
 Cf. Bohnsack  2002 , 154–156. 
 
24
 Cf. Barlow  1879 , 141. 
 
25
 Haute-Lice . The threads of this loom are disposed vertically. In the “ basse lice ,” they are 
 disposed horizontally. 
 
26
 Bourguet  1729 , 145. 
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 For Bonnet, it is both the automated production process and the product that are 
similar in looms and living beings, although the comparison should not be pushed 
too far. 27 Bonnet explains the order of organic bodies through the assimilative 
“reproduction” of the order of a regulating “plan” within a “system” of mini-machines 
that produce, sustain and repair “tissues.” These regulated processes are executed 
by a “secret force” ( force secrete ) that acts like a self-moving flying shuttle. 
The shuttle “chases the nutrition into the meshes ( mailles ).” 28 
 However, in difference to the mechanism of looms, organic systems react to outer 
“stimuli.” The regulating activity of the preexisting “plan” depends on a continuous 
initiation of movements through various “impulse” series. 29 Such “impulses” emerge 
in muscles and nerves. While Haller’s irritability of isolated muscles served Bonnet as 
a standard reference for an experimental proof of the general existence of this 
property in organic units, he tried to combine Haller’s irritability with the “impulse” 
series of nerve fibres to describe a general property of the natural automaton to initiate 
and repeat coordinated movements. Such a system of impulses and movements 
is for Bonnet an expression of the “vital principle” ( principe vital ) of living beings. 30 
 Bonnet localizes the natural spinning unit of tissues in an “evolving” germ that 
“contains” 31 ever smaller and smaller germs, an image that is similar to 
Malebranche’s example of an apple tree that is contained in its seeds. 32 But every 
imaginative approach to the process of  emboîtement risks cutting short a proper 
understanding of parts of matter that could be indefinitely small, and yet organized. 33 
Such an indefinitely small, but organized matter is not simply an “abridged sum” 
( abrégé raccourci ) of its “evolved,” visible body. Rather, Bonnet emphasizes, it is 
necessary “to give a much larger signification to the notion of germ.” 34 
 In his  Principes philosophiques (1754), Bonnet thought of the preexistence of a 
similar, though smaller organic body in the germ that “evolves” during its develop-
ment. 35 The publication of Haller’s research on the development of embryos in the 
egg yolk of chickens in 1757 seemed to confirm Bonnet’s viewpoint. 36 But from the 
 Considérations sur les corps organisés (1762) to the  Palingénésie philosophique 
(1769), Bonnet changes his position towards a more dynamic, regulative process 
that characterizes organic development:
 
27
 Cf. Bonnet  1985 , 63 (§ 83). 
 
28
 Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/1, 259. 
 
29
 Cf.  Bonnet , 508–509 (§ 797). 
 
30
 Cf. Bonnet  2002 , 267. 
 
31
 Beside the  emboîtement theory of germs, Bonnet also discussed a dissemination theory in 
 Considérations sur les corps organisés . He finally preferred the  emboîtement theory. Cf. Savioz 
 1948 , 75–78. 
 
32
 Cf. Bonnet,  Mémoires sur les germes , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 5, 10. Savioz  1948 , 76–77 and Marx 
 1976 , 57–58 discuss the influence of Malebranche on Bonnet’s preformation theory. 
 
33
 Cf. Bonnet,  Mémoires sur les germes , in Bonnet  1779 –1783, vol. 5, 2. 
 
34
 Bonnet  2002 , 257. 
 
35
 Bonnet,  Principes philosophiques , in Bonnet  1978 , 210. 
 
36
 Cf. Roger  1993 , 724. 
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 When the chicken is still in the state of a  germ , all its parts have forms, proportions and 
positions ( situations ) that differ extremely from those in which evolution will cover them. 
This goes so far that, if we could see this small germ in larger form, it would be impossible 
for us to recognize it as a chicken … In brief, the germ is composed of a sequence of points 
that afterwards form a line. These lines prolong and multiply themselves, and they produce 
surfaces. 37 
 Besides the discussions on developmental processes, Bonnet’s model of organic 
bodies and living looms is also part of debates on the soul–body-interface. From 
Willis’s  Cerebri anatome (1664) and William Croone’s  De ratione motus musculorum 
(1664) to Baglivi’s  De fibra motrice et morbosa (1700) and David Hartley’s 
 Observations on Man (1749), the fibre fabric of organic bodies has been associated 
with the transmission of stimuli and sensations through vibrations that originate in 
a soul-agent and in the senses. 38 Bonnet refers to such vibrations. However, in his 
later texts, Bonnet rejects – like Louis de Lacaze in his  Idée de l’homme physique et 
moral (1755) – a mechanical, string-based model for the soul–body-interface. 
In the nerve system, the impulse series seems for Bonnet to depend on an “electric 
fluid,” instead of being the result of minimal “vibrations”:
 The nerves that have been illustrated as strings of a music instrument are not at all under 
tension like the strings of such an instrument. They are not, like them, made to oscillate; 
they are not, like them, stretched in a straight line; they appear to have a lot of inflections. 
Finally, there are neither elastic nor irritable. Their proper substance is malleable and 
mushy … 39 
 
37
 Bonnet  1985 , 481 (§ 351). Cf. Bodemer  1964 , 25–27. However, in the  Palingénésie , Bonnet still 
argues that a similar, though smaller organic body preeexists in the germ. Cf. Bonnet  2002 , 260: 
“Mais quand il est question d’expliquer la reproduction d’un tout organique dissimilaire, il me 
paroît, que je suis dans l’obligation philosophique d’admettre, que ce tout prééxistoit dans un 
germe proprement dit, où il étoit dessiné très en petit et en entier. J’admets donc, qu’une tête, une 
queue, une jambe prééxistoient originairement sous la forme de germe, dans le grand tout 
organique où elles étoient appellées à se développer un jour.” 
 
38
 Cf. Glassman et al.  2007 and Whitaker et al.  2007 . Besides models of vibrations and strings, the 
movement of fluids in a canal system played a crucial role since Descartes for the soul–body-interface. 
Jean-Paul Marat refers in  De l’homme (1775–1776) to the “soul” as an agent that moves a “fluid” 
in the “nerves.” 
 
39
 Bonnet,  Méditations sur l’origine des sensations et sur l’union de l’ame et du corps , in Bonnet 
 1779 , vol. 8, 391. Cf.  Bonnet 1973 , 21: “ Mais les  Nerfs s ont mols, ils ne sont point tendus comme 
les Cordes d’un  Instrument : les Objets y exciteroient-ils donc des vibrations analogues à celles 
d’une Corde pincée? ces vibrations se communiqueroient-elles à l’instant au Siège de l’ame? la 
chose paraît difficile à concevoir. Mais si l’on admet dans les  Nerfs un  Fluide dont la subtilité & 
la mobilité approchent de celui de la  Lumière , on expliquera facilement par le secours de 
ce Fluide, & la célérité avec laquelle les impressions se communiquent à l’Ame, & celle avec 
laquelle l’Ame exécute tant d’Opérations différentes.” See also Haller, Letter to Bonnet of the 
6 September 1754; in Sonntag  1983 , 49. Newton combined theories of electricity and vibration 
for the transmission of stimuli in organic bodies. Cf. Wallace  2003 . For theories on animal 
electricity in the later half of the eighteenth century, see Bernardi  1992 . Clericuzio  1994 focuses 
on the development of chemical explanations of the actions of animal spirits. 
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 In a letter of 25 June 1771, Bonnet challenges Haller, the “famous experimenter,” 
to search a single explanatory scheme for the initiation of movements in nerves and 
muscles through the combination of irritability and electricity:
 How does thus the contact of some fluid or solid bodies, of a sharp spine or any kind of 
acid, excite in the  Touts organiques a more or less strong and continuous  Irritability ? … 
I would like to have  Electricity applied to  Irritability , & and that much attention is paid to 
the effects of this application. It would be enough to bring an  electric fluid on the recently 
detached limbs ( membres ) of their Subject. These experiments could be varied in thousands 
& thousands of different manners. 40 
 The organic “network” thus is an electric “networking machine” ( ouvrage à 
réseau ) 41 of organized units on various levels, a system of a “nearly infinite” number 
of intermediate “chain-links” that appear in certain subordinated levels of order and 
that are regulated by a force that executes a preexisting plan. This networking system 
depends on the “enchained” microscopic structures of fibres or “threads” ( fils ) that 
form meshes, tissues, membranes, and canals for the transport of liquids and the 
constant assimilation and excretion of outer and inner parts. 
 3  Organized Fibre Bodies and the Soul-Body-Interface 
 After the  Essai de psychologie (1754), Bonnet develops in the  Essai analytique sur 
les facultés de l’âme (1760) a detailed explanatory framework of the soul–body-
interface of a sensitive “statue” and its relation to the “œconomy of fibres” ( œconomie 
des fibres ) 42 of organized bodies. The soul–body-interface relies on two categorically 
different “substances”: the “immaterial substance” of the soul and the “material 
substance” of the body. 43 However, Bonnet does not give a detailed explanation of the 
ontological status of the two “substances.” Rather, he wants to discuss the “actions” 
( actions ) of an “agent” ( agent ) that are “observable” through “sensations.” 
 “Sensations” are for Bonnet the basis of all kind of knowledge. 44 In this perspective, 
his explanatory framework of the agency of organic bodies is situated within the 
 
40
 Letter from Bonnet to Haller of 25 June 1771; in Sonntag  1983 , 946. Bonnet mentioned this idea 
already in the very beginning of his correspondence with Haller in a letter of 16 August 1754: “If 
you suppose that the  Esprits Animaux have a Nature that is similar to the one of the  electric Fluid , 
then the effects of the  irritations of fibres correspond to the rubbing of electric Tubes” (ibid., 44). 
See also  Bonnet 1973 , 20–21 (§ 31). 
 
41
 Ibid., 65 (§ 97). 
 
42
 Ibid.  75. 
 
43
 Cf. ibid., 3: “ Je suppose que l’ Homme eft un  Composé de deux  Substances, l’une  immatérielle, 
l’autre  Corporelle …. ” 
 
44 
 Cf. ibid., 13–14: “L’ Expérience démontre que la  privation d’un  sens emporte avec elle la 
 privation de toutes les  idées attachées à l’ exercice de ce  sens : la privation de  tous les s ens, ou, ce 
qui revient au même, leur inaction  absolue emporteroit donc avec elle une privation  totale d’idées. 
 Je ne m’arrêterai point ici à combattre l’opinion des Idées  innées : elle a été trop souvent & trop 
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context of Lockean sensationalism and its French reception. 45 Bonnet combines 
Lockean sensationalism with Malebranche’s Cartesian fibre body, in which 
various fibre structures connect the brain and the senses through vibrations or 
the movements of so-called animal spirits within tiny “nets” ( filets ). 46 Bonnet 
focuses on the material conditions of the “mechanics of the operations of our 
soul” ( Méchanique des opérations de nôtre Ame ), 47 the “physics of the ideas” 
( physique des idées ) 48 and the “physics of reflection” ( physique de la reflexion ). 49 
His model of a sensitive “statue” thus is part of a general shift of interest from 
the soul-body-interface to the mechanisms of fibre movements that mediate 
between physical impressions and the regulating activitites of a mover. 50 However, 
Bonnet also thinks that certain self-experiences of sensitive agents cannot be 
adequately explained by mechanic models. The experience of the “I” as the author 
of various volitional acts points for him to the existence of two “substances” that 
“act on each other. 51 
solidement refutée. Je ne m’arrêterai pas non plus à prouver que nos idées les plus  abstraites ont 
une origine  corporelle : il suffira de dire que nous n’avons ces idées qu’à l’aide des  Signes qui les 
représentent; & ces  signes sont figures, sons, mouvemens,  corps.  Toutes nos idées dérivent donc 
originairement des  sens; … Je prends ici le mot  d’idées dans le sens le plus étendu, pour toute 
 manière d’être de l’Ame dont elle a la  conscience ou le s entiment. ” See also ibid., 174–175: “Nos 
Idées les plus  abstraites , les plus  spiritualisées , si je puis employer ce mot, dérivent donc des Idées 
s ensibles, comme de leur source naturelle. L’Idée de DIEU, par exemple, la plus spiritualisée de 
toutes nos Idées, tient manifestement aux  Sens. ” 
 
45 
 For the influence of Locke, see Marx  1976 , vol. 1, 105–108; Yolton  1991 ; and especially 
Wellman  1992 , 149–163 for La Mettrie’s Lockeanism. 
 
46 
 Cf. Malebranche  2006 , vol. 1, 192–199 and 246–250. For a comparison between Locke’s and 
Malebranche’s physiology of sensation, imagination, feeling and thinking, see Yolton  1983 , 
153–189. 
 
47 
 Bonnet 1973 , Preface, XIV. 
 
48 
 Cf. ibid., 46. 
 
49 
 Cf. ibid., 176. 
 
50 
 Cf. Tripp  1986 , 45: “Pourtant il faut se rendre compte du changement – inauguré par Borelli – 
dans la discussion scientifique concernant la correspondance entre l’âme et le corps. Non seulement 
l’application stricte de la géometrie au corps vivant, mais aussi le développement et la différenciation 
de l’analyse fournirent les moyens de restreindre de plus en plus la fonction de l’âme traditionnelle 
et de favoriser l’extension de la pensee mécanique, meme sous la forme de la machine”; and 
Des Chene  2005 , 255: “As with Borelli, we see [in Perrault’s model of organic order] a definite 
demarcation between the ‘mechanics’ of animals and what we might call their ‘energetics’. 
The source of active power is the soul, about which very little is said. What remains is to explain 
the transmission and application of that power to the end of locomotion, and that is a matter of 
applying mechanical knowledge. Perrault acknowledges that the animal-machine resembles 
‘pure machines’ in the manner of its operation. But every machine requires a mover, and this the 
mechanism itself is incapable of supplying.” 
 
51
 Cf. ibid., Préface, XIV: “Ce n’est point parce que je crois l’Ame un Etre plus excellent que la 
Matière, que j’attribue une Ame à l’Homme: c’est uniquement, parce que je ne puis attribuer à la 
Matière tous les Phénomènes de l’Homme.” See also ibid., 5: “Je reçois donc l’ Union de l’Ame 
& du Corps & leur  influence réciproque, comme un  Phénomène dont j’étudie les  Loix, & dont je 
fais profession d’ignorer profondément le  comment. ” 
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 Bonnet calls the interactions between the supposed substances “relations” 
( rapports ) or “liaisons” ( liaisons ). 52 Sensations are the “result” or the “effect” of 
these interactions. The human as a sensitive agent is “not a  certain soul or a 
 certain body,” but “the result of the union of a  certain soul and a  certain body.” 53 
The sensitive agent is a “mixed being” ( être mixte ). 54 Mixed beings are “humans” 
and “animals,” maybe also “plants.” 55 The unity of mixed human beings, the 
“human system” ( Système Humain ), is always both, a “machine”-like body and a 
regulating or intervening soul. 56 Taken for themselves, neither the body nor the soul 
is the “whole human being” ( tout l’Homme ). 57 
 The “organized” body of the human system is capable to process “impressions.” 
During its development from a germ-fibre-unit into an adult human, its soul, that is 
in the beginning a mere “puissance” or a mere “potential,” specifies its “faculties” 
through its “reactions” to physical impressions. 58 Thus, before the soul-part of 
the sensitive agent possesses specific faculties, the organized body has to “sense” 
or to receive impressions. These bodily impressions or sensations always 
follow movements, and the movements can be, in general, observed or experi-
enced 59 – although the “mechanique of the sensible fibres” ( méchanique des fibres 
sensibles ) is unknown. 60 
 Through the a priori sensibility of the organized body, the soul can have 
experiences – especially the experience of itself as an entity or an “I” ( moi ) in 
which all sensations are united. The “I” is “modified” through sensations and 
 
52
 Cf., ibid., 93–95. 
 
53
 Ibid., 5: “ L ’ Homme n’est pas une  certaine Ame ; il n’eft pas un  certain Corps, il eft le  resultat 
de l’ union d’une  certaine Ame à un  certain Corps. ” 
 
54 
 Cf. ibid., 3; and ibid., Préface, XIII: “L’Homme eft un Etre  mixte ; il n’a des Idées que par 
l’intervention des sens, & ses Notions les plus abstraites dérivent encore des Sens. C’est sur son 
Corps, & par son Corps que l’Ame agit. Il faut donc toujours en revenir au Physique, comme à la 
première origine de tout ce que l’Ame éprouve.” 
 
55 
 Cf. ibid., 16: “Si les Plantes sont insensibles, ce qui n’est point démontré, la Statue [qui n’a pas 
encore des sensations] est immédiatement au dessus de la  Plante : elle est entre la  Plante & 
 l’Animal. ” 
 
56 
 Ibid., 18. 
 
57 
 Ibid. 
 
58 
 Cf. ibid., 93: “Ailleurs j’ai défini  l’Ame une  Force, une Puissance , une  Capacité d’agir ou 
de produire  certains effets. C’était tout ce que je pouvais dire de l’Activité de l’Ame en la 
considérant sous ce point de vue général.” See also ibid., 29–30 and  100: “Mais , cette 
Activité, que je suppose que l’Ame exerce sur les Fibres, eft  en soi une Force  indéterminée ; c’est 
un simple  pouvoir d’agir, ou de produire certains  effets ; & ce n’est point tel ou tel effet en 
particulier.” 
 
59 
 Cf. ibid., 94: “Je vois une  Sensation suivre un  Mouvement: j’ignore ce que le Mouvement & 
la Sensation sont en eux-mêmes; mais j’étudie ce qu’ils sont par rapport à moi, c’est à dire par 
rapport à ma manière de concevoir. Cette étude me conduit à reconnoître que chaque Sensation 
a un mouvement qui lui correspond; & que ce mouvement est aussi distinct de tout autre 
mouvement, que cette Sensation est distincte de tout-autre Sensation.” 
 
60 
 Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/1, 151. 
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also capable to act upon the body. The soul-related events occur without any 
observable spatial movement or extension, 61 and the body-related events seem 
just to “give occasion” ( donner occasion ) to the actions of the soul. 62 It is an 
“inner sentiment” ( sentiment intérieur ) that “persuades” Bonnet that he is the 
“author” of these events as “actions” of a sensitive, immaterial soul that executes 
volitional acts:
 In the same way that I sense that I exist, because I am conscious of the actual modification 
of myself, I sense that I possess a will to move certain parts of my body, and that this 
will performs an act. I thus admit that my soul is capable of an activity that occurs in 
different modes. I understand that this activity is a force ( capacité ) of my soul to 
produce inside & outside of itself, or on its body ( en elle & hors d’elle, ou  sur son Corps ), 
certain effects. 63 
 Such experiences are for Bonnet “facts” ( faits ) of the “inner sentiment.” However, 
Bonnet admits that he knows nothing about the way how an “I”-agent acts. 64 He can 
only reconstruct the organic “milieu” ( milieu ) 65 within which it receives, processes 
and transforms sense data. The order of the milieu depends on the “œconomy of 
fibres.” And from this œconomy emerges also the order of “ideas”:
 … we know that ideas are attached to the play ( jeu ) of certain fibres. We can examine these 
fibres through that what we can see of them. We can study to some degree their movements, 
the results of their movements, and the relations that exist between them. 66 
 Within and through the “milieu” of the “œconomy of fibres,” events are 
mediated from the body to the soul and from the soul to the body. The soul 
produces in the sensible fibres “the same or analogue impressions ( impressions 
semblables ou analogues ) as those that the activity of objects would produce in 
her, or the corpuscules that emanate from them.” 67 Like the organized body 
itself, the soul acts according to a stimulus-reaction-scheme. For Bonnet, the 
 
61 
 Cf.  Bonnet 1973 , Préface, XVIII–XIX and ibid., 3. 
 
62 
 Cf. ibid., 5: “Je suppose que le Corps  agit sur l’Ame, ou, si l’on aime mieux, qu’à l’ occasion des 
 mouvemens que les  Objets excitent dans les  sens, l’activité de l’Ame  se déploye d’une certaine 
manière, d’où naissent les  Sensations & les  Volitions. ” 
 
63 
 Ibid., 4. Cf. ibid., 18 (“l’ action suivit  constamment la  décision de la  Volonté, comme la  Volonté 
suit  constamment la  décision de l’ Entendement ”) and 7: “Nous sommes constitués de manière que 
nous nous croyons  Auteurs de nos  actions … ” 
 
64 
 Cf. ibid., 93: “Nous nommons  Agents les Etres dans lesquels nous pensons qu’eft la  Raison de 
ces changemens, & cette Raison nous est aussi inconnue que les Essences  réelles. Le mot d’ Action 
qui revient si souvent dans nos discours n’emporte donc point la  connoissance de la  manière dont 
les  Agents opèrent, mais, simplement celle de ce qu’ils opèrent. Nous voyons des  Faits; & tout ce 
qui est au delà des Faits n’est pour nous que ténèbres plus ou moins épaisses. Toutes nos Théories 
de  Causes & d’Effets se bornent au fond à connoître l’ Ordre dans lequel les Choses se succédent; 
ou les  Rapports suivant lesquels l’ Existence, ou les  Modifications des unes, paroissent  détermi-
nées par l’Existence, ou les Modifications des autres.” 
 
65 
 Cf. ibid., Préface, 20. 
 
66  
 Ibid., Préface, XIII. 
 
67 
 Ibid., 100. 
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“perceptions” ( perceptions ) of the soul are at the same time its “sensations” 
( sensations ). 68 The knowledge about the “liaison and the reproduction of Ideas,” 
and the progress of “psychology” in general, thus depends on the knowledge about 
the “relations” between the fibres. 69 The movement and the “order of fibres” 
( Ordres de Fibres ) displays the “production” ( génération ) and the order of ideas. 70 
They are the “natural signs” ( Signes naturels ) of the ideas that can be, in principle, 
observed:
 I do not know how the movement of certain fibres of my brain produces ideas in my 
soul, but I know at least very well that I only have ideas because of the movements 
( en consequence des mouvemens ) that excite certain fibres in my brain. I thus examine 
these fibres and their movements. I think of them as natural signs of ideas, and I study 
the results of their possible combinations. From these analyses, I can deduce the order of 
the generation of ideas in my soul. 71 
 Bonnet admits that the order of fibres in organized bodies is still quite unknown. 
However, he supposes that this order resembles the structure of a tree. He thinks 
that the interface of the soul and the body (the “seat of the soul”) are surrounded by 
a “bundle” ( faisseaux ) of fibres as a “trunk” ( tronc ) of a tree in which the fibres of the 
“branches” ( branches ) and the “smallest ramifications” ( des plus petits Rameaux ) 
are united. 72 It is through this organized and complex net of fibres that the 
“undetermined force“ ( force indeterminate ) 73 of the soul exposes a certain tendency 
to act upon the fibers, after it has received certain patterns of impressions. 
These tendencies become her own “faculties.” To retrace the development of 
these faculties, Bonnet focuses, like Condillac, on the minimal conditions of the 
soul-body-interface and of soul-body-interactions within a fibre “automaton” that 
he calls a human “statue” ( statue) . 74 
 The statue becomes a “sensing being” ( Etre sentant ) in the very moment of the first 
sensation. 75 Its first sensation has to be “initiated” through an outer “object.” Without 
the initiation event from the outside, the statue simply has no sensation at all and 
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 Cf. ibid., 98. 
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 Cf. ibid., 53. 
 
70 
 Ibid. 
 
71  
 Ibid., Préface, 21–22. 
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 Ibid. 
 
73  
 Cf. ibid., 100. 
 
74  
 Cf. ibid., 7: “Ne considérons point un Homme fait, placé au milieu d’une Campagne, & environné 
de mille Objets divers: l’examen des opérations du Cerveau d’un tel Homme deviendroit pour 
nous infiniment trop compliqué. Allons par degrés: Simplifions; pouvons-nous trop simplifier 
dans un sujet si composé, & si singulierement composé ?  N’entreprenons pas même d’étudier 
les Enfans: ils sont encore trop difficiles à observer.” For Bonnet’s critique of Condillac’s  Essai , 
see ibid., 10–11. 
 
75  
 Cf. ibid., 24: “ J’approche donc une  Rose du  Nez de la Statue: au même instant elle devient un 
 Etre sentant. Son Ame est  modifiée pour la première fois: elle est  modifiée en odeur de Rose; elle 
 devient une odeur de Rofe; elle se  reprèsente une odeur de Rose.” 
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does not know what a sensation is. 76 In a series of thought experiments that rely on 
observations and experiences, Bonnet sets the fibre automaton step by step into 
motion:
 Let us thus have recourse to a fiction ( fiction ). It is not Nature, but it has its foundation in 
Nature. We separate things that are, in their natural condition, united. However, we do this 
only to understand them better. We will reunite them afterwards step by step and get again 
closer to Nature. Imagine a Human whose senses are all intact, but who did not begin to 
use them. Suppose that we have the power to restrain the senses of this Human or to let 
them free in the order, in the time and in the manner that pleases us. Offer successively to 
each sense, and later on also simultaneously to different senses, the objects that are proper 
to affect them. Let us observe what results from these impressions … This Human will be 
a kind of  Statue , and we will give him this name. 77 
 Bonnet begins with the sense of smell, but he does not successively introduce 
the other four senses. Rather, he focuses on the different steps that connect the 
first bodily impressions of the statue with its first cognitive reactions. He thus 
reconstructs a process that begins with the emanation of specific particles from an 
object – a rose – that act upon the surface-fibres of the skin, and that continues 
with the mediation of these impressions to “olfactory nerves,” their transport to the 
soul–body-interface in the “brain,” and their transformation into the first “sensation 
or perception” of the soul. 
 In general, impressions that have been transformed into data of olfactory 
nerves move the net of fibres that covers like a rhizome the zone of the soul–body-
interaction in the “brain” – the receptive and regulating center with which all 
nerves “communicate.” 78 These movements occur in the form of certain patterns of 
simultaneously moved fibres or fibre bundles. The soul has the faculty to sense or 
recognize these impressions as “modifications” ( modifications ) of itself. 79 
 
76 
 Cf. ibid., 15: “Déjà les mouvemens  vitaux s’opèrent dans la Statue; les Liqueurs y circulent & 
portent à toutes les Parties la nourriture qui leur est nécessaire. Les s ens sont prêts à jouer; mais, 
ils ne jouent point encore: le  Sentiment n’est pas né.” 
 
77
 Ibid., 8. 
 
78
 Cf. ibid., 20: “ Un Organe qui communique avec tous les  Sens, & par lequel l’Ame agit sur toutes 
les Parties de son  Corps soumises à son empire est, sans doute, un Organe prodigieusement 
composé. Il est en quelque sorte l’abrégé de tous les Organes, un  Systême Nerveux en raccourci. 
Les ramifications de tous les  Nerfs doivent aller aboutir à cet Organe ou avoir avec lui la 
communication la plus étroite. Le  Siège de l’Ame s eroit ainsi un  Centre où tous les  Nerfs iroient 
 rayonner. ” For Bonnet’s discussion of the “seat of the soul,” see ibid., Préface, XVIII, and ibid., 
18–19: “ La découverte de l’origine des  Nerfs, a conduit à placer l’ Ame dans le  Cerveau. Mais 
comme il n’y a que les  Corps qui ayent une  relation proprement dite avec le  Lieu, nous ne dirons 
pas que l’Ame occupe un  Lieu dans le  Cerveau ; nous dirons que l’Ame est présente au  Cerveau, 
& par le Cerveau à son  Corps d’une manière que nous ne pouvons définir …  Quoiqu’il en soit 
de cette décision de l’ Anatomie, que l’on ne prendra si l’on veut que pour la décision d’un 
Anatomiste, j’admets qu’il est quelque part dans le  Cerveau une Partie que je nomme le  Siège de 
l’Ame, & que je regarde comme l’instrument  immédiat du  Sentiment, de la  Pensée, & de  l’Action. 
Il est indifférent à mon but que cette Partie soit le  Corps Calleux, ou tout autre Corps.” 
 
79
 Cf. ibid., 29: “ Le  mouvement que la  Rofe imprime au  Nerf olfactif, & que celui-ci transmet à l’ Organe 
du Sentiment donne lieu à cette  modification de l’ Ame que nous exprimons par les termes d’O deur 
de Rose. Cette  modification est une  manière d’Etre de l’ Ame, un  état distinct de tout autre  état. ” 
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 “Modifications” are more or less distinct perceptions with the help of which the soul 
can process epistemic acts. In a similar way as in David-Renaud Boullier’s transfor-
mation of Malebranche’s model of the soul-body-interface (first discussed in his 
 Essai philosophique sur l’âme des bêtes (1728) 80 ), Bonnet’s soul reacts to modifications 
according to a pleasure principle and its volitional decisions. “Pleasure” ( plaisir ) 
and “pain” ( douleur ) depend for Bonnet on the “degree” of the impact of physical 
impressions on the structure of fibers. 81 Fast movements or “vibrations” can cause 
“painful” structural changes in fibres, while “smooth” movements are often “pleas-
ant.” 82 Pleasant sensations reinforce a certain tendency of the living agent to repeat 
the event or to actively try to repeat certain acts. Bonnet calls this effort “attention” 
( attention ). 83 The repetition of pleasure results into passions for something that 
has been sensed or experienced. “Decisions” of the will “satisfy” these passions. 84 
 
80
 Cf. Cheung  2008 , 113–117; and Boullier  1985 , 359–360: “Supposons un Agent immatériel 
capable de remuer la matiére, uni pour cela à une portion de matiére organisée; supposons un Esprit 
uniquement susceptible de perceptions confuses qui auroient pour objet les petits mouvemens 
excités dans cette Machine à laquelle il est uni; soit que ces mouvemens naissent du différent choc 
que les Corps extérieurs produisent sur ces organes, soit qu’il naisse de l’interieur de la Machine 
même. Supposons outre cela, que par la constitution essentielle de ce principe spirituel, quelques-
unes de ces perceptions soient agréables, et quelques autres affligeantes. … Il ne faut plus autre 
chose, si ce n’est que le Créateur ait tellement ajusté les ressorts de cette Machine faite pour l’Ame 
de la Bête, que les desirs confus qui correspondent aux Sensations douloureuses ou agréables, 
produisent dans le cerveau diverses impressions lesquelles, en vertu de la structure générale, feront 
mouvoir la Machine d’une maniére propre à éviter la cause de la douleur, et à s’unir à celle du 
plaisir. Il y aura dans tout cela une merveilleuse harmonie, et j’y vois point de difficulté.” 
 
81
 Cf. Bonnet 1973, 90: “Ainsi en supposant que l’action d’un Objet sur deux Individus soit précisé-
ment la même, celui-là sera le plus s ensible à cette action, dont les Fibres seront les plus  mobiles. Si 
cette  mobilité est  excessive, l’Individu aura une Sensation  désagréable ; les Molécules tendront à se 
désunir. Si les Fibres n’ont au contraire, que fort peu de mobilité, l’Individu ne sera affecté que très 
foiblement. Il le sera dans la proportion qui fait le P laisir si les Fibres ont une mobilité  tempérée. ” 
 
82
 Cf. ibid., 87: “Nous ne pouvons pas plus définir le  Plaisir ou la  Douleur, qu’une Sensation 
quelconque. Nous sçavons seulement que toute Sensation tient à un  mouvement, & qu’un mouvement 
 plus ou  moins fort, plus ou moins accéléré fait naître la Douleur ou le Plaisir. La plus  légère Sensation 
ne diffère du  Chatouillement le plus vif, & celui-ci de la  Douleur que par le  degré ; & c’eft au degré 
du mouvement que répond dans l’ Ame ce  Sentiment que nous exprimons par les termes de  Plaisir ou 
de  Douleur, comme c’est à l’ espéce du mouvement ou de la Fibre, que répond la  Sensation que nous 
exprimons par les termes  d’Odeur de Rose, ou  d’Odeur d’Oeillet. Ainsi la même Fibre qui produit le 
Plaisir lorsque ses vibrations sont accélérées dans un  certain degré, fait naître la douleur lorsque ces 
vibrations sont accélérées au point de  séparer trop les unes des autres les  Molécules de la Fibre. La 
Douleur sera à son dernier terme, si cette séparation va jusqu’à la  Solution de continuité. ” 
 
83
 Cf. ibid., 34: “J’entends ici, par l’ attention, cette  réaction de l’Âme sur les  Fibres que l’Objet a mises 
en mouvement, par laquelle l’Ame tend à conserver, à fortifier ou à prolonger ce mouvement.” 
 
84
 Cf. ibid., 21–22: “L’ Action des Objets, ou celle de l’Ame peut produire sur le  Fluide Nerveux des 
effets analogues à ceux que la chaleur ou les frictions produisent sur le  Fluide, électrique … Nous 
ignorons la nature des  Esprits Animaux: ils sont encore plus hors de la portée de nos sens & de nos 
Instrumens que les  Vaisseaux qui les filtrent ou qui les préparent. Ce n’est que par la voye du raison-
nement que nous sommes conduits à admettre leur existence, & à soupçonner quelqu’analogie entre 
ces  Esprits & le  Fluide Electrique. Cette analogie repose principalement sur certaines Propriétés 
très singuliéres de ce  Fluide ; en particulier sur la rapidité & la liberté avec lesquelles il se meut, le 
long d’une ou de plusieurs Cordes, au travers d’une masse d’Eau, même en mouvement.” 
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Finally, knowledge about something that left an impression on the body emerges 
when various modifications have been “memorized” and “compared” with each 
other. Like in Condillac’s statue, the first act of judgment of Bonnet’s statue about 
the status of objects within its environment begins with “comparisons” of memo-
rized or stored data. These data are “signs” which represent the sense-objects. After 
these first comparisons, more complex and abstract epistemic acts take place. The long 
chain of  impression – mediation – transportation – cognitive transformation – 
modification – pleasure & pain – attention – passion – memorization – comparison – 
abstraction produces, in the last chapters of Bonnet’s  Essai , “thoughts” ( pensées ). 
 Bonnet compares the mediation of the object-impression to the soul with a 
musical performance or “play” ( jeu ) that is executed on an instrument (the 
fibre body). 85 The “original constitution” ( constitution originale ) of the body-
automaton determines the quality of the sensation through its different fibre 
types that are moved like the keys of an organ, their spatial “arrangement” and 
their “coordination.” 86 
 In humans, sensations occur according to their five senses. These five sense 
“classes” can be again differentiated into an “indefinite number of genres and species.” 87 
Each sense is constituted through fibres that are made for “various kinds of sensa-
tions” ( diverses Espèces de Sensations ). 88 The sense of smell, for example, is 
composed of fibres that are apt to receive impressions from the “corpuscules” that 
“emanate from a rose,” and others that are apt to receive impressions from a 
 
85 
 Cf. ibid., 15–16 and 52. Already in his  Essai de psychologie (1755), Bonnet combined the image 
of a soul that plays on the body like an organist on an organ with the fibre fabric of the evolved 
germ. Bonnet  1978 , 13–14: “Le siège de l’ame est une petite machine prodigieusement composé, 
& pourtant fort simple dans sa composition. C’est un abrégé très complet de tout le Genre 
Nerveux, une Neurologie en mignature. On peut se représenter cet admirable instrument des 
opérations de notre ame, sous l’image d’un clavessin, d’une orgue, d’une horloge, ou sous celle 
de quelque autre machine beaucoup plus composée encore … L’ame est le musicien qui exécute 
sur cette machine différens airs, ou qui juge de ceux qui y sont éxécutés, & qui les répète. Chaque 
fibre est une espèce de Touche, ou de marteau destiné à rendre un certain ton. Soit que les Touches 
soient muëes par les objets, soit que le mouvement leur soit imprimé par la force motrice de l’ame, 
le jeu est le même; il ne peut différer qu’en durée & en intensité.” Cf.  Bonnet 1973 , 15–16 and 52. 
From Descartes, Pascal and Charles Perrault to Diderot, comparisons between clavichords or 
organs and the fibre mechanisms of organic order are frequently employed. Cf. Descartes,  Traité 
de l’homme , 1996, vol. 11, 165; Perrault  1680 , vol. 3; Perrault  1680 , Avertissement, 1; and Diderot 
1965, 50–51. For further references, see Proust  1963 ; Davies  1989 , 108–150; Kassler  1995 , 
43–48; and Mayer  1959 , 269–270 and 320–322. 
 
86 
 Bonnet 1973 , 16: “La valeur  Physique & Morale de nôtre Automate dépendra donc de sa  con-
stitution originelle, & de la  manière dont nous aurons sçû  jouer de cette  Machine. ” 
 
87 
 Cf. ibid., 23: “Nous avons cinq  Sens, dont procèdent cinq  Classes de  Sensations qui ont sous 
elles un nombre indéfini de  Genres & Espéces .” 
 
88  
 Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/1, 150: “Chaque sens renferme 
donc probablement des fibres spécifiquement différentes. Ce sont autant de petits sens particuliers, 
qui ont leur maniere propre d’agir, et dont la fin est d’exciter dans l’ame des perceptions 
correspondantes à leur jeu.” 
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carnation or a tuberose. 89 Bonnet highlights that the structural differences of most 
of the sense-specific fibres are still unknown. 90 However, he refers to the “papillae” 
( papilles ) of the senses of taste and of touch. Their “pyramidal form” contains 
“fibres of different lengths that probably correspond to the diversity of impressions 
that they have to receive and to transmit” – just as the different “proportions” of 
“strings” of musical instruments correspond to various tones. 91 
 Sensations of the soul are for Bonnet acts of representation of outer objects, and 
this representation is specifically coded through the organic fibre “constitution” of 
the statue in order to transmit suitable and exploitable sense data to the soul-body-
interface. 92 For Bonnet, the specific interaction between the “corpuscles” of the rose 
and the “net” ( rameaux ) of nervous fibres of the sense of smell cannot be otherwise 
conceived than through an “impulsion” that results from the collision of bodies in 
the form of “vibrations” ( vibrations ), “undulations” ( ondolations ) or “pressure” 
( pression ). 93 The impulsion-trace of the impression of the outer object is finally 
 
89
 Cf.  Bonnet 1973 , 52: “ Les Faits nous conduisent donc à penser que la  diversité des Sensations ne 
dépend pas de la  diversité des mouvemens imprimés par les Objets à des fibres  identiques … Ainsi, 
nous sommes acheminés à admettre qu’il est dans chaque s ens des Fibres appropriées aux diverses 
 Espèces de Sensations que le s ens peut exciter dans l’Ame; qu’il y a, par exemple, dans l’Organe de 
 l’Odorat des Fibres appropriées au jeu des Corpuscules qui émanent de la  Rofe, d’autres au jeu des 
Corpuscules de l’ Oeillet, d’autres à celui des Corpuscules de la  Tubereuse, &c.” 
 
90
 Cf. ibid., 23 and 52–53. 
 
91
 Cf. ibid., 52: “La forme piramidale des  Papilles du  Goût & de celles du  Toucher semble 
confirmer cette Hypothèse. Il résulte de cette forme que chaque Papille contient des Fibres de 
différentes longueurs assorties, sans doute, à la diversité des impressions qu’elles doivent recevoir 
& transmettre. Personne n’ignore qu’en variant les  proportions des Cordes d’un Instrument de 
Musique, on varie les  Tons .” 
 
92
 Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/1, 150: “Chaque sens renferme 
donc probablement des fibres spécifiquement différentes. Ce sont autant de petits sens particuliers, 
qui ont leur maniere propre d’agir, et dont la fin est d’exciter dans l’ame des perceptions correspon-
dantes à leur jeu.” In  Médicine de l’esprit (1753), Le Camus refers to the impact of fibre properties 
on the “vivacity of movements” that excite “distinct ideas” (Camus  1753 , vol. 1, 59): “La vivacité 
du mouvement qui excite en nous les idées distinctes, part aussi de quatre chefs. 1º. L’impétuosité 
des esprits, qui tire son origine de l’énergie des causes mouvantes nommées ci-dessus. 2º. La disposi-
tion des fibres, qui provient de leur structure, de leur sécheresse, de leur tension, de leur élasticité. 
3º. La facilité qu’elles ont à se mouvoir à cause de certains mouvemens antécédens plusieurs fois 
répétés. 4º. Une seule, ou plusieurs de ces causes. Ce qui peut rendre compte de tous les degrés qui 
se trouvent dans l’intervalle d’un entendement médiocre à un génie heureux.” 
 
93
 Bonnet 1973 , 27: “ La  manière dont les  Corpuscules odoriférans agissent sur les  Fibres 
nerveuses m’est inconnue: je n’ai aucune voye pour parvenir à cette connoissance. Mais, comme 
dans l’ordre de mes idées, je ne conçois pas qu’un  Corps puisse  agir s ur un autre  Corps autrement 
que  par impulsion ; je pense que les  Corpuscules odorifèrans étant doués d’un  certain mouvement, 
& d’un  certain degré de mouvement, communiquent ce  mouvement dans une  certaine proportion 
aux  Rameaux du  Nerf olfactif …  La  nature de ce  mouvement est au nombre de ces  Déterminations 
que j’ignore. Je ne sçais si c’edt un mouvement de  vibration, d’ondulation, de  pression, ou tout 
autre mouvement que je pourrois imaginer: je me borne donc à dire en général que les  Corpuscules 
odoriférans impriment un  mouvement aux  Rameaux du Nerf olfactif. ” 
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“transmitted” to the brain through a “nervous liquid” ( fluide nerveux ) and its various 
types of small particles, the animal spirits ( esprits animaux ). These animal spirits 
are still not observable. However, Bonnet suggests that they should have similar 
properties as the particles of “electric fluids.” 94 
 Physical sensations do not immediately end after an object stopped to “affect” a 
sensing agent. Rather, the length of a sensation depends on the “mobility” ( mobil-
ité ) of the nerves and the “activity” ( activité ) of the outer corpuscles on the nerves 
which causes “vibrations” ( vibrations ) or “perturbations” ( ébranlements ) of the 
fibres. 95 But this is not the only effect of the impressions of outer objects. They also 
change the “original form” ( forme originelle ) of the affected fibres and the “position” 
( position ) of their “molecules.” Impressions can thus change the entire “structure” 
( structure ) of the affected fibres. 96 The new structures possess new functional 
properties. These properties represent an adaptation of the fibres to the stimuli or 
impressions that they received. Bonnet calls the “capacity” of fibres to receive 
impressions their “temperament” ( tempérament ) and the capacity to acquire new 
dispositions their “mutability” ( mutabilité ). 97 
 Fibres as mediators of sensations are “determined” through physical impressions 
and their various movements. Affected fibres have a “tendency” ( tendance ) or a 
“disposition” ( disposition ) to perform certain movements. 98 “Dispositions” thus 
represent the physical “memory” of the “physical ideas” that they received and that 
the soul can activate through its own movements:
 
94
 Cf. ibid., 21–22: “L’ Action des Objets, ou celle de l’Ame peut produire sur le  Fluide Nerveux 
des effets analogues à ceux que la chaleur ou les frictions produisent sur le  Fluide électrique … 
Nous ignorons la nature des  Efprits Animaux: ils sont encore plus hors de la portée de nos sens & 
de nos Instrumens que les  Vaisseaux qui les filtrent ou qui les préparent. Ce n’est que par la voye 
du raisonnement que nous sommes conduits à admettre leur existence, & à soupçonner 
quelqu’analogie entre ces  Esprits & le  Fluide Electrique. Cette analogie repose principalement sur 
certaines Propriétés très singuliéres de ce  Fluide ; en particulier sur la rapidité & la liberté avec 
lesquelles il se meut, le long d’une ou de plusieurs Cordes, au travers d’une masse d’Eau, même 
en mouvement.” 
 
95
 Cf. ibid., 32: “ Ainsi quoique la Rose n’affecte plus  l’Odorat de la Statue, elle peut continuer à 
sentir; mais plus foiblement. La  durée de la Sensation est  proportionnelle à la  mobilité du Nerf, 
& à l’ activité des Corpuscules qui ont agi sur le Nerf. Au même instant où l’ébranlement finira, 
la Statue cessera de sentir.” 
 
96
 Cf. ibid., 42: “ L’ action des Objets sur les Fibres y produit l’un ou l’autre de ces deux effets, & 
peut-être tous les deux ensemble: elle  modifie la forme originelle de leurs Molécules, ou en  change 
la position  respective .” 
 
97
 Cf. ibid., 41: “ La  capacité de recevoir ces déterminations, ou pour m’exprimer par un seul mot, 
la  mutabilité des Fibres, a sa  raison dans leur  Structure. ”; and ibid., 90: “ Je définis le 
 Tempéramment d’une  Fibre, l’aptitude plus ou moins grande de cette Fibre à  céder à l’impression 
de l’Objet. Cette aptitude tient en général,  aux proportions de la Fibre, & à la  facilité qu’ont ses 
 Molécules de glisser les unes sur les autres, ou de s’écarter les unes des autres. 
 
98
 This tendency determines also the “passions.” Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet 
 1779 , vol. 4/1, 148: “Pourquoi les passions, qui ont leur source dans le tempérament, sont-elles si 
difficiles à maîtriser ? Elles tiennent fortement à la machine, et par la machine à l’ame. Les passions 
se nourrissent donc, croissent, se fortifient comme les fibres qui en sont le siege.” 
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 In their first beginning,  Ideas were only the movements that objects impressed on the fibres 
of the  Senses . Therefore, the  conservation of ideas through the memory depends on the 
disposition that the fibres of the  senses possess to  follow these movements and to repeat 
them ( à se prêter à ces mouvemens & à les répéter ). 99 
 If the same impressions occur frequently, the “nutritive atoms“ ( atomes 
nourriciers ) that are “assimilated” to the fibres of the senses, “fortify” their new 
dispositions. This fortification results into a “habit” ( habitude ) as a stable 
structure-function-complex of fibres that is capable to receive and to perform 
certain patterns of impressions and movements. 100 Embodied stimuli thus become 
part of an œconomy of fibres of living beings that sense their environment. 
 4  Concluding Remarks 
 In Bonnet’s writings, the fibre is the main operative building block of structure-
function-complexes in the œconomy of living automata that can receive, process 
and express sensations. His human statue represents a model of organized bodies in 
which merge (1) the Lockean concept of the genesis of ideas with Malebranche’s 
fibre interface between the soul and the body, (2) anatomical, medical and 
physiological references to the fibre as the smallest organic building block, and 
(3) debates about the common order of humans and animals as living beings and 
machine-like entities with type-specific perfectibilities. 
 
99
 Bonnet 1973 , 40. Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature , in Bonnet  1779 , vol. 4/1, 151: “Et 
puisque la réitération des mêmes mouvemens dans les mêmes fibres, y fait naître une disposi-
tion habituelle à les reproduire dans un ordre constant, nous pouvons en inférer que les fibres 
sensibles ont été construites sur de tels rapports avec la maniere d’agir des objets, qu’ils y produ-
isent des changemens ou des  déterminations plus ou moins durables, qui constituent le précieux 
fond de la mémoire et de l’ imagination.” 
 
100
 Bonnet 1973 , 69: “ En se plaçant relativement à la disposition  actuelle de la Fibre, les Atomes 
nourriciers maintiennent cette disposition, & si le même mouvement est répété de tems en tems 
dans la Fibre, & qu’il ne survienne point de mouvement contraire, ils la fortifient cette disposition, 
puisque leur incorporation dans la Fibre tend à augmenter sa Solidité. Voilà, la naissance de 
l’ Habitude. Si l’on dit en général, que la répétition des Actes la fortifie, c’est que la répétition des 
actes est une répétition de mouvemens, & qu’une répétition de mouvemens augmente la  tendance 
aux mouvemens.” Cf. Bonnet,  Contemplation de la nature ,  Bonnet 1973 –1983, vol. 4/1, 152: 
“Mais les fibres sensibles se nourrissent comme toutes les autres parties du corps: elles  s’assimilent 
ou s’incorporent les matieres alimentaires; elles croissent, et tandis qu’elles se nourrissent et 
qu’elles croissent, elles continuent à s’acquitter de leurs fonctions propres; elles demeurent 
essentiellement ce qu’elles sont. Leur méchanique est donc telle, qu’elles s’incorporent les 
matieres alimentaires dans un rapport direct à leur structure et à leurs déterminations acquises. 
Ainsi la nutrition tend à conserver aux fibres ces déterminations et à les y enraciner; car à mesure 
que les fibres croissent, elles prennent plus de consistance, et je crois entrevoir ici l’origine de 
l’habitude, cette puissante reine du monde sentant et intelligent.” 
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 For Bonnet, life is sensation, and the most important structure-function-
complexes of the sensibility of living beings are the fibre apparati. Only living 
beings possess fibre apparati, and their life lasts as long as they are able to sense. 
All tissues and organs are composed of fibres, and the sensibility of the senses 
depends on the specific dispositions of their fibre bundles. 
 Like Condillac, Bonnet still applies a dualistic model of a soul–body-interface 
to explain the faculties of human sensitive agents. However, his notion of the 
sensitive agent as a mixed body relies not on the metaphysics of the substantial 
properties of the soul, but on an organized “milieu” of fibres as a transitory zone of 
the physical body that mediates both stimuli and cognitive data. This mediation 
takes place between the sense apparati that are covered by the skin and the rhizome-
like nerve nets around the soul–body-interface in the brain. It is, according to Bonnet, 
observable in so far as movements of affected fibres are related to it. These movements 
establish not only causal connections between the affecting outer objects and their 
inner perception; they also occur in sequences and patterns that represent the 
specific appearance of the objects. These sequences and patterns can be memorized 
through the material “dispositions” of fibers. A similar fibre automaton is charac-
teristic of Diderot’s, Cabanis’s and Destutt de Tracy’s physical anthropologies. 101 
 Bonnet’s focus on stimuli-reaction-schemes and their visible movements in 
œconomies of fibres finally represents a general shift of interest from the ontology of 
the soul-body-interface and the mechanismis of movements to the processuality of the 
inside-outside-interface of living bodies. This shift, that is also indicated through 
other statue models in the writings of Buffon, Boureau-Deslandes and Condillac, takes 
place in the second half of the eighteenth century. In Bonnet’s model of a human 
statue, the research object  living body becomes a mediating physical entity that 
receives, transforms and expresses stimuli in the same way as it assimilates and 
excretes food particles. Both processes rely on the stimuli-reaction-schemes of 
sensitive fibres within organized bodies that function as adaptable, and yet stable 
containers for their performance. 
 
101 
 Some authors refer to Bonnet’s fibre model of a human statue as a paradigmatic example for 
such a physical anthropology. See for example Mendelssohn  1784 , 152–153: “Ein feines Gewebe 
von Fasern, welche ineinander verschlungen sind, und welche die Schwingungen und Bebungen, 
worin sie von äussern Gegenständen gesetzt werden, sich einander harmonisch mittheilen, dieses 
sind die Materialien, aus welchen sie [Condillac und Bonnet] eine ganze Geisterwelt erbauen wol-
len; und die Gesetze, nach welchen sich diese Schwingungen im Sichtbaren oder Fühlbaren 
erzeugen und mittheilen lassen, sollen dieselben sein, aus welchen sich die Gesetze der geistigen 
Verrichtungen alle herleiten lassen. Nachdem diese oder jene Fibern, mehr oder weniger, stärker 
oder schwächer, erschüttert worden; ist der Erfolg bald ein Urtheil des Verstandes, bald ein witz-
iger Einfall, bald eine großmüthige Entschließung. Diese Denker müssen sich in der That haben 
aus der Acht kommen lassen, dass Faser, Gewebe, Schwingen, Beben, und alle Synonyma, deren 
sie sich zum Behuf ihrer Hypothese bedienen, ursprünglich aus der Finger- und Augensprache 
entlehnt sind, und also nichts anders beweislich machen können, als was sich betasten oder 
besehen lässt  … Allein  … dieses Uebersetzen und bildliche Vorstellen für eine Erklärung ausge-
ben, heißt den Witz mit Händen greifen oder die Vernunft durch die Brille sehen wollen.” On the 
same subject, see also Engel  1784 . 
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 Abstract  Vitalism, from its early modern to its Enlightenment forms (from Glisson 
and Willis to La Caze and Barthez), is notoriously opposed to intervention into 
the living sphere. Experiment, quantification, measurement are all ‘vivisectionist’, 
morally suspect and worse, they alter and warp the ‘life’ of the subject. They are 
good for studying corpses, not living individuals. This much is well known, and it has 
disqualified vitalist medicine from having a place in standard histories of medicine, 
until recent, post-Foucauldian maneuvers have sought to change the situation (but for 
unrelated, contextualist reasons). What is perhaps more suprising is that if we con-
sider the emergence of medical ‘theory’ as a whole, from Harvey through to Locke 
and Sydenham, is the presence of a sustained anti-experimentalist line of argument, 
and this from the ‘empiricist’ (not Cartesian or Boerhaavian rationalist) side. It would 
seem then that ‘empiricks’, medical empiricists and other protagonists of an ‘embod-
ied empiricism’ are not Boylean experimentalists who seek to map out Nature in its 
transparency, but deliberately archaic, Hippocratic observers of living bodies. 
 It is known that empiricism is essentially a medical invention, dating back to the 
original ‘Empirics’ in the third century BC, with Serapion, a disciple of Herophilus 
of Alexandria (although ‘empiricist’ tendencies can be made out as far back as 
Hippocrates’ treatise  On Ancient Medicine ). 1 We are familiar with the distinction 
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between Empiricists, Methodists and Dogmatists from Galen’s accounts in treatises 
such as  On Medical Experience and  On Medical Sects 2 (the key trait of the empirics 
is their emphasis on description rather than definition and the compilation of what 
might be called tables of induction: collections of instances where one thing (say 
an illness) is seen to follow from another, which then constitutes an “experience” 
[ empeiria ].) Indeed, if we fast forward to the early modern era, we find Mandeville, 
in his book on hysterick and hypochondriac diseases, quoting the basic empiricist 
credo that ‘nothing is in the mind which was not first in the senses’ ( nihil est in 
intellectu [or:  in mente ]  quod non fuerit in sensu ) and attributing it to the physician 
Sylvius. 3 In the eighteenth century, if we consult Diderot and D’Alembert’s 
 Encyclopédie , the article “Empirisme” is much shorter than the article “Empirique,” 
which is entirely devoted to medicine. 4 
 In what follows I would like to briefly consider this uniquely medical or embod-
ied nature of empiricism, in order to stress how it differs from a more general or 
generic ‘experimentalist’ picture of scientific practice, including the common view 
of empiricism as stemming from the new Royal Society culture of experiment. 5 I 
have discussed elsewhere how careful consideration of even the ‘Epistle to the 
Reader’ of Locke’s  Essay reveals a project very different from the atomistic, sense-
data-oriented doctrine of empiricism we have come to be familiar with since at least 
the early twentieth century; how we should no longer think of Locke (and indeed of 
other empiricists) as the “underlabourer” of Newton, Boyle, Huygens and Sydenham, 
due to the uniquely moral, theological and political motivations of his doctrine. 6 
 The specifically medical dimension I want to focus on here, if combined with 
these reflections on Locke, could lead us to significantly revise our picture of what 
empiricism was in the early modern period, leading up to the notion of an  embodied 
empiricism . A good deal of robust revisionist work has changed our picture of 
‘British empiricism’ in the past 10–20 years (from Michael Ayers and David Fate 
Norton onwards). Its ‘Britishness’, its relation to experiment, its relation to 
Cartesianism and generally its status as an epistemology have all come under fire; 
most relevant here is the idea that the thinkers we call empiricists were both (a) less 
empirically minded than their sixteenth and seventeenth-century forebears, and in 
fact (b) were critical of empiricism, at least in the case of Hume. 7 
 
3
 Mandeville  1730 /1976, Preface, vi. On the history of the phrase (which is both philosophical and 
medical), see Cranefield  1970 . 
 
4
 A very different, more ‘Baconian–Boylean’ point of view is found in the article “Expérimental” by 
D’Alembert  (1756 , 298f.). This analysis can be extended all the way to the picture of materialism found 
in the French eighteenth century, which unlike its present-day variants is a ‘biologism’ rather than a 
‘physicalism’. I try to sketch out some aspects of this in  Wolfe and Aury 2008 , Wolfe  2009a,  b . 
 
5
 Contrast the standard view of empiricism as tied to the Royal Society’s experimental culture and 
its origins in Bacon and the Oxford Philosophical Club, e.g. in Kaplan  1993 , 44. Analyses which 
contextualize this culture of experiment as one of ‘trust’ and ‘civility’ (Shapin et al.) do not alter 
the classic view, for present purposes, as also indicated in the Introduction to this volume. 
 
6
 See Salter and Wolfe ( 2009). 
 
7
 Norton  1981 , 334, 340. 
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 I suggest that there might at the very least be  different kinds of empiricism opera-
tive in English thought in this period, such as – for the sake of discussion – the 
following: 
 – A ‘Royal Society’,  experimentalist empiricism , which may be the context in 
which an actual ‘philosophy of experiment’ emerges (as in Boyle’s “There is a 
big difference betwixt the being able to make Experiments, and the being able to 
give a Philosophical Account of them” 8 or Bacon’s “Founding a real model of the 
world … cannot be done without dissecting and anatomizing the world” 9 ); this is 
summarized in 1728 by Ephraim Chambers, in his  Cyclopædia , with the state-
ment that “Experiments, within these fifty or sixty years, are come into such 
vogue, that nothing will pass in philosophy, but what is founded on experiment, 
or confirm’d by experiment, &c. so that the new philosophy is altogether 
experimental.” 10 
 – A  moral/practical empiricism (Locke and Hume), in which themes such as 
anti-innatism (that is, the denial that there are innate ideas in the mind) are in fact 
not epistemological, that is, not primarily reducible to concerns about the nature 
of knowledge or the cognitive states of the knower, but are rather motivated by 
embedded concerns such as anti-authoritarianism (as in Locke’s rejection of an 
innate notion of ‘patriarchal’ authority) and the desire to articulate a notion of 
toleration. 11 
 – A  medically motivated, ‘embodied’ empiricism , as found in such diverse 
figures as William Harvey (see the current work of Alan Salter), Pierre Gassendi, 
Thomas Sydenham; in a different sense, La Mettrie, especially when located as 
he meant to be within the tradition or trend of ‘medical Epicureanism’ 12 , as in 
Gassendi-Lamy-La Mettrie 13 ; and the Montpellier vitalists. 
 
8
 Boyle 1661/ 1999 , 221. 
 
9
 Bacon,  Novum Organum , I, § 124. 
 
10
 “Experimental Philosophy,” in Chambers  1728 , vol. 1, 368. 
 
11
 On the idea of a specifically moral or practically motivated empiricism, see Dario Perinetti’s 
work on ‘moral certainty’,  Waldow & Wolfe (ms.) and more generally Gaukroger  2005 . 
 
12
 I discuss the tradition of ‘medical Epicureanism’ – whether as something medical or as a polemi-
cal, rhetorical construct (as Olivier Bloch puts it, “une médecine assez littéraire en somme . . . qui 
se réclame de Démocrite et Lucrèce face à Aristote et Galien”; Bloch  1992 , 79) – in Wolfe  2009b ; 
see also Cook  2007 , 385, on Boerhaave’s Epicureanism. Mandeville is obviously an Epicurean in 
his social theory, including the theory of the passions, but not in his medico-philosophical work 
on hysterical and hypochondriac diseases (which contains extensive materialist reflections on 
‘pneumatology’, but not of a particularly Epicurean sort). 
 
13
 On the Paris physician Guillaume Lamy 1644–1683, an atomist Epicurean author of works 
such as  De Principiis rerum (1669),  Discours anatomiques (1675) and  Explication mécanique 
et physique des fonctions de l’âme sensitive (1677), see Anna Minerbi Belgrado’s extensive, 
informative introduction to her edition of Lamy’s  Discours anatomiques & Explication mécha-
nique et physique des fonctions de l’âme sensitive (Lamy  1996) . For additional biographical 
information, see Mothu  1993 , which is also available online. 
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 That Locke worked closely with Sydenham, Richard Lower, and to some extent 
Thomas Willis, does not however render his empiricism a  medical one. Locke’s 
 Essay contains not a single medical example, and never makes a ‘realist’ ontologi-
cal claim involving bodily states and their truth-value (nor any reductive claims). It 
is clear that Locke devoted a number of years of his life to medicine (in different 
forms and contexts), and that his collaboration with Sydenham does reflect an 
emphasis on the ‘practical’ dimension; but after 1689, he ceases to care about medi-
cine. 14 Furthermore, he explicitly states that his ‘historical, plain Method’, his 
project of a logic of ideas, is not itself to be confused with “Physical consideration 
of the Mind”; any effort to “enquire philosophically into the peculiar Constitution 
of Bodies” is “contrary to the Design of [his] Essay,” which is chiefly motivated by 
“practical” concerns (the moral project I alluded to above). 15 However, it is possible 
to see medicine as falling broadly within a practical project, if it is a medicine 
emphasizing observation and the history of diseases, as I indicate below. 
 Here, focusing on the medical side of empiricism, I will claim that this trend 
culminates in the figure of vitalism, which philosophers of science are accustomed 
to present as the stupid person’s view (the belief in extra-causal vital forces and 
other otiose entities) but which was in fact the most sophisticated and diverse medi-
cal ‘model’ available in the Enlightenment (especially if we define vitalism so that 
it encompasses figures like Haller in addition to Bordeu, Barthez, Ménuret, 
Fouquet, etc., while conversely not applying the term ‘vitalism’ retroactively to a 
series of incompatible views including chimiatry and animism). A structurally 
similar claim was made a generation ago by Georges Canguilhem, in his study of 
the origins of the notion of reflex action; Canguilhem wanted to show that the true 
founder of neurophysiology was not the mechanist Descartes but the chimiatric, 
Helmontian Thomas Willis. 16 
 In this specifically medical empiricism, the stress is on observation rather 
than on experiment, on bodily states rather than on de-personalized, quantitative 
measures. This explains the otherwise puzzling presence of polemics against 
anatomy, quantitative methods, and instruments such as the microscope (similarly 
to Harvey) – experiment and instruments go better with mechanism. The microscope 
 
14
 I differ here from Peter Anstey (and from earlier, much more inflated claims such as Patrick 
Romanell’s), and find myself in greater agreement with J.C. Walmsley’s work on Locke and medi-
cine; Milton  2001 , 221 similarly comments that Locke no longer exhibited any interest in medi-
cine after 1689. 
 
15
 Locke  1975 , I.i.2, II.xxi.73. This should also lead us to reject, or at least be very cautious with, 
the image of Locke as the ‘underlabourer’ of the Scientific Revolution – which is not at all the same 
as the image of a ‘neurophilosophical’ Locke (or Hume) concerned with relations between ‘trains 
of animal spirits’ and ‘trains of thought’ (as discussed in Sutton’s contribution to this volume; the 
extent to which Sutton’s new, physiologically embedded description of empiricism concurs with or 
challenges the picture of empiricism I am presenting here, is a matter for further discussion). 
 
16
 Canguilhem  1955 /1977. The same point is made in Martensen  2004 , without any reference to 
Canguilhem. The present claim differs from Canguilhem’s inasmuch as it does not seek to rehabili-
tate one figure at the expense of another, but rather to revise our picture of a construct: empiricism. 
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is much friendlier to the iatromechanist, or the ‘expanded mechanists’ like 
Malebranche or Leibniz, than to the type of empiricist who promotes unaided 
sense-perception. 
 Locke and Sydenham similarly reject the value of microscopy:
 All that Anatomie can do is only to shew us the gross and sensible parts of the body, or the 
vapid dead juices all which, after the most diligent search, will be noe more able to direct a 
physician how to cure a disease than how to make a man. … How to regulate his dose, to mix 
his simples and to prescribe all in a due method? All this only from history and the advantage 
of a diligent observation of these diseases, of there beginning progress and ways of cure … 
sugar in some stomachs turns to acidity and milk the most universal and innocent food in the 
world, is to some men as bad as poison. The anatomist will hardly be enabled to tell us, 
therefore, what changes any particular medicine either makes or receives in the body … 17 
 and especially,
 it is … beyond controversy that nature perform all her operations in the body by parts so 
minute and insensible that I think noe body will ever hope or pretend even by the assistance 
of glasses or any other invention to come to a sight of them. 18 
 For Mandeville, too, “Our shallow Understandings will never penetrate into the 
Structure of Parts of that amazing as well as mysterious Composition, the Mass of 
Blood.” 19 It is apparent, then, that empiricists “rejected instrument-assisted sense 
perception,” whereas the microscope and related technologies were “very much 
welcomed by the mechanical philosopher.” 20 Indeed, from the mechanist standpoint 
the microscope is viewed as extending the sensory powers of the subject, and 
indeed her intellectual powers (notably in the Spinozist sense that it augments the 
causal power of the body and correspondingly “that part of the mind which is 
eternal” 21 ). In contrast, the empiricist has a kind of first-person view of experience 
( not, however, reducing it to uniquely mental states as an animist would: for there 
is a difference between criticizing iatromechanism for its inability to capture fea-
tures of living bodies, and criticizing it for missing the existence of an additional, 
spiritual substance, 22 a difference which also separates the vision of embodiment 
presented here from more phenomenologically inspired accounts of the  corps propre 
 
17
 Sydenham/Locke,  Anatomia (1668) (the text is attributed both to Sydenham and to Locke, but 
its attribution does not affect the claims made here); Locke’s ‘version’ is Locke ms., National 
Archives PRO 30/24/72/2 ff. 36v–37r.,  cit . Walmsley  2008 , 70. It is also transcribed in Dewhurst 
 1966 , 85–93. On this resistance to the microscope see Wolfe  1961 . 
 
18
 Sydenham/Locke,  Anatomia ,  op. cit ., in Dewhurst  1966 , 85 (also quoted in Dewhurst  1958 , 7–8). 
 
19
 Mandeville  1730 /1976, 168. 
 
20
 Van Speybroeck, et al.  2002 , 18. 
 
21
 Spinoza,  Ethics V, prop. 39; Garrett  2003 , 221. 
 
22
 On medicine in this context as articulating a ‘functional’ rather than a ‘substantival’ dualism see 
Wright  2000 ; on how some vitalistic critiques of mechanism are better seen as ‘complexifications’ 
of mechanism see  Wolfe & Terada 2008 . “It is something of an ‘ism’ paradox that the eighteenth-
century ‘mechanists’ generally described the body in non-quantitative terms whereas the ‘animists’ 
used mathematics to demonstrate the need of a soul to power the machine of the body” (French 
 1990 , 103). 
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versus the body inhabiting Cartesian or Newtonian space 23 ), a first-person state of 
experience in which “the investigator … [acquires] unmediated ocular evidence [ or 
tactile evidence, etc. CW ] of the way things stood in the body rather than testing 
hypotheses by means of artificial experiment.” 24 That is, there is not a demarcation 
between an ‘experiment’ as something depersonalized and an ‘experience’ as 
something that is  my own . Hence the emphasis on observation is not just a reflec-
tion of one particular ‘way of knowing’, or epistemological worry; for Sydenham 
and Locke, “observation without instruments is a moral imperative.” 25 
 We would of course want to ask here: what  kind of knowledge is this embodied, 
first-person knowledge characteristic of the medical empiricist? Is it scientific 
knowledge? (Or, how does it fit in a more historically appropriate distinction 
between, e.g., natural philosophy, natural history, and the mathematical sciences? 
It clearly is close to natural history, from Bacon to Locke to Diderot; yet it is some-
thing else again.) Note in addition that by distinguishing the embodied, medical 
focus of this kind of empiricism from a more quantitative, experimentalist, ‘Royal 
Society’ kind of empiricism, I am not reiterating the older, fairly a-historical claim 
(which one finds in Charles Gillispie, but also in Koyré or Alistair Crombie) that 
medicine in the early modern period was more of an ‘art’ than a ‘science’ – 
Crombie goes as far as to declare that medicine was closer to religion than to 
science. 26 This does not mean that medicine was never opposed to ‘science’ as a 
body of formalized statements traceable back to first principles: one story tells how, 
in 1678, after the favourite of the viceroy of Naples was killed by a chemical remedy 
administered by a Galenist, the viceroy wished to protest to the profession, but was 
told that regulation and hence penalty was impossible, because medicine was not a 
 scientia ! 27 Instead, one can consider that  personal knowledge does not necessarily 
have to be ‘art’ rather than ‘science’. 28 Witness Sydenham’s efforts to not be identi-
fied with the ‘empiricks’ even though he also attacks ‘learned medicine’. 
 If medical empiricism in its early modern form is to be distinguished from mecha-
nistic medicine, and from a more ‘rationalist’ belief in the measurable transparency 
of Nature, it starts to resemble a slightly different creature, namely, medical vitalism. 
 
23
 From Husserl to Hans Jonas and beyond, this anti-Cartesian tradition also completely misinter-
prets empiricism in ‘disembodied’ terms, as a theory of ideas condemned to skepticism and/or as 
a naïve, early psycho-physics. For an interesting attempt to enlist Hume in an embodied, ‘enactive’ 
phenomenological project, see Froese  2009 . 
 
24
 Dear  2006 , 112. On the rich contextual sense of ‘experimentum’ and ‘experimenta’ see in 
addition Cynthia Klestinec’s essay in this volume. 
 
25
 Wolfe  1961 , 209. 
 
26
 “The effect aimed at by medicine is health. It shares this end rather with religion than with 
science” (Crombie, as quoted in Cook,  1990 , 403). 
 
27
 As described in French,  2003 , 188. 
 
28
 As in Alan Salter’s remark that Harvey put the phrase ‘Per me’ on the frontispiece of his 
Lumleian Lectures (an academic exercise if there was one). Of course this also has the effect of 
shifting the problem to another ground: if medical knowledge is a kind of personal knowledge, a 
kind of knowledge by acquaintance, akin to a ‘craft knowledge’, is it scientific knowledge? Cf. 
Cook  2007 , 15, 34, 37. 
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The importance given to nosology – the history and taxonomy of diseases rather than 
the ‘essentialist’ concern with their internal causes, whether mechanistic or 
Helmontian – and the insistence on the legitimacy of (archaic) Hippocrates and 
Hippocratic medicine over and against ‘modern’ (e.g. mechanical) medicine, are ele-
ments common to the Locke/Sydenham view and to medical vitalism. 29 Sydenham 
had emphatically insisted on the need for a history and taxonomy of diseases rather 
than a theory of their internal causal composition. Illnesses needed to be repeatedly 
 observed over their duration, not explained mechanistically, with the goal of being 
able to delineate them into  species : “It is necessary that all diseases be reduced to 
definite and certain species …, with the same care which we see exhibited by bota-
nists in their phytologies,” he says in his  Medical Observations Concerning the 
History and Cure of Acute Diseases . 30 Locke often praised Sydenham for his “practi-
cal” abilities, and many years after their collaboration, in an unpublished text entitled 
 On the Conduct of the Understanding which was originally intended as a chapter of 
the  Essay , Locke wrote, “were it my business to understand physick, would not the 
safer and readier way be to consult nature herself and informe my self in the  history 
of diseases and their cures than espousing the principles of the Dogmatists, Methodists 
or Chymists” 31 ? This “history of diseases” is, of course, what was also called “nosol-
ogy.” As such, it resonates with a later Hippocratic avatar in south-west France, the 
Montpellier vitalist school. 
 Montpellier vitalism (that is, the doctrine or cluster of positions associated 
with the Medical Faculty at Montpellier, from the early eighteenth to the early 
nineteenth centuries) consistently praises observation and disparages experiment, 
whether the latter consists of anatomical and pathological studies of corpses, or 
worse (in their opinion), of the vivisection of live animals. It also tends to include 
favourable references to empiricism, particularly to Condillac, but also to Locke, 
and in the case of Barthez – the ‘leader’ of and most influential spokesperson for 
the Montpellier vitalists in the late eighteenth century – to Hume, even if it is 
also true that these philosophical references tend to render Barthez’s point murkier 
than it would have been otherwise. Henri Fouquet speaks of Haller’s theory of the 
irritability of muscular fibres as dependent on a “horrific experimental set-up 
[ appareil d’expériences ],” ostensibly “guided by the desire to help humankind, but 
leaving out no painful instrument, no source of torment for … an infinite number 
of animals.” 32 Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud (Ménuret) restricts his criticism 
to epistemology when he describes experimental phenomena in his programmatic 
 
29
 On nosology and Montpellier vitalism see Martin  1990 . Bichat in the early nineteenth century 
still has this specifically  medical hostility to the microscope, as a source of potential errors (as 
noted in Grmek and Bernabeo  1997 , 35). 
 
30
 Sydenham,  Medical Observations (orig. 1676), Preface to the 3rd edition, § 7, in Sydenham 
 1848 , I, 13. 
 
31
 Locke  1697 , § 35 (emphasis mine). 
 
32
 Fouquet  1765 , 50b. 
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article “Observation” as having been arbitrarily “decomposed and combined,” giv-
ing rise to conditions “far different from those present in nature.” 33 When the physi-
ologist dissolves blood freshly drawn from an animal, using other liquids, the 
knowledge he derives regarding the resulting mixture “is no longer the fruit of pure 
observation; … knowledge acquired by this means is quite mediocre and imper-
fect” ( ibid ., 314a). Louis de La Caze insists that ‘observation’ means “what can be 
observed on a healthy or sick body,” whereas ‘experiment’ means “whatever can be 
observed of a dead body,” 34 and also targets Boerhaave’s “useless experimentation” 
( ibid ., 47–48, 66). 
 Empiricism in its medical guise and vitalism in its Hippocratic, anti-substantialist 
mode thus inhabit a shared  Denkform or rather discursive space. Common to them 
both, in addition to the above features, is an involvement with ‘chymistry’, particu-
larly chimiatric medicine. From the empiricist standpoint, this was far removed from 
the more speculative, abstract character of iatromechanism; from the vitalist stand-
point, chemical processes and particularly the relations and differences between 
‘aggregates’ and ‘mixts’ were the best candidate for differentiating the organic from 
the inorganic. An additional feature in vitalist argumentation which is  not present in 
the Sydenham–Locke critique of anatomy and experiment, is its usage of Newtonian 
analogies (see Hall  1968) , which arguably complicates the distinction I suggested 
above between medical empiricism and Boyle–Newton, Royal Society empiricism. 
But in fact, contrary to the initial impression that empiricism should be a kind of 
‘epiphenomenalism’ which disregards the essences of things, whereas vitalism 
would be an ontological claim about the unique nature of a particular class of beings, 
namely living beings, 35 the Newtonian motif in vitalism renders it equally ‘agnostic’ 
as to the ontological status of its entities. As Barthez declared, “I am as indifferent 
as could be regarding  Ontology considered as the science of entities.” 36 
 The popularity of the analogy between vital force and Newtonian gravitation, in 
the eyes of the vitalists, lay in the combination this offered: explanatory power  and 
the absence of obligations to provide an account of vitality in terms of micro-struc-
ture (given that iatromechanists, whether Descartes, Borelli, Baglivi or Boerhaave, 
consistently affirmed in widely known and quoted passages of their works that 
micro-structural explanations dispel ambiguities inherent in chimiatric language and 
subsume the variety of functions under a fixed number of mechanical, indeed 
mathematical laws 37 ). This Newtonian feature of vitalism nicely complements the 
sustained references to Hippocrates and the Hippocratic tradition (as a non-reductive, 
non-essentialist type of medicine); taken together, they form a coherent anti-
metaphysical position as we would expect from medical empiricism. 
 
33
 Ménuret  1765 , 313b. 
 
34
 La Craz  1755 , 9. 
 
35
 Thanks to John Sutton for pointing out this issue. 
 
36
 Barthez  1806 , 96, note 17. See also French  1994 , 315–316 for a parallel between Newtonian 
ontological agnosticism and Harvey’s method. 
 
37
 Baglivi  1696 /1704, 135–136; Boerhaave  1708 /1751, 81. 
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 In sum: medical empiricism is different from the proof-and-validation experi-
mentalism of Royal Society empiricism; it has a vitalistic flavour as distinct from 
mechanical medicine. This is not as shocking as might seem from a post-nineteenth 
century standpoint (that is, after the appearance of the ‘neo-vitalisms’ of Driesch or 
Bergson, which were less focused on medicine or the body than on the mechanisms 
of generation and, for better or worse, an ensuing metaphysics), as eighteenth cen-
tury vitalism was a heavily pragmatic, heuristic sort of enterprise which, contrary 
to popular belief, has no concern with ‘vital forces’ or other extra-causal agents but 
rather with extending structural accounts of the organizational features of living 
bodies. 
 Now, in itself, the existence of a medicine of observation and nosology in 
contrast (indeed, in opposition) to a medicine of experiment and anatomy, is non-
controversial – trivial, as it were – but its articulation  with , or  as , a kind of empiri-
cism is less trivial. It implies, among other things, that ‘biology’, ‘physiology’ and 
other fields particularly concerned with living organisms do not have to wait for 
some of the ‘classics’ of Enlightenment popular science (Trembley’s polyp, 
Bonnet’s aphids, Haller’s irritable muscle fibres, Maupertuis’ African albino child 
and so on 38 ) to suddenly appear, after centuries of so-called ‘mechanism’. Not only 
is there a new, dynamic and active set of concerns grouped here under the heading 
‘medical empiricism’ but even mechanism itself (a topic for a different paper) was 
far more concerned with the functional properties of life than is generally recog-
nized, as recent work on Cartesian physiology has shown. 
 This is not tantamount to claiming that our uniquely medical, embodied empiri-
cism is a ‘paradigm’ or brings about a ‘paradigm shift’ 39 , nor that it was a specific 
research program; perhaps that it was a particular “historical form of mental activity,” 
of experimental and experiential culture, of “cognitive practice.” 40 And every 
attempt to distinguish between categories of a construct such as ‘empiricism’ will 
necessarily meet with disagreement since certain key figures (Harvey, Boyle and 
Locke come to mind) can be made to fit in several of these; other figures are hostile 
to the new program of experimental science for entirely different reasons (Hobbes). 
However, it remains the case that neither the history of science nor the history of 
philosophy have been able to account for this particularly ‘embodied’ context of 
 
38
 See Barsanti  2000 , 124 for this typical view (and a long enumeration of biologically relevant 
discoveries in the eighteenth century that on his view ‘could not have been understood’ a 
hundred years earlier). Similar arguments are made using the consolidation of chemistry 
as a basis for justifying the autonomy of ‘biomedical’ ontology and explanation, but they are 
 à double tranchant . 
 
39
 See Salomon-Bayet  1978 , 15 and Hall  1968 , 25 for interesting criticisms of the applicability of 
paradigms (or rather the very notion of paradigms) in early Enlightenment life science. 
 
40
 I borrow these terms from the description of “historical cognitive science” in Sutton  1995 . Of 
course, the idea of historically retrieving moments of ‘tacit knowledge’ is paradoxical by 
essence – but if we reject it outright then we also cut ourselves off from a variety of important 
interpretive moments, from the history of  mentalités to recent discussions on ‘experience’ in the 
early modern period. 
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empiricism. It is clear that most, and perhaps all historians of the Scientific 
Revolution, be they internalist or externalist, inclined towards astronomy, alchemy 
or colonial voyages, miss this dimension of ‘Life’, and the specificity of living 
beings, which of course is much more loudly articulated in the subsequent hundred-
odd years (from Leibniz’s debate with Stahl, the so-called  Negotium otiosum , to 
materialists such as Buffon and Diderot; from Haller to Bichat). Archaic medical 
invocations like Hippocratism and rather ‘baroque’ obsessions such as monsters are 
in fact signs of a dissatisfaction with Galilean, physico-mathematical explanations 
(it is eloquent in this sense that the  Encyclopédie contains no entry on Galileo) 
faced with a kind of ‘undecidability’ of Nature. 41 
 Should all of this revise our picture of the place of ‘Life’ within the Scientific 
Revolution (hitherto ignored or unacknowledged)? 42 Or is it sufficient to revise our 
vision of empiricism? It remains to be seen. 
 References 
 D’Alembert, Jean le Rond de. 1756. Expérimental (Philosophie nat.).  Encyclopédie VI, 298–301. 
Paris: Briasson. 
 Baglivi, Giorgio. 1696/1704.  De Praxi Medica , trans. G. Sewell & J.T. Desaguliers,  The Practice 
of Physick . London: A. Bell et al., 2nd edition. 
 Barsanti, Giulio. 2000. Lamarck: Taxonomy and Theoretical Biology.  Asclepio 52(2): 1191–131. 
 Barthez, Paul-Joseph. 1806.  Nouveaux Éléments de la Science de L’Homme , 2 vols, 2nd edition. 
Paris: Goujon & Brunot. 
 Bloch, Olivier. 1992. L’Héritage Libertin dans la Pensée des Lumières.  Dix-Huitième Siècle 24: 
73–82. 
 Boerhaave, Hermann. 1708/1752.  Dr. Boerhaave’s Academical Lectures on the Theory of Physic, 
Being a Translation of His Institutes and Explanatory Comments , vol. 1 of 6. London: 
W. Innys (a translation of  Institutiones medicae , 1708). 
 Boyle, Robert. 1999.  The Sceptical Chymist (1661). In  Works , eds. M. Hunter & E.B. Davis, vol. 
2. London: Pickering & Chatto. 
 Canguilhem, Georges. 1955/1977.  La Formation du Concept de Réflexe aux XVII  e   et XVIII  e  
 Siècles , 2nd revised edition. Paris: Vrin. 
 Chambers, Ephraim. 1728.  Cyclopaedia, or a Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences…, 2 vols. 
London: J. Knapton. 
 Cook, Harold J. 1990. The New Philosophy and Medicine in Seventeenth-Century England. In 
 Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution , eds. D. Lindberg and R. Westman, 397–436. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Cook, Harold J. 2007.  Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch 
Golden Age . New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 Cranefield, Paul. 1970. On the Origin of the Phrase  Nihil Est In Intellectu .  Journal of the History 
of Medicine and the Allied Sciences 25: 77–80. 
 
41
 On monsters as a stand-in for the nature of living beings, see Wolfe  2005 . 
 
42
 On this question see Cook  1990 (especially 401–404), Duchesneau  1996 , Rey  1994 , Salomon-
Bayet, Claire,  1978,  1981 . However, it is also difficult to follow Cook’s opposite claim, that medi-
cine and natural history are “the big science of the early modern period” (Cook  2007 , 410); 
compare the author’s more measured statement ( ibid ., 267). 
343Empiricist Heresies in Early Modern Medical Thought
 Dear, Peter. 2006. The Meanings of Experience. In  The Cambridge History of Science , vol. 3: 
 Early Modern Science , eds. K. Park & L. Daston, 106–131. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Dewhurst, Kenneth. 1958. Locke and Sydenham on the Teaching of Anatomy.  Medical History 2: 
1–12. 
 Dewhurst, Kenneth. 1966.  Dr. Thomas Sydenham (1624–1689), his Life and Original Writings . 
London: Wellcome Historical Medical Library. 
 Duchesneau, François. 1996. Révolution Scientifique et Problématique de l’Étre Vivant.  Revue 
Philosophique de Louvain 94: 568–598. 
 Fouquet, Henri. 1765. Sensibilité, Sentiment (Médecine).  Encyclopédie XV, 38–52. Paris: 
Briasson. 
 French, Roger K. 1990. Sickness and the soul: Stahl, Hoffmann and Sauvages on Pathology. In 
 The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century , eds. A. Cunningham & R. French, 
88–110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 French, Roger K. 1994.  William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 French, Roger K. 2003. Medicine Before Science . The Business of Medicine from the Middle Ages 
to the Enlightenment . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Froese, Tom. 2009. Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind.  Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 8(1): 95–133. 
 Garrett, Aaron V. 2003.  Meaning in Spinoza’s Method . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Gaukroger, Stephen. 2005. The Autonomy of Natural Philosophy: From Truth to Impartiality. In 
 Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century , eds. P. Anstey & J. Schuster, 131–164. 
Dordrecht & New York: Springer. 
 Grmek, Mirko & Bernabeo, Raffaele. 1997. La machine du corps. In  Histoire de la pensée médi-
cale en Occident , ed. M. Grmek, vol. 2:  De la Renaissance aux Lumières , 7–36. Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil. 
 Hall, T.S. 1968. On Biological Analogs of Newtonian paradigms.  Philosophy of Science 35(1): 6–27. 
 Hankinson, R.J. 1995. The Growth of Medical Empiricism. In  Knowledge and the Scholarly 
Medical Traditions , ed. D. Bates, 60–83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Kaplan, Barbara Beigun. 1993.  “Divulging of Useful Truths in Physic”: The Medical Agenda of 
Robert Boyle . Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. 
 de La Caze, Louis. 1755.  Idée de l’homme physique et moral pour servir d’introduction à un traité 
de médecine . Paris: Guérin & Delatour. 
 Lamy, Guillaume. 1996. D iscours Anatomiques & Explication Méchanique et Physique des 
Fonctions de l’Âme Sensitive , ed. Anna Minerbi Belgrado. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation. 
 Locke, John. 1697.  On the Conduct of the Understanding . Online at http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/
publications/CESdigital/locke/conduct/toc.html. 
 Locke, John. 1975.  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , ed. P. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Mandeville, Bernard. 1730/1976.  A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases , 2nd 
corrected edition. London: Tonson; reprint, Delmar, N.Y.: Scholars’ Reprints. 
 Martensen, Robert L. 2004.  The Brain Takes Shape: An Early History . New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Martin, Julian. 1990. Sauvages’ Nosology. Medical Enlightenment in Montpellier. In  The Medical 
Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century , eds. A. Cunningham and R.K. French, 111–138. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Ménuret de Chambaud, Jean-Joseph. 1765. Observation (Gram. Physiq. Méd.).  Encyclopédie XI, 
313–321. Paris: Briasson. 
 Milton, J.R. 2001. Locke, Medicine and the Mechanical Philosophy.  British Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 9(2): 221–243. 
 Mothu, Alain. 1993. La mort de Guillaume Lamy.  La Lettre clandestine 2. Online at http://www.
univ-paris12.fr/scd/lc2-2d.htm. 
 Norton, David F. 1981. The Myth of British Empiricism.  History of European Ideas 1(4): 331–344. 
344 C.T. Wolfe
 Pentzopoulou-Vallas, Teresa. 1990. Experience and Causal Explanation in Medical Empiricism. 
In  Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science , ed. P. Nicolacopoulos, BSPS, vol. 
121, 91–107. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 Rey, Roselyne. 1994. Naissance de la Biologie et Redistribution des Savoirs.  Revue de Synthèse 
1(2): 167–197. 
 Salomon-Bayet, Claire. 1978.  L’Institution de la Science et l’Expérience du Vivant: Méthode et 
Expérience à l’Académie Royale des Sciences, 1666–1793 . Paris: Flammarion. 
 Salomon-Bayet, Claire. 1981. 1802, ‘Biologie’ et Médecine. In  Epistemological and Social 
Problems of the Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century , eds. H.N. Jahnke & M. Otte, 35–54. 
Dordrecht: Reidel. 
 Salter, Alan & Wolfe, Charles T. 2009. Empiricism contra Experiment: Harvey, Locke and 
the Revisionist View of Experimental Philosophy.  Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire et 
d’Épistémologie des Sciences de la Vie 16(2): 113–140. 
 Sutton, John. 1995. Body, Mind, and Order: Local Memory and the Control of Mental 
Representations in Medieval and Renaissance Sciences of Self. In  1543 and All That: Word 
and Image in the Proto-Scientific Revolution , eds. A. Corones & G. Freeland, 117–150. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 Sydenham, Thomas. 1848–1850.  Works of Thomas Sydenham , trans. & ed. R.G. Latham, 2 vols. 
London: Sydenham Society. 
 Van Speybroeck, Linda, De Waele, Dani & Van De Vijver, Gertrudis. 2002. Theories in Early 
Embryology. Close Connections Between Epigenesis, Preformationism, and Self-Organization. 
 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 981:7–49. 
 Waldow, Anik & Wolfe, Charles T. 2008. Empiricism as a Moral Project in Locke and Hume. 
 Walzer, Richard and Frede, Michael. 1985.  Galen. Three Treatises on the Nature of Science . 
Indianapolis: Hackett. 
 Walmsley, J.C. 2008. Sydenham and the Development of Locke’s Natural Philosophy.  British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 16(1): 65–83. 
 Wolfe, Charles T. 2005. The Materialist Denial of Monsters. In  Monsters and Philosophy, ed. C.T. 
Wolfe, 187–204. London: College Publications. 
 Wolfe, Charles T. 2009a. ‘Cabinet d’Histoire Naturelle’, or: The Interplay of Nature and Artifice 
in Diderot’s Naturalism.  Perspectives on Science 17(1): 58–77. 
 Wolfe, Charles T., 2009b. A Happiness Fit for Organic Bodies: La Mettrie’s Medical Epicureanism. 
In  Epicureanism in the Enlightenment , eds. N. Leddy & A. Lifschitz, SVEC series, 69–83. 
Oxford: Voltaire Foundation. 
 Wolfe, Charles T. & Aury, Mathieu. 2008. Sommes-Nous les Héritiers des Lumières Matérialistes? 
 Phares 8: 11–33 (Université de Laval, Québec), also online at http://www.ulaval.ca/phares/
vol8-08/texte02.html. 
 Wolfe, Charles T. & Terada, Motoichi. 2008. The Animal Economy as Object and Program in 
Montpellier Vitalism. In  Vitalism without Metaphysics? A Reevaluation of Enlightenment 
Vitalism ,  Science in Context , ed. C.T. Wolfe, vol. 21(4) special issue, 537–579. 
 Wolfe, D.E. 1961. Sydenham and Locke on the Limits of Anatomy.  Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 35: 193–220. 
 Wright, John P. 2000. Substance vs. Function Dualism in 18th Century Medicine. In  Psyche and 
Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind–Body Problem from Antiquity to the 
Enlightenment , eds. J.P. Wright & P. Potter, 237–254. Oxford: Clarendon. 
345
 A 
 Académie des Sciences, 2, 84 
 Agent, 2, 89, 109, 110, 136–138, 219, 221, 
230, 245, 251, 253, 306, 309–328, 341 
 Agvilonius, Franciscus, 133, 134, 141 
 Alchemy, alchemical, 1, 21, 76, 84, 86, 96, 
104, 342 
 Alkahest, 75–90, 99–101, 103, 105–107 
 Anatomy, 2, 16, 22, 23, 33–55, 76, 77, 95–97, 
226, 247, 295, 336, 340, 341 
 Animal, 2, 18, 23, 34–36, 39, 47, 52, 64, 
67, 68, 71, 76, 77, 98, 107, 108, 
110–112, 141, 143, 160, 162, 181, 
182, 217–219, 221–223, 226–228, 
230, 232, 233, 248, 249, 253–255, 
257, 259, 269, 283, 310–312, 314, 
316, 318, 319, 327, 339, 340 
 Animal spirits, 111, 248, 253–255, 257, 259, 
316, 318, 326, 336 
 Appearances  vs . underlying reality, 303, 305 
 Aquapendente, Fabricius of, 35, 39 
 Archeus, 105–107, 109, 114 
 Ashley, Lord, 102 
 Astronomer, 121, 123, 130, 132, 139, 178 
 Astronomy, 61, 62, 68, 76, 122, 123, 125, 126, 
136, 138, 342 
 Attention, 3, 4, 10, 15, 18, 22, 27, 39, 41, 42, 
48, 59, 63, 67, 70, 77, 132, 134, 153, 
159, 162, 170, 192, 195, 201, 203, 215, 
221, 228, 231, 232, 245, 247–250, 252, 
253, 266, 273, 274, 276, 290, 294, 296, 
298, 303, 304, 306, 317, 323, 324 
 Aubrey, John, 28, 163 
 Augustine, St., 60, 61 
 B 
 Bacon, Francis, 1, 12, 20, 95, 149–167, 169, 187 
 Bacon, Roger, 137 
 Baconianism, 22 
 Barthez, Paul Joseph, 309, 336, 339, 340 
 Beale, John, 4, 185–206 
 ben Gershon, Levi (Gersonides), 135 
 Body.  See also embodiment 
 fluids, 217, 219, 253–256 
 modification, 171, 174, 175, 178, 179, 
182, 322–324 
 organized, 214, 231, 312, 319, 320
( see also organization, organism) 
 Boerhaave, Herman, 15, 311, 335, 340 
 Bonnet, Charles, 4, 213, 309–328, 341 
 Bordeu, Théophile de, 309, 310, 336 
 Boyle, Robert, 1, 4, 27, 77, 82, 85, 90, 
95–110, 113, 114, 185–206, 253, 255, 
259, 267, 334, 335, 340, 341 
 Brahe, Tycho, 125, 126, 130, 139 
 Branch, Thomas, 243, 244, 251, 252 
 Brereton, William, 188, 204 
 Briot, P., 103 
 Buffon, Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de, 
213, 214, 232, 310, 328, 342 
 Bulwer, John, 4, 169–182 
 C 
 Camera obscura, 131, 132, 134, 135, 139, 144 
 Carelessness, 243–260 
 Carpi, Berengario da, 38 
 Cellarius, A., 107 
 Chapman, George, 63–64, 67, 69, 71–73 
 Character 
 artificial, 169 
 universal, 170, 179, 180 
 Charles II, 96 
 Chemistry, 2, 10, 11, 16, 23, 26, 76, 106, 212, 
214, 224, 314.  See also chymistry 
 Chymistry, 3, 75–90, 93, 94, 96, 98–108, 
112–115, 187, 340.  See also chemistry 
 Index 
346 Index
 Clarke, Timothy, 95, 97 
 College of Physicians, 15, 17, 19, 21, 28, 47, 
94, 95, 97, 103 
 Comenius, Jan Amos, 190, 203 
 Comets, 123–133, 140 
 Commonplacing, of books and information, 
190–193 
 Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de, 4, 214, 219, 
266, 278, 280–283, 309, 310, 321, 324, 
328, 339 
 Controversy, 79, 84, 127, 131, 133, 140, 231, 337 
 Coxe, Daniel, 95, 108, 113 
 Craft, craftsmen, 17, 36, 37, 51, 52, 54, 55, 
171, 338 
 Croll, Oswald, 101 
 Cuningham, William, 61–63, 73 
 Currer, William, 100, 102 
 D 
 Daydreaming, 244–246, 250, 257 
 Death, 13, 18, 34, 35, 50, 63, 66, 71, 73, 77, 
84, 86, 104, 113, 154, 165, 188, 200, 
225, 284 
 Democritus, 157 
 Descartes, René, 21–26, 137, 189, 193, 247, 249, 
257, 259, 266, 269, 270, 275, 276, 283, 
284, 301, 306, 312, 316, 324, 336, 340 
 Diderot, Denis, 214, 229, 278, 324, 328, 334, 
338, 342 
 Disease, 13, 14, 16, 26, 34–36, 39, 41, 44, 51, 
52, 94–98, 105–110, 114, 156, 158, 
175, 254, 255, 292, 295, 334–337, 339 
 Distillation, 77, 79–82, 85–90, 98 
 Dodart, Denis, 78, 84–90 
 Dogma, dogmatic, 19, 151, 288, 291, 298–300 
 Dreaming, 25, 250–253, 256, 271, 306 
 Dualism, Cartesian, 288, 290, 297, 301, 305 
 Duclos, Samuel Cottereau, 3, 76–89, 103 
 Dury, John, 189, 193 
 E 
 Eden, Richard (Rycharde), 61, 72 
 Embodiment, 172, 181, 266, 267, 274, 283, 
337.  See also body 
 Emergence, emergent, 1, 80, 215, 223–225, 
228, 229, 231, 234 
 Empiricism, empirical 
 medical, 9–28, 287–307 
 Empirick, empiricks, 2, 3, 68, 186–188, 198, 
333, 338 
 Encyclopédie, 216, 310, 334, 342 
 Ent, Sir George, 95, 97 
 Epicurean, 293, 295, 305, 335 
 Ether, 255 
 Evolution, evolutionary, 10, 214, 215, 
218–221, 223–228, 230–235, 316 
 Exantlation, 106 
 Experience 
 practical, 11, 33–55 
 Experiment, experimental, 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 
16, 21, 22, 26, 28, 36, 54, 72, 76–78, 
82, 84, 85, 87, 94, 96, 97, 102, 104, 
107, 108, 113, 114, 132, 136, 150–163, 
165, 166, 186, 187, 189, 190, 193–195, 
197, 199, 202–206, 216, 272, 281, 282, 
288, 289, 295, 301, 311, 315, 317, 322, 
334–336, 338–341 
 Experimental philosophy, 1, 16, 96, 108, 113, 
114, 186, 203, 335 
 Expertise, 37–39, 42–45, 48, 53–55.  See also 
skill 
 F 
 Feeling, 64, 211–235, 245–247, 250, 251, 256, 
271, 274, 281–283, 303, 310, 318 
 Ferments, 108, 109, 111, 114, 225 
 Fibre, 247, 253–255, 258, 310–328, 339, 341 
 Fire analysis, 80–82, 87 
 G 
 Galen, 45, 49, 94, 95, 181, 187, 288, 291–299, 
301, 306, 307, 334 
 Galenic medicine, 94–96 
 Galilei, Galileo, 3, 11, 121–136, 138, 
140–145, 342 
 Gassendi, Pierre, 22, 288, 301–307, 335 
 Generation, 10, 14, 21, 36, 71, 73, 78, 86,
 89, 109, 111, 126, 154, 156, 161, 
220–222, 226, 229, 230, 288, 304,
311, 321, 336, 341 
 Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, Etienne, 212, 213 
 Germ, 311–313, 315, 316, 319, 324 
 Gesture, 4, 14, 67, 170–174, 178, 181, 182 
 Gibbs, James, 244, 253, 255 
 Glanvill, Joseph, 15, 16, 95 
 Glass, 62, 82, 123, 141, 142, 276, 337 
 Glauber, J. R., 86, 99, 100, 106 
 Glisson, Francis, 97, 312 
 Goodall, Charles, 109 
 Grassi, Horatio, 123–130, 132, 134,
140–142 
 Greverus, J., 103 
 Grosseteste, Robert, 137 
 Guiducci, Mario, 125–127 
347Index
 H 
 Haller, Albrecht von, 219, 227, 312, 315–317, 
336, 339, 341, 342 
 Harris, James, 97, 250, 252 
 Harris, John, 253, 255, 256 
 Hartlib, Samuel, 4, 105, 170, 185–206 
 Hartmann, Johann, 101 
 Harvey, William, 2, 3, 14, 16–22, 28, 54, 60, 
71–73, 163, 164, 335, 336, 338, 340, 341 
 Helmont, F. M. van, 104, 105 
 Helmont, J. B. van, 80, 86, 87, 89, 95, 100, 
105–109, 111–113 
 Hieroglyphics, 170, 174, 181, 182 
 Hippocrates, Hippocratic, 15, 49, 295, 339, 340 
 Historia, 187, 193 
 Hooke, Robert, 109, 112, 143, 144, 193,
205, 206 
 Human, 2–4, 12, 15–19, 22–24, 27, 28, 36, 
46–48, 64, 73, 90, 108, 113, 115, 122, 
126, 130–132, 135, 136, 138–140, 144, 
150, 151, 157–160, 162–164, 166, 167, 
171–173, 178–182, 211–235, 248–251, 
265, 267, 272, 278, 280, 281, 283, 
309–312, 319, 321, 322, 324, 327, 328 
 Hume, David, 26, 243–260, 272, 288, 
334–336, 338, 339 
 Huygens, Christiaan, 22, 75–77, 83, 87, 267, 334 
 I 
 Iatromechanism, 247, 337, 340 
 Image, 52, 62, 73, 90, 122, 126, 128, 130–132, 
134–138, 140, 141, 144, 159, 161, 175, 
192, 195, 197, 200, 226, 231, 244, 249, 
315, 324, 336 
 Imagination, 10, 59, 60, 69, 130, 178, 192, 
194, 216, 221, 233, 244, 250–253, 257, 
318, 327 
 Inattention, 4, 243–260 
 Inference (analogism  vs . epilogism), 292–293 
 Instrumentalism, 130, 138, 144 
 Instruments, 1–4, 13, 37, 41, 48, 49, 54, 59, 
62–64, 68, 121–145, 158, 172, 194, 
253, 265, 268, 272, 274, 313, 316, 324, 
325, 336–339 
 Irritability, 217–220, 222, 225, 227, 310, 312, 
315, 317, 339.  See also sensibility, 
sensitivity 
 Ivye, Ayliffe, 99, 100 
 J 
 James I, 19, 65, 67, 70 
 Jesuits, 123–128, 132, 133, 138, 202 
 K 
 Kant, Immanuel, 4, 287–292, 296, 297, 
300–302, 305–307 
 Kepler, Johannes, 3, 121–122, 126–128, 
130–142, 144 
 Kinner, Cyprian, 203, 204 
 Knowledge, 2, 10, 36, 59, 76, 96, 126, 150, 
173, 186, 225, 244, 267, 288, 317, 335 
 L 
 La Caze, Louis de, 340 
 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste de, 4, 211–235 
 La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, 310, 318, 335 
 Lamy, Guillaume, 335 
 Language 
 Adamic, 172 
 artificial, 169, 170, 179–181, 201, 204 
 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 23, 170, 180,
337, 342 
 Lens, 11, 121–123, 128, 131, 132, 134, 138, 
141, 142 
 Life, living, 2, 4, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 21, 23–26, 
41, 47–49, 53, 67, 68, 73, 77, 93, 97, 
111, 114, 143, 151, 154, 157, 159, 160, 
162, 163, 165, 166, 176, 191, 195, 197, 
212–219, 221–223, 226, 227, 229–232, 
234, 235, 244–248, 250–254, 257, 259, 
267, 281, 295, 297, 298, 300, 311, 312, 
315, 316, 323, 327, 328, 336, 337, 
340–342 
 Light, 13, 25, 49, 53, 64, 68, 73, 76, 80, 
89, 96, 100, 122, 126, 127, 134–138, 
140, 141, 143, 144, 158, 203, 250,
259, 275, 291 
 Locke, John, 3, 4, 26, 93–115, 187, 214, 
243–260, 265–284, 318, 334–341 
 Loom, 314–316 
 M 
 Machine, 247, 254, 269, 310, 311, 313–315, 
317–319, 323, 324, 326, 327, 337 
 Magic, 86, 150, 151, 162, 172 
 Mandeville, Bernard, 26, 334, 335, 337 
 Materialist, materialism, 18, 25, 26, 151, 164, 
229, 247, 254, 334, 335, 342 
 Maurolyco, Francesco, 135, 136 
 Mead, Richard, 244, 253–255, 257–259 
 Medicine, 2–4, 9–28, 33–37, 44–50, 76, 
93–115, 150, 196, 214, 215, 232, 244, 
247, 250, 255, 260, 291, 292, 295, 296, 
298, 325, 334, 336–341 
 Meditation, Boyle’s practice of, 194–198 
[Au1]
348 Index
 Memory 
 childhood  vs . old age, 191 
 natural, artificial, trained, 18, 199 
 personal  vs . non-personal, 198 
 Ménuret de Chambaud, Jean-Joseph, 339 
 Mercurialist transmutational alchemy, 104 
 Mercury of antimony, 100–102, 108 
 Metaphysics, 3, 22, 26, 151, 153, 170, 304, 
305, 328, 341 
 Methodus medendi, 94, 95, 97, 106 
 Micklethwaite, Sir John, 97 
 Microscope, 90, 144, 267, 336, 337, 339 
 Middleton, Sir Thomas, 65–67, 71, 72 
 Mind-wandering, 4, 243–260 
 Mnemonics, 199 
 Montaigne, Michel de, 24, 182, 196, 288, 
303–306 
 Moon, 121, 123, 125, 127, 128, 131, 139, 255 
 Moral, 1, 4, 25, 49, 158, 166, 178–182, 
194, 195, 197, 214, 219, 232, 233, 
243–246, 248, 250, 251, 256–260, 
316, 334–336, 338 
 N 
 Natural history 
 Baconian, 4, 76, 188 
 Natural philosophy, 3, 9, 10, 22, 28, 35, 40, 
46, 50, 54, 76, 78, 88, 94, 95, 103, 114, 
137, 150, 151, 158, 160, 163, 164, 166, 
174, 194, 195, 197, 199, 205, 338 
 Nedham, Marchamont, 95, 96 
 Nervous system, 215, 217–228, 230–232, 253 
 Network, 42, 46, 47, 126, 174, 188, 252, 313, 
314, 317 
 Newman, W. R., 76, 79, 86, 93, 95, 98–100, 
103–106, 108 
 Newton, Isaac (later Sir Isaac), 10, 104, 229, 
267, 316, 334, 340 
 Newtonian, 26, 253, 255–257, 338, 340 
 Nomenclature, botanical, 21, 78, 203, 204, 213 
 Nosology, 94, 108–110, 339, 341 
 O 
 O’Dowde, Thomas, 95, 96, 100 
 Observation, 1–4, 15, 21, 23, 59–63, 71–73, 
78, 79, 83, 96, 97, 103, 114, 121–123, 
125–127, 129–136, 138–140, 143, 144, 
153, 154, 162, 173, 174, 180, 186–191, 
195, 196, 198, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206, 
216, 232, 251, 296, 311, 316, 322, 
336–341 
 œconomy, 10, 254, 311–317, 320, 327 
 Oliver, John, 99 
 Ontology, ontological, 89, 106, 108, 110, 114, 
143, 164, 170, 182, 253, 255, 317, 328, 
336, 340, 341 
 Optics, 3, 22, 42, 43, 128, 131–140, 142 
 Organism, organization, 34, 188, 197, 
212–223, 225, 226, 228–234, 281, 310, 
311, 313, 314, 341.  See also organized 
body Orpheus, 158 
 P 
 Padua, 2, 3, 17, 21, 33–35, 37, 39, 40,
42–47, 53 
 Paracelsus, 11, 86, 87, 89, 95, 105–107 
 Parallax, 126, 127, 129 
 Passions, 3, 18, 22, 25–28, 51, 141, 151, 
152, 158, 160, 162, 163, 195, 233,
245, 247, 250, 265, 271, 310, 323,
324, 326, 335 
 Pecham, Robert, 135, 137, 138 
 Pell, John, 190, 193, 194, 198, 200, 205 
 Perception, 3, 15, 36, 39, 62, 69, 71, 72,
130, 133, 134, 136–140, 150, 161,
175, 222, 229, 234, 251, 252, 256,
257, 265–284, 287–291, 300–305,
310, 321–325, 328, 337 
 Petty, William, 188, 190, 192, 193, 198,
199, 205 
 Philosophers’ stone, 100 
 Philosophical (sophic) mercury, 98, 100, 101 
 Physical idea, 311, 326 
 Physick, 13, 14, 28, 98, 103, 107, 339 
 Physics, 64, 76, 88, 125, 151–157, 212, 
214, 318 
 Physiognomy, 50, 179 
 Physiology, 2, 4, 16, 23, 60, 71, 94, 95, 98, 
107, 110–112, 138, 204, 215, 229, 
243–260, 313, 318, 336, 341 
 Pierre, Georges, 103, 113 
 Pig, pigs, 48, 292 
 Planets, 63, 131, 132, 145, 256 
 Plants, 14, 68, 77–85, 87–90, 114, 166, 203, 
204, 217, 310–312, 314, 319 
 Poems, poetry, 3, 20, 50, 60, 64, 171, 175, 
176, 179, 180 
 Potable gold, 103 
 Power, Henry, 186 
 Preexistence, preformation, 312, 315 
 R 
 Rawley, William, 152 
 Read, John, 96, 101 
 Reason, 3, 10–15, 23–28, 52, 54, 59, 61, 64, 
68–73, 80, 85, 88, 89, 93, 123, 127, 
349Index
128, 130, 133, 136, 138, 142, 143, 
153–155, 166, 167, 171, 172, 175, 
179–181, 186, 187, 191–194, 198, 199, 
201, 203, 214, 227, 229, 232, 233, 
244–246, 249–252, 256, 257, 259, 266, 
267, 271–274, 277, 279, 280, 287–296, 
298, 300–305, 341 
 Recollection− vs . remembering, 198 
 Renaissance, 12, 34, 44, 45, 64, 72, 106, 137, 
150, 151, 192, 193, 300, 306 
 Revolution, revolutionary, 12, 16, 17, 27, 125, 
213, 214, 216, 289 
 Royal Society, 1, 2, 11, 15, 21, 95, 99, 150, 
188, 201, 205, 206, 253, 334, 335, 338, 
340, 341 
 Rupert, Prince, 102 
 S 
 Sal circulatum, 103, 105, 106 
 Salt of tartar, 105–107 
 Salts, Helmontian theory of, 110, 111 
 Sarsi, Lothario, 125, 128, 129, 141 
 Scepticism, skepticism, 4, 25, 73, 88, 114, 
139, 271, 272, 284, 288, 297–307, 338 
 Schard, Johann, 102, 107 
 Scheiner, Christoph, 132–134, 141 
 Scientific revolution, 10–12, 27, 93, 289, 333, 
336, 342 
 Self, 1, 4, 11, 23, 24, 94, 109, 143, 150, 
151, 156, 160, 163, 164, 166, 178, 
194, 195, 197, 212, 214–216, 220, 
225, 229–234, 245, 246, 250, 260, 
266, 269, 270, 272, 274, 280, 289, 
290, 306, 311, 315, 318, 339 
 Seminal principles, 86, 105, 114 
 Senses, sensation 
 the discourse of sense, 3, 59–73 
 Sensibility, sensitivity, 214, 216–218, 220, 
222, 227, 309, 310, 319, 328 
 Sentiment intérieur, 215, 220, 221, 228–235, 320 
 Severinus, Petrus, 106 
 Shaftesbury, The First Earl of, 97, 110 
 Sign language, 170, 173 
 Skill, 3, 12, 13, 18, 36, 37, 39, 43, 44, 48, 50, 
52, 54, 69, 77, 142, 200, 203.  See also 
expertise 
 Society of Chymical Physicians, 95, 96 
 Solution analysis, 82, 83, 85, 89 
 Spider, 66, 68, 301 
 Sprackling, Robert, 95 
 Sprat, Thomas, 95, 191 
 Stahl, Peter, 100, 101, 342 
 Starkey, George, 95, 98–101, 103–106, 108, 113 
 Statue, 64, 281, 282, 309–328 
 Stimulus, 247, 309, 310, 320 
 Stubbe, Henry, 15, 16, 95 
 Subjectivity, 4, 214, 304 
 Suchten, Alexander von, 99–101, 103, 104 
 Surgeon(s), surgery, 11, 19, 20, 27, 35, 37, 
39–50, 53, 54, 296 
 Sydenham, Thomas, 93, 109, 110, 113, 267, 
334–340 
 System(s) 
 as memory aids, 206 
 vs . empirical particulars, 187, 188, 190 
 T 
 Tattooing, 171, 174–178, 182 
 Telescope, 3, 122–123, 125, 127–132, 134, 
140–144 
 Telesio, Bernardino, 160, 161 
 Thomas, D., 102–105, 107 
 Thomson, George, 97 
 Tomkis, Thomas, 68–73 
 Touch, 49, 64, 66, 67, 69, 72, 76, 157–159, 
164, 195, 198, 278, 279, 281, 282, 303, 
324, 325 
 Truth, 24–26, 61, 62, 65–67, 69, 71, 
72, 101, 115, 128, 181, 187, 189, 
193, 206, 279, 292, 296–298, 300, 
302, 336 
 Twysden, John, 95 
 Tyrrell, James, 104 
 V 
 Vibration, 247, 316, 318, 323, 325, 326 
 Vision, 3, 64, 76, 80, 86, 87, 122, 126, 129, 
133–141, 143, 144, 164, 276, 278, 304, 
337, 342 
 Vitalist, vitalism, 80, 221, 226, 229, 335, 336, 
338–341 
 W 
 Ward, John, 99–101 
 Wilkins, John, 170, 201 
 Williams, Sir Thomas, 96, 101–103 
 Willis, Thomas, 95, 312, 316, 336 
 Wood, Anthony, 101 
 Writing, 1, 3, 15, 26, 27, 71–73, 93, 95, 97, 
99, 102, 105, 114, 125, 150, 162, 170, 
172, 174, 175, 178, 180, 181, 189, 190, 
194–198, 200, 205, 214–218, 220, 221, 
224–227, 230, 231, 244, 288, 298, 303, 
309, 327, 328 
Author Query:
[Au1]:  Found more than 302 instances. We have picked first instance page number 
from each chapter.
